FOUNDATIONS OF LAW

Natural law is that which holds the same force among all mankind.

Jus naturale est quod apud omnes homines eandem habet potentiam.

Source: Coke, 7 Co. 12; Jackson 473; Weisman, 82e

Natural law is universal — it binds every nation and every court, and no legislature can override it.

Natural law has its foundation in the will of God.

Jus naturale, sive lex naturalis, fundamentum habet in voluntate Dei.

Source: Blackstone, 1 Bl. Comm. 39; Kent, 1 Comm. 2; Weisman, 74f

The authority of natural law rests not on human enactment but on the will of the Creator — it precedes and supersedes all positive law.

The laws of nature are most perfect and unchangeable.

Leges naturae perfectissimae sunt et immutabiles.

Source: Coke, 7 Co. 25; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 74d

Human laws rise and fall, but the laws of nature admit neither amendment nor repeal — any statute contradicting them is void from the beginning.

When enacted law fails, we resort to custom; when custom also fails, we resort to natural reason.

Cum lex deficit, recurritur ad consuetudinem; cum et consuetudo deficit, recurritur ad rationem naturalem.

Source: 2 Rolle 298; Bouvier, Max. 136

Natural law is the ultimate backstop — when statute and custom are both silent, the case must be decided by the law written on nature itself.

No one is presumed to act against nature.

Nemo praesumitur facere contra naturam.

Source: Vinnius, 22 Vin. Abr. 154; Bouvier, Max. 142; Weisman, 74e

Courts will not presume that a party intended an act contrary to the natural order — the burden falls on whoever alleges the unnatural act.

Things forbidden by the nature of things are confirmed by no law.

Quae rerum natura prohibentur, nulla lege confirmantur.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Finch, Law 74; Weisman, 74j; Weisman, 90c

A legislature may pass any words it pleases, but no enactment can make valid what nature itself forbids.

The force of nature is the greatest.

Natura vis maxima est.

Source: Noy, Max. 26; Coke, 2 Inst. 564; Weisman, 74h

When natural law and positive law conflict, natural law prevails — no human enactment can overcome the force of nature.

Nature makes no leap; neither does law.

Natura non facit saltum; ita nec lex.

Source: Co. Litt. 238; Jackson 606; Wharton; Weisman, 74i

Law develops by orderly progression, not by sudden leaps — radical departures from established principle are suspect on their face.

Nature desires perfection; so does law.

Natura appetit perfectum; ita et lex.

Source: Hobart 144; Jackson 605; Wharton; Weisman, 74n

Both nature and law aim at completeness — a legal proceeding that falls short of its natural object is defective and should be corrected.

The highest reason is that which acts in favor of religion.

Summa ratio est quae pro religione facit.

Source: Co. Litt. 341; Jackson 998

Where competing interpretations of law exist, the one that best accords with divine principle and the moral law is to be preferred.

That which natural reason has established among all men is called the law of nations.

Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, vocatur jus gentium.

Source: Dig. 1.1.9; Inst. 1.2.1; 1 Bl. Comm. 43; Weisman, 74l

The law of nations is derived from natural law — it represents those principles so fundamental that all civilized peoples recognize them.

The law regards the order of nature.

Lex spectat naturae ordinem.

Source: Co. Litt. 197b; Jackson 533; Weisman, 74m

Courts must take the natural order into account — a legal result that defies the ordinary course of nature is presumptively wrong.

Crimes against nature are the most heinous.

Crimina contra naturam sunt gravissima.

Source: Coke, 3 Inst. 20; Weisman, 74k

Offenses that violate the natural order are treated with the greatest severity because they strike at the foundation of all law.

The Law respects the bonds of nature.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 268, max. 78; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, no. 29; Weisman, 74b

(English-origin maxim.) The law recognizes and protects the natural bonds of family — parent and child, husband and wife — as prior to and superior to any civil enactment.

Nature takes little heed.

Parum cavet natura.

Source: Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 127, 166; Weisman, 74g; Wharton, III-248

Nature operates by fixed principles indifferent to human convenience — courts invoke this maxim to explain why legal fictions cannot override natural facts such as birth, death, or biological parentage.

So far as natural law is concerned, all men are equal.

Quod ad jus naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt.

Source: Dig. 50.17.32; Co. Litt. 122b

The common law, rooted in natural law, recognizes no natural hierarchy among free men — all stand equal before the law.

The general custom of the whole country is the common law of the country.

Communis consuetudo totius patriae est lex communis patriae.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 119; Jackson 147; Weisman, 18e

The common law is not made by judges or legislators — it is the accumulated custom of the People, recognized and declared by the courts.

The laws of England are threefold: common law, customs, and decrees of Parliament.

Leges Angliae sunt tripartitae: jus commune, consuetudines, ac decreta comitiorum.

Source: Jackson 486; 1 Bl. Comm. 63; Wharton

Statute is only one of three sources of law — common law and custom operate with equal force, and statutes that derogate from them are strictly construed.

Things derogatory to the common law are strictly interpreted.

Quae sunt in derogatione juris communis stricte interpretantur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 29, p. 221, case 72; Weisman, 18; Weisman, 18a; Weisman, 18c

Any statute or grant that diminishes common law rights must be read as narrowly as possible — the common law yields only what is expressly taken.

Things introduced contrary to the common law are not to be drawn into precedent.

Quae contra jus commune introducta sunt, non trahi in exemplum debent.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Jenk. Cent. 29

Exceptions carved out of the common law remain exceptions — they must not be expanded by analogy or used to justify further erosion of common law rights.

An affirmative statute does not derogate from the common law.

Statuta affirmativa non derogant juri communi.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 24; Weisman, 18g

A statute that creates a new right or procedure does not, by that creation, abolish the existing common law remedy — both stand unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.

The jurisprudence of the common law is a social and comprehensive science.

Scientia juris communis est scientia socialis et comprehensiva.

Source: Coke, 7 Co. 28a; Weisman, 18b

The common law is not a narrow technical system — it comprehends the whole of social life and adapts to the needs of the People it governs.

A dispensation is a wound that injures the common law.

Dispensatio est vulnus, quod vulnerat jus commune.

Source: Davies, Ir. K.B. 69; Weisman, 18f; Weisman, 82c

Every special exemption from the common law weakens the law itself — dispensations must be granted sparingly and never presumed.

When in doubt, do not act; but a common error sometimes passes into law.

Quod dubitas, ne feceris; communis error facit jus.

Source: Broom, Max. 139; Co. Litt. 186a

A long-standing and universal mistake of law may, over time, acquire the force of law through common acceptance — but fresh doubts should be resolved by inaction, not innovation.

Many things in the common law have been introduced, for the public good, which are inconsistent with abstract reasoning.

Multa in jure communi, contra rationem disputandi, pro communi utilitate introducta sunt.

Source: Co. Litt. 70b; Broom, Max. 158; 2 Co. 75; Weisman, 71g

The common law is practical, not theoretical — it sometimes adopts rules that serve the public good even when pure logic might point elsewhere.

In England there is no interregnum.

In Anglia non est interregnum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 205; Jackson

The continuity of sovereign authority is never broken — upon the death of one king, the next succeeds instantly, ensuring that the People are never without the protection of law.

Custom is the best interpreter of the law.

Optima est legis interpres consuetudo.

Source: Dig. 1.3.37; 2 Inst. 18; Broom, Max. 931; Jenk. Cent. 273

When the meaning of a law is disputed, the long-established practice of the People under that law is the surest guide to its true intent.

Custom is another law.

Consuetudo est altera lex.

Source: Coke, 4 Co. 21; Co. Litt. 113; Weisman, 27d; Weisman, 27e; Weisman, 27n

Custom operates with the force of enacted law — a party who violates an established custom faces the same consequences as one who violates a statute.

A custom must be certain, for an uncertain custom is held as nothing.

Consuetudo debet esse certa; nam incerta pro nulla habetur.

Source: Davies 33; Black's 255; Bouvier, Max. 121; Weisman, 27c

A custom too vague to be stated with precision cannot bind — the party asserting custom must prove its definite content and consistent application.

A custom, however great its authority, should never prejudice manifest truth.

Consuetudo, licet sit magnae auctoritatis, nunquam tamen praejudicat manifestae veritati.

Source: Coke, 4 Co. 18; Weisman, 27i

No custom, however ancient or universal, can override plain truth — when custom and fact collide, fact prevails.

A custom grounded on a certain and reasonable cause supersedes the common law.

Consuetudo certa et rationabili causa superinducta vincit legem communem.

Source: Litt. s. 169; Co. Litt. 113; Broom, Max. 919; Weisman, 27h

Where a local custom rests on solid reason and has been consistently observed, it displaces the general common law rule for that locality.

Custom is observed as law.

Consuetudo pro lege servatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 113; 4 Co. 21

Courts are bound to recognize and enforce customs that meet the requirements of certainty, reasonableness, and long use.

Reason is the formal cause of custom.

Ratio est formalis causa consuetudinis.

Source: Black's 992; Bouvier, Max. 155; Weisman, 27g

A custom that lacks a rational foundation is no true custom — when reason departs, the custom falls with it.

Custom can neither arise from nor be destroyed by a wrong.

Consuetudo neque injuria oriri neque tolli potest.

Source: Lofft 340; Jackson 157; Weisman, 27m

An unlawful practice, no matter how long continued, never ripens into a binding custom — illegality at the root destroys the claim.

Custom is to be construed strictly.

Consuetudo stricte interpretatur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 83

A custom that departs from the general law must be proved precisely as alleged — it will not be extended by inference to cover cases not clearly within its terms.

A prescriptive and lawful custom overcomes the law.

Consuetudo praescripta et legitima vincit legem.

Source: Co. Litt. 113; 4 Co. 21; Weisman, 27r

A custom that has been exercised from time immemorial and rests on lawful grounds carries the force of law and overrides general rules to the contrary.

A custom once disallowed cannot again be brought forward.

Consuetudo semel reprobata non potest amplius induci.

Source: Davies 33; Black's 256; Jackson 156; Weisman, 27s

Once a court has rejected a claimed custom, the same custom cannot be revived in later proceedings — the question is settled.

There should be no departure from a common observance.

A communi observantia non est recedendum.

Source: 2 Co. 74; Co. Litt. 186a; Wing. Max. 203; Weisman, 17a

A long-established legal practice or custom carries the force of law until expressly abrogated — cite this to challenge novel statutory interpretations or administrative rules that depart from settled usage without clear constitutional warrant.

Custom leads the willing; law compels the unwilling.

Consuetudo volentes ducit, lex nolentes trahit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 274; Weisman, 27t

Custom governs by consent — those who follow it do so willingly. But when custom hardens into law, it compels even those who resist.

From unwritten sources comes that law which use has sanctioned.

Ex non scripto jus venit quod usus comprobavit.

Source: Inst. 1.2.9; Dig. 1.3.35; Jackson 245

The unwritten law — proved by long and uniform practice — is as binding as any statute, and in the common law tradition it is the more ancient authority.

Custom and common usage overcome the unwritten law if the custom is special; and they interpret the written law if the law is general.

Consuetudo et communis assuetudo vincit legem non scriptam, si sit specialis; et interpretatur legem scriptam, si lex sit generalis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 273; Weisman, 17f

Custom operates differently depending on its object — a special local custom displaces general unwritten law outright, while against a written statute custom serves as the interpreter rather than the overrider.

The custom of a manor and place is to be observed.

Consuetudo manerii et loci observanda est.

Source: 4 Co. 21; Weisman, 27k

Each manor and locality may have its own established customs that bind the inhabitants and the courts — these local customs are not extinguished by the general law but coexist with it.

The custom of England is the law of England.

Consuetudo regni Angliae est lex Angliae.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 119; Jackson

The common law of England is nothing more and nothing less than the general custom of the realm — what the People have long practiced is what the law declares.

A reasonable custom is to be obeyed like law.

Obtemperandum est consuetudini rationabili tanquam legi.

Source: 4 Co. 88; Jackson; Weisman, 27l

A custom that is both reasonable and long-established carries the binding force of law — courts and parties are obligated to respect it as they would a statute.

In those things which by common right are conceded to all, the custom of a particular district or place is not to be alleged.

Source: 11 Coke, 85; Weisman, 27a

(English-origin maxim.) A local custom cannot override a universal common-law right — cite this to defeat a municipality's claim that its local practice trumps a right available to all citizens by common right.

Custom is more powerful than grant.

Source: Black's, 907; Weisman, 27f

(English-origin maxim.) Long-established custom carries more authority than a written grant — invoke this when a customary right predates and conflicts with a later conveyance or statutory license.

Things which are done contrary to the custom and usage of our ancestors neither please nor appear right.

Source: 4 Coke, 78; Weisman, 27j

(English-origin maxim.) Innovations that contradict established ancestral practice are presumptively disfavored — cite this to challenge novel government procedures that depart from long-standing customary due process of law.

The antiquity of a custom is to be less regarded than its reasonableness.

Source: Co. Litt. 141a; Weisman, 27p

(English-origin maxim.) A custom's validity rests on its reasonableness, not merely its age — even an ancient custom may be struck down if it is unreasonable, and a newer custom sustained if it is sound.

General customs are such as prevail throughout a country and become the law of that country.

Source: Bodfish v. Fox, 23 Me. 95; Weisman, 27q

(English-origin maxim.) Customs observed uniformly throughout a country become part of its law — cite this to establish that a nationwide practice carries binding legal force even without a statute.

A custom of the truest antiquity is to be retained.

Source: 4 Coke, 78; Weisman, 27v

(English-origin maxim.) A custom of proven antiquity should be preserved and enforced — use this to defend a longstanding practice against legislative or administrative attempts to abolish it.

A custom introduced against reason ought rather to be called a usurpation than a custom.

Source: Co. Litt. 113; Weisman, 27b

(English-origin maxim.) Custom derives its authority from reason — when a custom contradicts reason, it is not true custom but mere usurpation, and carries no legal weight.

Equity is a certain perfect reason which interprets and amends the written law, comprehended in no writing, but consisting in right reason alone.

Aequitas est perfecta quaedam ratio, quae jus scriptum interpretatur et emendat; nulla scriptura comprehensa, sed sola ratione consistens.

Source: Co. Litt. 24b; Jackson 35; Weisman, 36j

Equity operates through reason to correct what the written law, by its generality, gets wrong in a particular case — it is the conscience of the law.

Equity is, as it were, equality.

Aequitas est quasi aequalitas.

Source: Co. Litt. 24; Bouvier, Inst. 3725; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 64

The foundation of equity is equal treatment — it ensures that like cases are treated alike and that no party gains an unjust advantage through technicality.

Equity is the correction of the law where, by reason of its generality, it is deficient.

Aequitas est correctio legis generaliter latae, qua parte deficit.

Source: Plowden 375, 467; Jackson 34; Weisman, 36e

When a general rule produces an unjust result in a specific case, equity steps in to supply what the law omits — it does not destroy the rule but tempers its application.

Equity follows the law.

Aequitas sequitur legem.

Source: Talbot 52; Story, Eq. Jur. s. 64; Co. Litt. 24b; Broom, Max. 151; Weisman, 36r; Weisman, 95t

Equity does not override the law — it supplements it. A court of equity applies legal rules to equitable estates and respects the general policy of the law.

Equity does not make law, but assists law.

Aequitas non facit jus, sed juri auxiliatur.

Source: Lofft 379; Weisman, 36d

Equity is not a rival system of law — it is an auxiliary that fills gaps and prevents injustice where the strict letter of the law falls short.

Equity never counteracts the laws.

Aequitas nunquam contravenit leges.

Source: Black's, 2d. 45; Jackson 37; Weisman, 36o

No court of equity may overturn a clear legal rule — its power is to mitigate and supplement, never to contradict or repeal.

Nothing is more unjust than to extend equity too far.

Nihil iniquius quam aequitatem nimis extendere.

Source: Halkerton 103; Weisman, 36g

Equity that exceeds its proper bounds becomes itself a source of injustice — the remedy must remain proportionate to the wrong.

In all things, but especially in law, equity is to be regarded.

In omnibus quidem, maxime tamen in jure, aequitas spectanda sit.

Source: Dig. 50.17.90; Story, Bailm. s. 257; Weisman, 36m

Every legal proceeding must be measured against equity — a technically correct result that works manifest injustice is not the law's purpose.

Law regards equity.

Jus respicit aequitatem.

Source: Co. Litt. 24b; Broom, Max. 143; Weisman, 36i

The common law itself takes equity into account — rigid application that produces inequitable results is contrary to the spirit of the law.

Equity acts upon the person.

Aequitas agit in personam.

Source: Bouvier, Inst. n. 3733; Weisman, 36c; Weisman, 36n

Equity directs its decrees to the person of the defendant, commanding or forbidding specific acts — this is its distinctive power over courts of law, which act only on property and money.

Equity suffers not a wrong without a remedy.

Aequitas non patitur jus deesse remedium.

Source: Bouvier, Inst. n. 3726; Weisman, 36p

Where a legal wrong exists but no legal remedy reaches it, equity will supply the remedy — the maxim forbids any gap between recognized right and available relief.

The court of chancery is the workshop of justice.

Curia cancellaria est officina justitiae.

Source: Coke, 2 Inst. 552; Weisman, 36l

The equity court exists not to follow rigid forms but to forge practical justice — it adapts its tools to the case at hand.

That which is equitable and good is the law of laws.

Aequum et bonum est lex legum.

