INTERPRETATION & CONSTRUCTION

Liberal constructions of written instruments are to be made, on account of the simplicity of the common people, so that the thing may have effect rather than perish; and words should serve the intention, not the intention the words.

Benignae faciendae sunt interpretationes propter simplicitatem laicorum, ut res magis valeat quam pereat; et verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire.

Source: Coke, Co. Litt. 36a; Broom, Max. 540; Wharton, Max. no. 13; Weisman, 22x

Instruments are to be read to give them effect, not to defeat them by technicality; intention governs over bare literalism.

The best interpretation is drawn from what goes before and what follows.

Ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretatio.

Source: 2 Inst. 317; Broom, Max. 577; Wharton, Max. no. 33; 1 Rolle 375; Weisman, 22nn

No clause or word may be interpreted in isolation; context — preceding and following language — is the primary guide to meaning.

The whole is preferred to any single part.

Totum praefertur unicuique parti.

Source: 2 Kent, Comm. 555; 2 Inst. 317; Wing. Max. 238

Every part of an instrument must be read together and harmonized; no single clause may be wrested from its place to defeat the whole.

Usage is the best interpreter of things.

Optimus interpres rerum usus.

Source: 2 Inst. 282; Broom, Max. 917, 930; Weisman, 22ee

When the meaning of a term or provision is doubtful, how it has been understood and applied in practice is the strongest evidence of its true sense.

Interpretation is always to be made so that what is absurd and inconvenient may be avoided.

Talis interpretatio semper fienda est, ut evitetur absurdum et inconveniens.

Source: 1 Co. 52; 4 Inst. 328; Broom, Max. 576; Weisman, 22n; Weisman, 24gg

An interpretation that produces an absurd, unjust, or impracticable result is presumed wrong and must yield to a reading that makes the instrument workable and reasonable.

The construction of law works no injury.

Constructio legis non facit injuriam.

Source: Co. Litt. 183a; Broom, Max. 603; Weisman, 22f

The law will construe an instrument so as not to injure a party; a reading that inflicts harm upon the innocent, when another reading is available, is the wrong reading.

Words are to be taken according to the subject matter.

Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam.

Source: 6 Co. 6; Bacon, Max. reg. 3; Broom, Max. 573; 2 Bl. Comm. 380; Weisman, 22cc

The same word may bear different meanings in different instruments; the subject matter of the instrument — not the dictionary alone — governs which meaning is intended.

The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.

Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum.

Source: Wing. Max. 239; 8 Co. 117b; Weisman, 22bb

Before resorting to external aids, every provision of the statute must be compared with every other; the statute is its own best expositor.

Contemporaneous exposition is the best and most powerful in law.

Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege.

Source: 2 Inst. 11; 3 Co. 7; 10 Co. 70; Broom, Max. 682; Weisman, 22z

A statute or instrument is best explained by the construction placed upon it by those who lived when it was made; later reinterpretation is suspect.

In contracts, the interpretation is to be liberal; in wills, more liberal; in restitutions, most liberal.

In contractibus, benigna; in testamentis, benignior; in restitutionibus, benignissima interpretatio facienda est.

Source: Co. Litt. 112a; Wharton, Max. no. 255; Weisman, 22g

The degree of liberality in construction increases with the character of the instrument — contracts are read fairly, wills with greater indulgence to the testator's intent, and acts of restoration with the greatest favor toward making the right whole.

Laws are to be more liberally interpreted so that their intent may be preserved.

Leges ad meliora contrahendas interpretandae sunt.

Source: Dig. 1, 3, 18; Dig. 1, 3, 16; Weisman, 22b

Where a strict reading of a law would defeat its purpose, a broader reading that preserves the legislative intent is to be preferred.

It is guessing, not interpretation, that altogether departs from the letter.

Divinatio, non interpretatio est, quae omnino recedit a litera.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 3; Broom, Max. 622

While liberal construction is favored, it has a limit: an interpretation that abandons the written text entirely is mere speculation and must be rejected. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.3.12.)

Blessed is the exposition by which anything is saved from destruction.

Benedicta est expositio quando res redimitur a destructione.

Source: 4 Co. 25; Jackson

An interpretation that rescues the instrument from nullity is always preferred; the law strives to preserve, not to destroy.

It is a bad exposition which corrupts the text.

Maledicta expositio quae corrumpit textum.

Source: 4 Co. 35; Jackson; Weisman, 22s

An exposition that distorts or rewrites the text it purports to interpret is condemned — the text must emerge from interpretation intact, not mutilated.

It is a venomous exposition which gnaws at the vitals of the text.

Viperina est expositio quae corrodit viscera textus.

Source: 11 Co. 34; Jackson

The worst form of bad interpretation is that which hollows out the substance while leaving the surface intact — it poisons from within.

An absolute sentence or proposition needs no expositor.

Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget.

Source: 2 Co. Inst. 533; Bouvier; Weisman, 22p

Where the language of a statute or instrument is plain and absolute, it requires no construction — the words speak for themselves and no gloss may be added. (Duplicate maxim — see also 8.8.15.)

A curious and captious interpretation in the law is to be reproved.

Curiosa et captiosa interpretatio in lege reprobatur.

Source: 1 Bulst. 6; Bouvier; Weisman, 22u

Ingenious but strained constructions that trap the unwary or twist ordinary language into unforeseen meanings are condemned; the law favors plain and honest reading. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.3.11.)

To interpret and reconcile laws so that they harmonize is the best mode of construction.

Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus.

Source: 8 Co. 169; Bouvier

Where statutes appear to conflict, the best interpretation is one that reconciles them into a consistent whole, rather than declaring one void. (Duplicate maxim — see also 6.4.10.)

The construction of law obtains the force of law.

Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet.

Source: Bouvier

An authoritative construction of a statute carries the same binding effect as the statute itself; the interpretation, once settled, governs as law. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.7.34.)

The laws consist not in being read, but in being understood.

Non in legendo sed in intelligendo leges consistunt.

Source: 8 Co. 167; Bouvier

Mere recitation of the text is insufficient — the law demands comprehension of meaning, purpose, and effect.

Every interpretation either declares, extends, or restrains.

Omnis interpretatio vel declarat, vel extendit, vel restringit.

