INSTRUMENTS & WRITINGS

An act of the law does injury to no one.

Actus legis nemini facit injuriam.

Source: 5 Co. 116; Broom, Max. 122; Jenk. Cent. 252; Weisman, 59q

Where the law itself operates to produce a result, no party can claim to be injured by that operation — the law is presumed to work justice. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.280, 7.4.6.)

An act of the law is harmful to no one.

Actus legis nemini est damnosus.

Source: 5 Co. 81; Wing. Max. 614

A legal consequence that flows from the operation of law — as distinct from the act of a party — carries no actionable injury.

Not what is said, but what is done, is to be regarded.

Non quod dictum est, sed quod factum est, inspicitur.

Source: Co. Litt. 36; 6 Bing. 310; Osborn v. Cook, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 536; Weisman, 2d

In the delivery of instruments, the substance of what was performed controls — not the oral declarations accompanying it.

To write is to act.

Scribere est agere.

Source: 2 Rolle 89; 4 Bl. Comm. 80; Broom, Max. 312, 967; Weisman, 2s

A writing carries the force of an act — a treasonous letter is as much an overt act as a treasonous deed.

Acts indicate the intention.

Actus indicant intentionem.

Source: 8 Co. 291; Broom, Max. 270; Troy v. Yelle, 176 P.2d 459, 463; Weisman, 2r

Where written intent is ambiguous, the course of conduct of the parties is the surest guide to meaning.

An act of a judge which does not pertain to his office is of no force.

Factum a judice quod ad ejus officium non spectat, non ratum est.

Source: 10 Co. 76; Dig. 50, 17, 170

A judicial act performed beyond the judge's jurisdiction is a nullity — it binds no one and conveys no authority. (Duplicate maxim — see also 8.1.41.)

A thing done cannot be undone.

Factum infectum fieri nequit.

Source: 1 Kames, Eq. 96, 259; Weisman, 2x; Weisman, 13o

Once an act is completed — a deed delivered, an instrument executed — the actor cannot recall it by his own will alone.

In things that are favorable to the spirit, though injurious to things, an extension of a statute should sometimes be made.

In rebus quae sunt favorabilia animae, quamvis sunt damnosa rebus, fiat aliquando extensio statuti.

Source: 10 Co. 101; Jackson

Statutes may be extended beyond their strict letter when the soul's welfare is at stake, even at the cost of temporal property — the law favors the spiritual over the material.

If the written law be silent, that which is drawn from manners and custom ought to be observed; and if in that anything is defective, then that which is next and analogous to it.

Lex scripta si cesset, id custodiri oportet quod moribus et consuetudine inductum est; et si qua in re hoc defecerit, tunc id quod proximum et consequens ei est.

Source: 7 Co. 19; Jackson

Where the written law fails to address a matter, custom fills the gap; where custom also fails, the nearest analogous principle governs.

The king is not bound by any statute if he be not expressly named therein.

Roy n'est lie per ascun statute si il ne soit expressement nosme.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 307; Wharton

The sovereign is not presumed to be included in the operation of a statute unless the statute expressly names him — a principle of construction, not of immunity.

Legal form is essential form.

Forma legalis forma essentialis.

Source: 10 Co. 100; Bouvier

The prescribed form of an instrument is not a mere technicality but the very substance of its validity; an act performed without the form required by law is a nullity. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.6.1.)

When form is not observed, a nullity of the act is inferred.

Forma non observata, infertur adnullatio actus.

Source: 12 Co. 7; Bouvier

Failure to comply with mandatory legal form is fatal to the act — the law infers from the defective form that no valid act was performed.

Execution is the end and the fruit of the law.

Executio est finis et fructus legis.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; Bouvier

The purpose of the law is achieved only through execution; a judgment without enforcement is a tree without fruit. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.31, 8.9.2.)

Acts required to be done by law do not admit of qualification.

Source: Hob. 153; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 2b

(English-origin maxim.) When the law mandates a specific act — such as recording a deed or filing within a deadline — no party may attach conditions or qualifications to the performance; it must be done precisely as the law commands.

Certain legal consequences are attached to the voluntary act of a person.