Source: Hobart 224; Jackson 39; Weisman, 68b

The ultimate test of any legal rule is whether it produces what is equitable and good — a rule that consistently fails this test has lost its claim to authority.

Extreme law is extreme injury.

Summum jus, summa injuria.

Source: Hobart 125; Cicero, De Officiis 1.10.33

The rigid application of a legal rule to its utmost extreme produces the greatest injustice — this maxim is the classical warrant for equity's intervention wherever strict law would work manifest wrong.

A court of equity ought to do justice completely and not by halves.

Source: Rice & Adams Corp. v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509, 515; Weisman, 36a

(English-origin maxim.) When equity takes jurisdiction of a cause, it must grant complete relief — a court cannot resolve part of the dispute and leave the rest, as half-justice is no justice at all.

The civil law is what a people establishes for itself.

Source: Inst. 1, 2, 1; Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 424, 426; Weisman, 36h

(English-origin maxim.) The civil law derives its authority from the consent of the people who adopt it — a statute imposed without the people's consent lacks the character of true law.

In the court of chancery ( equity) a man shall not be prejudiced by his mispleading, or defect of form, but according to the truth of the matter; for the decision should be made according to conscience and not according to the rigor of law.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 36f

(English-origin maxim.) Equity looks to substance, not form — a party's right to be heard on the merits cannot be defeated by a technical pleading defect, because the court of conscience is bound to reach the truth of the matter rather than punish imperfect procedure.

Laws derived from the pure source of equity and justice must be founded on the consent of those whose obedience they require.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 36s

(English-origin maxim.) No law is legitimate unless it rests on the consent of the governed — invoke this maxim to challenge any regulation, ordinance, or statute imposed upon the People without their genuine consent, as all just authority flows upward from the sovereign People, not downward from government.

All the powers, being derived from equity, are, even in a court of law, to be construed equitably.

Source: Wharton, III-14

(English-origin maxim.) Even in a court of law, powers derived from equity must be construed equitably — a party may invoke equitable principles to temper the rigid application of a legal power.

Courts of equity delight to do justice, and that not by halves.

Source: Wharton, III-58

(English-origin maxim.) Equity will not stop at half-measures — once a court of conscience undertakes a cause, it must fashion a remedy that fully resolves the matter rather than leaving parties in continuing dispute.

Equitable relief will not be granted to a suitor unless he comes into court with clean hands.

Source: Tripp v. Cook; Wharton, III-84

(English-origin maxim.) A party seeking equitable relief must come to court with clean hands — if the plaintiff has acted inequitably regarding the subject matter of the suit, the court will deny the requested relief.

Equity regards whatever is ordered to be done by one having authority, or what ought to be done, as actually done.

Source: Wharton, III-88

(English-origin maxim.) Equity treats an act that should have been performed as though it was performed — invoke this to enforce obligations that a party was duty-bound to complete but neglected.

Wherever persons agree concerning any particular subject, that, in a court of equity, as against the party himself and any claiming under him voluntarily or with notice, raises a trust.

Source: Wharton, III-384

(English-origin maxim.) When parties agree on a matter, equity will enforce that agreement as a trust against the promisor and anyone claiming under him with notice — this is the foundation of constructive trusts arising from consensual dealings.

Law is the highest reason, which commands what is useful and necessary, and forbids what is contrary thereto.

Lex est ratio summa, quae jubet quae sunt utilia et necessaria, et contraria prohibet.

Source: Co. Litt. 319b; Jenk. Cent. p. 117; 2 Inst. 587; Jackson 504

True law is grounded in reason — it commands what is beneficial and forbids what is harmful. An enactment that commands what is harmful or forbids what is useful has departed from law.

The same is always referred to its next antecedent.

Idem semper antecedenti proximo refertur.

Source: Co. Litt. 20; Jackson; Weisman, 97c

In construing a document, a relative pronoun or phrase is applied to the nearest preceding subject — this rule of grammatical construction prevents ambiguity in legal instruments.

No man should be condemned unheard and unsummoned, unless for contumacy.

Nemo inauditus nec insummonitus condemnari debet, si non sit contumax.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 8; Jackson; Weisman, 65s

Due process of law requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before any condemnation — only willful refusal to appear (contumacy) justifies proceeding in a party’s absence.

What is mine cannot be lost or transferred to another without my act or my default.

Quod meum est sine facto meo vel defectu meo amitti vel in alium transferri non potest.

Source: Prest. Abs. 147; Jackson; Weisman, 91z

Property cannot be taken from its owner without his voluntary act or his legal fault — involuntary transfers without consent or due process of law are void.

Law is the science of what is good and just.

Jus est ars boni et aequi.

Source: Dig. 1.1.1; Bracton, fol. 2b; Weisman, 71e

Law is not mere command — it is the art of discerning what is good and equitable, and applying that discernment to human affairs.

Law is a rule of right.

Lex est norma recti.

Source: Bouvier, Max. 136; Weisman, 12d; Weisman, 59o; Weisman, 71f

Every law must be measured against the standard of right — an enactment that violates right is not true law but mere force.

The law always intends what is agreeable to reason.

Lex semper intendit quod convenit rationi.

Source: Co. Litt. 78b; Jackson 532; Weisman, 71jj

When a statute or rule admits of two readings, adopt the one that accords with reason — the law never intends an absurd result.

The precepts of the law are these: to live honorably, to harm no one, to render to every one his due.

Juris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.

Source: Inst. 1.1.3; 1 Bl. Comm. 40; Weisman, 71dd

These three precepts define the entire scope of legal duty — every rule of law is an application of one or more of them.

Law is a sacred sanction, commanding what is proper and forbidding what is contrary.

Lex est sanctio sancta, jubens honesta, et prohibens contraria.

Source: Coke, 2 Inst. 587; Jackson 505; Weisman, 90e

The binding force of law rests on its sacred character — it commands what is honorable and forbids what is dishonorable. When it does the reverse, it forfeits its claim to obedience.

All law has either been derived from the consent of the people, established by necessity, confirmed by custom, or introduced by Divine Providence.

Omne jus aut consensus fecit, aut necessitas constituit, aut firmavit consuetudo, aut quod his defecit Providentia Divina introduxit.

Source: Dig. 1.3.40; Broom, Max. 616; Weisman, 71gg

There are only four sources of law — consent, necessity, custom, and divine decree. Any purported law that cannot trace its origin to one of these is no law at all.

Obedience is the essence of law.

Obedientia est legis essentia.

Source: Coke, 11 Co. 100; Weisman, 72i

Law without obedience is mere ink on paper — a law that the People will not obey, and that cannot be enforced justly, is no law in practice.

Laws are made to no purpose except for those who are subject and obedient.

Leges in vanum conficiuntur, nisi iis subjicientibus et obedientibus.

Source: Branch, Princ.; 7 Co. 13; Weisman, 72m

A law that binds no one accomplishes nothing — law derives its force from the obedience of the governed.

That is perfect which consists of all its parts.

Illud perfectum est quod ex omnibus suis partibus constat.

Source: Coke, 9 Co. 9; Weisman, 95p

A legal proceeding, instrument, or right must include every essential element — remove one necessary part and the whole fails.

The law does not arise from the rule, but the rule from the law.

Non ex regula jus sumatur, sed ex jure quod est regula fiat.

Source: Trayner, Lat. Max. 384; Dig. 50.17.1; Weisman, 95bb

Maxims and rules are summaries of the law, not its source — when the maxim and the underlying law diverge, the law governs.

The foundation being removed, the superstructure falls.

Sublato fundamento, cadit opus.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 106; Broom, Max. 169; Weisman, 95j

Destroy the jurisdictional basis, the constitutional authority, or the factual predicate of a legal proceeding, and the entire proceeding collapses.

An integral part being removed, the whole is taken away.

Sublata parte integrante, tollitur totum.

Source: Coke, 8 Co. 41; Weisman, 95s

When an essential element of a statute, contract, or proceeding is struck down, the remainder cannot stand — the parts depend on the whole.

Nothing is invented and perfected at the same moment.

Nihil simul inventum est et perfectum.

Source: Co. Litt. 230; 2 Bl. Comm. 298 n.; Weisman, 95u

Law develops over time through experience and application — new doctrines must be tested before they can be trusted.

It is better to seek the source than to follow the streamlets.

Melius est petere fontes quam sectari rivulos.

Source: Lofft 606

Always go to the original source — Coke, Bracton, the Digest, the constitution — rather than relying on secondary commentary or modern restatement.

The law is the safest shield; under the protection of the law no one is deceived.

Lex est tutissima cassis; sub clypeo legis nemo decipitur.

Source: Coke, 2 Inst. 56; Jackson 506

The law exists to protect — anyone acting within the law and relying on the law's protections is not to be prejudiced by that reliance.

Reason is the soul of law; when the reason of the law changes, the law itself changes.

Ratio est legis anima; mutata legis ratione, mutatur et lex.

Source: Co. Litt. 70b, 122a; 7 Co. 7; Broom, Max. 159; Jackson 917; Weisman, 71uu

When the underlying reason for a rule has ceased to exist, the rule itself ceases — no law survives the death of the reason that gave it life.

The reason of the law ceasing, the law itself ceases.

Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex.

Source: Co. Litt. 70b; 2 Bl. Comm. 390; Broom, Max. 159; Weisman, 14a; Weisman, 71vv

A statute enacted to address a specific evil or condition becomes void in its application when that evil or condition no longer exists.

The law is more praised when it is approved by reason.

Lex magis laudatur quando ratione probatur.

Source: Broom, Max. 159; Weisman, 71mm

A law that can withstand the test of reason commands greater respect and more willing obedience than one that rests on bare authority alone.

Extremities or subtleties of law are not law.

Apices juris non sunt jura.

Source: Co. Litt. 304b; 10 Co. 126; Wing. Max. 19; Broom, Max. 188; Weisman, 71hh

Hair-splitting technical arguments that pervert the clear purpose of a rule are to be rejected — the law is substance, not sophistry.

Law arises from fact.

Ex facto jus oritur.

Source: Broom, Max. 102; Jackson 243; Weisman, 71q; Weisman, 30n

Legal rights and duties arise from concrete facts, not from abstract propositions — the court must first establish the facts before it can apply the law.

The law does nothing in vain.

Lex nil frustra facit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 17; Broom, Max. 252; Jackson 512; Weisman, 71u

Every provision of law is presumed to have a purpose — if a statutory provision would be rendered meaningless by a particular interpretation, that interpretation is wrong.

The law compels no one to do vain or useless things.

Lex neminem cogit ad vana seu inutilia peragenda.

Source: 5 Co. 21a; Co. Litt. 197b; Broom, Max. 252; Jackson 510; Weisman, 72c; Weisman, 72k

No court order or statutory requirement can lawfully demand a futile act — if compliance would serve no purpose, the requirement is void.

The law does not concern itself with trifles.

Lex non curat de minimis.

Source: Hobart 88; Jackson 514

Immaterial errors, trivial losses, and negligible deviations will not sustain a legal action — the law reserves its machinery for matters of substance.

The laws are adapted to those cases which most frequently occur.

Ad ea quae frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur.

Source: 2 Inst. 187; Dig. 1.3.3

Law cannot anticipate every possible circumstance — it addresses the ordinary course of events, and rare or extraordinary cases do not invalidate a rule that serves the common situation.

Application is the life of a rule.

Applicatio est vita regulae.

Source: 2 Bulst. 79; Weisman, 95q

A rule that is never applied is dead letter — rules exist to govern actual cases, and their meaning is known only through their application to real facts.

The laws sometimes sleep, but never die.

Dormiunt aliquando leges, nunquam moriuntur.

Source: 2 Inst. 161

A law may fall into disuse or be suspended in extraordinary times, but it is not thereby repealed — when the occasion returns, the dormant law awakens with full force.

Execution is the end and fruit of the law.

Executio est finis et fructus legis.

Source: Co. Litt. 289b

A law that is not executed is as if it did not exist — the entire purpose of law is fulfilled only when its commands are carried into effect. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.13, 8.9.2.)

The operation of the law is firmer and more powerful than the will of man.

Firmior et potentior est operatio legis quam dispositio hominis.

Source: Co. Litt. 102a; Weisman, 71tt

No private arrangement can override what the law itself commands — the legal consequences attached to an act by operation of law prevail over any contrary intention of the parties.

Later laws prevail over those which preceded them.

Constitutiones tempore posteriores potiores sunt his quae ipsas praecesserunt.

Source: Dig. 1.4.4; Weisman, 88f

When two laws conflict and cannot be reconciled, the later enactment governs — the sovereign will most recently expressed is the one in force.

No one is compelled to accuse himself, except before God.

Accusare nemo se debet, nisi coram Deo.

Source: Jackson

The privilege against self-incrimination is a natural right — no tribunal of man may compel a person to bear witness against himself.

Legal actions do not admit a limitation.

Actus legitimi non recipiunt modum.

Source: Hob. 158; Jackson

Acts required by law must be performed absolutely and completely — they cannot be qualified by conditions or limitations that the law does not authorize.

An adjournment is to appoint a day or to give a day.

Adjournamentum est ad diem dicere seu diem dare.

Source: 4 Inst. 27; Jackson; Weisman, 65z

An adjournment is not a dismissal but a continuance — the matter remains pending and must be taken up on the appointed day.

Alienation of property is favoured by the law rather than accumulation.

Alienatio rei praefertur juri accrescendi.

Source: Co. Litt. 185a; Jackson

The law favors the free transfer of property over its indefinite accumulation in one hand — policies that restrict alienation are disfavored.

To conceal is one thing, to be silent another.

Aliud est celare, aliud tacere.

Source: Jackson

Mere silence is not fraud, but active concealment is — the distinction between withholding information and affirmatively hiding it determines liability.

He who alleges contrary things is not to be heard.

Allegans contraria non est audiendus.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 16; Jackson

A party who makes contradictory claims destroys his own credibility — the court will not entertain assertions that are irreconcilable with each other.

That which, if proved, would not be relevant, ought not to be heard.

Allegari non debuit quod probatum non relevat.

Source: 1 Chan. Cas. 45; Jackson; Weisman, 99o

Irrelevant allegations waste the court's time — a party should not be permitted to allege what, even if proved, would have no bearing on the outcome.

An alternative petition is not to be heard.

Alternativa petitio non est audienda.

Source: 5 Co. 40; Jackson; Weisman, 65bb; Weisman, 87f

A party must state his claim with certainty — a petition that asserts one thing or another in the alternative lacks the definiteness the law requires.

A tree is so called whilst growing, but wood when it ceases to grow.

Arbor dum crescit; lignum cum crescere nescit.

Source: 2 Bul. 82; Jackson

The character of a thing changes when its nature changes — a standing tree is real property, but once felled it becomes personal property.

The meeting of minds — i.e. mutual consent.

Assensio mentium.

Source: Jackson

No binding agreement exists without a genuine meeting of minds — both parties must understand and agree to the same terms for a contract to form.

That which is assigned takes with it for its use the rights of the assignor.

Assignatus utitur jure auctoris.

Source: Hal. Max. 14; Jackson

An assignee stands in the shoes of his assignor and acquires no greater right than the assignor possessed — one cannot transfer more than one has.

The original estate ceasing, that which is derived from it ceases.

Cessante statu primitivo, cessat derivativus.

Source: 8 Co. 34; Jackson

A derivative right cannot outlive its source — when the principal estate terminates, all lesser interests carved from it terminate as well.

Commerce, by the law of nations, ought to be common, and not converted to monopoly and the private gain of a few.

Commercium jure gentium commune esse debet, et non in monopolium et privatum paucorum quaestum convertendum.

Source: 3 Inst. 56; Jackson

Trade is a natural right of all men — government-granted monopolies that restrict commerce for the benefit of a privileged few violate the law of nations.

Against a man denying principles there is no disputing.

Contra negantem principia non est disputandum.

Source: Co. Litt. 343; Jackson

One who refuses to accept first principles places himself beyond the reach of rational argument — debate requires shared premises. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.1.12.)

The body — i.e. the gist — of the offence.

Corpus delicti.

Source: Jackson

Before any person can be convicted of a crime, the corpus delicti — the fact that a crime was actually committed — must first be established by evidence independent of any confession.

A human body is not susceptible of appraisement.

Corpus humanum non recipit aestimationem.

Source: Hob. 59; Jackson

The body of a free person cannot be reduced to a monetary value — this principle forbids treating human beings as commodities and underlies the prohibition against involuntary servitude.

Whosoever is skilled in his profession is to be believed.

Cuilibet in sua arte perito est credendum.

Source: Co. Litt. 125; Jackson

Expert testimony is given credit in matters within the expert's field — but the same expert has no special authority outside his area of competence.

A weak foundation destroys the superstructure.

Debile fundamentum fallit opus.

Source: Noy, Max. 20; Jackson

A legal argument, proceeding, or claim built on a defective premise will inevitably fail — the soundness of the foundation determines the soundness of the whole.

Debts follow the person of the debtor.

Debita sequuntur personam debitoris.

Source: Halk. Max. 18; Jackson; Weisman, 28k

A debtor cannot escape his obligations by changing location or residence — his debts attach to his person and may be pursued wherever he goes.

A luxurious debtor is odious in law.

Delicatus debitor est odiosus in lege.

Source: 2 Bulst. 148; Jackson

A debtor who lives extravagantly while refusing to pay his creditors receives no sympathy from the court — the law disfavors those who indulge themselves at the expense of those to whom they owe.

