WRONGS, CRIMES & REMEDIES

In criminal matters, the will is taken for the deed.

In criminalibus, voluntas reputabitur pro facto.

Source: Coke, 3 Inst. 106; Weisman, 26t; Weisman, 44r

Where criminal intent is clearly proved, the law may hold a man accountable even though the intended result was not fully accomplished.

In criminal matters, a general malice of intention is sufficient when joined with an act of equal degree.

In criminalibus sufficit generalis malitia intentionis cum facto paris gradus.

Source: Bacon, Max. p. 65, reg. 15; Broom, Max. 291; Weisman, 26s

The prosecution need not prove specific malice toward a particular person when general malicious intent accompanied the criminal act.

In offenses, the intention is regarded, not the outcome.

In maleficiis voluntas spectatur, non exitus.

Source: Dig. 48, 8, 14; Bacon, Max. reg. 7; Weisman, 26p

A man who attempts a crime with full intent is not excused merely because he failed in the execution.

In more atrocious crimes, the intent is punished even though the effect does not follow.

In atrocioribus delictis punitur affectus licet non sequatur effectus.

Source: 2 Rolle 82; Weisman, 26l

The more serious the intended crime, the more the law focuses on the criminal purpose rather than whether harm was actually accomplished.

Felony, by force of the term, signifies any capital crime committed with a malignant mind.

Felonia, ex vi termini, significat quodlibet capitale crimen felleo animo perpetratum.

Source: Co. Litt. 391; Weisman, 26e

The very definition of felony embeds the requirement of evil intent — without the felonious mind, there is no felony.

Drunkenness both inflames and reveals every crime.

Omne crimen ebrietas et incendit et detegit.

Source: Co. Litt. 241a; 4 Bl. Comm. 26; Broom, Max. 17

Intoxication is no defense to criminal conduct — it aggravates rather than excuses, and the law holds a man accountable for what he does when drunk.

Crime vitiates everything that springs from it.

Crimen omnia ex se nata vitiat.

Source: Henry v. Bank of Salina, 5 Hill (N.Y.) 523, 531; Weisman, 26o

No lawful right, title, or benefit can arise from a criminal act — the taint of the original wrong infects everything built upon it.

The crime of treason exceeds all other crimes as to its punishment.

Crimen laesae majestatis omnia alia crimina excedit quoad poenam.

Source: 3 Inst. 210; Weisman, 26c

Treason — the betrayal of sovereign trust — stands apart from all other offenses in severity, because it strikes at the foundation of the entire legal order.

The touching of property not one’s own, with an intention to steal, is theft.

Contrectatio rei alienae, animo furandi, est furtum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 132; Jackson; Weisman, 91c

The mere handling of another’s property with intent to steal constitutes theft, even if the property is not carried away — the crime is complete upon the wrongful touching.

He who is bound to obey is in no fault. As where the proper officer executes a criminal, or where an officer of justice, in the legal exercise of a particular duty, kills a person who resists.

Ejus nulla culpa est cui parere necesse sit.

Source: D. 50, 17, 169; Jackson

An officer acting under lawful compulsion bears no guilt for the consequences of obedience — the fault lies with the authority that commanded the act, not the instrument that carried it out.

It is a greater crime to kill one’s self than another.

Majus est delictum seipsum occidere quam alium.

Source: 3 Inst. 54; Jackson

Self-destruction is regarded as the greater offense because it deprives both God and the commonwealth of a life over which the individual has stewardship, not ownership.

He threatens the innocent who spares the guilty.

Minatur innocentibus, qui parcit nocentibus.

Source: 4 Co. 45; Jackson; Weisman, 92x

Failure to punish the guilty emboldens wrongdoers and leaves the innocent exposed to future harm — leniency toward criminals is cruelty toward their victims.

No crime is greater than disobedience.

Nullum crimen majus est inobedientia.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 77; Jackson

Disobedience to lawful authority strikes at the foundation of order itself — every other crime is a particular wrong, but disobedience is a rejection of the rule of law as such.

Let him who accuses be of clear fame, and not criminal.

Qui accusat integrae famae sit et non criminosus.

Source: 3 Inst. 26; Jackson

An accuser must himself be of unblemished reputation — a criminal bringing charges against another lacks the standing and credibility the law demands.

If a man kill one, meaning to kill another, he is held guilty of felony.

Si quis unum percusserit, cum alium percutere vellet, in felonia tenetur.

Source: 3 Inst. 51; Jackson; Weisman, 26n

Transferred intent applies in felony — a man who kills the wrong person through misdirected violence is as guilty as if he had struck his intended target.

An act does not make a person guilty, unless the intention be also guilty.

Actus non reum facit, nisi mens sit rea.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2211; Weisman, 60h; Weisman, 60n

Criminal liability requires the union of a wrongful act with a guilty mind; without criminal intent, there is no crime.

It is the crime which causes the shame, and not the scaffold.

C'est le crime qui fait la honte, et non pas l'echafaud.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

Disgrace attaches to the criminal act itself, not to the punishment that follows — the wrongdoer bears the shame regardless of whether he is caught.

Felony is included or implied in every treason.

Felonia implicatur in quolibet proditione.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 15

Every act of treason necessarily contains within it the lesser offense of felony, because betrayal of sovereign trust is the highest grade of criminal conduct.

Offenses against nature are the heaviest.

Peccata contra naturam sunt gravissima.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 20

Crimes that violate the natural order are treated as the most serious in law, because they offend not merely human enactment but the law of nature itself.

All crimes committed openly are considered lighter.

Omnia delicta in aperto leviora sunt.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 8 Co. 127; Weisman, 26aa

An offense committed in the open carries less moral weight than one carried out in secret, because concealment implies a deliberate effort to evade justice.

He who betrays his country is like the insane sailor who bores a hole in the ship which carries him.

Qui molitur insidias in patriam, id facit quod insanus nauta perforans navem in qua vehitur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 36

Treason is self-destructive folly — the traitor undermines the very order upon which his own safety depends.

Mayhem is the least of great crimes, and the greatest of small.

Mathemium est inter crimina majora minimum, et inter minora maximum.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 127

Mayhem occupies a middle position in the hierarchy of offenses, marking the boundary between capital crimes and lesser wrongs.

One who is accessory to a crime cannot be guilty of a higher degree of crime than his principal.

Source: 3 Inst. 139; Weisman, 26b

(English-origin maxim.) An accessory's guilt cannot exceed that of the principal — if the principal is guilty of manslaughter, the accessory cannot be convicted of murder.

The character of a past offense is never aggravated by a subsequent act or matter.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 138, 1; Bacon, Max. reg. 8; Broom, Max. 42; Weisman, 26d

(English-origin maxim.) A man's criminal liability is measured at the time of the offense and cannot be increased by anything he does afterward — later misconduct is charged separately.

Prevention is better than cure.

Source: Co. Litt. 304b; Weisman, 26f

(English-origin maxim.) The law favors preventive remedies — injunctions and restraining orders — over after-the-fact damages, because preventing harm is superior to compensating for it.

Facility of pardon is an incentive to crime.

Source: 4 Coke, 45; 3 Inst. 236; Weisman, 26m

(English-origin maxim.) Easy pardons encourage crime — when offenders expect clemency, the deterrent force of the law is destroyed and lawlessness increases.

Crimes are extinguished by death.

Source: Black's, 2d. 300; Weisman, 26r

(English-origin maxim.) Criminal prosecution abates upon the death of the accused — the state cannot try a dead man, and pending charges die with the defendant.

The will and the proposed end distinguished crimes.