Source: Bouvier; Weisman, 22ii

There are only three operations of interpretation: to declare the existing meaning, to extend it to like cases, or to confine it within narrower bounds; no interpretation can do anything beyond these three.

Lawful commands receive a strict interpretation, but unlawful ones a wide and broad construction.

Mandata licita recipiunt strictam interpretationem, sed illicita latam et extensam.

Source: Bacon's Max. Reg. 16; Bouvier

A lawful order is confined to its strict terms so that authority is not exceeded; an unlawful order is read broadly so that any illegality within it may be fully exposed and defeated.

It is his to interpret whose it is to enact.

Source: Tayl. Civil. Law, 96; Weisman, 22c

(English-origin maxim.) The authority to interpret a law belongs to the body that enacted it. In the American system, the People enacted the Constitution — and the judiciary's duty under judicial review (Marbury v. Madison) is to test statutes against that supreme enactment. No legislature may authoritatively interpret the Constitution to expand its own power; that interpretation belongs to the People and the courts they established to guard the instrument.

The construction or explanation should arise out of the whole subject-matter.

Source: Wing. Max. 238; Weisman, 22i

(English-origin maxim.) A provision must be construed in light of the entire instrument, not in isolation — the meaning of a part is determined by its relationship to the whole.

The most benignant interpretation is to be made in restitutions.

Source: Co. Litt. 112; Weisman, 22k; Weisman, 22kk

(English-origin maxim.) When construing instruments that restore rights or property, the most generous and favorable interpretation is to be preferred, so that the remedial purpose is fully achieved.

Law construes things according to common possibility or intendment.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 705, max. 189; Weisman, 22q

(English-origin maxim.) Legal instruments are construed according to what is ordinarily possible and intended, not according to far-fetched or improbable constructions.

Things which have had a certain interpretation [whose interpretation has been settled, as by common opinion] are not to be altered.

Source: Co. Litt. 365; Wing. Max. p. 748, max. 202; Weisman, 22t

(English-origin maxim.) Once an authoritative interpretation of a legal term or provision has been settled by common usage or judicial decision, it should not be disturbed — stability of meaning is essential to the rule of law.

The best interpretation is made from antecedents and consequents.

Source: Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed. 513; 2 Inst. 317; 2 Bl. Comm. 379; 1 Bulstr. 101; Weisman, 22w; Weisman, 22h

(English-origin maxim.) The best way to construe a doubtful passage is to examine what comes before and what follows it — context, both preceding and subsequent, illuminates meaning.

That interpretation is to be received [or adopted] which is free from fault [or wrong.] The law will not intend a wrong.

Source: Bacon, Max. 17, in reg. 3; Bouv. 124; Weisman, 22aa

(English-origin maxim.) Among competing interpretations, the one free from wrong or absurdity must be adopted; the law will not intend an unjust result when a just reading is available.

The whole instrument is to be viewed and compared in all its parts, so that every part of it may be made consistent and effectual.

Source: 2 Kent, Comm. 555; 2 Inst. 317; Wing. Max. 238; Weisman, 22ij; Weisman, 22jj

(English-origin maxim.) Every part of an instrument must be compared with every other part so that no clause is rendered inconsistent, superfluous, or void — the whole must be read as a harmonious unit.

Interpretation must be reasonable.

Source: Jones v. Gibbons, 8 Exch. 923; Buck v. Burk, 18 N.Y. 339, 341; Wharton, III-B-33

(English-origin maxim.) Everything is to have a reasonable construction, and everything necessary to make a rule reasonable is implied.

Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context.

Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio, nisi impediatur sententia.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 180; Noy, Max. 4; Wing. Max. 19; Broom, Max. 606; Weisman, 104c; Weisman, 104e

When construing a document, relative and qualifying words attach to the nearest preceding antecedent unless the broader context plainly requires a different reference. (Duplicate maxim — see also 8.8.2.)

The meaning of the words is the spirit of the law.

Sensus verborum est anima legis.

Source: 5 Co. 2; Weisman, 104s

The spirit of a law is found in its words rightly understood — not in some abstract purpose divorced from the text.

Words are always to be received in their milder sense.

Verba semper accipienda sunt in mitiori sensu.

Source: 4 Co. 13; Broom, Max. 576

When a word carries both a harsh and a mild meaning, the mild meaning is preferred; the law does not strain toward severity.

Words are indicators of the mind.

Verba sunt indices animi.

Source: Bacon, Max.; Co. Litt. 68; Weisman, 104h

Words are the outward signs of inward intent; they are the primary — though not the exclusive — evidence of what a party meant.

Words ought to be understood with effect, so that the thing may be preserved rather than destroyed.

Verba debent intelligi cum effectu, ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

Source: 6 Co. 62; Bacon, Max. reg. 3; Plowd. 156; 2 Bl. Comm. 380

No word in an instrument is to be treated as surplusage if any meaning can reasonably be given to it; every term must be read to produce some effect.

Words ought to have some operation.

Verba aliquid operari debent.

Source: 8 Co. 94a; Bacon, Max. reg. 3; Weisman, 104m

An interpretation that renders a word or clause meaningless is disfavored; the drafter is presumed to have used every word for a purpose.

Terms of an art are to be explained according to the art.

Termini artis explicandi sunt secundum artem.

Source: 2 Kent, Comm. 556

Technical words used in their technical context must be given their technical meaning; trade, science, and craft each supply the definitions proper to their own language.

A word is known by the company it keeps.

Noscitur a sociis.

Source: 3 T.R. 87; Broom, Max. 523, 588; Wharton, Max. no. 534; Corning v. McCullough, 1 N.Y. 47, 69

The meaning of an ambiguous word is ascertained by reference to the words associated with it in the same clause or instrument.

The words of instruments are taken most strongly against him who uses them.

Verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem.

Source: Co. Litt. 36a; Broom, Max. 594, 599; Bacon, Max. reg. 3; Dig. 45, 1, 38, 18; Weisman, 104r

He who chose the words bears the burden of their ambiguity; the drafter of a deed, contract, or statute cannot profit from the obscurity of his own language.

From the words of the law there must be no departure.

A verbis legis non est recedendum.

Source: 5 Co. 119; Wing. Max. 25; Weisman, 104v

Where the words are clear, there is no room for construction; the plain text governs and may not be overridden by appeal to purpose or policy.

General words are to be restricted to the nature of the subject or the fitness of the person.

Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personae.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 10; Weisman, 104o

Broad language in a grant or statute is limited by the nature of what it purports to convey and the capacity of the person to whom it is directed.

Common observance is not to be departed from, and things which have a certain meaning are to be changed as little as possible.

A communi observantia non est recedendum, et minime mutandae sunt quae certam interpretationem habent.

Source: Wing. Max. 756; Jackson

Settled usage and established meaning are not lightly disturbed; a term whose sense is fixed by long practice should not be given a novel construction.

The coupling of words shows that they are to be taken in the same sense.

Copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu.

Source: Bac. iv. 26; Jackson; Weisman, 104a

Words joined together in a clause are presumed to share a common sense; coupling signals that the terms are of the same class and import.

Where an ambiguous, or even erroneous, expression occurs in a will, it should be construed liberally and in accordance with the testator’s probable meaning.

Cum in testamento ambigue aut etiam perperam scriptum est, benigne interpretari debet et secundum id quod credibile est cogitatum credendum est.

Source: D. 34, 5, 24; Jackson; Weisman, 103c

A will is construed with the greatest indulgence toward the testator’s intent, even where the language is imperfect or mistaken.

That is uselessly done by more words which may be done by fewer.

Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora.

Source: Jenk. 61; Jackson

Brevity is preferred in legal instruments; unnecessary verbiage adds nothing and may obscure the operative terms.

A general saying is to be interpreted generally; general words are to be understood generally.

Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum; generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.

Source: 3 Inst. 76; Jackson; Weisman, 43c

General language is not to be artificially narrowed; where the legislature speaks broadly, its words are given their full natural reach.

In agreements the intention of the parties, rather than the words actually used, should be considered.

In conventionibus contrahentium voluntas potius quam verba spectari placuit.

Source: Jackson; Weisman, 24ee

When the words of a contract are ambiguous or conflict with the evident purpose, courts look to the circumstances, course of dealing, and mutual understanding at the time of agreement — invoke this maxim to defeat a party's attempt to exploit a technical misstatement against the other's known intent.

In the construction of contracts, words are interpreted against the person using them.

In stipulationibus cum quaeritur quid actum sit, verba contra stipulatorem interpretanda sunt.

Source: D. 45, 1, 38; Jackson; Weisman, 22r

The drafter of a stipulation bears the risk of his own ambiguity; doubtful terms are construed against him who chose them.

In words, not the words but the thing and the meaning are to be inquired after.

In verbis non verba sed res et ratio quaerenda est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 182; Jackson; Weisman, 104cc

The substance and reason behind the words, not the words themselves, are the proper object of legal inquiry.

It behoves us not to depart from the literal meaning of words, unless it is evident that the testator intended some other meaning.

Non aliter a significatione verborum recedi oportet quam cum manifestum est aliud sensisse testatorem.

Source: D. 32, 69; Jackson

The literal sense governs unless clear evidence demonstrates a different intention; departure from the text requires proof, not conjecture.

He who sticks to the letter sticks to the bark; he who considers merely the letter of an instrument cannot comprehend its meaning.

Qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; Jackson; Weisman, 22j

Bare literalism misses the substance of an instrument just as one who examines only the bark of a tree misses the wood within. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.293.)

Whenever in contracts the expression is doubtful, it is most advantageous that that meaning be accepted by which the safety of the subject-matter may be assured.

Quoties in stipulationibus ambigua oratio est, commodissimum est id accipi quo res de qua agitur in tuto sit.

Source: D. 41, 1, 80; Jackson

Ambiguity in a contract is resolved in favor of the reading that best protects the subject matter of the agreement.

Compacts are accustomed to be clothed by the thing itself, by words, by writing, by consent, by delivery, by connection.

Re, verbis, scripto, consensu, traditione, junctura vestes sumere pacta solent.

Source: Plow. Com. 161; Jackson; Weisman, 24l

An agreement may be formed and evidenced in any of these six modes; the law recognizes substance in all its forms, not writing alone.

Where words are not conjoined, it suffices if either be complied with.

Ubi verba conjuncta non sunt, sufficit alterutrum esse factum.

Source: D. 50, 17, 110; Jackson

Disjunctive terms require compliance with only one of the alternatives, not both; the conjunction "or" demands satisfaction of either, not each.

Words equivocal, and placed in a doubtful sense, are to be taken in their more worthy and effective sense.

Verba aequivoca ac in dubio sensu posita intelliguntur digniori et potentiori sensu.

Source: 6 Co. 20; Jackson; Weisman, 104t

Between a noble and a base meaning of an ambiguous word, the more dignified and operative construction is always preferred.

Words inferred are to be considered as incorporated.

Verba illata inesse videntur.

Source: Co. Litt. 359; Jackson

Terms necessarily implied by law are treated as if expressly written into the instrument, even though the parties did not state them.

Subsequent words, added for the purpose of certainty, are to be referred to preceding words which need certainty.

Verba posteriora, propter certitudinem addita, ad priora, quae certitudine indigent, sunt referenda.

Source: Wing.; Jackson; Weisman, 15c

Later qualifying language in an instrument is read as clarifying the earlier, less certain terms — the later words illuminate the earlier.

Words to which reference is made in an instrument have the same effect and operation as if they were inserted in the instrument referring to them.

Verba relata hoc maxime operantur per referentiam, ut in eis inesse videntur.

Source: Co. Litt. 359; Jackson; Weisman, 16c

Incorporation by reference gives the referenced words the same force as if they had been copied into the instrument verbatim.

A twisting of language is unworthy of a judge.

Aucupia verborum sunt judice indigna.

Source: Hob. 343; Bouvier

A judge who resorts to verbal trickery or strained readings of words to reach a desired result debases the office; honest construction, not clever word-play, is the standard. (Duplicate maxim — see also 8.1.15.)

When the words and the mind agree, there is no place for interpretation.

Quando verba et mens congruunt, non est interpretationi locus.

Source: Bouvier; Weisman, 24hh

Where the text and the intent of the drafter plainly coincide, no construction is permitted — the instrument speaks for itself and admits of no gloss.

We must speak as the common people; we must think as the learned.

Loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut docti.

Source: 7 Co. 11; Bouvier

Words in a statute or instrument are taken in their ordinary, popular sense — the language of the People — but the reasoning applied to them must be precise and learned.