A deceiver deals in general terms.

Dolosus versatur in generalibus.

Source: 2 Co. 34; Jackson; Weisman, 29c

Vague and general language in a contract or representation is a hallmark of fraud — the honest party speaks with specificity, while the deceiver hides behind ambiguity. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.6.13, 7.2.14.)

A thing is said to be given when it is yielded otherwise than by virtue of a right.

Donari videtur, quod nullo jure cogente conceditur.

Source: D. 50, 17, 82; Jackson; Weisman, 48l

What is yielded without legal compulsion is treated as a gift — the distinction between what is owed by right and what is given freely determines the nature of the transfer.

Those things which seldom happen are not rashly to be taken into account in transacting business.

Ea quae raro accidunt, non temere in agendis negotiis computantur.

Source: D. 50, 17, 64; Jackson; Weisman, 35l

The law does not require parties to guard against every remote contingency — reasonable foresight, not perfect foresight, is the standard.

Election once made cannot be recalled.

Electio semel facta non patitur regressum.

Source: Co. Litt. 146a; Jackson

When a party is given a choice between two remedies or rights and elects one, he is bound by that election and cannot later pursue the other.

A bond is released by the same formalities with which it is contracted.

Eodem ligamine quo ligatum est dissolvitur.

Source: Co. Litt. 212b; Jackson

An obligation created by a specific form can only be dissolved by that same form — what was bound by deed can only be released by deed.

To refer errors to their principles is to refute them.

Errores ad sua principia referre, est refellere.

Source: 3 Inst. 15; Jackson; Wharton; Weisman, 37j

The surest way to expose a legal error is to trace it back to the principle from which it claims to derive — when the principle does not support the conclusion, the error is laid bare.

An event is that which follows from the cause; and is called an event because it results from causes.

Eventus est qui ex causa sequitur; et dicitur eventus quia ex causis evenit.

Source: 9 Co. 81; Jackson; Weisman, 38a

The law traces consequences to their causes — liability attaches to the cause, not to the mere occurrence of the event.

A new matter always induces various events.

Eventus varios res nova semper habet.

Source: Co. Litt. 379; Jackson; Weisman, 38b

Innovation in law or commerce carries unpredictable consequences — caution is warranted when departing from established practice.

There is no exception of that thing of which the dissolution is sought.

Exceptio ejus rei cujus petitur dissolutio nulla est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 37; Jackson

A party who seeks to dissolve an obligation cannot simultaneously claim an exception under it — one cannot destroy a thing and shelter beneath it at the same time.

Excess in law is reprehended. Excess in any matter is reprehended at common law.

Excessivum in jure reprobatur. Excessus in re qualibet jure reprobatur communi.

Source: Co. 44; Jackson; Weisman, 41a

The law disfavors excess in all things — whether in pleading, punishment, or the exercise of authority, going beyond what is necessary is condemned.

From lapse of time, all things are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly.

Ex diuturnitate temporis omnia praesumuntur esse rite et solenniter acta.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 185; Jackson; Weisman, 100e

Long-standing acts and proceedings enjoy a presumption of regularity — the passage of time cures minor defects in form and shifts the burden to him who alleges irregularity.

Examples illustrate, but do not restrict, the law.

Exempla illustrant, non restringunt, legem.

Source: Co. Litt. 240; Jackson; Weisman, 22l

Examples given in a statute or instrument serve to clarify its meaning but do not limit its scope — the law extends beyond the specific instances named.

It is for the public good that no one should use his property badly.

Expedit reipublicae ne sua re quis male utatur.

Source: Inst. 1, 8, 2; Jackson

Under the monarchy, the Crown claimed authority to regulate property use for the public good without limit. In the American system, the People delegated limited authority to government — the public interest in property use is real, but it cannot override the owner's natural right of dominion without due process of law, and the burden falls on government to show genuine public harm, not mere regulatory preference.

Deeds contain many things which are prohibited to be done.

Facta tenent multa quae fieri prohibentur.

Source: 12 Co. 125; Jackson; Weisman, 30b

Acts already done may stand even though similar acts are now forbidden — the prohibition operates prospectively, and completed transactions are not automatically undone.

Executions are more preferred than all other processes whatever.

Favorabiliores sunt executiones aliis processibus quibuscunque.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; Jackson; Weisman, 42d

The law favors the enforcement of judgments over further proceedings — once a judgment is rendered, the priority shifts to carrying it into effect.

Felony is implied in every treason.

Felonia implicatur in qualibet proditione.

Source: 3 Inst. 15; Jackson; Weisman, 26i

Treason necessarily includes felony as a lesser offense — the greater crime comprehends the lesser.

A fee is that which anyone holds, from whatever cause, whether it be a tenement or a rent.

Feodum est quod quis tenet ex quacunque causa, sive sit tenementum sive reditus.

Source: Co. Litt. 1; Jackson

The term "fee" encompasses all inheritable interests, whether in land or in rent — it is defined by the nature of the holding, not by its physical form.

A fee-simple, so called because fee is the same as inheritance, and simple is the same as legitimate or pure; and thus fee-simple is the same as a legitimate or pure inheritance.

Feodum simplex quia feodum idem est quod hereditas, et simplex idem est quod legitimum vel purum, et sic feodum simplex idem est quod haereditas legitima vel hereditas pura.

Source: Litt. § 1; Jackson; Weisman, 58f

Fee-simple is the highest estate in land — it is an absolute and unconditional inheritance, free from any limitation as to heirs.

Fee-tail — that is, an inheritance within a certain limit.

Feodum taliatum, i.e. haereditas in quandam certitudinem limitata.

Source: Litt. § 18; Jackson

A fee-tail restricts the inheritance to a particular line of heirs — the estate descends only to the specified class and reverts when that line is exhausted.

We generally interpret in favour of the promisor.

Fere secundum promissorem interpretamur.

Source: D. 45, 1, 99; Jackson

Ambiguities in an obligation are construed in favor of the one who made the promise — the promisor is not held to more than he clearly undertook.

Affiliation cannot be proved.

Filiatio non potest probari.

Source: Co. Litt. 126; Jackson

At common law, paternity could not be directly proved by physical evidence — the law therefore relied on the presumption that a child born in wedlock is the child of the husband.

The end puts an end to litigations.

Finis finem litibus imponit.

Source: 3 Co. 78; Jackson; Weisman, 75h

A final judgment concludes the dispute — the law demands that litigation reach an end and that parties be bound by the outcome.

The end of one day is the beginning of another.

Finis unius diei est principium alterius.

Source: 2 Buls. 305; Jackson

For purposes of legal computation, the expiration of one period marks the commencement of the next — time is continuous and admits no gaps.

Navigable rivers and ports are public; therefore the right of fishing there is common to all.

Flumina et portus publica sunt, ideoque jus piscandi omnibus commune est.

Source: Jackson

Navigable waters are held in common for the benefit of all the People — no private party may monopolize what belongs by nature to the public.

Happy is he who can apprehend the causes of things.

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.

Source: Co. Litt. 231; Jackson

Understanding the root causes of legal disputes, rather than merely their symptoms, is the mark of true legal wisdom.

Women are not able to hold public offices.

Feminae non sunt capaces de publicis officiis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 237; Jackson

This maxim reflected the common law disability of women from holding public office — a rule long since superseded. The right of women to hold office came through the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee and reforms in the several state constitutions, not the Nineteenth Amendment, which secured the distinct right to vote.

The custody of the law is stronger than that of man.

Fortior est custodia legis quam hominis.

Source: 2 Rol. Rep. 325; Jackson

Property or persons in the custody of the law are more securely held than in any private custody — the protection of law is the strongest safeguard available.

The law does not regard the fraction of a day.

Fractionem diei non recipit lex.

Source: Lofft, 572; Jackson

For purposes of legal computation, a day is treated as an indivisible unit — the law does not generally inquire into what hour of the day an act was performed.

The frequency of an act operates much.

Frequentia actus multum operatur.

Source: 4 Co. 78; Jackson; Weisman, 2a

Repeated acts carry greater legal weight than isolated ones — habitual conduct tends to establish custom, usage, or pattern of intent.

It is useless to prove that which, being proved, would not avail.

Frustra probatur quod probatum non relevat.

Source: Halk. Max. 50; Jackson; Weisman, 39u

Evidence that has no bearing on the issue should not be admitted — the court's time is not to be consumed by proof of immaterial facts.

A madman is like a man who is absent.

Furiosus absentis loco est.

Source: D. 50, 17, 124; Jackson

One who is insane is treated in law as though he were absent — he cannot act, consent, or bind himself, and the law provides for his protection as it would for one who is not present.

A general expression implies nothing certain.

Generale nihil certi implicat.

Source: 2 Co. 33; Jackson; Weisman, 43f

Broad and general language in a grant, statute, or contract conveys no specific right or obligation — certainty requires specificity.

Inheritance is of two kinds, corporeal and incorporeal: corporeal is that which can be touched and seen; incorporeal, that which can neither be touched nor seen.

Hereditas, alia corporalis, alia incorporalis: corporalis est, quae tangi potest et videri; incorporalis quae tangi non potest nec videri.

Source: Co. Litt. 9; Jackson; Weisman, 58m

The law recognizes both tangible and intangible property rights as inheritable — rights, rents, and easements pass by inheritance just as land and goods do.

Inheritance never ascends.

Hereditas nunquam ascendit.

Source: Glanville, l. 7, c. 1; Jackson

Under the feudal rule, property descended to heirs below but never passed upward to ancestors — this maxim was later modified by statute in most jurisdictions.

By the title of heirs come the heirs of heirs to infinity.

Heredum appellatione veniunt heredes heredum in infinitum.

Source: Co. Litt. 9; Jackson; Weisman, 58j

A grant to a man and his heirs extends to all succeeding generations without limit — the word "heirs" creates a perpetual line of succession.

Homicide, or the slaughter of a man, is the killing of a man by a man.

Homicidium vel hominis caedium, est hominis occisio ab homine facta.

Source: 3 Inst. 54; Jackson

Homicide is defined by its essential elements — the killing of one human being by another — and includes all degrees from justifiable to criminal.

It is the same thing to say nothing and not to say sufficient.

Idem est nihil dicere et insufficienter dicere.

Source: 2 Inst. 178; Jackson

An insufficient pleading or allegation is treated as no pleading at all — the law requires that claims be stated with enough particularity to inform the opposing party. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.34.)

That is perfect which is complete in all its parts; and nothing is perfect whilst anything remains to be done.

Id perfectum est quod ex omnibus suis partibus constat; et nihil perfectum est dum aliquid restat agendum.

Source: 9 Co. 9; Jackson

A legal proceeding, instrument, or obligation must be complete in every essential element — an incomplete act is imperfect and may be challenged until it is perfected.

That which is common is said to be ours.

Id quod commune est, nostrum esse dicitur.

Source: Jackson; Weisman, 70v

Common property belongs to all — each member of the public has an equal interest in public roads, navigable waters, and other common resources.

That which is more remote does not draw to itself that which is nearer, but on the contrary in every case.

Id quod est magis remotum non trahit ad se quod est magis junctum, sed e contrario in omni casu.

Source: Co. Litt. 164; Jackson; Weisman, 95kk

The nearer or more immediate interest prevails over the more remote — a closer connection or claim takes precedence over a distant one.

Wicked rumours spread abroad are the forerunners of rebellion.

Improbi rumores dissipati sunt rebellionis prodromi.

Source: 2 Inst. 226; Jackson

False and malicious reports, when circulated among a people, breed discontent and lawlessness — this maxim warns that seditious falsehood is a harbinger of insurrection, not a harmless exercise of speech.

Impunity always invites to greater crimes.

Impunitas semper ad deteriora invitat.

Source: 5 Co. 69; Jackson

Failure to punish wrongdoing encourages escalation — when offenders go unpunished, they and others are emboldened to commit worse offenses.

An uncertain quantity vitiates the act.

Incerta quantitas vitiat actum.

Source: 1 Rol. Rep. 465; Jackson; Weisman, 15j

A grant, contract, or charge that fails to specify a definite quantity is void for uncertainty — the parties and the court must be able to determine what is owed. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.3.7.)

Speech is the indication of thought.

Index animi sermo est.

Source: Jackson

A person’s words are taken as evidence of his intent — the law judges the mind by what the mouth declares.

In disjunctives it suffices if either part be true.

In disjunctivis sufficit alteram partem esse veram.

Source: Wing. 13; Jackson

When a legal proposition is stated in the alternative, it is satisfied if either branch is proved — both need not be established.

Want of finality in law is reprehensible.

Infinitum in jure reprobatur.

Source: 9 Co. 45; Jackson

The law abhors endless proceedings — every dispute must reach a final determination, and procedural devices that perpetuate litigation are disfavored.

In law every definition is dangerous.

In jure omnis definitio periculosa est.

Source: Jackson

Legal definitions risk being either too broad or too narrow — a rigid definition may exclude what should be included or include what should be excluded.

A new remedy is to be applied to a new case.

In novo casu, novum remedium apponendum est.

Source: 2 Inst. 8; Jackson; Weisman, 94s

When existing remedies are insufficient to address a novel wrong, the law must fashion new remedies — justice is not defeated by the absence of precedent.

All things are presumed against a despoiler.

In odium spoliatoris omnia praesumuntur.

Source: 1 Vern. 19; Jackson; Weisman, 39t; Weisman, 39v; Weisman, 105j

One who destroys or conceals evidence is presumed to have done so because the evidence was against him — every inference is drawn against the spoliator.

In everything is born that which destroys the thing itself.

In omni re nascitur res quae ipsam rem exterminat.

Source: 2 Inst. 15; Jackson

Every right, power, or institution carries within it the seeds of its own limitation or destruction — overuse of authority tends to its eventual overthrow.

In the presence of the greater, the power of the inferior ceases.

In praesentia majoris cessat potentia minoris.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 214; Jackson; Weisman, 11w

When a superior authority is present and acting, the jurisdiction of the subordinate is suspended — the higher power controls.

A hidden intention is bad.

Intentio caeca mala.

Source: 2 Bulst. 179; Jackson; Weisman, 60j

Concealed purposes are disfavored in law — parties dealing with each other are bound to act with transparency, and secret reservations may vitiate a transaction.

Frequent interruption does not take away a prescription once acquired.

Interruptio multiplex non tollit praescriptionem semel obtentam.

Source: 2 Inst. 654; Jackson; Weisman, 95hh

Once a prescriptive right has been fully established, subsequent interruptions do not destroy it — the right, once vested, endures.

In the whole a part is also contained.

In toto et pars continetur.

Source: D. 50, 17, 113; Jackson

He who has the whole necessarily has every part — a grant of the entirety includes all its constituent elements.

In the delivery of deeds, not what is said but what is done is regarded.

In traditionibus scriptorum, non quod dictum est sed quod gestum est inspicitur.

Source: 9 Co. 137; Jackson

The legal effect of a conveyance is determined by the act of delivery, not by the words spoken at the time — substance prevails over accompanying declarations.

He who finds a notorious libel and does not destroy it is punished.

Inveniens libellum famosum et non corrumpens punitur.

Source: Moor. 813; Jackson

At common law, a libelous publication was considered so dangerous to the peace that anyone who found one and failed to destroy it was punishable — the maxim reflects the severity with which the common law treated defamatory writings.

Let the interpretation be always such that the disposition may prevail.

Ita semper fiat relatio ut valeat dispositio.

Source: 6 Co. Rep. 76; Jackson

When construing a legal instrument, the interpretation that gives effect to the intended disposition is preferred over one that defeats it.

Judgments frequently mature by deliberation, never by hurried process.

Judicia in deliberationibus crebro maturescunt, in accelerato processu nunquam.

Source: 3 Inst. 210; Jackson

Sound judicial decision-making requires careful deliberation — hasty proceedings produce unreliable results and risk injustice.

Credit is to be given to the latest decisions.

Judiciis posterioribus fides est adhibenda.

Source: 13 Co. 14; Jackson

This maxim establishes a procedural default: where multiple decisions address the same point, the latest is presumed to state the law. However, this presumption yields to first principles — a later decision that departs from the original understanding of a constitutional provision does not thereby become correct.

The right of survivorship is preferred to encumbrances.

Jus accrescendi praefertur oneribus.

Source: Co. Litt. 185; Jackson; Weisman, 103n

The surviving joint tenant takes the property free of encumbrances created by the deceased tenant alone — the right of survivorship prevails.

Law ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most frequently, and not to those which are unexpected.

Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt, non quae ex inopinato.

Source: D. 1, 3, 8; Jackson; Weisman, 71s

Legislation should address the ordinary course of events, not rare exceptions — laws tailored to unusual cases often produce unjust results in common ones.

The right descends, and not the land.

Jus descendit, et non terra.

Source: Co. Litt. 345; Jackson

What passes by inheritance is the legal right to the land, not the physical soil itself — the heir succeeds to the title, and the title carries with it dominion over the land.

It is not safe to obey him who has no right.

Jus non habenti tute non paretur.

Source: Hob. 146; Jackson; Weisman, 99c

Obedience to an authority acting without lawful right may expose the obedient party to liability — one must first satisfy himself that the command comes from legitimate authority.

A right growing to a possessor accrues to the successor.

Jus superveniens auctori accrescit successori.

Source: Halk. 76; Jackson; Weisman, 58l; Weisman, 103s

A right that attaches to property after its transfer vests in the successor, not in the original holder — the successor takes the benefit of any improvement in title.