Source: Duncan v. Landis, 106 Fed. 839; Weisman, 2e

(English-origin maxim.) A person who voluntarily performs an act is bound by the legal consequences that flow from it, regardless of whether he foresaw or intended those consequences.

Things which are done simultaneously with an act are supposed to be inherent in it; to be a constituent part of it.

Source: Co. Litt. 236b; Weisman, 2f

(English-origin maxim.) Contemporaneous acts and declarations made at the time of a transaction are admissible as part of the res gestae — they are woven into the act itself and inseparable from it.

Environment illuminates the meaning of acts, as context does that of words.

Source: Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 33; Weisman, 2g

(English-origin maxim.) The circumstances surrounding an act — its time, place, and setting — are essential to determining its legal character, just as context gives meaning to language.

Where there is no principal, there can be no accessory.

Ubi non est principalis non potest esse accessorius.

Source: 4 Coke, 43; Weisman, 2i

Without a principal act or offense, no accessory liability can exist — the accessory charge is entirely dependent on the commission of the primary act.

Your motive gives a name to your act.

Source: Bract. 2b, 101b; Weisman, 2j

(English-origin maxim.) The intent behind an act determines its legal classification — the same physical deed may be lawful or unlawful depending on the motive that animates it.

A repugnant act cannot be brought into being, i.e., cannot be made effectual.

Source: Plowd. 355; Weisman, 2l; Weisman, 62b

(English-origin maxim.) An act that contradicts itself or is internally inconsistent is void — the law will not give effect to what is self-defeating.

When many join in one act, the law will construe it as the act of him who could best accomplish it.

Source: Noy, Max. 38; Weisman, 2m

(English-origin maxim.) Where several persons participate in a single transaction, the law attributes the act to the party with the authority or capacity to perform it, such as the grantor in a deed or the officer with jurisdiction.

One may not do an act to himself.

Source: Bouv. 146; Weisman, 2n

(English-origin maxim.) A man cannot be both grantor and grantee, obligor and obligee, in the same transaction — the law requires distinct parties for a valid legal act.

Take away the will, and every action will be indifferent.

Source: Bract. 2; Weisman, 2o

(English-origin maxim.) Without voluntary intent, no act carries moral or legal significance — this principle is the foundation of the defense of compulsion and the requirement of mens rea.

Every man is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own voluntary act.

Source: Greenl. Ev. s. 18; 9 East, 277; Weisman, 2p

(English-origin maxim.) Invoke this presumption to establish intent from conduct — a party who performs a voluntary act cannot later disclaim the foreseeable results by professing ignorance of their consequences.

External acts indicate undisclosed thoughts.

Source: 8 Coke, 146b; Weisman, 2t

(English-origin maxim.) Where a party's subjective intent is unknown, the court infers it from outward conduct — overt acts are the law's window into hidden purpose.

All actions in the world are limited within certain periods.

Source: Bract. 52; Weisman, 2u

(English-origin maxim.) No cause of action endures forever — statutes of limitation reflect this principle by fixing a definite period within which every claim must be brought or be forever barred.

A party's own act should prejudice himself, not his adversary.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 155; Weisman, 2v

(English-origin maxim.) Where one party's conduct creates a legal disadvantage, the burden falls on the actor himself — no man should profit from shifting the consequences of his own deed to another.

When there is doubt about an act, it receives interpretation from the (known) feelings of the actor.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 68, 1; Weisman, 2w

(English-origin maxim.) When a deed or transaction is ambiguous, the known disposition and prior declarations of the actor supply the key to construction.

There is no surer way to find out what parties meant, than to see what they have done.

Source: Brooklyn Ins. Co. v. Dutcher, 5 Otto (95 U.S.) 269, 273; Weisman, 2z

(English-origin maxim.) The practical construction placed on an agreement by the parties' own conduct is the best evidence of their mutual intent — actions speak louder than recitals.

A party who is silent when he ought to speak shall not be permitted to speak afterwards to the prejudice of those who have been induced to act upon such omission to speak.

Source: Wharton, III-26

(English-origin maxim.) A party who remains silent when duty requires him to speak is estopped from later asserting a position that contradicts the reliance others placed on his silence.