Laws are imposed on things, not on words.

Leges non verbis sed rebus sunt impositae.

Source: 10 Co. 101; Bouvier

Legislation governs substance and reality, not mere verbal formulas; the words are the vehicle, not the destination. (Duplicate maxim — see also 2.1.9.)

Words spoken to one end ought not to be perverted to another.

Quae ad unum finem loquuta sunt, non debent ad alium detorqueri.

Source: 4 Co. 14; Bouvier

Language drafted for a specific purpose must not be wrested from that purpose and applied to a different end — every provision has its proper office and must not be conscripted into foreign service. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.200.)

It is the same thing to say nothing and not to say it sufficiently.

Idem est nihil dicere et insufficienter dicere.

Source: 2 Co. Inst. 178; Bouvier

A statement so vague or incomplete that it communicates nothing is treated as no statement at all; the law demands not merely words but adequate words. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.90.)

The propriety of words is the safety of property.

Proprietas verborum est salus proprietatum.

Source: Bouvier

Precision of language safeguards rights; careless or imprecise drafting invites the loss of what was intended to be secured.

It matters not what becomes of equipollent expressions.

Source: 5 Coke, 122; Weisman, 104d

(English-origin maxim.) Where two expressions mean exactly the same thing, it is immaterial which is used — the law does not distinguish between equivalent formulations.

Words ought not to be accepted to import a false description, which may have effect by way of true limitation.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 13; Broom, Max. 573; 4 Etch. 604; Weisman, 104f

(English-origin maxim.) Words should not be read to produce a false description when they can be given effect as a true limitation — prefer the construction that makes the language accurate rather than misleading.

What is never sufficiently said is never said too much.

Source: Co. Litt. 375; Weisman, 104i

(English-origin maxim.) A matter of such importance that it can never be stated adequately is never stated too often — repetition for clarity and emphasis is not prolixity when the subject demands it.

The spoken word flies; the written letter remains.

Vox emissa volat, litera scripta manet.

Source: Broom, Max. 666; Weisman, 104j

Oral statements vanish once uttered, but written instruments endure as permanent evidence — this is why the law requires important transactions to be reduced to writing. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.360.)

Words should be understood effectively.

Source: Rickets v. Livingston, 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 97, 101; Weisman, 104p

(English-origin maxim.) Words in a legal instrument must be given operative effect — every term should be construed to accomplish something, not rendered meaningless by a strained interpretation.

From a few words or hints the understanding conceives many things.

Source: Litt. s. 550; Weisman, 104w

(English-origin maxim.) The law does not require that every consequence be spelled out in detail; a few well-chosen words or hints are sufficient to convey a broad understanding when the intent is clear.

The full meaning of a word should be ascertained at the outset, in order that the sense may not be lost by defect of expression, and that the law be not without reason.

Source: Co. Litt. 68; Weisman, 104x; Weisman, 104q

(English-origin maxim.) The full meaning of a word must be ascertained before applying it, so that ambiguity does not corrupt the sense of the instrument and leave the law without its intended reason.

There is no prolixity where there is nothing that can be omitted.

Source: Vaugh. 138; Weisman, 104y

(English-origin maxim.) A writing is not prolix merely because it is long — if nothing in it can be omitted without loss of meaning, every word is necessary and the length is justified.

Terms of an art should be explained from the art.

Source: 2 Kent, Comm. 556, note; Weisman, 104bb

(English-origin maxim.) Technical terms must be defined by reference to the art or discipline from which they arise, not by common parlance — a term of art carries its specialized meaning.

Words ought to be made subservient to the intent, not the intent to the words.

Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire.

Source: 8 Coke, 94; 2 Bl. Comm. 379; Weisman, 104ff

Words are the servants of intent, not its master — where the literal words conflict with the clear intention of the parties or the legislature, the intent governs and the words must yield.

An ambiguous answer is to be taken against him who offers it.

Ambigua responsio contra proferentem est accipienda.

Source: 10 Co. 58, 59; Broom, Max. 594; Weisman, 6a

He who speaks ambiguously when he could have spoken plainly has only himself to blame; the doubt is resolved against him.

In an ambiguous expression of law, that meaning is to be preferred which is consonant with equity, especially when the spirit of the law can be gathered from it.

In ambigua voce legis, ea potius accipienda est significatio quae vitio caret, praesertim cum etiam voluntas legis ex hoc colligi possit.

Source: Dig. 1, 3, 19; Broom, Max. 576; Weisman, 6f

Where the law speaks with a double tongue, the meaning which accords with justice and reason is preferred over that which leads to inequity.

In ambiguous cases, that which is least inconvenient is always to be done.

In ambiguis casibus semper id fieri debet quod minus est inconveniens.

Source: 4 Inst. 328; Dig. 50, 17, 9

When both readings of an ambiguous instrument are plausible, the court adopts the one that avoids the greater practical harm.

A latent ambiguity may be supplied by proof; for what arises in ambiguity from an extrinsic fact is removed by proof of the fact.

Ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur; nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 23; 2 Kent, Comm. 557; Broom, Max. 608

Where an instrument appears clear on its face but becomes ambiguous when applied to the facts, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to resolve the doubt.

A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence.

Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur.

Source: Lofft 249; Bacon, Max. reg. 25; Broom, Max. 619; Weisman, 6b; Weisman, 6c

Where the ambiguity is apparent on the face of the instrument itself, the defect must be cured by the instrument's own language or not at all; outside evidence is inadmissible.

In ambiguous expressions, the intent of him who used them is chiefly to be regarded.

In ambiguis orationibus maxime sententia spectanda est ejus qui eas protulisset.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 96; Broom, Max. 567; Weisman, 6e

The paramount question in resolving ambiguity is: what did the speaker or writer mean? The words are his instrument, and his intent is the master key.

When in the words there is no ambiguity, no exposition contrary to the expressed words is to be made.

Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra verba expressa fienda est.

Source: Co. Litt. 147; Wharton, Max. no. 684; Weisman, 22hh

Plain words admit no construction; where the text is clear, the inquiry ends and the court applies the language as written.

In obscure cases, we follow that which is least obscure.

In obscuris, quod minimum est sequimur.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 9; Broom, Max. 687; Weisman, 22ff

When the meaning of a provision is uncertain, the clearer and more readily understood reading is to be preferred over the more obscure.