Source: Bract. fol. 2b, 136b; 2 Inst. 57; Weisman, 26u

(English-origin maxim.) Criminal intent and the intended object distinguish one crime from another — the same physical act may constitute different offenses depending on the purpose behind it.

Capital crimes are punished by death.

Source: Walker v. State, 13 S.W. 860; Weisman, 26v

(English-origin maxim.) The defining characteristic of a capital crime is that it carries the death penalty — no lesser punishment qualifies an offense as capital.

It is not just and proper that he who speaks ill of a bad man should be condemned on that account; for it is fitting and expedient that the crimes of bad men should be known.

Source: Dig. 47, 10, 17; 1 Bl. Comm. 125; Weisman, 26dd

(English-origin maxim.) Truth is a defense to defamation — a man who speaks truthfully about the crimes of a wrongdoer cannot be condemned for doing so, because the public has a right to know.

The accessory does not precede, but follows the principal.

Source: Co. Litt. 152; C.L.M.; Weisman, 26x

(English-origin maxim.) An accessory's liability depends on the principal's — there can be no accessory without a principal offender, and the accessory's guilt follows from and cannot exceed the principal's.

It is fraud to conceal a fraud.

Fraus est celare fraudem.

Source: 1 Vern. 270; Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 389-390; Weisman, 29r

One who knows of a fraud and conceals it becomes a party to the fraud itself — silence in the face of known deceit is active participation.

Fraud is odious and is not to be presumed.

Fraus est odiosa et non praesumenda.

Source: Cro. Car. 550; Jackson, No. 296; Weisman, 29s

The law does not presume fraud but requires it to be proved by clear evidence — yet once proved, every presumption turns against the wrongdoer.

Fraud is not purged by circuity.

Dolus circuitu non purgatur.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 4; Broom, Max. 228; Noy, Max. 9, 12; Weisman, 29p

A fraudulent act cannot be laundered into legitimacy by running it through intermediate steps, agencies, or transactions — the taint follows every link in the chain.

No right of action arises from fraud.

Ex dolo malo non oritur actio.

Source: Cowp. 341; Broom, Max. 729; Phelps v. Decker, 10 Mass. 276

A party who has himself engaged in fraud cannot invoke the courts to enforce an advantage gained by that fraud — the law will not assist the fraudulent.

Fraud and justice never dwell together.

Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant.

Source: Wing. Max. 680; Weisman, 29t

Where fraud is found, right cannot coexist — justice demands that every trace of fraud be rooted out before any claim built upon it can stand.

Fraud and deceit should be a defense or advantage to no one.

Dolus et fraus nemini patrocinari debent.

Source: 3 Coke, 78b; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 13, § 15; Best, Evid. p. 469

No man shall profit, find shelter, or gain legal advantage through his own deceit — the law strips every benefit built on fraudulent foundations.

Let him who wishes to be deceived, be deceived.

Qui vult decipi, decipiatur.

Source: Broom, Max. 782 n.; Shep. Touch. 56

One who voluntarily enters a transaction with full knowledge of its deceptive character cannot afterward claim the protection of the court.

Once a fraud, always presumed a fraud.

Semel fraudator, semper praesumitur fraudator.

Source: 13 Vin. Abr. 539; Weisman, 29i

A proven pattern of fraud raises a continuing presumption — the law does not extend fresh credit to a demonstrated deceiver.

He is not considered to have consented who has altered something under the direction of a threatening party.

Non videtur consensum retinuisse si quis ex praescripto minantis aliquid immutavit.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 145

Consent procured by threat or coercion is no consent at all — where duress overbears the will, the apparent agreement is void and the party compelled is not bound.

A man cannot validly contract that he shall be irresponsible for his own fraud.

Nulla pactione effici potest ut dolus praestetur.

Source: D. 2, 14, 27; Jackson

No contract clause can exempt a party from liability for his own fraud — an agreement to be held harmless for future deceit is void as against public policy.

The fraud of a predecessor does not prejudice the successor.

Dolus auctoris non nocet successori.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Weisman, 29e

A successor in title or office is not tainted by the fraud of his predecessor — each person answers for his own deceit, and no innocent party inherits another's guilt.

Fraud lies hidden in general expressions.

Fraus latet in generalibus.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

Vague and sweeping language is the natural refuge of the deceiver; the law demands specificity precisely because generality conceals the fraud.

Fraud deserves fraud.

Fraus meretur fraudem.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Plow. 100

He who practices deceit cannot complain when deceit is returned upon him — the law gives no sympathy to the deceiver who is himself deceived.

A deceiver deals in generalities.

Dolosus versatur in generalibus.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Co. 34

The fraudulent actor avoids specifics because particular statements can be tested and disproved, while vague assertions resist scrutiny. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.6.13, 1.5.54.)

He who acts fraudulently acts in vain.

Qui per fraudem agit, frustra agit.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Roll. R. 17; Weisman, 29y

Every action grounded in fraud is void and of no legal effect — the law strips the deceiver of every advantage gained by his deceit.

What is otherwise good and just, if sought by force or fraud, becomes bad and unjust.

Quod alias bonum et justum est, si per vim vel fraudem petatur, malum et injustum efficitur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. 78; Weisman, 29j

Even a rightful claim is corrupted when pursued through unlawful means — the manner of seeking justice must itself be just.

The laws help persons who are deceived, not those deceiving.

Source: Tray. Lat. Max. 149; Weisman, 29a

(English-origin maxim.) Equity intervenes to protect the deceived party, not the deceiver — a man who practiced fraud upon another will find no shelter in the courts.

It is safer to be deceived than to deceive.

Source: Lofft, 396; Weisman, 29b

(English-origin maxim.) A man is better off being the victim of deception than being the deceiver, because the deceiver bears the moral and legal guilt while the deceived retains the law's protection.

Fraud should be proved by clear tokens.

Source: 1 Story, Cont. s. 625; Code. 2, 21, 6; Weisman, 29d

(English-origin maxim.) Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, not mere suspicion — vague allegations of dishonesty are insufficient to set aside a transaction.

Gross negligence is equivalent to fraud.

Source: Black's, 2d. 698; Dig. 11, 6, 1; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 646; McCracken v. Hare, 2 Spears (S.C.) 256; Weisman, 29h; Weisman, 44e

(English-origin maxim.) A trustee or fiduciary whose neglect is so extreme as to amount to recklessness is treated the same as one who acted with fraudulent intent — gross negligence and fraud produce the same legal consequences.

Deceit and fraud shall not defend, excuse or benefit any man.

Source: Best, Evid. p. 469, s. 428; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 395; 3 Coke, 78; Fleta, lib. 1, C. 13, s. 15; Weisman, 29l

(English-origin maxim.) No party may use fraud as a shield — deceit cannot serve as a defense, an excuse, or a foundation for any legal benefit, regardless of the circumstances.

Deceit is an artifice, since it pretends one thing and does another.

Source: Black's, 387; Weisman, 29m

(English-origin maxim.) The essence of deceit is the gap between appearance and reality — fraud is proven by showing that the party represented one thing while intending or doing another.

A new road, not an old one, often deceives the traveler.

Source: 4 Inst. 34; Tray. Lat. Max. 162; 2 Coke, 34a; 3 Coke, 81a; Weisman, 29n

(English-origin maxim.) Counsel should warn clients that novel legal theories and untested procedures carry greater risk of error than well-established paths — the old and familiar road is the safer one.

He acts in fraud of the law who, though the letter of the law being inviolate, uses the law contrary to its intention.