The law of England is a law of mercy.

Lex Angliae est lex misericordiae.

Source: 2 Inst. 315; Jackson

The English common law tradition, inherited by the American system, is grounded in mercy — harsh or oppressive constructions are disfavored whenever a merciful reading is available.

The law of England cannot be changed but by Parliament.

Lex Angliae sine Parliamento mutari non potest.

Source: 2 Inst. 619; Jackson

Fundamental law cannot be altered by executive decree or judicial invention — only the legislative body, acting within its constitutional authority, may change the law.

The law compels no one to declare that which he is presumed not to know.

Lex neminem cogit ostendere quod nescire presumitur.

Source: Lofft, 569; Jackson; Weisman, 69n; Weisman, 72l

A party cannot be required to disclose information the law presumes he does not possess — compelled testimony must rest on a reasonable basis for the witness’s knowledge.

The law suffers no fractions and divisions of statutes.

Lex non patitur fractiones et divisiones statutorum.

Source: 1 Co. 87; Jackson

Statutes must be read as a whole, not cherry-picked in fragments — isolating one clause from its context to defeat the purpose of the act is impermissible.

A later Act takes away the effect of an earlier one.

Lex posterior derogat priori.

Source: Mackeld. Civ. L. 5.; Jackson

Where two statutes conflict, the later enactment prevails — the legislature is presumed to have known the earlier law and intended to supersede it.

The law punishes a lie.

Lex punit mendacium.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 15; Jackson; Weisman, 71m

Falsehood before a tribunal — whether by perjury, fraud, or suppression of truth — is punishable because the administration of justice depends on truthful testimony.

The law rejects superfluous, contradictory, and incongruous things.

Lex rejicit superflua, pugnantia, incongrua.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 133; Jackson; Weisman, 71rr

Courts will disregard surplusage, resolve contradictions, and reject absurdities in the construction of legal instruments — clarity and consistency are demanded.

Things permitted are properly united unless the form of law oppose.

Licita bene miscentur, formula nisi juris obstet.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 24; Jackson

Lawful acts may be freely combined unless a specific legal formality prevents it — the law does not prohibit the joining of permissible actions without express cause.

Allegiance is, as it were, the essence of law; it is the chain of faith.

Ligeantia est quasi legis essentia; est vinculum fidei.

Source: Co. Litt. 129; Jackson

Allegiance is the reciprocal bond between the sovereign and the subject — the sovereign protects, the subject obeys, and this mutual obligation is the foundation of lawful government.

Natural allegiance is restrained by no barriers, reined by no bounds, stopped by no limits.

Ligeantia naturalis nullis claustris coercetur, nullis metis refrenatur, nullis finibus premitur.

Source: 7 Co. 10; Jackson

The natural-born allegiance a man owes to the land of his birth is universal and cannot be confined by territorial boundaries or artificial distinctions.

The right line is always preferred to the collateral.

Linea recta semper prefertur transversali.

Source: Co. Litt. 10; Jackson

In matters of descent and inheritance, direct lineage (parent to child) takes precedence over collateral relations (siblings, cousins) — the direct line is always favored.

The act is governed by the law of the place where it is done.

Locus regit actum.

Source: Jackson

The validity and effect of a legal act are determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the act occurs — a contract made in one state is governed by that state’s law as to its form and execution.

The greater contains the less.

Majus continet minus.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 208; Jackson

A grant of a greater power necessarily includes all lesser powers within it — one who has authority to do the whole may do any part.

The more worthy draws with it the less worthy.

Majus dignum trahit ad se minus dignum.

Source: 1 Inst. 48; Jackson; Weisman, 95gg

When two things of unequal dignity are joined, the lesser follows the greater — the principal thing governs the accessory.

Evil deeds ought not to remain unpunished; and impunity affords continual incitement to the delinquent.

Maleficia non debent remanere impunita; et impunitas continuum affectum tribuit delinquenti.

Source: 4 Co. 45; Jackson; Weisman, 78a

Failure to punish wrongdoing encourages further wrongdoing — justice requires that offences be addressed, lest impunity embolden the offender.

A mandatory cannot exceed the bounds placed upon himself.

Mandatarius terminos sibi positos transgredi non potest.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 53; Jackson

An agent or officer acts only within the limits of his mandate — any act beyond those bounds is unauthorized and void as to the principal. (Duplicate maxim — see also 4.4.16.)

A manor is called from “manendo,” according to its excellence, a seat, great, fixed, and firm.

Manerium dicitur a manendo, secundum excellentiam, sedes magna, fixa et stabilis.

Source: Co. Litt. 58; Jackson

The manor, as the permanent seat of lordship and governance, signifies stability — its fixed nature is the basis of the feudal land tenure system and the rights attached thereto.

Mortmain (dead hand) because it is an immortal possession; “manus” stands for possession, and “mortua” for immortal.

Manus mortua, quia possessio est immortalis, manus pro possessione et mortua pro immortali.

Source: Co. Litt. 2; Jackson

Lands held in mortmain (by corporations or religious houses) are effectively removed from commerce because the holder never dies — statutes of mortmain exist to prevent perpetual accumulation by immortal entities.

The promises of women are prompter than those of men.

Maturiora sunt vota mulierum quam virorum.

Source: 6 Co. 71; Jackson; Weisman, 104n

This maxim historically justified earlier ages of legal capacity for women in certain contexts — it reflects the common law’s recognition that maturity of judgment may differ between individuals.

To lie is to go against the mind.

Mentiri est contra mentem ire.

Source: 3 Buls. 260; Jackson

A lie is a deliberate contradiction of what the speaker knows to be true — it is an act against one’s own conscience, and the law punishes it because it corrupts the foundations of justice. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.5.16.)

The smallest bodily punishment is greater than any pecuniary one.

Minima pena corporalis est major qualibet pecuniaria.

Source: 2 Inst. 220; Jackson; Weisman, 92y

Liberty of the person is more precious than property — the law treats even the slightest restraint on bodily freedom as more serious than any monetary penalty.

The right of coining money is comprehended amongst those rights of royalty which are never separated from the kingly sceptre.

Monetandi jus comprehenditur in regalibus quae nunquam a regio sceptro abdicantur.

Source: Dav. 18; Jackson

The power to coin money is a sovereign prerogative that cannot be delegated away — in the American system, this power is vested exclusively in Congress by Article I, Section 8.

Death is denominated the extreme penalty.

Mors dicitur ultimum supplicium.

Source: 3 Inst. 212; Jackson

Capital punishment stands at the summit of legal penalties — its severity demands the highest degree of procedural safeguard and certainty of guilt.

Death dissolves all things.

Mors omnia solvit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 160; Jackson; Weisman, 75v

Death extinguishes personal obligations and liabilities — actions that are purely personal (as opposed to those touching property) die with the party.

Many things are obliquely conceded which are not conceded directly.

Multa conceduntur per obliquum, quae non conceduntur de directo.

Source: 6 Co. 47; Jackson

The law sometimes permits by indirect means what it would not allow directly — incidental consequences of a lawful act may be tolerated even if they could not be directly authorized.

Ten make a multitude.

Multitudinem decem faciunt.

Source: Co. Litt. 257; Jackson

For legal purposes, ten persons constitute a “multitude” — this threshold is relevant to offenses such as riot and unlawful assembly.

The multitude of those who err gives no excuse to error.

Multitudo errantium non parit errori patrocinium.

Source: 11 Co. 75; Jackson; Weisman, 37n

The popularity of a mistake does not make it right — no matter how many follow a wrong course, the error remains an error and the law does not bend to accommodate it.

A negative destroys a negative, and both make an affirmative.

Negatio destruit negationem, et ambo faciunt affirmativum.

Source: Co. Litt. 146; Jackson; Weisman, 95z

In the construction of legal instruments, a double negative creates an affirmative — “not without consent” means “with consent.”

Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.

Negligentia semper habet infortuniam comitem.

Source: Co. Litt. 246; Jackson

He who neglects his duty or his property invites harm — negligence is the mother of loss, and the law does not relieve those who fail to exercise ordinary care.

Nobody need be wiser than the laws.

Neminem oportet esse sapientiorem legibus.

Source: Co. Litt. 97; Jackson

No individual is expected to exceed the wisdom of the law — a party who acts in conformity with the law has done all that can be required of him.

No one is born an artificer.

Nemo nascitur artifex.

Source: Co. Litt. 97; Jackson

Skill and knowledge are acquired, not innate — the law recognizes that competence comes through training, and does not presume expertise without evidence of it.

No one can do through another what he cannot do himself.

Nemo potest facere per alium, quod per se non potest.

Source: Jenk. 237; Jackson

A principal cannot enlarge his own powers by acting through an agent — the agent’s authority can never exceed what the principal himself lawfully possesses.

No one is presumed to have preferred another’s posterity to his own.

Nemo presumitur alienam posteritatem suae pretulisse.

Source: Wing. 285; Jackson; Weisman, 58mm

The law presumes that a man provides for his own descendants before strangers — in construing wills and grants, preference for one’s own issue is the default assumption.

No one is presumed to be forgetful of his own eternal welfare, and more particularly in the moment of death.

Nemo presumitur esse immemor suae aeternae salutis, et maxime in articulo mortis.

Source: 6 Co. 76; Jackson; Weisman, 103l

Deathbed declarations are given special weight because a person facing death is presumed to speak truthfully, being mindful of his eternal soul and the judgment to come.

No one is restrained from using several defences.

Nemo prohibetur pluribus defensionibus uti.

Source: Co. Litt. 304; Jackson

A defendant may plead as many defenses as he has available — the law does not force a party to rely on a single ground when multiple grounds exist.

Nothing more preserves in tranquillity and concord those subjected to the Government than a due administration of the laws.

Nihil infra regnum subditos magis conservat in tranquillitate et concordia quam debita legum administratio.

Source: 2 Inst. 158; Jackson

Public peace depends on faithful law enforcement — when officials administer the law justly and consistently, order follows; when they do not, discord and resistance arise.

Nothing in law is more intolerable than to rule a similar case by a diverse law.

Nihil in lege intolerabilius est, eandem rem diverso jure censeri.

Source: 4 Co. 93; Jackson

Equal cases must receive equal treatment — applying different rules to materially identical facts destroys public confidence in the impartiality of the courts.

Nothing is prescribed except what is possessed.

Nihil prescribitur nisi quod possidetur.

Source: 5 B. & A. 277; Jackson

A prescriptive right can only be claimed over property one actually possesses — mere assertion of a right, without actual enjoyment, cannot ripen into prescription.

There are two sorts of nobility, the higher and the lower.

Nobilitas est duplex, superior et inferior.

Source: 2 Inst. 583; Jackson

The distinction between grades of nobility determined the order of precedence and the incidents of tenure — in American law, all titles of nobility are prohibited by the Constitution.

A person may not be punished otherwise than according to what the sentence enjoins.

Non alio modo puniatur aliquis, quam secundum quod se habet condemnatio.

Source: 3 Inst. 217; Jackson

Punishment must conform exactly to the sentence imposed — no officer may inflict a penalty beyond what the judgment prescribes.

I ought not to be in a better position than my assignor, from whom the right passes to me.

Non debeo melioris conditionis esse, quam auctor meus, a quo jus in me transit.

Source: D. 50, 17, 175; Jackson

An assignee takes the right exactly as the assignor held it, with all its limitations and defects — no one can transfer a greater interest than he possesses.

There is no rule but what may fail.

Non est regula quin fallit.

Source: Plow. Com. 162; Jackson

Every legal rule admits of exceptions — blind adherence to a rule without regard to the circumstances of the case may produce injustice.

Names ought to be regarded not by the opinions of individuals, but by common use.

Non ex opinionibus singulorum sed ex communi usu nomina exaudiri debent.

Source: D. 38, 10, 7; Jackson

Legal terms are to be understood according to their ordinary and customary meaning, not according to any private or idiosyncratic definition a party may assign to them.

You are not to do evil that good may thence arise.

Non facias malum ut inde veniat bonum.

Source: 11 Co. 74; Jackson

The end does not justify the means — an unlawful act is not excused by the good result it may produce.

The laws consist not in being read, but in being understood.

Non in legendo sed in intelligendo leges consistunt.

Source: 8 Co. 167; Jackson; Weisman, 71a

The force of law lies not in the bare words of the text but in their true meaning — a statute must be interpreted according to its sense and purpose, not merely recited.

A reason cannot be given for all the laws that have been established by our ancestors.

Non omnium quae a majoribus nostris constituta sunt ratio reddi potest.

Source: D. 1, 3, 20; Jackson; Weisman, 60o

Some laws rest on grounds that time has obscured — the inability to articulate their reason does not invalidate them, but neither does their antiquity alone justify their perpetuation.

Not what the testator wished, but what he said, is considered in construing a will.

Non quod voluit testator, sed quod dixit in testamento inspicitur.

Source: Jackson

Courts construe wills by the words actually used, not by speculation about unexpressed intent — the written text governs over any alleged secret purpose.

It matters not what is known to the Judge, if it be not known judicially.

Non refert quid notum sit judici, si notum non sit in forma judicii.

Source: 3 Buls. 115; Jackson

A judge's private knowledge may not substitute for evidence properly before the court — only facts established through the judicial process may be relied upon for decision. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.4.9.)

Surplusage is not wont to vitiate writings.

Non solent quae abundant vitiare scripturas.

Source: D. 50, 17, 94; Jackson

Unnecessary words in a legal instrument do not invalidate it — the excess is simply disregarded, and the operative provisions stand.

Confirmation is not valid unless he who confirms is either in possession of the thing itself or of the right of which confirmation is to be made; and in like manner, unless he to whom confirmation is made is in possession.

Non valet confirmatio, nisi ille, qui confirmat, sit in possessione rei vel juris unde fieri debet confirmatio; et eodem modo, nisi ille cui confirmatio fit, sit in possessione.

Source: Co. Litt. 295; Jackson; Weisman, 20g

A confirmation conveys no interest unless both parties — the confirmer and the person confirmed — already hold some interest in the subject matter.

No one is considered entitled to recover that which he must give up to another.

Non videtur quisquam id capere, quod ei necesse est alii restituere.

Source: D. 50, 17, 51; Jackson; Weisman, 94l

The law does not permit a futile recovery — if a party must immediately surrender what he obtains, he has no real interest worth pursuing.

A new law ought to impose form on what is to follow, not on the past.

Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis.

Source: 2 Inst. 292; Jackson

Legislation operates prospectively — a new law governs future conduct and cannot retroactively alter rights or obligations that have already vested.

A novation is not presumed.

Novatio non praesumitur.

Source: Halk. 109; Jackson

An existing obligation is not presumed to have been replaced by a new one — the party asserting novation must prove that both parties intended to extinguish the original agreement.

No iniquity is to be presumed in law.

Nullum iniquum est praesumendum in jure.

Source: 7 Co. 71; Jackson

The law presumes itself to be just — an interpretation that would make the law work an injustice is to be rejected in favor of one that produces an equitable result.

No one is to be esteemed a wrongdoer who merely avails himself of his legal rights.

Nullus videtur dolo facere qui suo jure utitur.

Source: D. 50, 17, 55; Jackson

The lawful exercise of a right is not actionable, even if it causes incidental harm to another — a man standing on his own right commits no wrong.

The estimation of a past offence is never increased by a later fact.

Nunquam crescit ex post facto praeteriti delicti aestimatio.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 8; Jackson

The gravity of an offense is fixed at the time it is committed — subsequent events cannot retroactively enlarge the penalty or change the character of the act.

The concealment of discovered treasure is fraudulent.

Occultatio thesauri inventi fraudulosa.

Source: 3 Inst. 133; Jackson

One who discovers treasure trove and conceals it commits a fraud upon the Crown or sovereign — the law requires disclosure of found treasure.

The offices of magistrates ought not to be sold.

Officia magistratus non debent esse venalia.

Source: Co. Litt. 234; Jackson

Public offices exist for the service of the People, not for the profit of the officeholder — the sale of public office is an act of corruption that vitiates the appointment.

All crimes done openly are lighter.

Omnia delicta in aperto leviora sunt.

Source: 8 Co. 127; Jackson

Offenses committed openly are treated less severely than those done in secret — concealment implies a consciousness of guilt that aggravates the offense.

All things are presumed legitimately done, until the contrary be proved.

Omnia praesumuntur legitime facta donec probetur in contrarium.

Source: Co. Litt. 232; Jackson

Official acts and completed transactions enjoy a presumption of regularity — the burden of proving irregularity falls on the party who alleges it.

All things which are contracted by law perish by a contrary law.

Omnia quae jure contrahuntur, contrario jure pereunt.

Source: D. 50, 17, 100; Jackson

An obligation created by one law may be dissolved by a subsequent law of equal or greater authority — what the law creates, the law may destroy.

Every interpretation, if it can be done, is to be so made in instruments as that all contradictions may be removed.

Omnis interpretatio si fieri potest ita fienda est in instrumentis, ut omnes contrarietates amoveantur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 96; Jackson; Weisman, 22dd

When construing a legal instrument, the interpreter must harmonize apparently conflicting provisions rather than declare them irreconcilable — every clause should be given effect if possible.

Every privation presupposes former enjoyment.

Omnis privatio praesupponit habitum.

Source: Co. Litt. 339; Jackson

Before a right can be taken away, it must first have existed — a claim of deprivation requires proof that the claimant once possessed the thing of which he says he has been deprived.