It is a wretched state of things when the law is vague or uncertain.

Misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut incertum.

Source: 2 Salk. 512; Weisman, 6d; Weisman, 15i

Vague law is no law at all; it subjects the People to the arbitrary will of whoever interprets it, rather than to a fixed and knowable rule. (Duplicate maxim — see also 2.3.7.)

When a thing done is in obscurity, it receives interpretation from the affection of each party.

Quod factum est, cum in obscuro sit, ex affectione cujusque capit interpretationem.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 168, 1; Bouvier

Where an act is ambiguous, each party's intent and disposition at the time of the act furnishes the guide to its meaning — the doubtful deed is construed according to the doer's demonstrated purpose.

A curious and captious interpretation in law is to be reproved.

Curiosa et captiosa interpretatio in lege reprobatur.

Source: 1 Bulst. 6; Bouvier

Strained, hair-splitting, or overly clever readings of instruments and statutes are rejected; the law favors the natural, straightforward meaning over ingenious technicality.

It is a guess, not interpretation, which altogether departs from the letter.

Divinatio, non interpretatio est, quae omnino recedit a litera.

Source: Bacon, Max. in Reg. 3, p. 47; Bouvier; Weisman, 22m

Construction that abandons the text entirely is mere speculation; interpretation must remain tethered to the words actually used, however broadly or liberally they may be read.

In obscure cases, we look at what is most probable, or what most commonly happens.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 114; Dig. 50, 17, 9; 2 Kent, Comm. 557; Weisman, 6h

(English-origin maxim.) When language is obscure, the court resolves the doubt by looking to what is most probable or what most commonly occurs in similar circumstances.

Ambiguity is doubtfulness; doubleness of meaning.

Source: Chapman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 173 S.E. 801, 803, 172 S.C. 250; Weisman, 6i

(English-origin maxim.) Ambiguity exists wherever language is susceptible of two or more reasonable meanings — it is doubtfulness or doubleness of sense that opens the door to construction.

Indistinctness in a written instrument is ambiguity.

Source: Black's, 2d. 64; Weisman, 6j

(English-origin maxim.) Any indistinctness in a written instrument — whether from unclear phrasing, conflicting provisions, or uncertain reference — constitutes ambiguity and opens the door to construction; whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to resolve it depends upon whether the ambiguity is patent (apparent on the face — see 10.3.5) or latent (revealed only by application to the facts — see 10.3.4).

An ambiguity in a writing which will warrant the introduction of parol evidence is duplicity, indistinctness, or an uncertainty of meaning or expression, and mere omission or mistake is not an ambiguity.

Source: Beidler v. Davis, 50 N.E.2d 613, 616, 72 Ohio App. 27; 72 Ohio App; Weisman, 6k

(English-origin maxim.) Only genuine ambiguity — duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty of expression — warrants the introduction of parol evidence; a simple omission or scrivener's error is not ambiguity and does not open the door to extrinsic proof.

Every definition in law is perilous, for there is little that cannot be subverted.

Omnis definitio in jure civili periculosa est; parum est enim, ut non subverti possit.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 202; 2 Wooddeson, Lect. 196; Weisman, 31c

Definitions in law carry an inherent danger — they are always on the verge of being undermined by unforeseen circumstances; broad principles are more durable than narrow definitions.

A false description does not vitiate when the thing is sufficiently identified.

Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat.

Source: 6 Term 676; 1 Greenl. Ev. §301; Broom, Max. 562, 629; Weisman, 31a; Weisman, 31d

Mere misdescription in a deed, will, or instrument does not invalidate it if the subject matter intended can be identified with certainty from the whole instrument.

He who distinguishes well, teaches well.

Qui bene distinguit, bene docet.

Source: 2 Inst. 470; Weisman, 31b

Clear reasoning in law depends upon making precise distinctions; the failure to distinguish things that differ leads to confusion and error.

Whatever is added to describe a thing already sufficiently described is of no effect.

Quidquid demonstratae rei additur satis demonstratae, frustra est.

Source: Dig. 33, 4, 1, 8; Broom, Max. 562; Weisman, 31e

Surplus description beyond what is needed to identify the subject cannot enlarge, diminish, or defeat a grant or devise; the sufficient description controls.

Discretion is to discern through law what is just.

Discretio est discernere per legem quid sit justum.

Source: 5 Co. 99, 100; 4 Inst. 41; 1 Bl. Comm. 152; Weisman, 31g

Judicial discretion is not arbitrary choice — it is the disciplined application of law to fact, discerning what justice requires in the particular case.

The undefined supplies the place of the whole.

Indefinitum supplet locum universalis.

Source: 4 Co. 77; Weisman, 31f

A term left undefined in an instrument is to be taken in its broadest and most universal sense, covering everything it is capable of embracing.

Nothing is so natural as to dissolve a thing in the same manner in which it was bound.

Nihil tam naturale est, quam eo genere quidque dissolvere quo colligatum est.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 35; Jenk. Cent. 74

An instrument, obligation, or act is undone by the same method by which it was constituted; what was made by deed is dissolved by deed, what by consent is dissolved by consent.

It is the same thing not to exist and not to appear.

Idem non esse et non apparere.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 207; Co. Litt. 6b

A right, condition, or fact that is not made to appear in the record or instrument is treated as if it did not exist; what cannot be shown cannot be relied upon.

To define is to determine with precision or to exhibit clearly the boundaries thereof.

Source: Deal v. Enon Sanitary Dist., 95 S.E.2d 362, 366, 245 N.C. 74; Weisman, 31h

(English-origin maxim.) A definition must fix the boundaries of the thing defined with precision and clarity — a definition that leaves doubt is no definition at all.

The purpose of a description is to afford the means to identify the subject matter.

Source: Mitchell v. Moore, 13 So.2d 314, 317, 152 Fla. 843; Matson v. Hord, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 130, 138; Weisman, 31i

(English-origin maxim.) The function of a description in a deed, will, or other instrument is to provide sufficient means to identify the subject matter with certainty, so that the parties and courts can know exactly what is conveyed.

A description which distinguishes it from any other, although a better description might be given, is all that is required.