Source: Dig. 1, 3, 29; Weisman, 29q

(English-origin maxim.) One who technically complies with the letter of a law while deliberately subverting its purpose commits fraud upon the law and will be treated as a violator.

Fraud is always positive or intentional and distinguished from negligence.

Source: Alexander v. Church, 53 Conn. 561; 4 Atl. 103; 53 Conn; Weisman, 29v

(English-origin maxim.) Fraud requires a deliberate act of deception — it is always affirmative and intentional, and must be distinguished from mere carelessness or negligence.

No one is considered as deceiving those who know and consent to his acts.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 145; Bouv. 141; Weisman, 29w

(English-origin maxim.) Volenti non fit injuria — a person who enters a transaction with full knowledge of the other party's conduct and consents to it cannot afterward claim to have been deceived.

Fraud lurks in generalities. Fraud deals in generalities.

Source: Tray. Lat. Max. 162; 2 Coke, 34a; 3 Coke, 81a; Weisman, 29o

(English-origin maxim.) Vague and general language is the natural habitat of fraud — demand specificity in every transaction, for the fraudster hides behind broad terms and undefined words.

That which is bad in its beginning does not improve by lapse of time.

Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescet.

Source: Broom, Max. 178; 4 Coke, 2

An act founded in corruption cannot ripen into legitimacy merely because no one challenged it promptly — illegality at the root is permanent.

The corruption of the best is the worst.

Corruptio optimi pessima.

Source: Black's, 2d. 277; Weisman, 25d

When those entrusted with the highest offices and duties become corrupt, the resulting injury to the public trust is the most severe.

A poisonous gloss is one which corrupts the substance of the text.

Glossa venenata est quae corrumpit viscera textus.

Source: 11 Coke, 34; Weisman, 25c

An interpretation that twists a law's plain meaning to serve corrupt purposes destroys the law itself — the corruption of the text is worse than ignoring it entirely.

Corruption is always the forerunner of despotism.

Corruptio est semper praecursor despotismi.

Source: Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U.S. 108, 111-12; Weisman, 25f

Where public officers engage in corrupt practices, tyranny inevitably follows — corruption in government is not an isolated vice but the gateway to the loss of all liberty.

Abuse does not take away use.

Abusus non tollit usum.

Source: Dav. Ir. K.B. 79

The fact that a right or power has been abused does not justify abolishing it — the remedy for abuse is correction, not extinction.

An evil custom is to be abolished.

Malus usus abolendus est.

Source: Co. Litt. 141; Weisman, 78h

No custom or practice, however long-standing, can survive once shown to be contrary to right — duration does not convert wrong into right.

Extortion is a crime when, under color of office, one takes what is not due, or more than is due, or before the time when it is due.

Extortio est crimen quando quis colore officii extorquet quod non est debitum, vel supra debitum, vel ante tempus quod est debitum.

Source: 10 Coke, 102; Weisman, 26q

A public officer who uses his position to exact anything beyond what is lawfully owed commits the specific crime of extortion — color of office magnifies, not excuses, the wrong.

Whatever in itself is not lawful, necessity makes lawful; and necessity induces a privilege as regards private rights.

Quicquid per se non est licitum, necessitate fit licitum; et necessitas inducit privilegium quoad jura privata.

Source: 2 Inst. 564

Under the monarchy, necessity was declared by the Crown and accepted without question. In the American system, necessity does not suspend due process of law — even genuine emergency must pass through judicial review, and no claim of necessity can permanently destroy a reserved right of the People without due process of law.

It is not the rigor but the inexpediency of laws and acts of authority which make them tyrannical.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 25a

(English-origin maxim.) A law does not become tyrannical merely because it is strict; tyranny arises when law serves no just purpose or exceeds the scope of the authority delegated by the People. Legislation that bears no rational connection to the security of natural rights is an act of arbitrary power, not of lawful governance.

There may be damage without legal injury.

Damnum sine injuria esse potest.

Source: Lofft, 112; 3 Bl. Comm. 219; Broom, Max. 93

Not every loss gives rise to a legal claim — a man may suffer damage without any violation of his legal rights.

Injury is not presumed.

Injuria non praesumitur.

Source: Co. Litt. 232; Weisman, 59c

The law presumes that men act lawfully until the contrary is shown — no man is presumed to have wronged another without proof.

The act of God does injury to no one.

Actus Dei nemini facit injuriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 287; 1 Coke, 97b; Co. Litt. 206a; 5 Co. 87; Weisman, 59d

No man is held liable for losses caused by forces beyond human control — where God acts, man is excused.

He who does not repel an injury when he can, invites it.

Qui non repellit injuriam quando potest, inducit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 271; Weisman, 59f

A man who has the power to resist a wrong and does nothing makes himself partly responsible for the harm that follows — rights must be defended or they will be lost.

No one causes damage except he who does what he has no right to do.

Nemo damnum facit nisi qui id fecit quod facere jus non habet.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 151

Lawful exercise of one's own rights cannot constitute an actionable injury to another, even if the other suffers loss thereby.

The act of law does injury to no one.

Actus legis nemini facit injuriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 287; 5 Coke, 116; 2 Bl. Comm. 123

The lawful operation of established legal process is not an injury, even when it produces an adverse result — but this protection extends only to acts truly authorized by law. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.1, 1.5.280.)

An action should not be given to one who has suffered no injury.

Non debet actio dari ei qui non est injuria passus.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 69

Standing in law requires actual injury to a cognizable right — no man may invoke the courts over a wrong he has not personally suffered.

Bodily injuries cannot be assessed against future considerations.

Corporalis injuria non recipit aestimationem de futuro.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 22; Broom, Max. 278

A personal injury demands present satisfaction — it cannot be deferred, discounted, or traded against future contingencies.

Abundant caution does no injury.

Abundans cautela non nocet.

Source: 11 Co. 6; Jackson; Wharton

Taking extra precautions in legal proceedings or transactions does no harm and cannot be held against the party who exercises them.

Something is conceded, which otherwise would not be conceded, lest an injury should remain unpunished.

Aliquid conceditur ne injuria remaneat impunita, quod alias non concederetur.

Source: Co. Litt. 197; Jackson

The law will stretch its ordinary rules to ensure that no wrong goes without remedy — procedural or technical barriers yield when their enforcement would leave an injury entirely unredressed.

No one can change his purpose to the injury of another.

Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam.

Source: D. 50, 17, 75; Jackson; Weisman, 59i

A man may not reverse his course of action when doing so would injure another who has relied upon his original undertaking — change of mind does not excuse the harm it causes.

The king cannot confer a favour on one subject to the injury and damage of others.

Non potest rex gratiam facere cum injuria et damno aliorum.

Source: 3 Inst. 286; Jackson

Sovereign favor extended to one person cannot lawfully come at the expense of another's rights — the crown's grace must not operate as a trespass upon the people.

What right is, and in what consists injury, is the business of the law to declare.

Quid sit jus et in quo consistit injuria, legis est definire.

Source: Co. Litt. 158; Jackson; Weisman, 59t

The definition of rights and wrongs belongs to the law, not to private opinion — no man may unilaterally declare what constitutes his right or another's injury.

It is the rule, that everyone is prejudiced by his ignorance of law, but is not prejudiced by his ignorance of a material fact.

Regula est, juris quidem ignorantiam cuique nocere, facti vero ignorantiam non nocere.

Source: D. 22, 6, 9; Jackson; Weisman, 57b

Ignorance of the law is no excuse, but ignorance of a material fact may be — the law presumes every man knows his legal obligations, while excusing honest ignorance of circumstances.

