EVIDENCE & PROOF

The power of adducing proof is not to be narrowed.

Facultas probationum non est angustanda.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson, No. 262

Courts must not restrict a party's opportunity to present evidence; the right to prove one's case is fundamental to due process of law.

The burden of proof falls upon the one who asserts, not the one who denies.

Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat.

Source: Dig. 22, 3, 2; Halk. Max. 9; Steph. Pl. 84

He who brings a claim must prove it; a party denying an allegation is not required to produce evidence of the negative.

The proof rests upon the one who affirms, not upon the one who denies.

Affirmanti, non neganti, incumbit probatio.

Source: Halk. Max. 9; Dig. 22, 3, 2

A restatement of the fundamental rule: the affirmative party bears the burden because a negative, by its nature, does not admit of direct proof.

A confession made in court is stronger than any proof.

Confessio facta in judicio omni probatione major est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 102; 11 Co. 30; Weisman, 39b

A voluntary admission before the tribunal supersedes the need for extrinsic evidence on the admitted point.

No one ought to be a witness in his own cause.

Testis nemo in sua causa esse debet.

Source: 3 Bl. Comm. 371; Dig. 22, 5, 10

A man's testimony in his own cause is inherently suspect because self-interest taints credibility — cite this to challenge the weight given to interested-party testimony, or to argue that a party's uncorroborated self-serving declarations should not carry the day.

Negatives cannot be proved.

Negativa probari non possunt.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Code. 4, 19, 23

It is in the nature of things that a party cannot prove what did not happen; therefore the law places the burden of proof on the affirmative.

The thing speaks for itself.

Res ipsa loquitur.

Source: Broom, Max.; per Pollock, C.B. in Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 2 H. & C. 722

Where an event is of such a character that it could not ordinarily occur without negligence or wrongful act, the occurrence itself is evidence sufficient to raise a presumption of fault without further proof.

False in one thing, false in all things.

Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Broom, Max.; Jackson, Lat. for Lawyers, No. 266; Weisman, 26bb; Weisman, 37f

Where a witness is shown to have testified falsely on a material point — one on which he could not be presumed to be mistaken — the tribunal may reject the whole of his testimony.

In criminal cases, the proofs ought to be clearer than light.

In criminalibus, probationes debent esse luce clariores.

Source: 3 Inst. 210; Jackson, No. 371

Because the criminal proceeding puts life and liberty at hazard, the proof required is of the highest degree — clear, certain, and beyond reasonable doubt.

No one alleging his own wrongdoing is to be heard as a witness.

Nemo turpitudinem suam allegans audiendus est.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Best, Ev. §385; Weisman, 39ii

A person who would profit from his own wrong is not a credible witness; the law does not receive testimony grounded in the witness's own turpitude.

Proofs ought to be evident — that is, clear and easily understood.

Probationes debent esse evidentes, id est, perspicuae et faciles intellectu.

Source: Co. Litt. 283; Weisman, 39r

Evidence must be presented plainly and intelligibly; obscure or convoluted proofs fail to satisfy the standard the law requires.

One eye-witness is worth more than ten ear-witnesses.

Pluris est oculatus testis unus quam auriti decem.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; 3 Bouv. Inst. n. 3154; Weisman, 39w

Direct observation outweighs hearsay; testimony from one who saw the event firsthand carries greater weight than any number of those who merely heard of it.

Witnesses are weighed, not counted.

Testes ponderantur, non numerantur.

Source: 1 Starkie, Ev. 554; Best, Ev. §389; Weisman, 39x

The credibility and quality of witnesses determines the force of their testimony, not the mere number of them.

We have the best witness in an accused who confesses the charge.

Habemus optimum testem confitentem reum.

Source: Fost. Cr. L. 243; Jackson

A voluntary confession by the accused is the strongest evidence of guilt — no testimony from any other witness can surpass the defendant's own admission.

Women ought not to be admitted to proof of the estate of a man.

Mulieres ad probationem status hominis admitti non debent.

Source: Co. Litt. 6; Jackson

This historical common law rule restricted certain categories of witness testimony regarding status; modern practice has broadly abandoned such categorical exclusions.

A strumpet is a sufficient witness to a happening in a brothel.

Testis lupanaris sufficit ad factum in lupanari.

Source: Moor, 817; Jackson

A witness is competent to testify about events occurring in a place she frequents, regardless of her character — the law takes testimony where it can find it.

Violent presumption is sometimes full proof.