Source: Matson v. Hurd, 14 U.S. 130, 138; Weisman, 31j

(English-origin maxim.) A description need only be sufficient to identify the thing uniquely — perfection is not required, only distinctiveness.

The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Source: Co. Litt. 210a; Broom, Max. 596; Wharton, Max. no. 169; Pearson v. Lord, 6 Mass. 81, 84; Weisman, 43b; Weisman, 95ll; Weisman, 98a

When a law or instrument names particular things, the omission of others is deliberate; what is not included is excluded by the act of specifying.

That which is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.

Expressum facit cessare tacitum.

Source: 4 Co. 80; Broom, Max. 651; Weston v. Davis, 24 Me. 374; Weisman, 43d

When parties reduce their agreement to express terms, no implication inconsistent with those terms may be raised; the express provision governs.

A general clause does not extend to things previously provided for specially.

Generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea quae antea specialiter sunt comprehensa.

Source: 8 Co. 154; Broom, Max. 647; Weisman, 16a

A general residuary provision in a statute or instrument does not reach back to capture subjects already dealt with in specific earlier provisions.

Things which have no force singly may have force when joined.

Quae non valeant singula, juncta juvant.

Source: Dig. 50, 17; Bacon, Max.; Wing. Max. 164

Provisions or words that standing alone might be insufficient may, when read together with other provisions, achieve the full effect intended.

The expression of things that are tacitly implied avails nothing.

Expressio eorum quae tacite insunt nihil operatur.

Source: 2 Inst. 365; Dig. 50, 15, 5

Stating explicitly what the law would already imply adds nothing; the express mention of what was already present by implication neither enlarges nor diminishes the right.

Things which do not appear are treated as though they do not exist; and not appearing judicially is the same as not being.

Quae non apparent non sunt; et non apparent judicialiter idem est ac si non essent.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 207; Co. Litt. 6b

What is not expressed in a record, instrument, or pleading cannot be relied upon; the law takes no notice of what is not brought before it.

Things expressed may be prejudicial; things not expressed are not.

Expressa nocent, non expressa non nocent.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 195; Dig. 35, 1, 52; Weisman, 43e

A party is bound by what he has expressed but not by what he has left unsaid; only the expressed terms of a contract or instrument create obligations.

Many things can be implied from a few expressions.

Ex multis implicatur unum.

Source: Litt. §384; Weisman, 43g

The law does not require every consequence to be spelled out; a few well-chosen words can carry broad implications that the law will enforce.

A general clause does not refer to things expressed.

Clausula generalis non refertur ad expressa.

Source: 8 Co. 154; Jackson

A general residuary clause does not reach back to capture matters already specifically addressed in earlier provisions of the same instrument.

Those things which cannot be given, or which are not in existence, are held as not expressed.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 135; Weisman, 43a; Weisman, 5c

(English-origin maxim.) Provisions purporting to grant what cannot exist or what is not in being are treated as though they were never written — the law does not give effect to impossibilities.

The expression of things of which, if unexpressed, one would have the benefit, is useless.

Source: 4 Coke, 73; Weisman, 43h

(English-origin maxim.) Expressing what the law would already imply is mere surplusage — it adds nothing and changes nothing, because the implied right or condition already exists by operation of law.

A general residuary clause does not comprehend things which are not of the same kind as those specifically enumerated.

Clausula generalis de residuo non ea complectitur quae non ejusdem sint generis cum iis quae speciatim dicta fuerint.

Source: Lofft 419; Broom, Max.; Wharton, Max.

This is the *ejusdem generis* rule: when specific items are listed followed by a general term, the general term is limited to things of the same kind as those specifically named.

Where the law does not distinguish, neither ought we to distinguish.

Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.

Source: 7 Co. 5b; Weisman, 98g

When the legislature has spoken in general terms without qualification, the court has no warrant to introduce distinctions or limitations the law itself does not make.

General things do not derogate from special things.

Generalia specialibus non derogant.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 120; Halk. Max. 51; Weisman, 104gg

A general statute does not repeal or override a special statute on the same subject; the specific provision controls within its own domain.

General things precede, special things follow.

Generalia praecedunt, specialia sequuntur.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier, Max. 128; Weisman, 98e

In the natural order of legislation and drafting, general principles are laid down first, and specific provisions — which may qualify or limit the general — follow after.

The specific derogates from the general.

Specialis derogat generali.

Source: Halk. Max. 51; Jenk. Cent. 199

When a general and a specific provision conflict, the specific provision controls; the legislature is presumed to have enacted the special rule with the general one in mind.

What is generally granted carries this exception: if it be not contrary to law and right.

Quod generaliter conceditur inest haec exceptio, si non aliquid sit contra jus fasque.

Source: Wing. Max.; 10 Co. 78

Every general grant is subject to an implied limitation: it cannot authorize what the law forbids; no general language, however broad, may be read to sanction illegality.

When the law is special but its reason is general, the law is to be understood generally.

Quando lex est specialis, ratio autem generalis, generaliter lex est intelligenda.

Source: 2 Inst. 43, 83; 10 Co. 101; Weisman, 98b

A statute enacted for a particular case but resting on a universal principle extends to all cases governed by that principle.

What is general prevails as much amongst things general as what is particular amongst things particular.

Generale tantum valet in generalibus, quantum singulare in singulis.

Source: 11 Co. 59; Jackson; Weisman, 98c

General rules apply to general classes with the same force that particular rules apply to particular cases; each governs within its proper sphere.

A general rule is to be understood generally.

Generalis regula generaliter est intelligenda.

Source: 6 Co. Rep. 65; Jackson; Weisman, 95e

A rule stated in general terms must not be narrowed by implication; where the law speaks broadly, its words receive their full scope.

Specialties are always included in generalities.

Semper specialia generalibus insunt.

Source: D. 50, 17, 147; Jackson

Every general grant or rule necessarily contains within it the specific cases that fall under its scope; the particular is always embraced by the general.

Throughout the whole of the law, the species derogates from the genus, and that which is directed to the species is regarded as most important.

In toto jure generi per speciem derogatur, et illud potissimum habetur quod ad speciem directum est.

Source: Piatt v. Lott, 17 N.Y. 478; Wharton

A specific provision always overrides a general one on the same subject; the particular controls the general within its own domain.

A general expression implies nothing certain.

Generale nihil certum implicat.