Surplusage hurts not.

Surplusagium non nocet.

Source: 9 H. 6, 26; Jackson

Unnecessary or redundant matter in a pleading or instrument does not vitiate what is otherwise sufficient — superfluous words are disregarded rather than treated as fatal defects.

An error of a clerk ought not to hurt.

Vitium clerici nocere non debet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 23; Jackson

A clerical or ministerial error in recording or transcribing does not defeat the substance of a proceeding — the law will not allow a scrivener's mistake to destroy a party's rights.

One's own wrong shall not benefit the person doing it.

Injuria propria non cadet in beneficium facientis.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

No man may convert his own wrongful act into an advantage — the law refuses to let the wrongdoer profit from the very injury he inflicts.

Not every loss produces an injury.

Non omne damnum inducit injuriam.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Bl. Com. 219; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2211; Weisman, 59b

Loss alone does not give rise to a cause of action; there must be a violation of a legal right before the law provides a remedy.

He who suffers damage by his own fault has no right to complain.

Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur damnum sentire.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Dig. 50, 17, 203; Weisman, 59k

A man who brings loss upon himself through his own negligence or wrongdoing cannot seek redress from another for that self-inflicted harm.

There may be damage or injury inflicted without any act of injustice.

Source: Lofft, 112; Weisman, 59a

(English-origin maxim.) Not every loss gives rise to a legal claim — damage without a violation of a legal right (damnum absque injuria) is not actionable.

Extreme law (rigor of law) is the greatest injury; strict law is great punishment.

Source: Hob. 125; Weisman, 59e

(English-origin maxim.) The rigid application of law without equity produces injustice — courts must temper strict legal rules with reason to avoid results that defeat the very purpose of the law.

A personal injury does not receive satisfaction from a future course of proceeding, [is not left for its satisfaction to a future course of proceeding.].

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 6; Broom, Max. 278; Weisman, 59h

(English-origin maxim.) A wrong to the person demands immediate redress — the injured party cannot be told to wait for some future proceeding, because personal injuries require present remedy.

An injury is done to him of whom a reproachful thing is said, or concerning whom an infamous song is made.

Source: 9 Coke, 60; Weisman, 59l

(English-origin maxim.) Defamation — whether by spoken word, written libel, or satirical song — constitutes a legal injury to the person whose reputation is attacked.

An injury is extinguished by the forgiveness or reconcilement of the party injured.

Source: Ersk. Inst. 4, 4, 108; Weisman, 59m

(English-origin maxim.) When the injured party forgives the wrongdoer or the parties reconcile, the cause of action for the injury is extinguished and cannot be revived.

Damage derived by consent is not a cause of action.

Source: Wing. Max. 482; Bract. fol. 20; Weisman, 59s

(English-origin maxim.) Volenti non fit injuria — one who voluntarily consents to a risk of harm cannot afterward sue for damages arising from that very risk.

No one should be injured by that which has taken place between other parties.

Source: Dig. 12, 2, 10; Weisman, 59u

(English-origin maxim.) A stranger to a transaction or proceeding cannot be prejudiced by it — no man should suffer injury from the acts of parties with whom he had no dealing.

From things to which one is accustomed, or in which there has been long acquiescence, no injury or wrong arises.

Source: Jenk. Cent. Intro. viii; Weisman, 59v

(English-origin maxim.) Long-standing custom or acquiescence bars a claim of injury — a party who endured a condition without complaint for an extended time cannot suddenly treat it as a wrong.

Extreme caution does no harm.

Source: 11 Coke, 6b; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 28, s.1; Weisman, 59x

(English-origin maxim.) Excessive caution in legal proceedings is never harmful — it is better to take every precaution than to overlook a safeguard and suffer irreversible loss.

Bodily injuries cannot be foreseen and guarded against by means of provisos.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 22; Weisman, 59y

(English-origin maxim.) Contract clauses and provisos cannot anticipate or guard against every possible bodily harm — personal injuries are by nature unpredictable and require remedies beyond mere contractual terms.

An injury offered to a judge, or person representing the king, is considered as offered to the king himself, especially if it be done in the exercise of his office.

Injuria illata judici, seu locum tenenti regis, videtur ipsi regi illata, maxime si fiat in exercente officium.

Source: 3 Inst. 1; Jackson

An affront to a judicial officer acting in his official capacity is treated as an affront to the sovereign authority he represents — contempt of the officer is contempt of the law itself.

He is free from fault who knows but cannot prevent.

Culpa caret qui scit sed prohibere non potest.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 50; Weisman, 44a

The law does not hold a man culpable for failing to prevent what was genuinely beyond his power — but the inability must be real, not merely inconvenient.

Gross fault is equivalent to intentional wrong.

Culpa lata aequiparatur dolo.

Source: Dig. 50, 16, 226; Black's, 2d. 304

Negligence so extreme as to suggest reckless indifference to consequences is treated by the law as though it were a deliberate act.

Impossibility is an excuse in law.

Impotentia excusat legem.

Source: Co. Litt. 29b; Broom, Max. 223; Weisman, 44o

Where performance is genuinely impossible, the law excuses — but the impossibility must be objective, not self-created.

Let the punishment be proportioned to the fault.

Culpae poena par esto.

Source: Dig. 48, 19, 11; Broom, Max. 279; Weisman, 92dd

The measure of accountability must match the degree of blameworthiness — the law demands proportionality between fault and consequence.

When both parties are equally at fault, the position of the possessor (or defendant) is the stronger.

In pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis (vel defendentis).

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 154; 4 T.R. 270; Broom, Max. 325

Where both parties are equally guilty, the court will not intervene to shift the advantage — it leaves the loss where it finds it.

He who is free from fault does not create fault.

Qui culpa caret non facit culpam.

Source: 5 Coke, 49

Where a man acts without fault, no culpability attaches to him — the law does not manufacture blame where none exists.

A frivolous fear is not a lawful excuse.

Vanus timor non est excusatio.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 184; 2 Inst. 483; Weisman, 44g

The law does not accept speculative or imaginary fears as justification for wrongful action — the apprehended danger must be real and imminent.

It is a fault for a man to meddle in a matter not pertaining to him.

Culpa est immiscere se rei ad se non pertinenti.

Source: D. 50, 17, 36; Jackson; Weisman, 44b

One who interjects himself into affairs that are none of his business bears responsibility for any harm that results — the law does not protect the busybody.

When both parties are in fault the plaintiff must always fail, and the cause of the person in possession be preferred.

Cum par delictum est duorum, semper oneratur petitor.

Source: D. 50, 17, 154; Jackson; Weisman, 44p; Weisman, 99w

Where both parties are equally culpable, the court will not disturb the existing state of affairs — the plaintiff who comes with unclean hands loses to the defendant in possession.

To commit and not prohibit, when in your power, is the same thing; and he who does not, when he can prohibit, is in fault.

Idem est facere et non prohibere cum possis; et qui non prohibet cum prohibere possit in culpa est.

Source: 3 Inst. 158; Jackson; Weisman, 44n

He who has the power to prevent a wrong and fails to act is as culpable as the one who commits it — the duty to prevent evil is as binding as the duty not to commit it.

The force of a word is to be first examined, lest by a fault of expression the discourse or the law be obstructed without arguments.

Primo excutienda est verbi vis, ne sermonis vitio obstruatur oratio, sive lex sine argumentis.

Source: Co. Litt. 68; Jackson; Weisman, 104aa

The precise meaning of every word must be established before argument begins, lest imprecise language obstruct the entire proceeding.