No person, by his own transgression, can create a cause of action in his own favor, against another.

Source: Briggs v. Easterly; Wharton, III-215

(English-origin maxim.) A wrongdoer cannot manufacture a cause of action from his own transgression — the law will not allow a party to benefit from his own wrong.

Prescription and execution do not pertain to the validity of the contract, but to the time and manner of bringing the action.

Praescriptio et executio non pertinent ad valorem contractus, sed ad tempus et modum actionis instituendae.

Source: Wharton, III-255

The statute of limitations and the mode of enforcement affect only procedure, not the underlying validity of the contract — a barred action does not mean the obligation never existed.

He is repelled by the exception of actions to be assigned.

Repellitur exceptione cedendarum actionum.

Source: Wharton, III-297

A party who has failed to assign or transfer an action when required may be barred by the exception — the defense lies against him who has neglected to cede what ought to have been ceded.

Old age alone and of itself does not vitiate a gift, a will, or a transaction.

Sola ac per se senectus donationem, testamentum, aut transactionem non vitiat.

Source: Wharton, III-321

Advanced age, standing alone, is no ground to set aside a deed, will, or contract — incapacity must be proved by evidence of mental infirmity, not merely by the passage of years.

An act done by me, against my will, is not my act.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bract. 101b; Cycl. Dict. 25; Weisman, 2q

(English-origin maxim.) An act performed under compulsion is legally void — the law requires a voluntary will behind every binding act.

Deeds are more powerful than words.

Facta sunt potentiora verbis.

Source: Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 476; Co. Litt. 36; Weisman, 30a

Where a deed and a parol declaration conflict, the deed prevails — written instruments carry greater weight than oral statements. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.1.18.)

That is not called a deed which does not continue operative.

Factum non dicitur quod non perseverat.

Source: 5 Co. 96; Weisman, 30c

An instrument that ceases to have legal effect ceases to be a deed in the eyes of the law.

Delivery makes a deed speak.

Traditio loqui facit chartam.

Source: 5 Co. 1a; Weisman, 30m

Until delivery, a deed is a silent instrument — it is the act of delivery that gives life and legal force to the writing.

It is the tenor of the deed which gives validity to the estate.

Tenor est qui legem dat feudo.

Source: Co. Litt. 36; cf. 5 Co. 96; Weisman, 30f

The operative language of an instrument — its tenor — determines the rights conveyed, not the label or title given to it.

Bad grammar does not vitiate a deed.

Mala grammatica non vitiat chartam.

Source: Shep. Touch. 55, 87; 9 Co. 48a; Wing. Max. 19

A deed or grant is not defeated by imperfect Latin, misspelling, or grammatical error — the law looks to substance, not syntax.

A deed is nothing but the vestment of a gift.

Charta non est nisi vestimentum donationis.

Source: Co. Litt. 36; Weisman, 30j

The deed is the clothing of the grant — the formal expression through which the intention to convey is made operative.

Writings remain; words fly away.

Scripta manent, verba volant.

Source: Attributed to Caius Titus, Roman Senate; Broom, Max. 312 (principle)

The enduring nature of a written instrument is why the law favors documented evidence over oral testimony — what is written persists; what is spoken vanishes.

An allegation contrary to a deed is not admissible.

Allegatio contra factum non est admittenda.

Source: Jackson; Weisman, 24dd

A party may not contradict by oral allegation what he has solemnly committed to a written instrument; the deed speaks and cannot be gainsaid.

Intention is the soul of an instrument.

Animus hominis est anima scripti.

Source: 8 Bulst. 67; Jackson

The intent of the maker is the animating principle of every written instrument; without ascertaining intent, the instrument is a dead letter.

A charter concerning a thing not in existence is of no avail.

Charta de non ente non valet.

Source: Co. Litt. 36a; Jackson

A deed or grant that purports to convey something that does not exist is a nullity — the law cannot clothe with validity what has no substance.

Public and private law is that which is collected from natural principles, either of nations or in states; and what in written law is called *jus*, by the law of England is said to be right.

Jus publicum et privatum est quod ex naturalibus praeceptis, aut gentium, aut civilibus est collectum; et quod in jure scripto jus appellatur, id in lege Angliae rectum esse dicitur.