Source: 2 Co. 34; Bouvier

Broad, sweeping language carries no definite obligation and confers no specific right; certainty requires particularity, and generality is the enemy of precision.

A deceiver deals in generalities.

Dolosus versatur in generalibus.

Source: 2 Co. 34; Bouvier

Fraud hides behind vague, general language; the more general the expression, the greater the suspicion that it conceals the true bargain — specificity is the mark of honest dealing. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.54, 7.2.14.)

General words are to be understood in a general sense.

Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.

Source: 3 Co. Inst. 76; Bouvier

Words of general import are not to be narrowed without reason; where the legislature has spoken broadly, the court must give the words their full natural reach.

Things general do not derogate from things special.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 120; Jenk. Cent. 199; Weisman, 98d

(English-origin maxim.) A general statute or provision does not override or repeal a special one on the same subject — the specific controls within its own domain regardless of the general rule.

Things special take from things general.

Source: Halk. Max. 51; Weisman, 98f

(English-origin maxim.) Specific provisions carve out their subject from the reach of general provisions — the particular takes precedence and limits the general within the area the particular governs.

Things general precede, things special follow.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouv. 128; Weisman, 98e

(English-origin maxim.) General principles are stated first, followed by specific applications — in statutory construction, the general framework controls unless a special provision creates an exception.

An exception proves the rule concerning things not excepted.

Exceptio probat regulam de rebus non exceptis.

Source: 11 Co. 41; 3 Term 722; Bacon, Aph. 17; Weisman, 40b

The existence of an exception implies the existence of a general rule from which the exception departs; what is excepted proves that everything else is within the rule.

An exception confirms the rule in cases not excepted.

Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis.

Source: Bacon, Aph.; 2 Bulstr. 189

By specifying what is taken out of the rule, the exception affirms the rule's application to everything that remains; the exception strengthens, not weakens, the general principle.

Every exception is itself also a rule.

Omnis exceptio est ipsa quoque regula.

Source: Black's Law Dict. (2d ed.) 852; Weisman, 40c

An exception does not create a void — it creates its own governing principle; within its scope, the exception operates with the same binding force as the rule from which it departs.

An exception should always be placed last.

Exceptio semper ultimo ponenda est.

Source: 9 Co. 53; Weisman, 40d

In drafting, exceptions follow the statement of the general rule; an exception placed before its rule obscures the meaning and inverts the natural order of legislative expression.

Laws ought to have greater force than any exception.

Leges majorem vim habere debent quam exceptiones.

Source: Halk. Max. 74

The exception must always remain subordinate to the general rule; an exception that swallows the rule destroys the legislative intent and is void.

The law rejects exceptions that destroy the rule.

Lex rejectis excipit.

Source: Bacon, Max.; Wing. Max.

An exception so broad that it defeats the very statute or instrument in which it appears is no true exception but a nullification, and will not be given effect.

Enumeration weakens the rule in cases not enumerated.

Enumeratio infirmat regulam in casibus non enumeratis.

Source: Bac. Aph. 17; Bouvier

Where specific items are listed, the rule is affirmed for those items but weakened — and may be negated — for everything not named; the enumeration draws a boundary that excludes the unenumerated.

The exception also declares the rule.

Exceptio quoque regulam declarat.

Source: Bac. Aph. 17; Bouvier; Weisman, 40e

An exception is not merely a carve-out; it is an affirmative declaration of the scope and content of the rule from which it departs — by showing what is excluded, it illuminates what is included.

The exception affirms the rule to be the other way.

Source: Bacon, Aph; Weisman, 40a

(English-origin maxim.) The very existence of an exception demonstrates that the rule runs the other way for all cases not excepted — the exception proves the affirmative rule by marking its boundary.

It is proper that laws be greater than any exception.

Source: Halk. Max. 74; Weisman, 40g

(English-origin maxim.) The general law must always be stronger than any exception carved from it; an exception that overpowers the rule it serves is void as an absurdity.

Fiction yields to truth; there is no fiction of law where truth is.

Fictio cedit veritati; fictio juris non est ubi veritas.

Source: 11 Co. 51; Wharton, Max. no. 189; Jackson, Lat. for Lawyers 3146

A legal fiction may stand only where the truth is absent; the moment truth is established, the fiction falls and reality governs.

A fiction is contrary to truth, but is held for truth.

Fictio est contra veritatem, sed pro veritate habetur.

Source: Co. Litt.; Hibberd v. Smith, 67 Cal. 547, 4 Pac. 473

A fiction is a deliberate assumption of something known to be false, adopted by the law for the sake of justice; it operates as truth only within the boundaries set by that purpose.

A fiction of law injures no one.

Fictio legis neminem laedit.

Source: 3 Co. 36; 3 Bl. Comm. 43; Broom, Max. 127; Weisman, 45c

A fiction is adopted only for equitable ends; the moment it produces harm or injustice, it ceases to be legitimate and must be abandoned.

In fiction of law, equity always exists.

In fictione juris semper aequitas existit.

Source: 11 Co. 51a; Broom, Max. 127, 130; Wharton, Max. no. 261

Every legal fiction must be consistent with equity; a fiction that produces inequity is no longer a fiction but a falsehood and must fall.

A fiction of law is wrongful if it works loss or injury to anyone.

Fictio legis inique operatur alicui damnum vel injuriam.

Source: 2 Co. 35; Broom, Max. 122; Weisman, 45g

This is the negative corollary of the rule that fiction injures no one: where a fiction does in fact produce damage, it stands condemned by its own excess and will not be sustained.

Fictions arise from the law, not law from fictions.

Fictiones juris ex lege oriuntur, non lex ex fictionibus.

Source: Bouvier, Max. 136; Weisman, 45f

The law creates fictions as instruments to serve justice; fictions may never be used to create new law or to extend the law beyond its actual provisions.

Fiction is a poor ground for changing substantial rights.

Fictio est pauperum fundamentum ad mutanda jura substantialia.

Source: Bacon, Max.; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 45h

No fiction may be used to alter vested rights; it is a procedural convenience, not a substantive power, and may never serve as the basis for taking from one to give to another.

Relation back is a fiction of law.

Relatio est fictio juris.

Source: Wharton, Max.; Jackson v. Davenport, 30 Johns. 537, 551; Weisman, 93a

The doctrine of relation back — by which a later act is deemed to have taken effect from an earlier date — is a fiction and therefore subject to all the limits of fictions: it must serve equity and may injure no one.