That which is without remedy avails of itself if there be no fault in the party seeking to enforce it.

Quod remedio destituitur ipsa re valet si culpa absit.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 9; Jackson; Weisman, 94b

Where no formal remedy exists, the right itself still has force provided the claimant is free from fault — the absence of a prescribed procedure does not extinguish the underlying right.

A fault finds its own authors.

Culpa tenet suos auctores.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

Blame attaches to the one who caused the fault — responsibility cannot be shifted to an innocent party but traces back to its true origin.

Ignorance, or want of skill, is considered a negligence.

Imperitia culpae annumeratur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Dig. 50, 17, 132; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 1004; Weisman, 57i

One who professes skill in a trade or profession and then performs incompetently is held negligent, because the undertaking itself creates the duty of competence.

Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.

Negligentia semper habet infortunium comitem.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 246

Carelessness inevitably breeds adverse consequences; the law therefore treats neglect as a culpable failure, not as mere accident.

No guilt attaches to him who is compelled to obey.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 169, pr.; Bouv. 124; Weisman, 44c

(English-origin maxim.) A soldier obeying a lawful order, or a servant acting under his master's command, bears no fault for the consequences — compulsion negates personal culpability.

Obedience to existing laws is a sufficient extenuation of guilt before a civil tribunal.

Source: Broom, Max. 12, note; Weisman, 44d

(English-origin maxim.) Compliance with existing law is a sufficient mitigation of guilt before a civil tribunal — a man who acted within the bounds of the law as it stood is entitled to leniency, because obedience to the law of the land extenuates what might otherwise be blameworthy.

He adds fault to fault who sets up a defense of a wrong committed by him.

Source: 5 Coke, 49; Weisman, 44f

(English-origin maxim.) A wrongdoer who attempts to justify his wrong compounds his offense — defending a bad act adds a second fault to the first.

Where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it.

Source: Story, Ag. s. 195; Weisman, 44j

(English-origin maxim.) When both parties are equally at fault, the law will not intervene for either — the court leaves the loss where it finds it, granting no relief to either side.

Misconduct binds [should bind] its own authors. It is a never-failing axiom that everyone is accountable only for his own offense or wrong.

Source: Ersk. Inst. 4, 1, 14; Weisman, 44l

(English-origin maxim.) Each man answers only for his own misconduct — liability cannot be shifted to one who had no part in the wrong.

The law holds him excused who chose that his blood should be redeemed on any terms.

Source: Dig. 48, 21, 1; 1 Bl. Comm. 131; Weisman, 44m

(English-origin maxim.) Self-preservation is a right recognized by law — a man who acts under duress to save his own life is excused, even if he submitted to terms he would otherwise refuse.

He who does not blame, approves.

Source: 3 Inst. 27; Weisman, 44h

(English-origin maxim.) Silence in the face of wrongdoing constitutes approval — one who fails to object or condemn is treated as having endorsed the act.

Malice is bitter; it is the character of a wicked mind.

Malitia est acida; est mali animi affectus.

Source: 2 Bulstr. 49

Malice is not mere ill-feeling but a settled disposition to do wrong — the law treats it as a distinct and aggravating element of culpability.

Evil is not presumed.

Malum non praesumitur.

Source: 4 Coke, 72; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 78c

The law's starting presumption is innocence — no man is assumed to harbor evil intent until the evidence compels that conclusion.

He who is once shown to be bad is presumed to remain so in the same kind.

Semel malus, semper praesumitur esse malus in eodem genere.

Source: Cro. Car. 317; Best, Evid. 345; Weisman, 26j; Weisman, 78e

A demonstrated pattern of wrongdoing creates a rebuttable presumption of continued misconduct of the same character — past behavior is evidence of present disposition.

Evil does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one.

Malum non habet efficientem, sed deficientem causam.

Source: 3 Inst. Proem.; Weisman, 78l

Evil arises not from the creation of something new but from the failure or corruption of what should be good — wrongdoing is a deficiency, not a creative act.

It is not lawful to do evil that good may come of it.

Non licet ex malo bonum facere.

Source: 11 Coke, 74a; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 378; Weisman, 78n

No desired outcome, however beneficial, can justify the use of unlawful means to achieve it — the end never justifies the means.

Evil deeds are distinguished from evil purposes.

Mala in se distinguuntur a malis propositis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 290; Weisman, 78m

The law recognizes the distinction between an act that is inherently wrong and a purpose that is wicked — both matter, but they are judged by different measures.

What otherwise was not lawful, necessity makes lawful; but when something is not in itself evil, yet may serve as an example for evil, it is not to be done.

Quod alias non fuit licitum, necessitas licitum facit; sed quando per se non sit malum, et tamen exemplum mali.

Source: 2 Inst. 564

Necessity may justify acts that would otherwise be unlawful; but even where an act is not inherently wrongful, the law prohibits it if permitting it would normalize wrongful conduct by setting a dangerous example.

Malice supplies age.

Malitia supplet aetatem.

Source: 1 Bl. Comm. 464; Weisman, 78j

Where a minor demonstrates a degree of malice beyond his years, the law may treat him as capable of criminal intent regardless of the presumption of incapacity attending his age.

Evil mind, evil intent.

Mala mens, malus animus.

Source: 4 Coke, 15

The law recognizes that a wicked purpose and a corrupt will are inseparable — where malice of mind is established, evil intent is presumed to follow, and the law acts accordingly.

Good men hate sin through love of virtue; bad men, through fear of punishment.

Bonos mores peccata delinquentium odiunt per amorem virtutis; malos per timorem poenae.

Source: Black's, 2d. 847; Weisman, 92k

The law serves both the virtuous and the wicked — it reinforces the good man's conscience and restrains the bad man's appetite through the credible threat of consequences.

The malice of men is to be avoided.

Malum hominum est obviandum.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 4 Co. 15; Weisman, 78k

The law takes preventive measures against known evil — where malicious intent is apparent, it is to be guarded against before it ripens into harm.

The more common the evil, the worse.

Malum quo communius eo pejus.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Weisman, 78d

A wrong that spreads widely through society is more dangerous than an isolated offense, because it corrupts the general order and threatens the peace of all.

Malice is sour, it is the quality of a bad mind.

Source: 2 Bulst. 49; Weisman, 78b

(English-origin maxim.) Malice is the hallmark of a corrupt mind — where malice is proved, the law infers a disposition hostile to the rights of others and punishes accordingly.

Good laws arise from evil manners, i.e., are necessitated by the evil behavior of men.

Source: 2 Inst. 161; Weisman, 78f

(English-origin maxim.) Legislation arises from the need to restrain wrongdoing — it is the misconduct of men that compels the creation of new laws.

The malicious plans of men must be avoided.

Source: 4 Coke, 15; Weisman, 78k

(English-origin maxim.) Schemes born of malice carry no legal protection — the law recognizes and frustrates malicious designs rather than giving them effect.

One wrong does not excuse another.

Injuria non excusat injuriam.

Source: Broom, Max. 395; 11 Exch. 822; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 105a

That another man wronged you first grants no license to wrong him in return — each wrong must be answered for independently.

No one can take advantage of his own wrong.

Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria.

Source: Co. Litt. 148b; Jenk. Cent. 161; Broom, Max. 279; Weisman, 105b

The law will never permit a wrongdoer to profit from his own wrongful act — no right, title, or benefit shall arise from a man's own unlawful conduct.

The law hates wrong.

Lex odit injuriam.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 563, max. 146; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, no. 62; Weisman, 105d

The entire structure of law exists to prevent, deter, and remedy wrongful acts — the law's fundamental disposition is hostility toward every species of injustice.