That which is given for all is restored by the contribution of all.

Omnium contributione sarciatur quod pro omnibus datum est.

Source: 4 Bing. 121; Jackson

When one party bears a loss that benefits all, the cost must be shared proportionally — this is the foundation of general average in maritime law and analogous principles elsewhere.

There may be an abuse of everything of which there is a use, virtue alone excepted.

Omnium rerum quarum usus est, potest esse abusus, virtute solo excepta.

Source: Dav. 79; Jackson; Weisman, 25e

Every right and power is susceptible of misuse — the law therefore imposes limits on the exercise of rights to prevent their perversion into instruments of harm.

It is manifest that no one is able, of his own will, to get rid of his proper origin.

Origine propria neminem posse voluntate sua eximi manifestum est.

Source: Cod. 10, 38, 4; Jackson

A person's natural allegiance and place of origin are fixed by birth and cannot be unilaterally disclaimed — expatriation requires a lawful process, not merely a declaration of will.

The origin of a thing ought to be inquired into.

Origo rei inspici debet.

Source: 1 Co. 99; Jackson

Understanding the source of a right, title, or obligation is essential to determining its present scope and validity — tracing a claim to its origin exposes both its strength and its defects.

Compacts which are not illegal, and do not originate in fraud, must in all respects be observed.

Pacta conventa quae neque contra leges neque dolo malo inita sunt omnimodo observanda sunt.

Source: C. 2, 8, 29; Jackson; Weisman, 24m

Lawful agreements freely made are binding and must be honored — only illegality or fraud in the formation of the contract furnishes ground for non-performance.

It is undoubted law that agreements which are contrary to the laws and constitutions, or contrary to good morals, have no force.

Pacta quae contra leges constitutionesque vel contra bonos mores fiunt, nullam vim habere, indubitati juris est.

Source: C. 2, 3, 6; Jackson

A contract that violates the law, the constitution, or public morality is void ab initio — no court will enforce an agreement founded on illegality.

Agreements founded upon a base consideration are not to be observed.

Pacta quae turpem causam continent non sunt observanda.

Source: D. 2, 14, 27; Jackson

When the consideration for an agreement is immoral or illegal, the entire agreement is unenforceable — the law will not lend its aid to an unconscionable bargain.

Many partners are as one body, inasmuch as they have one right, and it is necessary that the body be perfect, and that there be defect in no part.

Participes plures sunt quasi unum corpus, in eo quod unum jus habent, et oportet quod corpus sit integrum et quod in nulla parte sit defectus.

Source: Co. Litt. 164; Jackson

Joint owners or partners must act as a single body with respect to their shared right — a defect affecting any one partner may defeat the interest of all.

Partners are, as it were, capable of a share, or taking a part, because the thing is common among them by reason of the plurality of persons.

Participes, quasi partis capaces, sive partem capientes, quia res inter eas est communis, ratione plurium personarum.

Source: Co. Litt. 146; Jackson

The concept of partnership rests on shared ownership — each partner holds a proportionate interest in the common property, and none may claim the whole to the exclusion of the others.

It is not enough that sentence be given unless it be carried to execution.

Parum est latam esse sententiam nisi mandetur executioni.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; Jackson

A judgment without enforcement is an empty declaration — the administration of justice is complete only when the sentence is actually executed.

He adds one offence to another who, when he commits an offence, joins the protection of a defence.

Peccatum peccato addit qui culpae quam facit patrocinium defensionis adjungit.

Source: 5 Co. 49; Jackson

Using legal process as a shield for wrongdoing compounds the original offense — the law views the abuse of defensive procedure as an aggravation, not a mitigation.

Money (pecunia) is so called from cattle (pecus), because the wealth of our ancestors consisted in cattle.

Pecunia dicitur a pecus, omnes enim veterum divitiae in animalibus consistebant.

Source: Co. Litt. 207; Jackson; Weisman, 35w

This etymological maxim reminds us that “money” in law is not limited to coined currency — historically and legally, any medium of exchange recognized by the community may serve as money.

The risk of a thing sold, and not yet delivered, is the purchaser’s.

Periculum rei venditae, nondum traditae, est emptoris.

Source: Jackson

Once a sale is complete, risk of loss passes to the buyer even before physical delivery — the buyer bears the loss if the goods are destroyed in transit.

Politics are to be adapted to the laws, and not the laws to politics.

Politiae legibus non leges politiis adaptandae.

Source: Hob. 154; Jackson

Government policy must conform to the law, not the reverse — bending the law to fit political convenience is a subversion of the rule of law.

Possession is, as it were, the position of the foot.

Possessio est quasi pedis positio.

Source: 3 Co. 42; Jackson

Possession requires actual physical presence or control — the word itself derives from the idea of placing one’s foot upon the land, signifying dominion.

Of principles there is no rule.

Principiorum non est ratio.

Source: 2 Buls. 239; Jackson

First principles are self-evident and require no further justification — they are the axioms from which all legal reasoning proceeds and cannot themselves be proved by prior rules.

Protection begets subjection, and subjection protection.

Protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem.

Source: Co. Litt. 65; Jackson

The duty of allegiance and the right to protection are reciprocal — when the sovereign protects, the subject owes obedience; when the sovereign fails to protect, the obligation of allegiance is correspondingly diminished.

That which was a useless institution at the commencement cannot gain strength from an after-fact.

Quae ab initio inutilis fuit institutio, ex post facto convalescere non potest.

Source: D. 50, 17, 210; Jackson

A void act cannot be validated retroactively by subsequent events — if the foundation was defective from the start, no later development can cure it.

Things which are incidents are extinguished when the principals are extinguished.

Quae accessionum locum obtinent extinguuntur cum principales res peremptae fuerint.

Source: 2 Pothier Ob. 202; Jackson

Accessory rights and obligations depend on their principal — when the main right or thing is destroyed, all incidents attached to it perish as well.

Those things which are spoken to one end, ought not to be perverted to another.

Quae ad unum finem loquuta sunt, non debent ad alium detorqueri.

Source: 4 Co. 14; Jackson; Weisman, 104dd

Words in a statute or instrument must be applied to the purpose for which they were intended — twisting language to serve a purpose foreign to its original design is a perversion of the law. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.33.)

Every grant is to be most strongly taken against the grantor.

Quaelibet concessio fortissime contra donatorem interpretanda est.

Source: Co. Litt. 183; Jackson

Ambiguities in a grant are resolved against the party who drafted it — the grantor had the opportunity to express himself clearly and bears the consequence of any uncertainty.

Things bad in the commencement seldom achieve a good end.

Quae mala sunt inchoata in principio vix est ut bono peragantur exitu.

Source: 4 Co. 2; Jackson

An enterprise begun in fraud, illegality, or injustice rarely produces a lawful result — the taint of the origin infects the whole proceeding.

When provision of party is wanting, provision of law is present.

Quando abest provisio partis, adest provisio legis.

Source: cited 18 C. B. 960; Jackson

Where the parties to a contract have failed to address a particular matter, the law supplies the missing term — default rules fill the gaps that private agreement leaves open.

When anything is prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly.

Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo prohibetur et per obliquum.

Source: Co. Litt. 223; Jackson; Weisman, 90a

The law cannot be evaded by doing indirectly what it forbids doing directly — a prohibition extends to every method of accomplishing the forbidden result.

When a noble woman marries a man not noble, she ceases to be noble, unless her nobility was born with her.

Quando mulier nobilis nupserit ignobili desinit esse nobilis nisi nobilitas nata fuit.

Source: 4 Co. 118; Jackson

Under the common law, a woman’s legal status was altered by marriage — this maxim has been superseded by constitutional amendments recognizing the inherent equality of all persons before the law. The Fourteenth Amendment did not create equality; it recognized and secured what already existed in natural law.

He who succeeds to the right or property of another ought to be clothed with his right.

Qui in jus dominiumve alterius succedit jure ejus uti debet.

Source: D. 50, 17, 177; Jackson

A successor in interest takes the right exactly as the predecessor held it — he steps into the same legal position, with the same powers and the same limitations.

Those fears are to be esteemed vain which do not affect a firm man.

Qui non cadunt in constantem virum vani timores sunt aestimandi.

Source: 7 Co. 27; Jackson; Weisman, 95ff

Duress is measured by an objective standard — only threats that would overcome the will of a person of ordinary firmness are legally cognizable.

He who has no power of alienation must retain.

Qui non habet potestatem alienandi habet necessitatem retinendi.

Source: Hob. 336; Jackson

When the law forbids a person from transferring property, he is compelled to hold it — the inability to alienate creates a corresponding obligation of custody.

He who does not prevent what he can prevent, is regarded as doing the thing.

Qui non obstat quod obstare potest facere videtur.

Source: 2 Inst. 146; Jackson

One who has the power and duty to prevent a wrong and fails to act is treated as if he committed the wrong himself — passive acquiescence in preventable harm creates liability.

What a man does fraudulently, he does in vain.

Qui per fraudem agit, frustra agit.

Source: 2 Rol. Rep. 17; Jackson

Fraud vitiates everything it touches — an act procured by fraud is void and confers no rights upon the fraudulent actor.

They who search for reason in all things subvert reason.

Qui rationem in omnibus quaerunt rationem subvertunt.

Source: 2 Co. Rep. 75a; Jackson

Not every legal rule can be reduced to a demonstrable reason — some principles rest on long experience and policy, and demanding a logical proof for every rule undermines the stability of the law.

That which is built on the ground devised passes to the devisee.

Quod aedificatur in area legata cedit legato.

Source: Jackson

Improvements made upon devised land become part of the devise — the devisee takes the land together with everything built upon it.

What is inconvenient, or contrary to reason, is not permitted in law.

Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem, non permissum est in lege.

Source: Co. Litt. 178; Jackson

An interpretation or application of law that produces absurd or unreasonable results is presumptively wrong — the law never intends what reason condemns.

What ought to be done is easily presumed.

Quod fieri debet facile praesumitur.

Source: Halk. Max. 153; Jackson; Weisman, 89i

The law presumes that persons have performed their legal obligations — the burden falls on the party alleging non-performance to prove it.

That which has no beginning has no end.

Quod non habet principium non habet finem.

Source: Co. Litt. 345; Jackson; Weisman, 95nn

A right or obligation that never validly came into existence can never be extinguished — what was never created cannot expire.

What is not read is not believed.

Quod non legitur non creditur.

Source: 4 Inst. 304; Jackson; Weisman, 69t

A document not produced and read before the tribunal has no evidentiary weight — the court believes only what has been properly placed before it.

What I cannot do in person, I cannot do by proxy.

Quod per me non possum, nec per alium.

Source: 4 Co. 24; Jackson

A person cannot circumvent legal restrictions on his own authority by acting through an agent — the agent’s power can never exceed the principal’s.

Legislators pass over that which happens only once or twice.

Quod semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores.

Source: D. 1, 3, 6; Jackson

Legislation addresses recurring conditions, not isolated incidents — the law does not burden the general public with rules designed for extraordinary one-off situations.

What is understood is not lacking.

Quod subintelligitur non deest.

Source: Ld. Raym. 832; Jackson

An implied term need not be expressly stated to be effective — what the parties or the law necessarily understood to be part of the agreement is treated as included.

The law requires not what is vain and useless.

Quod vanum et inutile est, lex non requirit.

Source: Co. Litt. 319; Jackson

The law never demands a futile act — compliance with a requirement that would serve no purpose is not legally compelled.

Whenever the same language expresses two meanings, that is to be taken which is the better fitted for effecting the proposed end.

Quotiens idem sermo duas sententias exprimit, ea potissimum excipiatur, quae rei gerendae aptior est.

Source: D. 50, 17, 67; Jackson; Weisman, 22gg; Weisman, 104l

When statutory or contractual language is susceptible of two interpretations, the court adopts the one that best accomplishes the stated purpose of the instrument.

We dispense with the forms of law rather than that crimes and wrongs should go unpunished.

Receditur a placitis juris potius quam injuriae et delicta maneant impunita.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 12; Jackson

Procedural technicalities must not become shields for injustice — when rigid adherence to form would allow a wrong to escape correction, the form yields.

The kingdom is not divisible.

Regnum non est divisibile.

Source: Co. Litt. 165-166; Jackson; Wharton

Sovereign authority cannot be fractured into independent competing jurisdictions within a single realm — the unity of the sovereign power is essential to the rule of law.

Money refused frees the debtor.

Reprobata pecunia liberat solventem.

Source: 9 Co. 79; Jackson

A lawful tender of payment that is refused by the creditor discharges the debt — the debtor who offers what he owes in good faith cannot be held liable for the creditor’s refusal to accept.

In the course of events many things arise which at the beginning could not be guarded against or foreseen.

Rerum progressu ostendunt multa, quae in initio praecaveri seu praevideri non possunt.

Source: 6 Co. 40; Jackson; Weisman, 38d

The law does not demand perfect foresight — parties and legislators are not held to have anticipated every contingency that later events reveal.

Resignation is a spontaneous relinquishment of one’s own right.

Resignatio est juris proprii spontanea refutatio.

Source: Godb. 284; Jackson

A voluntary resignation extinguishes the right resigned — once freely relinquished, the right cannot be reclaimed absent fraud or duress in the act of resignation.

The value of a thing is estimated according to its worth in money; but the value of money is not estimated by reference to the thing.

Res per pecuniam aestimatur et non pecunia per res.

Source: 9 Co. 76; Jackson; Weisman, 35r

Money is the universal standard of value by which all other things are measured — damages are assessed in monetary terms because money provides the common denominator for compensation.

The grant of a right comes to an end on the termination of the right of the grantor.

Resoluto jure concedentis resolvitur jus concessum.

Source: Mackeld. 179; Jackson

A grant cannot outlive the grantor’s own interest — when the grantor’s right expires, the grantee’s derivative right expires with it.

No one can have a servitude over his own property.

Res sua nemini servit.

Source: Jackson

A servitude requires two distinct parties — an owner cannot hold an easement or other servitude against himself, because the dominant and servient estates must be in different hands.

Sacrilege transcends the cupidity and wickedness of all other thefts.

Sacrilegus omnium praedonum cupiditatem et scelera superat.

Source: 4 Co. 106; Jackson

Theft from a sacred place or of sacred things is treated as the most aggravated form of larceny — the violation of the sacred compounds the offense beyond ordinary theft.

It is according to nature that the advantages of anything should attach to him to whom the disadvantages attach.

Secundum naturam est, commoda cujusque rei eum sequi, quem sequuntur incommoda.

Source: D. 50, 17, 10; Jackson

He who bears the burdens of ownership is entitled to its benefits — risk and reward travel together, and the law does not separate them.

Always in doubtful matters the more liberal construction should be preferred.

Semper in dubiis benigniora praeferenda.

Source: Jackson

When a legal provision is ambiguous, the interpretation most favorable to liberty, to the accused, or to the party whose rights are at stake is to be adopted.

Simony is an ecclesiastical word, derived from Simon Magus, who thought the gift of the Holy Spirit could be purchased with money.

Simonia est vox ecclesiastica, a Simone illo Mago deducta, qui donum Spiritus Sancti pecunia emi putavit.

Source: 3 Inst. 153; Jackson

The buying or selling of spiritual offices or sacraments is an offense against both divine and human law — this maxim defines the origin and nature of the crime of simony.

If anything is owed to an entire body it is not owed to the individual members, nor do the individual members owe what is owed by the entire body.

Si quid universitati debetur singulis non debetur nec quod debet universitas singuli debent.

Source: D. 3, 4, 7, 1; Jackson; Weisman, 28o

A corporation or body politic is a legal person distinct from its members — debts owed to or by the entity are not the debts of the individuals who compose it.

If the suggestion be not true, the letters patent are void.

Si suggestio non sit vera, literae patentes vacuae sunt.

Source: 10 Co. 118; Jackson

A patent or royal grant obtained upon false representations is void — the sovereign’s grant is conditional upon the truth of the facts stated in the petition.

A term of years ought to be certain and determinate.

Terminus annorum certus debet esse et determinatus.

Source: Co. Litt. 45; Jackson; Weisman, 100i

A lease for years must specify a definite beginning and end — an estate of uncertain duration cannot exist as a valid term of years.

The term and the fee cannot both be in one and the same person at the same time.

Terminus et feodum non possunt constare simul in una eademque persona.

Source: Plow. Com. 29; Jackson

When a lessee acquires the fee, the lesser estate merges into the greater — two inconsistent estates cannot coexist in one person, and the lesser is absorbed.

Wills ought to have the broadest interpretation.

Testamenta latissimam interpretationem habere debent.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 81; Jackson; Weisman, 103d

Courts construe wills liberally to carry out the testator’s intent — unlike contracts, wills are read in the light most favorable to giving effect to the testator’s wishes.

Where the number of witnesses is equal on both sides, the more worthy are to be believed.

Testibus deponentibus in pari numero dignioribus est credendum.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson

When conflicting testimony is evenly balanced, the credibility and character of the witnesses determine which side prevails — quality of testimony outweighs quantity.

Witnesses cannot prove a negative, but an affirmative.

Tesmoignes ne poent testifier le negative, mes l’affirmative.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson; Weisman, 39m

A witness can attest to what he saw or heard, but proving that something did not happen is inherently unreliable — the burden of proving a positive fact falls on the party asserting it.

That part is bad which accords not with its whole.

Turpis est pars quae non convenit cum suo toto.