Source: Co. Litt. 158; Jackson

All law — public and private — derives from natural principles; the English common law term "right" corresponds to the civil law term *jus*, both rooted in the law of nature.

A deed or bond found with the debtor is presumed to be paid.

Chirographum apud debitorem repertum praesumitur solutum.

Source: Bouvier

The physical possession of an obligation by the debtor raises a presumption that it has been satisfied — if the debt were still owed, the creditor would retain the instrument. (Duplicate maxim — see also 6.5.1.)

In the delivery of writings, not what is said, but what is done, is to be considered.

In traditionibus scriptorum non quod dictum est, sed quod gestum est, inspicitur.

Source: 9 Co. 137; Bouvier; Weisman, 30d

The validity and effect of a written instrument depend on the actual delivery and acts performed, not on the oral declarations accompanying the transfer.

False spelling or false grammar does not vitiate a grant.

Falsa orthographia, sive falsa grammatica, non vitiat concessionem.

Source: 9 Co. 48; Shep. Touch. 55; Bouvier

A grant or deed is not defeated by mistakes in spelling or grammar; the law looks to the substance of what is conveyed, not to the accuracy of the penmanship. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.5.11.)

Authority to execute a deed must be given by deed.

Source: 4 Term, 313; Cooper v. Rankin, 5 Binn. (Penn.) 613; Weisman, 30e

(English-origin maxim.) The authority to execute a deed on behalf of another must itself be conferred by deed — a bare parol authorization is insufficient to support a formal conveyance.

The deed of one should not hurt another.

Source: Co. Litt. 152; Weisman, 30g

(English-origin maxim.) No person should be prejudiced by the deed of a stranger — the acts of one party cannot impose obligations or forfeitures upon another who is not privy to the instrument.

When a deed contains a general clause, and afterwards descends to special words, consistent with the general clause, the deed is to be construed according to the special words.

Source: 8 Coke, 154; Weisman, 30h

(English-origin maxim.) Where a deed opens with a general grant and then specifies particular terms consistent with it, the special words control the construction — the general yields to the specific.

The intention is to be taken for the deed.

Voluntas reputabatur pro facto.

Source: 3 Inst; Weisman, 30k; Weisman, 51b; Weisman, 104z

Where the intent to execute a deed is clearly established but formal completion is prevented by death or other cause, equity may treat the intention as equivalent to the act.

No man can contravene or contradict his own deed.

Source: 2 Inst. 66; Weisman, 30l; Weisman, 2aa

(English-origin maxim.) A party who has executed a deed is estopped from denying its terms — his solemn act binds him, and he may not contradict what he has formally declared.

A clause in a law which precludes its own repeal is void from the beginning.

Clausula quae abrogationem excludit ab initio non valet.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 19; Broom, Max. (3d Lond. ed.) 27; Weisman, 16b

No legislature can bind its successors — a statute that declares itself unrepealable attempts to exceed the legislative power and is a nullity. (Duplicate maxim — see also 6.8.3.)

Unusual clauses always excite suspicion.

Clausulae inconsuetae semper inducunt suspicionem.

Source: 3 Co. 81; Broom, Max. (3d Lond. ed.) 264; Weisman, 16d

An uncommon or unexpected provision in an instrument invites close scrutiny — it may signal fraud, overreach, or an attempt to conceal the true bargain.

A proviso is to provide for the present and future, not the past.

Provisio est providere praesentia et futura, non praeterita.

Source: 2 Co. 72; Broom, Max. (3d Lond. ed.) 275; Weisman, 16e

A proviso in an instrument operates prospectively — it cannot retroactively alter obligations already performed or rights already vested.

Words are to be received with effect.

Verba cum effectu sunt accipienda.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 3; Plowd. 156; Weisman, 104k; Weisman, 104u

Every clause in an instrument is presumed to have been inserted for a purpose — no provision is to be treated as idle or thrown away if it can be given a sensible operation.

Where the provision of the party is wanting, the provision of the law is at hand.

Ubi defecit remedium partis, ibi adest remedium legis.