A right cannot arise from a wrong.

Jus ex injuria non oritur.

Source: Broom, Max. 738 n.; 4 Bing. 639; Weisman, 77h

No lawful claim can be founded on an unlawful act — a right purportedly created by wrongdoing is no right at all.

Force, fraud, and wrong are the greatest enemies of peace.

Vis, fraus, et injuria, maximi sunt hostes pacis.

Source: Co. Litt. 161

The three great destroyers of civil order are violence, deceit, and injustice — the law's first object is to suppress all three.

The act of law does wrong to no one.

Actus legis nulli facit injuriam.

Source: 5 Coke, 116; 2 Bl. Comm. 123; Weisman, 105q

Where the law itself operates, the resulting consequence is deemed just — but this maxim protects only acts truly authorized by law, not acts merely performed under its color.

It is better to turn back than to proceed wrongly.

Melius est recurrere quam male currere.

Source: 4 Inst. 176; Weisman, 95aa; Weisman, 105m

When a course of action is discovered to be unlawful, the duty is to stop and reverse — not to press on and hope the wrong corrects itself.

A wrong, in capital cases, is excused or palliated, which would not be so treated in civil cases.

Excusat aut extenuat delictum in capitalibus quod non operatur idem in civilibus.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 15; Jackson

Because life is at stake in capital matters, the law extends defenses and mitigating circumstances that would not avail in civil proceedings — the higher the penalty, the more liberal the construction in favor of the accused.

Law is a rule of right; and whatever is contrary to the rule of right is a wrong.

Jus est norma recti; et quicquid est contra normam recti est injuria.

Source: 3 Buls. 313; Jackson; Bouvier's Law Dictionary

The law is the standard of right conduct, and any departure from that standard constitutes a legal injury — there is no middle ground between right and wrong in the eyes of the law.

No one can take advantage of his own wrong.

Nul prendra advantage de son tort demesne.

Source: 2 Inst. 713; Wharton

A man may not profit from or found a claim upon his own wrongful act — the law denies every benefit flowing from self-created injury.

No one can improve his condition by a crime.

Nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Dig. 50, 17, 137

A criminal act can never serve as the foundation for bettering one's legal position — the law denies all benefit flowing from wrongful conduct.

Whatever is done in excess is prohibited by law.

Quicquid in excessu actum est, lege prohibetur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Co. Inst. 107; Weisman, 41b

The law sets bounds to every right and every power; action that exceeds those bounds is itself a wrong, regardless of whether the underlying authority was legitimate. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.5.1.)

The rigor or height of law is the height of wrong.

Source: Hob. 125; Weisman, 105e

(English-origin maxim.) The overly strict application of legal rules can itself become a form of injustice — courts must temper rigor with equity to prevent the law from defeating its own purpose.

Wherever there is a wrong, there damage follows.

Source: 10 Coke, 116; Weisman, 105f

(English-origin maxim.) Every legal wrong carries with it a corresponding damage — where a right is violated, the law presumes that harm has resulted, even without proof of specific monetary loss.

Wrong is wiped out by reconciliation.

Source: Bouv. 124; Weisman, 105g

(English-origin maxim.) Reconciliation between the parties extinguishes the wrong and bars further suit — once the injured party and the wrongdoer are reconciled, the cause of action is dead.

The idea of rights naturally suggests the correlative one of wrongs; for every right is capable of being violated.

Source: Black's, 1235; Weisman, 105l

(English-origin maxim.) For every right the law recognizes, there exists a corresponding wrong that may violate it — rights and wrongs are correlatives, and the capacity of a right to be infringed is inherent in its nature.

A wrong is not presumed.

Source: Co. Litt. 232; 3 Inst. 23; Weisman, 105n

(English-origin maxim.) The law does not presume wrongdoing — in the absence of evidence, every man's conduct is presumed to be lawful and honest.

Although a thing may not be bad in itself, yet, if it is of bad example, it is not to be done.

Source: 2 Inst. 564; Weisman, 105p

(English-origin maxim.) Even lawful acts should be avoided when they set a dangerous precedent — the law considers not only the immediate effect but the example set for others.

The act of the law does no one wrong.

Source: 5 Coke, 116; 2 Bl. Comm. 123; Weisman, 105q

(English-origin maxim.) What the law itself commands or permits cannot constitute a legal wrong — an act done by operation of law injures no one in the eyes of the law.

Crimes are more effectively prevented by certainty than by severity of punishment.

Recidivum effectuosius praevenit certitudo quam severitas poenae.

Source: Cf. Beccaria, Dei Delitti e delle Pene (1764); Blackstone, 4 Bl. Comm. 11; Weisman, 92b

Swift and certain enforcement deters more powerfully than occasional extreme punishment — a law that is reliably enforced is respected more than one that punishes harshly but rarely.

No one should be punished twice for the same offense.

Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.

Source: 4 Coke, 43; 11 Coke, 59b; Jackson, No. 632; Weisman, 77a; Weisman, 92e

Double punishment for a single wrong is itself a wrong — once a man has answered for his crime by the sentence of a competent tribunal, that matter is concluded forever.

The instigator of a crime is worse than the perpetrator.

Auctor peccati praestat auctore facti.

Source: 5 Coke, 99; Weisman, 26z

The man who conceives and directs a crime from safety bears a heavier moral and legal burden than the one who carries it out — the mastermind outranks the tool.

No one is punished for the crime of another.

Nemo punitur pro alieno delicto.

Source: Wing. Max. 336; Weisman, 92hh

Criminal responsibility is individual — no man can be made to suffer punishment for wrongs committed by another without his knowledge, direction, or participation.

No one is punished unless for some wrong, act, or default.

Nemo punitur sine injuria, facto, seu defalta.

Source: 2 Inst. 287; Weisman, 92n

Punishment presupposes an offense actually committed — the law cannot punish status, condition, or mere association without a wrongful act or culpable omission.

Let the punishment reach the few, but the fear of it affect all.

Poena ad paucas, metus ad omnes perveniat.

Source: 4 Inst. 6; 4 Bl. Comm. 11; Weisman, 92p

The purpose of punishment is deterrence, not vengeance — it should be proportioned so that its certainty discourages all, even though only the guilty suffer it.

No one suffers punishment for his thoughts.

Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur.

Source: Dig. 48, 19, 18; Broom, Max. 279; Weisman, 92i

The law punishes acts, not ideas — a man's innermost thoughts, however wicked, are beyond the reach of earthly tribunals until they manifest in conduct.

The intention is punished though the intended result does not follow.

Intentio punitur licet non sequatur effectus.

Source: 9 Coke, 55; Weisman, 92s

Where criminal intent is fully formed and an overt act taken in furtherance of it, the failure to achieve the intended result does not shield the actor from punishment.

It concerns the state that crimes do not remain unpunished.

Interest reipublicae ne maleficia remaneant impunita.

Source: Jenk. Cent. pp. 30-31, case 59; Wing. Max. 501; Weisman, 92z

The public has an interest in the enforcement of criminal law that transcends the private interest of the victim — unpunished crime undermines the order upon which all rights depend.

He who sins when drunk shall be punished when sober.

Qui peccat ebrius, luat sobrius.

Source: Broom, Max. 17; Weisman, 92r

Voluntary intoxication is no defense — a man who deliberately impairs his own judgment assumes responsibility for every act committed in that impaired state.

Punishment ought not to precede the crime.

Poena non debet antecedere crimen.