Source: Plow. 161; Jackson; Weisman, 78g

A clause in a document that contradicts the overall purpose of the instrument is to be rejected or construed into harmony — the parts must serve the whole.

That guardianship is secure which trusts to itself alone.

Tuta est custodia quae sibimet creditur.

Source: Hob. 340; Jackson; Weisman, 53d

The safest custody is self-reliance — a party who depends on his own vigilance rather than the good faith of others is best protected.

Where a common remedy ceases, there recourse must be had to an extraordinary one.

Ubi cessat remedium ordinarium ibi decurritur ad extraordinarium.

Source: 4 Co. 93; Jackson; Weisman, 94n

When ordinary legal processes are inadequate, the court may grant extraordinary relief such as writs of mandamus, prohibition, or habeas corpus to prevent a failure of justice.

In the same manner in which anything is bound it is loosened.

Unumquodque eodem modo quo colligatum est dissolvitur.

Source: 2 Rolle Rep. 39; Jackson

An obligation may be discharged only by the same formality that created it — what was established by deed must be released by deed, what was created by statute must be repealed by statute.

An outlaw is, as it were, put out of the protection of the law: he carries the head of a wolf.

Utlagatus est quasi extra legem positus: caput gerit lupinum.

Source: 7 Co. 14; Jackson; Weisman, 26cc

One declared outlaw forfeits the protection of the law — the severity of this maxim historically meant that any man might treat the outlaw as he would a wolf, though modern law has replaced outlawry with less drastic measures.

Scarcely any law can be made which is suitable to all; but it is useful if it regard the greater part.

Vix ulla lex fieri potest quae omnibus commoda sit, sed si majori parti prospiciat utilis est.

Source: Plow. 369; Jackson

No law can satisfy everyone — a law that serves the majority fairly and justly is valid even though it may inconvenience a few. However, the rights of the individual are not subject to majority vote — a law serving the majority cannot violate reserved rights of a minority.

The intention of a testator has a broad and benignant interpretation.

Voluntas testatoris habet interpretationem latam et benignam.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 260; Jackson

Courts favor the testator's intent and construe wills liberally to give effect to his wishes — ambiguities are resolved in favor of carrying out the expressed purpose rather than defeating it.

Charters are called "muniments" from "muniendo," because they fortify and defend the inheritance.

Charters sont appelle "muniments" a "muniendo" quia muniunt et defendunt haereditatem.

Source: 4 Co. 153; Wharton

Title deeds and charters serve as the documentary armor of property rights — their preservation is essential because they are the evidence by which ownership is proved and defended.

The law gives no more than is demanded.

Droit ne done pluis que soit demande.

Source: 2 Inst. 286; Wharton

A court cannot award relief beyond what the plaintiff has asked for — the scope of the remedy is limited by the scope of the demand.

In an exchange it is necessary that the estates be equal.

En eschange il covient que les estates soient egales.

Source: Co. Litt. 60; Wharton

A valid exchange of property requires that both estates be of the same nature and quality — a fee cannot be exchanged for a term of years, nor freehold for leasehold.

The right of survivorship is preferred to the last will.

Jus accrescendi praefertur ultimae voluntati.

Source: Co. Litt. 185; Wharton

In a joint tenancy, the right of survivorship overrides the will of a deceased tenant — the surviving tenant takes the whole, and the deceased's testamentary disposition of his share is defeated.

Where the law gives a right, it gives a remedy to recover.

Lou le ley done chose, la ceo done remedie a vener a ceo.

Source: 2 Rol. R. 17; Wharton

Every legal right carries with it a corresponding remedy — a right without a means of enforcement is no right at all.

A strong presumption avails in law.

Praesumptio violenta valet in lege.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 56; Wharton; Weisman, 89b

A violent or compelling presumption has the force of proof — when the circumstances point overwhelmingly in one direction, the law treats the presumption as equivalent to direct evidence. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.3.3.)

When anything is prohibited, everything by which it is reached is prohibited.

Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur omne per quod devenitur ad illud.

Source: 2 Inst. 48; Wharton; Weisman, 90b

A prohibition extends to every means of accomplishing the forbidden act — one cannot evade the law by achieving the same result through a different method.

Of things relating to each other, one being known, the other is also known.

Relativorum, cognito uno, cognoscitur et alterum.

Source: Cro. Jac. 539; Wharton; Weisman, 93d

Correlative legal concepts are understood together — knowing the right reveals the duty, knowing the grant reveals the obligation, and understanding one side of a legal relationship necessarily illuminates the other. (Duplicate maxim — see also 3.4.12.)

We can do nothing against truth.

Nihil possumus contra veritatem.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 101h

Truth is the foundation on which all law rests; no act, statute, or judgment can prevail against it — what is true remains true regardless of what any tribunal declares. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.5.17.)

A new judgment does not make new law, but declares the old.

Novum judicium non dat novum jus, sed declarat antiquum.

Source: 10 Co. 42; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 64v

Courts do not create law; they discover and declare what the law has always been — every valid judgment is a recognition of pre-existing principle.

Every ratification relates back and is equivalent to a prior command.

Omnis ratihabitio retro trahitur et mandato aequiparatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 207; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 11q

When a principal ratifies an unauthorized act, the ratification reaches back to the moment of the act and validates it as though it had been commanded from the beginning.

Reason is a ray of divine light.

Ratio est radius divini luminis.

Source: Co. Litt. 232; Bouvier, Max.

The capacity for reason is God-given, and the law, being founded on reason, partakes of a divine character — an unreasonable law is no law at all. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.11.6.)

Reason and authority are the two brightest lights of the world.

Ratio et auctoritas duo clarissima mundi lumina.

Source: 4 Inst. 320; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 11u

Law is sustained by two pillars: the rational principle that justifies it and the legitimate authority that enforces it — neither alone is sufficient. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.1.13.)

In default of the law, the maxim rules.

Regula pro lege, si deficit lex.

Source: Bouvier, Max.

Where no statute or precedent directly governs, the maxims of law fill the gap — they are the distilled wisdom of the common law and the court's guide when all else is silent.

By various acts experience frames the law.

Per varios actus legem experientia facit.

Source: 4 Inst. 50; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 2h

The common law is not the product of abstract theorizing but of accumulated human experience — repeated acts, tested by time, harden into binding rule.

Records are vestiges of antiquity and truth.

Recorda sunt vestigia vetustatis et veritatis.

Source: 2 Roll. R. 296; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 101a

The written record preserves what memory cannot — it is the evidence of what was actually done and said, and stands as proof against later contradiction.

Whatever is against the rule of right is a wrong.

Quicquid est contra normam recti est injuria.

Source: 3 Bulstr. 313; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 105h

Right and wrong are measured against an objective standard — any act that departs from that standard is an injury, regardless of whether a statute authorizes it.

There is no fiction without law.

Nunquam fictio sine lege.

Source: Bouvier, Max.

Legal fictions exist only because the law creates and sanctions them for a specific purpose — no court may invent a fiction without lawful authority.

Nothing should be rashly changed.

Nil temere novandum.

Source: Bouvier, Max.

The law favors stability — innovation without necessity risks destroying the settled expectations upon which the People have ordered their lives.

Things which are not valid from the beginning cannot be made valid by a subsequent act.

Quae ab initio non valent, ex post facto convalescere non possunt.

Source: People v. Shall, 9 Cow. (N.Y.) 784; Weisman, 62d; Weisman, 62c

An act void from inception cannot be cured by any subsequent event — cite this to challenge government actions taken without jurisdiction, which remain void regardless of later ratification attempts.

What ought not to be done, when done, is valid.

Quod fieri non debet, factum valet.

Source: 5 Coke, 38, 39; Nichols v. Ketchan, 19 Johns. (N.Y.) 84, 92; Weisman, 62e

An irregular but not void act remains effective — a deed delivered on Sunday or a marriage performed by an unauthorized person may be merely voidable, not void, and courts will not undo what is already accomplished if no jurisdictional defect exists.

That which is valid in law has legal strength, force, and effect, or incapable of being rightfully overthrown or set aside.

Source: Emerson v. Knapp, 75 Mo.App. 92, 97; Weisman, 62g

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A valid instrument carries the full force of law and cannot be collaterally attacked; opposing parties must show a jurisdictional or constitutional defect to overcome it.

Voidable imports a valid act which may be avoided, rather than an invalid act which may be confirmed as such.

Source: Rothberg v. Schmiedeskamp, 134 N.E.2d 544, 546, 334 Mass. 172; Weisman, 62j

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A voidable contract or conveyance stands until the injured party elects to rescind — unlike a void act, it confers rights and imposes duties unless and until affirmatively set aside.

Things shall not be void which may possibly be good.

Source: Bouv. 160; Weisman, 62k

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Courts will construe instruments to sustain their validity wherever possible — a deed or statute that admits of a lawful interpretation will not be declared void when it can be given effect.

Time cannot render valid an act void in its origin.

Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescit.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 29; Weisman, 62l; 4 Co. 2; Bouvier, Max.

No amount of passage of time, acquiescence, or subsequent ratification can cure a jurisdictional defect or an act that was void from inception — an unconstitutional statute does not become constitutional through long enforcement.

He who concedes anything is considered as conceding that without which his concession would be void; or without which the thing itself could not exist.

Qui concedit aliquid concedere videtur et id sine quo concessio est irrita, sine quo res ipsa esse non potuit.

Source: 11 Coke, 52; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 8; Weisman, 62n; Weisman, 4b

A grant implies everything necessary for its enjoyment — a grant of land implies access, a corporate charter implies by-law power, and a delegation of authority carries with it all powers indispensable to its exercise.

A thing which has no effect in law is not an impediment.

Source: Jenk. Cent. Cas. 162; Wing. Max. 727; Weisman, 71b

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A legally void condition, clause, or act cannot obstruct a valid proceeding — a void statute cannot bar an otherwise lawful exercise of right, nor can a defective appointment prevent the office from functioning.

Things favorably considered in law are the treasury, dower, life, and liberty.

Favorabilia in lege sunt fiscus, dos, vita, libertas.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 94; Co. Litt. 341; Weisman, 71c

When a statute or instrument is ambiguous, courts construe it in favor of life, liberty, a widow's dower, and the public fisc — these four interests receive the most favorable presumption at common law.

Law is from everlasting.

Lex est ab aeterno.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 34, case 66; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 71d; Bouvier, Max.

The common law is not a legislative creation but a reflection of eternal principles of justice; no parliament or legislature can claim to have invented rights that pre-exist all positive enactment.

Law is established for the benefit of man.

Hominum causa jus constitutum est.

Source: Black's, 2d. 577; Weisman, 71i

All law exists to serve and protect the People, not to aggrandize government — any construction of a statute that benefits the state at the expense of the individual inverts the purpose of law itself.

The wisdom of the law cannot be valued by money.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 168; Weisman, 71k

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) The principles of justice embedded in the common law transcend monetary valuation — a court cannot put a price on the rule of law itself, nor can damages adequately compensate for the destruction of legal principle.

Law is made to prevent the stronger from having the power to do everything.

Source: Dav. Ir. K.B. 36; Weisman, 71l

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) The law exists as a check on power — government and the powerful may act only within their delegated authority, and the common law protects the weak against the encroachments of the strong.

An act of law shall prejudice no man.

Actus legis nemini facit injuriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 287; Hob. 216; 5 Term, 381, 385; Van Brunt v. Schenck, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 380; Weisman, 71r

When the operation of law itself causes a consequence — such as the vesting of an estate by descent or the merger of legal interests — no party is deemed injured, because the law cannot work injustice by its own necessary action. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.1, 7.4.6.)

Law disfavors improbabilities or impossibilities.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 620, max. 161; p. 606, max. 155; Weisman, 71t

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Courts will not construe a statute or contract to require something impossible or wildly improbable — an interpretation that leads to absurdity is presumed not to have been intended.

Law favors honor and order.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 739, max. 199; Weisman, 71w

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Courts presume that parties acted honorably and in good order — ambiguous acts are construed in favor of lawful conduct, and the law upholds established hierarchies of jurisdiction and authority.

Law favors life, liberty, and dower.

Source: 4 Bacon's Works, 345; Weisman, 71x; Weisman, 71v; Weisman, 89d

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) In every doubtful case, the construction that preserves life, protects liberty, or secures a widow's dower is preferred — these are the interests the common law guards most jealously.

Law favors speeding of men's causes.

Source: Wing. Max. max. 175; Weisman, 71y

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Justice delayed is justice denied — courts should resolve disputes expeditiously, and procedural rules are construed to advance rather than obstruct the prompt determination of cases.

Law favors truth, faith, and certainty.

Source: Wing. Max. max. 154; Weisman, 71z

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Courts construe instruments to uphold truth over falsehood, good faith over bad faith, and certainty over ambiguity — the law rewards honest dealing and clear expression.

The torture or wresting of Laws is the worst kind of torture.

Source: 4 Bacon's Works, 434; Weisman, 71ii

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Twisting a law to punish the innocent or to reach a result it was never designed to achieve is a greater injustice than any physical compulsion — cite this when government distorts a statute beyond its plain meaning to justify an overreach.

Things which are found within the reason of a law are supposed to be within the law itself.

Source: 2 Inst. 689; Weisman, 71qq

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Whatever falls within the spirit and purpose of a law is governed by it, even if not expressly named — a statute prohibiting fraud covers schemes not specifically enumerated if they fall within the mischief the law was enacted to remedy.

He does contrary to the law who does what the law prohibits; he acts in fraud of the law who, the letter of the law being inviolate, uses the law contrary to its intention.

Contra legem facit qui id facit quod lex prohibet; in fraudem vero qui, salvis verbis legis, sententiam ejus circumvenit.

Source: Dig. 1, 3, 29; Weisman, 72a

Compliance with the letter of a statute while subverting its purpose is as unlawful as open violation — cite this against schemes that technically satisfy statutory language but defeat the law's protective intent.

There is something more perfect in things allowed.

Source: Hob. 159; Weisman, 72d

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A lawful act carries greater weight and perfection than one merely tolerated or overlooked — rights exercised with affirmative legal sanction stand on stronger ground than those existing by sufferance alone.

Where there is no authority to establish, there is no necessity to obey.

Source: Dav. 69; Bouv. 160; Weisman, 72e; Weisman, 11i

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) An act of government made without constitutional authority imposes no obligation on the People — cite this to challenge any regulation, order, or mandate for which no delegated power can be shown.

Laws should bind their own maker.

Patere legem quam ipse tulisti.

Source: Fleta, lib. 1, c. 17, s. 11; Weisman, 72f

A legislature is bound by the laws it enacts — government officers cannot exempt themselves from statutes that bind the People, and any claim of sovereign immunity must yield to the principle that the lawmaker is the first subject of the law.

Law is a general rule of adherence to external acts.

Source: Black's, 700; Weisman, 72g

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) The law governs outward conduct, not private thought — a man's intentions are judged by his acts, and legal obligations attach to what is done or omitted, not to what is merely contemplated.

He who adheres to the letter of the law adheres to its bark.

Qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; 5 Coke, 4b; 11 Coke, 34b; 12 East, 372; Weisman, 72j

A purely literal reading of a statute that ignores its purpose and reason grasps only the surface — courts must look to the spirit and intent of the law, not merely its words, to reach a just construction. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.21.)

The word "thing" has a general signification, because it comprehends corporeal and incorporeal objects, of whatever nature, sort, or species.

Source: 3 Inst. 182; Weisman, 95a

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) "Thing" in law encompasses all species of property — tangible and intangible, real and personal — so a statute or grant referencing "things" or "property" is not limited to physical objects but includes rights, choses in action, and every form of legal interest.

Every general principle [or maxim of law] is its own pledge or warrant; and things that are clearly true are not to be proved.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Co. Litt. 11; Weisman, 95b

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A maxim of law requires no external proof — it is self-authenticating authority that a court may take judicial notice of without supporting evidence, and an opponent cannot demand that a party "prove" a fundamental legal axiom.

From nothing nothing comes.

Ex nihilo nihil fit.

Source: Jackson v. Waldron, 13 Wend. (N.Y.) 178, 221; Root v. Stuyvesant, 18 Wend. (N.Y.) 257, 301; Weisman, 95d; Wharton, III-98

A right, title, or obligation cannot be built upon a nullity — if the foundational act, instrument, or authority is void, everything that purports to derive from it falls with it.

There is no reasoning of principles; no argument is required to prove fundamental rules.

Source: 2 Bulst. 239; Weisman, 95f

(English-origin maxim.) First principles of law — such as the right to life, liberty, and property — need no proof or demonstration; they are self-evident axioms upon which all other legal reasoning depends.

The principle ( or beginning) of anything is the most powerful part of a thing.

Source: 10 Coke, 49; Weisman, 95g

(English-origin maxim.) The origin or foundation of a right, grant, or obligation controls its entire subsequent operation — challenge the root and the whole structure falls.

In conjunctives each part must be true.

Source: Wing. Max. 13; Weisman, 95l

(English-origin maxim.) Where a statute, contract, or condition joins requirements with "and," every element must be satisfied — failure of any one part defeats the whole.

The omission of those things which are tacitly implied is of no consequence.

Source: 2 Bulst. 131; Weisman, 95n; Weisman, 43i

(English-origin maxim.) An instrument is not defective merely because it fails to state what the law already implies — implied terms and conditions are read in as though expressly written.