Source: 6 Vin. Abr. 49; Weisman, 16g

Where the parties to an instrument have failed to address a contingency, the common law supplies the default rule — silence in a contract is not a void, but an invitation for law to govern.

Surplusage does no harm.

Superflua non nocent.

Source: 3 Bouv. Inst. no. 2949; Broom, Max. 627; Jenk. Cent. 184; Weisman, 41c; Weisman, 41e

Unnecessary words in a deed or statute do not invalidate it — the good part stands even if accompanied by surplus language.

An unnecessary clause or disposition is not upheld by a remote presumption or a cause arising after the event.

Clausula vel dispositio inutilis per praesumptionem vel causam remotam ex post facto non fulcitur.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 21; Jackson

A useless provision cannot be rescued by speculative reasoning or after-the-fact justification; it must stand or fall on its own terms at the time it was made.

The clause, "Of our special grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion," is of no avail where it may be presumed that the prince was ignorant.

De gratia speciali, certa scientia, et mero motu; talis clausula non valet in his in quibus praesumitur principem esse ignorantem.

Source: 1 Co. Rep. 53; Jackson

A royal grant claiming to be made from the sovereign’s personal knowledge is void if the facts show the sovereign could not have known the circumstances — the recital does not cure the ignorance.

A derogatory clause does not prevent things from being dissolved by the same power which created them.

Non impedit clausula derogatoria quo minus ab eadem potestate res dissolvantur a qua constituuntur.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 19; Jackson

No clause can bind the power that created it; the same authority that establishes a law or instrument may unmake it, regardless of any self-protecting language.

It is an everlasting law that no positive and human law shall be perpetual, and a clause which excludes abrogation is void from its commencement.

Perpetua lex est, nullam legem humanam ac positivam perpetuam esse, et clausula quae abrogationem excludit, ab initio non valet.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 19; Wharton

No human law can make itself eternal; a statute purporting to prevent its own future repeal exceeds the legislative power and is void ab initio.

Special clauses are comprised in general ones.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 147; Weisman, 16f

(English-origin maxim.) A specific clause that falls within the scope of a general provision does not limit or narrow the general clause — the special is understood as already included within the general.

Particular clauses inserted in agreements to avoid doubts and ambiguity do not prejudice the general law.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 81; Weisman, 16h

(English-origin maxim.) Explanatory clauses inserted in an agreement for the sake of clarity do not override or restrict the general principles of law that would otherwise apply.

To discontinue is to intermit, to disuse, to interrupt.

Discontinuare est intermittere, desuescere, interrumpere.

Source: Co. Litt. 325

Discontinuance is the failure to maintain or prosecute — a right or action left dormant may be treated as abandoned.

Custom is sustained by its own force through continuance.

Consuetudo robore suo sustinetur.

Source: Cf. Mann v. Mann's Ex'rs, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 231, 237; 2 Bl. Comm. 263

A practice that persists without interruption gathers legal force — continuity itself is evidence of right.

That which is so persistently repeated as to constitute virtually an unbroken series is continuous.

Quod perseveranter repetitur, ut seriem ininterruptam constituat, continuum est.

Source: Ingraham v. Hough, 46 N.C. 43; Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 260; Weisman, 23c

Continuous use is proven not by absolute permanence, but by a pattern of repetition so consistent that it admits no meaningful break.

Time is a means of destroying obligations and actions.

Tempus enim modus tollendi obligationes et actiones.

Source: Bract. fols. 100b, 101; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 4, s. 5, §12; Weisman, 100a

Where an instrument or right is not enforced within the time allowed, the law may extinguish the obligation — continuity of claim is the antidote to the running of time.

It gains strength by continuance.

Source: Mann v. Mann Ex'rs, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 231, 237; Weisman, 23h; Weisman, 23b

(English-origin maxim.) A right, custom, or practice that has been continuously maintained accumulates legal force over time — uninterrupted use is the strongest proof of right.

That is continuing which is enduring, not terminated by a single act or fact.

Source: Black's, 2d. 260; Weisman, 23d

(English-origin maxim.) A continuing obligation or wrong is one that persists over time and is not exhausted by a single occurrence — each day of its continuance may give rise to a fresh cause of action.