Source: Halk. Max. 126; Weisman, 92cc

No person may be subjected to punitive measures in anticipation of wrongdoing — the law punishes what has been done, never what might be done.

As wickedness increases, so ought the punishment to increase.

Crescente malitia crescere debet et poena.

Source: 2 Inst. 479

The severity of punishment must match the severity of the offense — habitual or aggravated wrongdoing justifies proportionally greater penalties.

In penal causes the interpretation ought to be the more favourable.

In penalibus causis benignius interpretandum est.

Source: D. 50, 17, 155; Jackson

Penal statutes and criminal provisions must be construed strictly and in favor of the accused — ambiguity in the law may not be resolved to the defendant's disadvantage.

No Court which has not a record can impose a fine, or commit any person to prison; because those powers belong only to Courts of record.

Nulla curia quae recordum non habet potest imponere finem, neque aliquem mandare carceri; quia ista spectant tantummodo ad curias de recordo.

Source: 8 Co. 60; Jackson; Weisman, 65h

The power to fine and imprison is reserved exclusively to courts of record — inferior tribunals lacking a formal record have no authority to deprive a man of his property or liberty.

Those consenting and those perpetrating are embraced in the same punishment.

Consentientes et agentes pari poena plectentur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 5 Co. 80

One who consents to a crime is equally liable with the one who carries it out — the law draws no distinction between the approver and the doer.

Impunity offers a continual bait to a delinquent.

Impunitas continuum affectum tribuit delinquenti.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 4 Co. 45

Failure to punish emboldens the wrongdoer to repeat and escalate his offenses — unpunished crime breeds more crime.

A person may not be punished differently than according to what the sentence enjoins.

Non alio modo puniatur aliquis, quam secundum quod se habet condemnatio.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 217; Weisman, 92ii

The punishment must conform strictly to the judgment — no officer may impose penalties beyond or different from those ordered by the court.

A madman is punished by his madness alone.

Furiosus solo furore punitur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 247

The insane cannot be held criminally responsible, for their affliction is itself their punishment and the law will not add to it.

The heir is not bound in a penalty inflicted for the crime of the ancestor.

Poena ex delicto defuncti haeres teneri non debet.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Inst. 198

Criminal punishment is personal and dies with the offender — no descendant may be compelled to answer for the wrongs of a forebear.

Punishments should rather be softened than aggravated.

Poenae potius molliendae quam exasperandae sunt.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 220

When doubt exists as to the proper measure of punishment, the law favors leniency over severity.

No wise man punishes that things done may be revoked, but that future wrongs may be prevented.

Nemo prudens punit ut praeterita revocentur, sed ut futura praeveniantur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Buls. 173; Weisman, 92gg

The purpose of punishment is prevention, not revenge — the law looks forward to deterrence rather than backward to retribution.

Positive rules of law will be receded from, rather than crimes and wrongs should remain unpunished.

Receditur a placitis juris, potius quam injuriae et delicta maneant impunita.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Bacon's Max. Reg. 12

Technical legal rules yield when their strict application would allow wrongdoing to escape all consequence, because the public safety is the supreme law.

The smallest bodily punishment is greater than any pecuniary one.

Minima poena corporalis est major qualibet pecuniaria.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Inst. 220

Even the lightest physical punishment outweighs the heaviest fine, because liberty of the person is more precious than property.

In whatever thing one offends, in that he is rightfully to be punished.

In quo quis delinquit, in eo de jure est puniendus.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 233; Weisman, 92ee

The punishment should correspond in kind to the nature of the offense — the law matches consequence to transgression.

The estimation of a crime committed never increases from a subsequent fact.

Aestimatio praeteriti delicti ex postremo facto nunquam crescit.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Bac. Max. Reg. 8

A past offense cannot be retroactively aggravated by later events — the gravity of a crime is fixed at the time of its commission.

A prison is established not for the sake of punishment, but of detention and guarding.

Source: Co. Litt. 260a; Lofft, 119; Weisman, 92c

(English-origin maxim.) The purpose of imprisonment before trial is detention, not punishment — a jail is a place of custody to ensure the accused appears for trial, not a penal institution.

Those sinning secretly are punished more severely than those sinning openly.

Source: 8 Coke, 127; Weisman, 92d

(English-origin maxim.) Concealment aggravates the offense — a crime committed in secret is punished more severely than one committed openly, because secrecy implies deliberate evasion of justice.

Punishment adheres to the offense.

Source: Peoria Gas & Elec. Co. v. Peoria, 200 U.S. 48, 56; Weisman, 92f

(English-origin maxim.) Punishment belongs to the specific offense committed — it cannot be transferred to another person or attached to a different act.

Death is called the "last punishment," the "extremity of punishment".

Source: 3 Inst. 212; Weisman, 92h

(English-origin maxim.) Death is the ultimate and final penalty the law can impose — no punishment beyond death exists, making it the last extremity of penal power.

The most extreme punishment we consider to be is death.

Source: Dig. 48, 19, 21; Weisman, 92h

(English-origin maxim.) Because death is the ultimate penalty, it establishes the outer boundary of the state's punitive power — no punishment may exceed it, and its imposition demands the most rigorous procedural safeguards recognized under the common law.

The law punishes falsehood.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 15; Weisman, 92j

(English-origin maxim.) Perjury and false testimony are among the wrongs the law most actively punishes, because the integrity of judicial proceedings depends entirely on the truthfulness of witnesses.

One confessing willingly should be dealt with more leniently.

Source: 4 Inst. 66; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 92l

(English-origin maxim.) A voluntary confession merits more lenient treatment — the law rewards cooperation with justice and treats the willing confessor more favorably than the defiant offender.

A fine does not impose a loss of reputation or character.

Source: Code. 1, 54; Weisman, 92m

(English-origin maxim.) A monetary fine, unlike imprisonment or corporal punishment, does not affect a man's character or reputation — it is a penalty upon the purse, not upon the person.

He who spares the guilty punishes the innocent.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 133; Weisman, 92q

(English-origin maxim.) Failure to punish the guilty is itself an injury to the innocent — when wrongdoers go unpunished, their future victims bear the cost of the law's leniency.

The deprivation of any rights may be punished.

Source: Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277, 320; Weisman, 92aa

(English-origin maxim.) The deprivation of any right — whether by civil disability, exclusion from a profession, or denial of a previously held privilege — is a punishable wrong. Cite this to establish that government actions stripping rights are subject to due process of law, and that the wrongful taking of a right gives rise to a cause of action.

Infamy arises from crime, not from its punishment.

Infamia ex delicto, non ex poena.

Source: Weisman, 92g

The disgrace of a criminal conviction attaches to the crime itself, not to the penalty imposed — a man is infamous because he committed the offense, not because the court punished him for it.

Where the crime is, there the punishment should be also.

Ubi culpa est, ibi poena subesse debet.

Source: 6 Coke, 47; Weisman, 92t

Punishment must follow the offender and attach to him personally — it cannot be imposed on an innocent party, and it must be inflicted where the guilt actually lies.

Let not jailers torture or augment the punishment of those intrusted to their keeping; but let the sentence of the law be duly yet mercifully executed.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 92u

(English-origin maxim.) A jailer's authority extends only to the lawful execution of the sentence imposed by the court — any cruelty, deprivation, or punishment beyond the judgment is an unauthorized trespass upon the prisoner's natural rights. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments recognizes this ancient common-law limitation on custodial power.

The punishment due to a crime of which one falsely accuses another should be inflicted upon the perjured informer.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 92w

(English-origin maxim.) One who bears false witness to secure another's punishment has committed an offense equal to the harm sought — justice demands that the perjured accuser suffer the very penalty he attempted to bring upon the innocent. This principle deters the weaponization of the legal process against the People.