Where truth is, fiction of law does not exist.

Source: Black's 494; Bouv. 127; Weisman, 45a

(English-origin maxim.) A legal fiction cannot survive where the truth has been established — once the actual facts are proved, the fiction is extinguished and reality governs.

A fiction is a rule of law that assumes something which is or may be false as true.

Source: Hibberd v. Smith, 67 Cal. 547; 4 Pac. 473; Weisman, 45b

(English-origin maxim.) A legal fiction is a rule that deliberately assumes something which is or may be false as true, adopted for the purpose of doing justice — it is a tool, not a truth, and may be used only within its proper limits.

In the fiction of law there is always equity; a legal fiction is always consistent with equity.

Source: 11 Coke, 51a; Broom, Max. 127, 130; Weisman, 45d

(English-origin maxim.) Every legal fiction must be grounded in equity — the fiction exists to serve fairness, and the moment it produces inequitable results, it ceases to be a legitimate instrument of law.

Of things similar, the judgment is the same.

De similibus idem est judicium.

Source: 7 Co. 18; Co. Litt. 191

Where two cases rest on the same reason, the same rule governs both; the law does not produce different results from identical principles.

Where the same reason exists, there the same law prevails; and of things similar, the judgment is similar.

Ubi eadem ratio, ibi idem jus; et de similibus idem est judicium.

Source: 7 Co. 18; Co. Litt. 191; Weisman, 97g

The law is governed by reason, not by accident; when two facts present the same rationale, neither party may claim a different rule.

From similars to similars, we are to proceed by the same rule.

A similibus ad similia eadem ratione procedendum est.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 8e; Weisman, 97m

Reasoning by analogy is lawful and necessary: where a case falls within the reason of an established rule, the rule extends to it by operation of logic, even if the case was not specifically contemplated.

Similar things are dissolved by similar things.

Similia similibus dissolvantur.

Source: Bacon, Max.; Bouvier, Max. 147; Weisman, 97f

An obligation or bond created by a particular mode is dissolved by the same mode — what consent created, consent dissolves; what deed established, deed undoes. Cite this alongside 10.4.7 to argue that the method of dissolution must match the method of creation.

From similars to dissimilars no argument is drawn; of dissimilar things, the reason is dissimilar.

De similibus ad dissimilia non fit argumentum; dissimilium dissimilis est ratio.

Source: Co. Litt. 191; 4 Co. 18

Analogy has its limits — where things differ in their essential nature, reasoning from one to the other produces error; different things demand different rules.

Things dissimilar ought not to be joined.

Dissimilia non debent jungi.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 24; Weisman, 97a

What is unlike in kind must not be yoked together in construction or application; joining dissimilar things corrupts both the rule and its application.

What is effectual in one of two like things shall be effectual in the other.

Quod in uno simili valet, valebit in altero.

Source: Co. Litt. 191a; Weisman, 97k

A rule that operates in one case extends to every case that stands on the same footing; consistency is the life of the law.

What is like is not the same; nothing similar is identical.

Simile non est idem; nihil simile est idem.

Source: 4 Co. 18; Co. Litt. 3a; 2 Bl. Comm. 162

Resemblance is not identity; even where the analogy is strong, the law must attend to the particular differences that may demand a different result.

Things which agree in substance differ but little.

Quae in una parte conveniunt, in altera paulum distant.

Source: 2 Bulstr. 86; Weisman, 97j

Where things agree in their substance and diverge only in accidental detail, the law treats them alike; trifling differences do not justify different treatment.

No example is the same for all purposes.

Nullum exemplum est idem omnibus.

Source: Co. Litt. 212a; Weisman, 97n

Every precedent carries implicit limitations; an example illuminates a principle but does not govern every case to which a superficial resemblance might be drawn.

No simile runs on all fours.

Nullum simile quatuor pedibus currit.

Source: Co. Litt. 3; Jackson

No analogy is perfect in every respect; every comparison breaks down at some point, and the law must attend to where the likeness ends.

What is like is not the same; for nothing similar is the same.

Talis non est eadem; nam nullum simile est idem.

Source: 4 Co. 18; Jackson; Weisman, 97h

Similarity is not identity; even the closest analogy remains an analogy, and the law must recognize the distinction between resemblance and equivalence.

Examples illustrate and do not restrict the law.

Exempla illustrant non restringunt legem.

Source: Co. Litt. 24; Bouvier

An example given in a statute or instrument serves to clarify the rule, not to limit it; the rule extends to every case within its reason, whether or not specifically illustrated.

That which is similar denotes a partial resemblance only, unless the context indicates otherwise.

Source: Black's, 2d. 1089; Weisman, 97b

(English-origin maxim.) Similarity denotes only a partial resemblance unless context indicates otherwise — counsel must demonstrate not just surface likeness but true correspondence of the governing principle before claiming analogical force.

Of dissimilars the rule is dissimilar.

Source: Co. Litt. 191; Weisman, 97d

(English-origin maxim.) Where things are dissimilar, the governing rule is likewise dissimilar — a rule established for one class of cases does not apply to a materially different class.

Legal similarity is a similar reason which governs various cases when compared with each other; for what avails in one similar case will avail in the other. Of things dissimilar, the reason is dissimilar.

Source: Co. Litt. 191; Weisman, 97e

(English-origin maxim.) Legal similarity means that the same reason governs both cases; where cases share the same rationale, the same rule applies, but where the underlying reason differs, the cases must be treated differently.

Of things equal, the reason is the same, and the same is the law.

Source: Black's, 873; Weisman, 97l

(English-origin maxim.) Where things are truly equal in their essential character, the same reason and the same law govern both — parity of reason demands parity of treatment.

All which is dissimilar, is a difference of degree, the extent of which is ascertained by close and objective analysis.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 97i

(English-origin maxim.) When things appear different, the distinction is one of degree rather than kind, and the law requires precise, objective analysis to determine the extent of that difference — vague assertions of dissimilarity cannot justify disparate legal treatment.

Similar things unite with similar.

Source: Bacon, Max.; Bouv. 147; Weisman, 97f

(English-origin maxim.) Like things are to be grouped and treated together — the law joins similar matters and applies consistent rules to them.