That shall be preserved which is useful in the beginning.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 23; Bract. 73b; Weisman, 95o

(English-origin maxim.) A provision, grant, or right that served a lawful purpose at its inception should be maintained and enforced rather than discarded by later construction.

Everything contains the element of its own destruction.

Source: 2 Inst. 15; Weisman, 95r

(English-origin maxim.) Every grant of authority carries inherent limits — the very conditions that create a power also define the circumstances under which that power expires or is forfeited.

Multiplicity and indistinctness produce confusion; and questions, the more simple they are, the more lucid.

Source: Hob. 335; Weisman, 95v

(English-origin maxim.) Legal pleadings, instruments, and questions should be framed with simplicity and precision — complexity and vagueness obscure truth and defeat justice.

What is in suspense is considered as not existing during such suspense.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 169, 1; Weisman, 95w

(English-origin maxim.) A right, title, or obligation that is contingent or undetermined has no present legal effect — it cannot be enforced, transferred, or relied upon until the condition resolves.

A consequence should not be drawn from another consequence.

Source: Bouv. 121; Bacon,Aph; Weisman, 95x

(English-origin maxim.) Legal reasoning must proceed from established facts or settled principles, not from inferences stacked upon other inferences — a chain of speculation does not constitute proof.

Not only what is permitted, but what is convenient, is to be considered, because what is inconvenient is illegal.

Source: Co. Litt. 66a; Weisman, 95y

(English-origin maxim.) In construing laws and grants, an interpretation that produces absurd or impracticable results must be rejected in favor of one that operates reasonably and conveniently.

Precision and certainty are often of more importance to the rules of law than their abstract justice.

Source: 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 598, 602; Weisman, 95cc

(English-origin maxim.) Settled and predictable rules — even if imperfect in individual cases — serve the public better than rules that bend to abstract fairness, because certainty allows men to order their affairs.

The greater number contains in itself the less also.

Source: Bract. fol. 16; Dig. 50, 17, 110; Broom, Max. 174; 5 Coke, 115; Jenk. Cent. 208; Bouv. 124; Weisman, 95ii

(English-origin maxim.) A grant or power that encompasses the greater necessarily includes the lesser — one who may convey the whole may convey a part, and one authorized to do the major act may do the minor.

The mind submits reluctantly to the rule of Law.

Source: Hannay v. Eve, 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 242, 247; Weisman, 95mm

(English-origin maxim.) Human nature resists legal constraint, which is precisely why the law must be clear, certain, and firmly enforced — the rule of law exists because men will not voluntarily govern themselves by it.

A thing void ab initio is one that never went into effect.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 62i

(English-origin maxim.) An act, contract, or proceeding that was void from its inception has no legal force at any point — it cannot be ratified, cured, or given effect by lapse of time.

Void in part, void in toto.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 62m

(English-origin maxim.) Where a material part of an instrument or act is void, the entire instrument or act fails — the law will not sever and enforce only the valid portions when the void portion is essential to the whole.

An unconstitutional Act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

Source: Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Weisman, 62p

(English-origin maxim.) Any statute that exceeds the constitutional grant of authority to the legislature is a nullity from the moment of its purported enactment — no citizen is bound to obey it, no officer may enforce it, and no office or right created under it has lawful existence.

The indefinite equals the universal.

Indefinitum equipollet universali.

Source: Wharton, II-258

A grant, statute, or declaration that uses indefinite language without limitation is construed as applying universally — an unrestricted term covers all persons, things, or cases within its class.

The court has nothing to do with what is not before it.

Nihil habet forum ex scena.

Source: Wharton, II-507

A court may only adjudicate matters properly brought before it in the case at bar — it has no authority to reach out and decide questions not raised by the parties or presented in the pleadings.

A party may waive the benefit of any condition or provision made in his behalf, no matter in what manner it may have been made or secured.

Source: Wharton, III-25

(English-origin maxim.) A right or protection established for an individual's benefit may be voluntarily relinquished by that individual, but the waiver must be knowing and intentional — no one else can waive it on his behalf without authority.

A thing that is within the letter of a statute, is not within the statute, unless it be within the intention of the law makers.

Source: Wharton, III-32

(English-origin maxim.) The literal text of a statute does not control if the act in question falls outside the legislature's actual purpose — courts must look to the intent behind the law, not merely its words.

An estimate of the value must be made when a part is lost by eviction.

Bonitatis aestimationem faciendam cum pars evincitur.

Source: Wharton, III-41

When a buyer is dispossessed of part of what he purchased because a superior title prevails, the value of what was lost must be assessed at the time of eviction so that the buyer may recover his just compensation.

A final judgment which contains neither condemnation nor acquittal is not held to be just.

Definitiva sententia quae condemnationem vel absolutionem non continet, pro justa non habetur.

Source: Wharton, III-69

A court's final judgment must resolve the matter definitively by either condemning or acquitting — a judgment that leaves the parties in limbo, deciding nothing, is no judgment at all and may be challenged as a nullity.

The times must be distinguished.

Distinguenda sunt tempora.

Source: Wharton, III-74; Weisman, 100h

In construing statutes, contracts, and rights, the time period matters — what was lawful at one time may be unlawful at another, and the applicable law is determined by the time of the act.

The mandate is extinguished when the will of the mandator has ended.

Extinctum est mandatum, finita voluntate.

Source: Wharton, III-106

An agency or authority granted by one person to another ceases automatically when the grantor revokes his consent, dies, or otherwise terminates his will — the agent's power does not survive the principal's authority.

If an affirmative statute, which is introductive of a new law, direct a thing to be done in a certain manner, that thing shall not, even although there are no negative words, be done in any other manner.

Source: Cook v. Kelley, 12 Abb. Pr. 35, 36; Wharton, III-131

(English-origin maxim.) When a statute prescribes a specific method for performing an act, that method is exclusive — compliance by any other means is invalid even though the statute contains no express prohibition of alternatives.

Residence establishes domicile.

Incolas domicilium facit.

Source: Wharton, III-137

A person's actual dwelling place, where he habitually resides with intent to remain, fixes his legal domicile for purposes of jurisdiction, taxation, and civil status.

The most unjust peace is to be preferred to the most just war.

Iniquissima pax est anteponenda justissimo bello.

Source: Wharton, III-142

The law favors settlement and compromise over litigation — even an imperfect resolution by agreement is preferred to the destruction, expense, and uncertainty of protracted legal combat.

So the law is written.

Ita lex scripta est.

Source: Wharton, III-153

Where the written law is clear and unambiguous, courts must apply it as written without adding to it or subtracting from it — the plain text governs, however harsh the result may seem.

Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things divine and human.

Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia.

Source: Wharton, III-161

True knowledge of the law encompasses both divine law (the moral order established by the Creator) and human law (the civil order established by men) — a jurisprudence that ignores either is incomplete.

The highest law is often the greatest wrong.

Jus summum saepe summa est malitia.

Source: Wharton, III-164

Rigid, literal enforcement of a legal rule without regard to equity or circumstance can produce gross injustice — the law must be tempered by reason, and courts of equity exist precisely to prevent the letter of the law from becoming an instrument of oppression.

Every man is free to determine for himself whether counsel is advantageous to him.

Liberum est cuique apud se explorare an expediat sibi consilium.

Source: Wharton, III-175

No person may be compelled to accept legal counsel against his will — the right to represent oneself (sui juris) is inherent, and the decision whether to seek or follow advice belongs solely to the individual.

The written letter remains.

Litera scripta manet.

Source: Wharton, III-176

Written instruments — contracts, deeds, statutes, constitutions — endure as evidence and bind the parties long after oral promises are forgotten; what is reduced to writing is the controlling record.

A guardian ought not to make profit from the guardianship of his ward.

Lucrum facere ex pupilli tutela tutor non debet.

Source: Wharton, III-178

A fiduciary entrusted with the care of another's person or property — whether guardian, trustee, or public officer — must never use that position for personal gain; any profit derived from the trust belongs to the beneficiary.

The moment of death is the last moment of life.

Mortis momentum est ultimum vitae momentum.

Source: Wharton, III-186

For purposes of inheritance, vesting of rights, and survival of actions, a person is treated as alive until the instant of death — rights that depend on survivorship are determined at that precise moment.

No one is bound by counsel.

Nemo ex consilio obligatur.

Source: Wharton, III-196; Weisman, 77k; Weisman, 84k

Mere advice, whether from an attorney, officer, or any other person, creates no legal obligation on the recipient — a man is bound only by his own acts, contracts, and the operation of law, not by another's opinion.

No partner can alienate more than his own share, even if they are partners in all goods.

Nemo ex sociis plus parte sua potest alienare, etsi totorum bonorum socii sint.

Source: Wharton, III-197

A co-owner or partner may dispose of only his own interest in the common property — he cannot convey, encumber, or destroy the shares belonging to his fellow partners without their consent.

An example does nothing which resolves one dispute by another dispute.

Nil agit exemplum, litem quod lite resolvit.

Source: Wharton, III-203

Citing a contested or uncertain precedent to settle a legal question is no resolution at all — authority relied upon must itself be settled, or the original dispute remains unresolved.

Nothing in vain.

Nil frustra.

Source: Newell v. Wheeler; Wharton, III-205

The law does nothing in vain — every word in a statute, constitution, or instrument is presumed to have meaning and effect, and no provision should be construed as superfluous or idle.

It is not proper to surrender men when the cause has not been heard.

Non decet homines dedere causa non cognita.

Source: Wharton, III-217

No person may be delivered up to punishment, extradition, or forfeiture of liberty without first having his cause examined — due process of law requires that the matter be heard before any surrender of the person.

No statute is to have a retrospect beyond the time of its commencement.

Source: People ex rel. Peake; Wharton, III-222

(English-origin maxim.) Statutes operate prospectively only — a law cannot reach back to punish or alter rights that were vested before its enactment.

Once a mortgage always a mortgage.

Source: Wharton, III-243

(English-origin maxim.) A transaction that is in substance a mortgage cannot be converted into an absolute conveyance by any device of the parties — equity will always permit the mortgagor to redeem, regardless of the form of the instrument.

The punishment may be remitted, but the guilt remains forever.

Poena potest tolli, culpa perennis erit.

Source: Houghtaling v. Kelderhouse, 1 Park. Cr. 241, 242; Wharton, III-252

A pardon removes the penalty but does not erase the underlying wrongful act — the fact of guilt persists regardless of whether punishment is enforced.

A presumption arises from what usually happens.

Praesumptio ex eo quod plerumque fit.

Source: Wharton, III-256

Courts may presume facts based on the ordinary course of events — what commonly occurs is taken as the standard until rebutted by contrary evidence.

The offspring follows the condition of the father.

Proles sequitur sortem paternam.

Source: Wharton, III-258

In questions of status, descent, and inheritance, the child's condition follows the father's — applied in determining legitimacy, citizenship, and rights of inheritance.

Things which individually do not avail, taken together are helpful.

Quae singula non prosunt, juncta juvant.

Source: Hendricks v. Robinson; Wharton, III-261

Pieces of evidence that are individually insufficient may collectively establish a fact — the whole is greater than the sum of its parts in matters of proof.

When what I do is not valid as I do it, let it be valid to the extent that it can be.

Quando quod ago non valeat ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.

Source: Wharton, III-267

An act or instrument that fails in its intended form should be upheld to whatever extent the law permits — the court will give it the greatest effect possible rather than void it entirely.

He who excuses himself accuses himself.

Qui s'excuse s'accuse.

Source: Wharton, III-279

An unsolicited defense or excuse raises suspicion of guilt — one who volunteers justifications before being accused invites the inference that he knows his conduct requires justification.

He who has written himself heir.

Qui se scripsit haeredem.

Source: Wharton, III-281; Weisman, 12e; Weisman, 104g

One who names himself as heir in an instrument he has drafted is regarded with suspicion — a man cannot be the author of his own entitlement to another's estate.

In whatever manner he wishes, in whatever manner he can.

Quocumque modo velit, quocumque modo possit.

Source: Wharton, III-284

A man may dispose of his own property or exercise his own rights by any lawful means he chooses — the law does not prescribe the method where the right itself is established.

That which is granted or reserved in a certain form is not to be drawn into valuation or compensation.

Quod sub certa forma concessum vel reservatum est, non trahitur ad valorem vel compensationem.

Source: Ex parte Miller, 2 Hill 418, 433; Wharton, III-288

When a grant or reservation is made in a specific form, it must be honored in that form — the grantee cannot substitute a money equivalent or different consideration for what was specifically granted.

By rendering each to each.

Reddendo singula singulis.

Source: Wharton, III-295

A rule of construction: when a sentence contains multiple subjects and multiple predicates, each is to be applied to its corresponding counterpart — distributing the words to their proper referents.

A matter adjudged.

Res adjudicata.

Source: Snyder v. Trumpbour, 38 N.Y. 355, 361; Angel v. Hollister, Id. 378, 35 Barb. 308; Wharton, III-298; Weisman, 64x; Weisman, 64y

A matter finally decided on its merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties and cannot be relitigated — the judgment stands as law between them.

A thing sold in good faith ought not to be rescinded on account of a trifling cause.

Res bona fide vendita, propter minimam causam inempta fieri non debet.

Source: Wharton, III-299; Weisman, 50

Good faith sales are not to be undone for minor defects — the law favors the stability of completed transactions and will not set aside a sale for an insignificant reason.

The tie of blood binds men together in benevolence and affection.

Sanguinis conjunctio benevolentia devincit homines et caritate.

Source: Wharton, III-306

The bond of kinship creates natural obligations of care and loyalty — the law recognizes and protects family ties as a foundation of civil society.

The custom of the place where the action is brought must be observed.

Servanda est consuetudo loci ubi causa agitur.

Source: Wharton, III-312; Weisman, 27o

Local custom governs where it is established — courts apply the usage of the place where the matter arises, not the customs of a foreign jurisdiction.

If there is a partnership in any matter and the business is concluded, the partnership is ended.

Si alicujus rei societas sit, et finis negotio impositus est, finitur societas.

Source: Griswold v. Waddington; Wharton, III-313

A partnership formed for a specific purpose terminates when that purpose is accomplished — the venture's completion dissolves the association by operation of law.

Thus I will, thus I command.

Sic volo, sic jubeo.

Source: Wharton, III-315

Attributed to arbitrary power — the assertion of naked will without reason. The maxim is cited to condemn tyrannical commands that rest on authority alone rather than on law and reason.

Will stands in place of reason.

Stat pro ratione voluntas.

Source: Wharton, III-326

In matters of testamentary disposition, the testator's will is itself the reason — he need not justify his bequests. In matters of government, the maxim is cited as a condemnation: where will replaces reason, tyranny begins.

Every bond is dissolved by the same bond by which it was bound.

Unumquodque ligamen dissolvitur eodem ligamine quo ligatur.

Source: Wharton, III-356

An obligation is released by the same formality that created it — a contract under seal is discharged by a release under seal, a debt by payment, a vow by fulfillment.

A word in the imperfect tense signifies a thing still incomplete.

Verbum imperfecti temporis rem adhuc imperfectam significat.

Source: Wharton, III-366

In construing instruments and statutes, verb tense matters — the imperfect tense indicates an action or state that was ongoing and not yet completed at the relevant time.

It appears that one who is deaf and mute cannot make an alienation.

Videtur qui surdus et mutus ne poet faire alienation.

Source: Wharton, III-369

At common law, a person who could neither hear nor speak was presumed to lack the capacity to convey property, because alienation requires the expression of informed consent.

It gathers strength as it goes.

Vires acquirit eundo.

Source: Wharton, III-371

Applied to custom, precedent, and reputation — a principle or practice gains authority through continued and consistent observance over time.

Void things are as no things.

Source: Wharton, III-373

(English-origin maxim.) That which is void has no legal existence — it creates no rights, imposes no duties, and cannot be ratified or validated by the passage of time.

The voice once uttered flies away, the written letter remains.

Vox emissa volat, litera scripta manet.

Source: Wharton, III-375

Spoken words vanish; written instruments endure — the law therefore favors written evidence over oral testimony, and a written contract over a verbal agreement. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.39.)

One who grants a thing is presumed to grant also whatever is essential to its use.

Cuicunque aliquis quid concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest.

Source: Sterricker v. Dickinson, 9 Barb. 518; Troup v. Hurlbut, 10 Id. 359; People v. Hicks, 15 Id. 160; Seymour v. Canandaigua R.R. Co., 25 Id. 310; Wharton, III-B-13

A grant of land surrounded by the grantor's other land implies a right of way over that land. A corporate charter implies the power to make by-laws. Whatever is necessary to enjoy what was granted is considered granted as well.

Where one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he by whose negligence it happened must be the sufferer.

Source: Sandford v. Handy, 3 Wend. 368; Koot v. French, 13 Id. 573; Griswold v. Haven, 35 N.Y. 595; Exchange Bank v. Monteath, 26 N.Y. 505, 513; Wharton, III-B-34

(English-origin maxim.) Between two innocent parties, the loss falls on the one whose negligence enabled the wrong — applied independently of agency law.

Law respects matter of substance more than matter of circumstance.

Source: Wing. Max. 382, max. 101; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 39; Weisman, 71aa

(English-origin maxim.) Substance prevails over form — the law looks to the essential nature of a transaction rather than its incidental details or procedural trappings.

Extremities, or mere subtleties of law, are not rules of law.