As transgression is multiplied, the infliction of punishment should increase.

Source: 2 Inst. 479; Weisman, 92bb

(English-origin maxim.) Repeated offenses warrant escalating punishment — the law recognizes that habitual wrongdoing deserves a heavier hand than a first offense.

Remedies are the life of rights.

Remedia sunt vitae jurium.

Source: Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 631; Weisman, 94w

A right that cannot be enforced is a dead letter — the vitality of every right depends on the availability and efficacy of its remedy.

Take away the remedy and you take away the right.

Tolle remedium et tollis jus.

Source: Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 270, 303

Any legislative or administrative action that eliminates the means of enforcing a constitutional right effectively destroys the right — the remedy and the right are inseparable.

Extraordinary remedies are never to be resorted to until ordinary ones fail.

Nunquam ad extraordinaria recurrendum est nisi ubi ordinaria deficiunt.

Source: 4 Inst. 84

The law favors regular process and reserves extraordinary writs, injunctions, and special proceedings for cases where the normal channels have proven inadequate.

If the old remedies can provide relief, new ones should not be tried.

Si veteribus remediis subveniri potest, nova non sunt tentanda.

Source: 10 Coke, 142b

The proven remedies of the common law should be exhausted before inventing novel procedures — established forms carry the weight of precedent and the assurance of tested process.

Not a new but a customary remedy is to be used.

Non novo sed consueto remedio utendum.

Source: 2 Inst. 3

The law favors established and proven remedies over novel inventions — parties should resort to the known forms of action rather than seeking untested procedures.

Resist beginnings; the remedy comes too late when the evil has gathered strength through long delay.

Principiis obsta; sero medicina paratur cum mala per longas convaluere moras.

Source: 2 Inst. 299; Ovid, Remedia Amoris, 91

Prevention is superior to cure — a wrong resisted at its inception is far easier to overcome than one allowed to entrench itself through indifference or delay.

Trial should always be held where the jurors can have better knowledge.

Ibi semper debet fieri triatio ubi juratores meliorem possunt habere notitiam.

Source: Co. Litt. 112

Venue should be fixed where the jury can be best informed of the facts — the right to trial by a jury of the vicinage ensures that those who decide the case have local knowledge of the circumstances.

He who cannot pay with his purse must answer with his person, lest any offend with impunity.

Qui non potest solvere in aere, luat in corpore, ne quis peccetur impune.

Source: 2 Inst. 173; 4 Bl. Comm. 20; Weisman, 94i

The inability to pay a judgment does not extinguish the obligation — the law ensures that no wrong goes entirely unremedied, even when the wrongdoer lacks the means for monetary satisfaction.

In similar cases, the remedy should be similar.

In consimili casu consimile debet esse remedium.

Source: Hardr. 65; Statute of Westminster II (13 Edw. I, c. 24); Weisman, 94p

Like wrongs demand like remedies — the law applies consistent treatment to comparable injuries, ensuring that justice is not arbitrary.

The despoiled party ought to be restored before all else.

Spoliatus debet ante omnia restitui.

Source: 2 Inst. 714

Before any other question is heard — before defenses, counterclaims, or procedural objections — the party wrongfully deprived of his property must first be restored to possession. Restoration comes before adjudication.

No one is obliged to restore that which has been exacted by way of penalty.

Quod a quoquo poenae nomine exactum est id eidem restituere nemo cogitur.

Source: D. 50, 17, 46; Jackson

A penalty lawfully imposed and collected need not be refunded to the offender — what was taken as punishment is taken permanently.

Remedies ought to be reciprocal.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

(English-origin maxim.) Where the law grants a remedy to one party, the opposing party must have a corresponding remedy available — justice requires mutuality of recourse.

Remedies for rights are ever favorably extended.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 18 Vin. Ab. 521; Weisman, 94o

(English-origin maxim.) Courts construe remedial provisions liberally to ensure that rights are made effective, not theoretical.

The process of the law is a grievous vexation; the execution of the law crowns the work.

Processus legis est gravis vexatio, executio legis coronat opus.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 289

Legal process is burdensome by nature, but its justification lies in the final execution of judgment — without execution, all the vexation of process serves no purpose.

When the law gives anything, it gives the means of obtaining it ( all incidents are tacitly given).

Source: 2 Inst. 326; 5 Coke, 47; 3 Kent, Comm. 421; Hob. 234; Weisman, 94c

(English-origin maxim.) When the law grants a right, it implicitly grants all the means necessary to exercise and enforce that right — a right without the tools to vindicate it is no right at all.

To take away all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to take away the right itself.

Source: Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 270, 303; Weisman, 94e

(English-origin maxim.) Destroying the remedy is destroying the right itself — a government that removes all means of enforcement has effectively repealed the right, whatever it claims in words.

Remedy signifies the judicial means for enforcing a right or redressing a wrong.

Source: Walters v. City of Ottawa, 88 N.E. 651, 654, 240 Ill. 259; 240 Ill; Weisman, 94f

(English-origin maxim.) A remedy is the judicial means by which a right is enforced or a wrong is redressed — without a remedy, a right exists only on paper.

Recovery, i.e., restitution, is had by sentence of a judge of a thing wrongfully extorted or detained.

Source: Co. Litt. 154a; Weisman, 94g

(English-origin maxim.) Restitution is the judicial restoration of property wrongfully taken or withheld — the court compels the return of what was unlawfully seized or detained.

It is better to restrain or meet a thing in time, than to seek a remedy after a wrong has been inflicted.

Source: 2 Inst. 299; Weisman, 94j; Weisman, 105o

(English-origin maxim.) Prevention is superior to cure — it is better to restrain a threatened wrong by injunction than to seek damages after the injury has been inflicted.

The law forbids such recoveries whose ends are vain, chargeable, and unprofitable.

Source: Co. Litt. 127b; Weisman, 94t

(English-origin maxim.) The law does not countenance futile litigation — if the recovery sought would be worthless, burdensome, or unenforceable, the court will not entertain the action.

The law wills that, in every case where a man is wronged and endamaged, he shall always have a remedy.

Source: Co. Litt. 197b; Branch, Princ.; Broom, Max. 192; Bouv. Inst. 2411; Weisman, 94u

(English-origin maxim.) The law guarantees a remedy for every wrong — no man may be injured without recourse, and for every violation of a right the law provides a means of redress.

Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies.

Source: Schechter v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528; Weisman, 94x

(English-origin maxim.) Where ordinary remedies are inadequate to meet an extraordinary situation, the court may fashion extraordinary relief — unusual circumstances justify unusual measures.

It is just that every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or character.

Source: Weisman, 94h

(English-origin maxim.) Every person is entitled to a remedy at law for injuries to his person, property, or reputation — the right to redress is itself a fundamental right.

We are never to resort to what is extraordinary as a remedy, until what is ordinary fails.

Source: 4 Inst. 84; Weisman, 94m

(English-origin maxim.) Extraordinary remedies are reserved for extraordinary circumstances — exhaust the ordinary legal channels before seeking exceptional relief.

Where the ordinary remedy fails, we must have recourse to what is extraordinary.

Source: Black's, 2d 1002; Bouv. 155; 4 Coke, 92b, 93; Weisman, 94n

(English-origin maxim.) When standard remedies prove inadequate, the law provides extraordinary ones — writs of mandamus, habeas corpus, and prohibition exist precisely for when the ordinary course of justice falls short.