Source: Co. Litt. 304b; 10 Coke, 126; Wing. Max. 19, max. 14; Broom, Max. 188; Weisman, 71hh

(English-origin maxim.) Hyper-technical readings and extreme extensions of legal rules are not themselves law — the law does not reward those who push principles beyond their reasonable scope.

The law does not care for, or recognize, very small or trifling matters.

Source: Hob. 88; C.L.M.; Weisman, 71kk

(English-origin maxim.) De minimis non curat lex — the law will not concern itself with trivial matters. A fractional error, an insignificant deviation, a negligible harm will not sustain an action.

Laws are imposed, not upon words, but upon things.

Source: 10 Coke, 101; Branch, Princ.; Code 6, 43, 2; Weisman, 71n

(English-origin maxim.) Law governs substance, not labels — the legal effect of an act depends on what it actually is, not on what the parties choose to call it.

The disposition of the law is more equitable than that of man.

Source: 8 Coke, 152; Weisman, 71tt

(English-origin maxim.) The law, when allowed to operate according to its settled principles, produces more just results than the arbitrary discretion of any individual.

Law favors diligence, and therefore hates folly and negligence.

Source: Wing. Max. 665, max. 172; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 70; Weisman, 71v

(English-origin maxim.) The law rewards those who act promptly and carefully, and disfavors those who are careless or dilatory — laches, estoppel, and waiver are all expressions of this principle.

The law aids the vigilant, not the slothful or negligent.

Source: C.L.M.; Smith v. Carll, 5 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 122, 145; Toole v. Cook, 16 How. Prac. (N.Y.) 142, 144; 1 Story, Cont. s. 529; Weisman, 71ww

(English-origin maxim.) Vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit — equity aids the vigilant. Those who sleep on their rights lose them; those who act promptly are protected.

As to things not apparent, and those not existing, the rule is the same.

Source: 5 Coke, 6; Weisman, 95h

(English-origin maxim.) What cannot be seen and what does not exist are treated identically by the law — if a fact or condition is not manifest, the law proceeds as though it were absent.

Legal form is essential form.

Forma legalis forma essentialis.

Source: Coke, 10 Co. 100; Weisman, 46b

The forms prescribed by law are not optional niceties — they are essential to the validity of the act, and their omission destroys the proceeding. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.11.)

Form gives being.

Forma dat esse.

Source: Black's 514 (called "the old physical maxim"); Weisman, 46a

A thing has legal existence only when it has assumed its proper form — without the prescribed form, it is a nullity regardless of intent.

Where form is not observed, a nullity of the act is inferred.

Ubi forma non observatur, infertur adnullatio actus.

Source: Coke, 12 Co. 7; Weisman, 46c

An act performed without the required legal form has no legal effect — it cannot create rights, impose duties, or bind any party.

Where the law prescribes a form, the nonobservance of it is fatal to the proceeding.

Ubi lex aliquam formam praescribit, non observatio formae est fatalis.

Source: Best, Ev. Introd. s. 59; Weisman, 46d

A warrant without a signature, an indictment without a charge, a deed without a seal (where seal is required) — all are void for want of form.

The law regards the substance of a thing more than its form.

Lex respicit substantiam rei magis quam formam.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 382, max. 101; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3

Where the essential form has been observed, minor defects in form do not vitiate the act — the law looks through form to substance, punishing sham and rewarding reality.

Simplicity is favorable to the laws, and too much subtlety in law is to be rejected.

Simplicitas est legibus amica; et nimia subtilitas in jure reprobatur.

Source: Coke, 4 Co. 8; Weisman, 44k; Weisman, 71cc

Legal proceedings should be simple and direct — complexity for its own sake obscures justice and serves only those who profit from confusion.

When laws imposed by the state fail, we must act by the law of nature.

Legibus sumptis desinentibus, lege naturae utendum est.

Source: 2 Roll. R. 298; Weisman, 74a

The law of nature is the ultimate fallback — when positive law is silent, absent, or has broken down, men are governed by natural law, which never fails.

Nothing that is against reason is lawful.

Nihil quod est contra rationem est licitum.

Source: Co. Litt. 97b; Jackson 668; Weisman, 73e

An act that defies reason cannot be sustained at law — this is the universal test of lawfulness, applicable to statutes, contracts, and judicial decrees alike.

Nothing that is inconvenient is lawful.

Nihil quod inconveniens est licitum est.

Source: Co. Litt. 66a, 97b; Jackson 669; Weisman, 73g

"Inconvenient" here means inconsistent or absurd — a legal outcome that produces absurd or self-contradictory results cannot be lawful.

Under pretext of legality, what is illegal ought not to be admitted.

Sub praetextu legalitatis, non debet admitti illicitum.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 728, max. 196; Weisman, 73a

A lawful label on an unlawful act does not sanitize it — the law strips away pretense and judges the substance of the act.

We are able to do only that which we can do lawfully.

Id possumus quod de jure possumus.

Source: Bouvier, Max. 129; Weisman, 73c

Power without lawful authority is no power at all — an officer who exceeds his lawful commission acts as a private person, not as an agent of the law.

It is lawful to repel force by force, provided it is done with the moderation of blameless defense, not for the purpose of taking revenge, but to ward off injury.

Vim vi repellere licet, modo fiat moderamine inculpatae tutelae, non ad sumendam vindictam, sed ad propulsandam injuriam.

Source: Co. Litt. 162a; Weisman, 73d

Self-defense is a natural right — but it must be proportionate and defensive, not retaliatory. The force used must match the threat, not exceed it.

To investigate is the way to know what things are truly lawful.

Investigare est modus sciendi quae res sint vere licita.

Source: Litt. s. 443; Bouvier, Max. 150; Weisman, 73b

Lawfulness is not assumed — it is proved by inquiry. The party asserting lawful authority bears the burden of showing the lawful basis for the act.

Necessity makes lawful what is otherwise not lawful.

Aliquid quod non est licitum in lege, necessitas facit licitum.

Source: 10 Co. 61; Noy, Max.

In cases of true necessity — where the preservation of life or the prevention of greater harm demands immediate action — acts otherwise unlawful are excused. But the necessity must be genuine, not manufactured.

Where the law ends, tyranny begins.

Ubi cessat lex, ibi incipit tyrannis.

Source: Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U.S. 694, 702

The boundary of law is the boundary of legitimate power — any exercise of authority beyond what the law authorizes is tyranny, regardless of who exercises it.

He vainly invokes the aid of the law who transgresses the law.

Frustra legis auxilium quaerit qui in legem committit.

Source: Fleta, lib. 4, c. 2, s. 3; Broom, Max. 279, 297; Weisman, 72n

A party who has acted unlawfully cannot turn to the law for relief arising from that very unlawfulness — the courts will not aid one whose own hands are unclean.

Where there is no law, there is no transgression.

Ubi non est lex, ibi non est transgressio.

Source: Coke, 4 Co. 16b; Romans 4:15; Weisman, 72h

No one can be punished for an act that was not prohibited by law at the time it was committed — this is the foundation of the prohibition against ex post facto legislation.

The law looks forward, not backward.

Lex prospicit, non respicit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 284; Jackson 524; Weisman, 71pp

Laws operate prospectively — they govern future conduct, not past acts. A new law cannot punish what was lawful when done.

What is done contrary to law is deemed not to have been done.

Quod contra legem fit, pro infecto habetur.

Source: 4 Co. 31

An act performed in violation of law is treated as a nullity — it creates no rights, imposes no obligations, and is regarded as though it never occurred.

The laws are silent amid arms.

Silent leges inter arma.

Source: 4 Inst. 70; Cicero, Pro Milone 4.11; Weisman, 9d

In times of open conflict or armed tumult, the ordinary processes of law are necessarily suspended — but this maxim is a description of fact, not a license for tyranny; the moment arms are laid down, the law resumes its full authority.

Law is the dictate of reason.

Lex est dictamen rationis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 117; Co. Litt. 319; Weisman, 71nn; Weisman, 77o

Law is not the arbitrary will of the legislator but the product of right reason applied to the governance of human affairs — an enactment contrary to reason is no law at all.

The law delights in equity; it covets perfection; it is a rule of right.

Lex aequitate gaudet; appetit perfectum; est norma recti.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 36

The three attributes of law — equity, perfection, rightness — express its highest aspiration. Where a construction of law defeats any of these, the construction is wrong.

A beneficial law affords a remedy in a similar case.

Lex beneficialis rei consimili remedium praestat.

Source: 2 Inst. 689

When a law provides a remedy for one class of injury, equity extends that remedy to similar injuries — the law does not leave a man without recourse merely because his case is not identical to the one expressly provided for.

The law would rather tolerate a private loss than a public evil.

Lex citius tolerare vult privatum damnum quam publicum malum.

Source: Co. Litt. 152

Between private hardship and public harm, the law accepts the former to prevent the latter — but this is a principle of last resort, not a license to sacrifice individual rights at will. In the American system, this principle is bounded by the Bill of Rights — no public interest can destroy a secured right.

The law provides for the future; the judge for the past.

Lex de futuro, judex de praeterito.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 63i

The legislature speaks to future conduct; the judge resolves past disputes. Neither should trespass upon the other's domain.

The law cannot fail in dispensing justice.

Lex deficere non potest in justitia exhibenda.

Source: Co. Litt. 197

If the law appears to fail a party seeking justice, the fault lies in the application, not in the law itself. A court must find a way to do justice within the law.

The law always abhors delay.

Lex dilationes semper exhorret.

Source: 2 Inst. 240

Prompt administration of justice is a fundamental principle — delay is the enemy of right, and procedural devices used to obstruct justice are looked upon with disfavor.

The law creates a fiction where equity subsists.

Lex fingit ubi subsistit aequitas.

Source: 11 Co. 90; Weisman, 45e

Legal fictions are permitted only to serve the ends of equity and justice — the law feigns what it must in order to produce a just result, but never to produce an unjust one.

The law presumes that a neighbor knows the acts of his neighbor.

Lex intendit vicinum vicini facta scire.

Source: Co. Litt. 78

One cannot claim ignorance of what is open and notorious in his own vicinity — the law charges a man with knowledge of what reasonable diligence would reveal.

The law judges of things which must necessarily be done as if actually done.

Lex judicat de rebus necessario faciendis quasi re ipsa factis.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 64w

When the law requires an act, and the act must inevitably follow, the law treats it as already accomplished — formalism yields to substance.

The law of necessity is the law of time — that is, of the present instant.

Lex necessitatis est lex temporis, id est instantis.

Source: Hob. 159; 8 Co. 69; Weisman, 83i

Necessity justifies only what the immediate moment demands — once the emergency passes, the ordinary law resumes. No permanent rule can be built on temporary necessity.

The law never works an injury, nor does any man a wrong.

Lex nemini operatur iniquum, nemini facit injuriam.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 22

The law, correctly applied, is incapable of producing injustice — when an unjust result appears, it is the application that has erred, not the law itself.

The law does nothing and commands nothing in vain.

Lex nil facit frustra, nil jubet frustra.

Source: 3 Bulstr. 279; Jenk. Cent. 17

Every provision of law serves a purpose — if a construction renders a provision nugatory, that construction is wrong.

The law commands no useless things, because useless labor is foolish.

Lex non praecipit inutilia, quia inutilis labor stultus.

Source: Co. Litt. 197

The law does not require men to perform acts that serve no legal purpose — compliance with meaningless formalities is not demanded.

The law intends nothing impossible.

Lex non intendit aliquid impossibile.

Source: 12 Co. 89

The law does not command what cannot be done. Where compliance is genuinely impossible, the obligation is excused.

The law does not require that to be proved which is apparent to the court.

Lex non requirit verificare quod apparet curiae.

Source: 9 Co. 54

What is already manifest to the court needs no formal proof — judicial notice dispenses with the necessity of proving the obvious.

The law speaks to all with one mouth.

Lex uno ore omnes alloquitur.

Source: 2 Inst. 184

The law applies equally to all — there is no separate law for the powerful and another for the weak. Uniform application is the essence of the rule of law.

The law sometimes follows equity.

Lex aliquando sequitur aequitatem.

Source: 3 Wils. 119

Where strict law and equity diverge, the law bends toward the equitable result — rigidity in the law is tempered by the demands of justice.

Human laws are born, live, and die.

Leges humanae nascuntur, vivunt et moriuntur.

Source: 7 Co. 25; Weisman, 71p

Unlike the natural law, positive laws are temporal — they arise from necessity, serve their purpose, and are superseded when conditions change.

The construction of law obtains the force of law.

Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier, Max.

An authoritative interpretation of a law has the same binding effect as the law itself — courts are bound not only by the text but by its received meaning. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.1.19.)

The custom of making and remaking laws is most dangerous.

Legis figendi et refigendi consuetudo periculosissima est.

Source: 4 Co. Ad Lect.

Frequent legislative change undermines stability and predictability — the People cannot order their affairs when the rules shift constantly beneath them.

The voice of legislators is a living voice, to impose laws on things, not on words.

Legislatorum est viva vox, rebus et non verbis, legem imponere.

Source: 10 Co. 101

Legislation addresses realities, not verbal abstractions — the law binds conduct, not language, and its force attaches to substance, not to form.

The minister of the law is not bound, in the execution of his office, to fly or retreat.

Legis minister non tenetur, in executione officii sui, fugere aut retrocedere.

Source: 6 Co. 68; Weisman, 51h

An officer lawfully executing his duty is not required to yield or withdraw — the law backs its own process and the officers who carry it out.

One who commands lawfully must be obeyed.

Legitime imperanti parere necesse est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 120; Weisman, 11s

Lawful authority commands obedience — but the emphasis falls on "lawfully." An unlawful command binds no one.

Although alienation be prohibited, yet by the consent of all those in whose favour it is prohibited it may take place; for it is in the power of every man to renounce a law made in his own favour.

Alienatio licet prohibeatur, consensu tamen omnium in quorum favorem prohibita est potest fieri.

Source: Co. Litt. 98; Jackson

A restriction on alienation may be waived by the unanimous consent of those the restriction was designed to protect — every person has the right to renounce a benefit conferred for his own advantage.

An argument follows necessarily in the negative from the not possible to the not being, though not in the affirmative.

A non posse ad non esse sequitur argumentum necessarie negative, licet non affirmative.

Source: Hob. 336; Jackson

If a thing is impossible, it necessarily does not exist — but the reverse does not hold, because the mere absence of a thing does not prove its impossibility.

Those who are born from unlawful intercourse are not counted among the children.

Qui ex damnato coitu nascuntur inter liberos non computentur.

Source: Co. Litt. 8a; Jackson; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 289; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

At common law, children born out of wedlock had no rights of inheritance — a rule that has been substantially modified in all American jurisdictions, recognizing that the rights of the child are inherent and not forfeited by the circumstances of birth.

Where the law compels a man to show cause, it is incumbent that the cause be just and lawful.

Ubi lex aliquem cogit ostendere causam necesse est quod causa sit justa et legitima.

Source: 2 Inst. 269; Jackson; Weisman, 14h

When a party is ordered to show cause, vague or pretextual reasons will not suffice — the cause shown must be substantive, lawful, and sufficient to justify the act in question.

A law is not obligatory unless it has been promulgated.

Non obligat lex nisi promulgata.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 72b

A law that has not been published and made known to the People cannot bind them — no one is obliged to obey what he has no means of knowing.

Not everything that is permitted is honorable.

Non omne quod licet honestum est.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 144; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 52e

The law tolerates many things it does not approve — legality is the floor, not the ceiling, of right conduct.

It is a perpetual law that no human and positive law is perpetual.

Perpetua lex est nullam legem humanam ac positivam perpetuam esse.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; cf. 7 Co. 25; Weisman, 7c

Only the natural and divine laws endure forever — every statute, regulation, and ordinance of man is temporal and subject to repeal or amendment.

There are some things which are not proper though lawful; but certainly those things are not proper which are not lawful.

Source: Hob. 159; Weisman, 73f

(English-origin maxim.) Something may be technically lawful yet still improper — but what is unlawful can never be proper, and courts will not enforce an act that is both unlawful and improper.

That which is or lawful in the less shall be lawful in the greater; and that which is not lawful in the greater shall neither be lawful in the less.

Source: Co. Litt. 260a; 8 Coke, 48; Weisman, 73h

(English-origin maxim.) What is lawful in the lesser case is also lawful in the greater, and what is unlawful in the greater is also unlawful in the lesser — use this to argue by analogy from established precedent to a stronger or weaker case.

That which is lawful is constituted or authorized by law; rightful; conformable to law; allowed by law; legitimate; competent.

Source: Ohio Auto. Spr. Co. v. Fender, 141 N.E. 269, 275; Weisman, 73j

(English-origin maxim.) "Lawful" means authorized by law, conformable to law, and legitimate — cite this definition to distinguish lawful authority from mere power exercised without legal sanction.

The principle distinction between the terms 'lawful' and 'legal' is that the former contemplates the substance of law, the latter the form of law.

Source: Black's, 703; Weisman, 73k

(English-origin maxim.) "Lawful" refers to the substance of law (conformity with right and justice) while "legal" refers merely to the form of law (compliance with procedural requirements) — an act may be legal in form yet unlawful in substance.

If the object is to regulate a thing it cannot be prohibited, for the power to regulate is not the power to prohibit.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 90f

(English-origin maxim.) When the People delegate a power to regulate, that delegation does not include the power to destroy through prohibition — a regulatory scheme that operates as a de facto ban exceeds the delegated authority and is void as an act beyond the scope of the trust.