Violenta praesumptio aliquando est plena probatio.

Source: Co. Litt. 6; Jackson

A presumption so strong that it admits of no reasonable alternative explanation may stand as complete proof of the fact presumed, shifting the burden entirely to the opposing party.

Facts are more powerful than words.

Facta sunt potentiora verbis.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Weisman, 101d

Deeds and circumstances carry greater evidentiary weight than mere declarations — the law looks to what was done, not merely what was said. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.2.1.)

When the proofs of facts are present, what need is there of words.

Cum adsunt testimonia rerum, quid opus est verbis.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Buls. 53; Weisman, 39bb

Where the evidence itself speaks clearly, verbal testimony becomes superfluous — tangible proof supersedes oral assertion.

Things done in one action cannot be taken as evidence in another, unless it be between the same parties.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 11; Weisman, 39a

(English-origin maxim.) Proceedings and findings in one action cannot serve as evidence in a different action unless both actions involve the same parties, because strangers to the first case had no opportunity to test the evidence.

Proof is the effect of evidence; the establishment of a fact by evidence.

Source: Tift v. Jones, 77 Ga. 181; 3 S.E. 399; Weisman, 39d

(English-origin maxim.) Proof is not the evidence itself but the conclusion the evidence establishes; counsel should distinguish between offering evidence and actually proving the fact at issue.

Nothing can be treated as evidence which is not introduced as such.

Source: Harvey v. Waitt, 44 N.E.2d 629, 633, 312 Mass. 333; Weisman, 39f

(English-origin maxim.) Matter not formally introduced into evidence cannot be considered by the tribunal — a party who fails to offer material into the record may not rely upon it, however relevant it may be.

The law arises out of the fact.

Source: 2 Inst. 479; 2 Bl. Comm. 329; Weisman, 39g

(English-origin maxim.) Law does not exist in the abstract — it must be applied to actual facts. A court cannot declare the law until the facts giving rise to the legal question are established. The facts are the foundation; the law follows from them.

It is in the nature of things that a negative is no proof.

Source: Black's, 2d. 890; Bouv. 147; Code. 4, 19, 23; Weisman, 39j

(English-origin maxim.) A negative proposition cannot be proved directly; therefore the party who asserts the affirmative bears the entire burden and must produce positive proof.

He who affirms must prove.

Source: Porter v. Stevens, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 535; Weisman, 39k

(English-origin maxim.) The party who makes an affirmative claim must sustain it with evidence; the opposing party is not required to disprove what has not first been proved.

The answer of one witness shall not be heard at all; the testimony of a single witness shall not be admitted under any circumstances (for civil cases).

Source: 1 Greenl. Ev. s. 260; Code. 4, 20, 9; 3 Bl. Comm. 370; Best, Ev. p. 426, s. 390, and note; Weisman, 39l

(English-origin maxim.) In civil cases, the testimony of a single uncorroborated witness was historically insufficient to establish a fact; this rule enforces the principle that important matters require more than one source of proof.

What is not proved and what does not exist are the same; it is not a defect of the law, but of proof.

Source: Black's, 587; Jenk. Cent. 207; Weisman, 39z; Weisman, 95h

(English-origin maxim.) A fact not established by evidence is treated as nonexistent — this is not a flaw in the law but in the party's failure to prove; the court cannot act on what is not before it.

Report, which induces suspicion, ought to arise from good and grave men; not, indeed, from malevolent and malicious men, but from cautious and credible persons; not only once, but frequently; for clamor diminishes, and defamation manifests.

Source: 2 Inst. 52; Black's, 2d. 482; Weisman, 39cc

(English-origin maxim.) Rumor and report that would justify investigation must originate from credible, disinterested persons and must be persistent — isolated accusations from hostile witnesses do not constitute lawful grounds for suspicion.

A witness is a person who is present at and observes a transaction.

Source: State v. Desforges, 47 La. Ann. 1167, 17 So. 811; McDonald v. Robertson, 104 F.2d 945, 948; Weisman, 39ee

(English-origin maxim.) A witness is one who was present and perceived the transaction firsthand; this definition excludes those who merely heard about the event or arrived after the fact.

The rules of evidence are of great importance, and cannot be departed without endangering private as well as public rights.

Source: Nicholls v. Webb, 8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 326, 332; Weisman, 39hh

(English-origin maxim.) The rules of evidence safeguard both private rights and public order; courts must not relax evidentiary standards for convenience, as doing so endangers the rights of all parties.

Witnesses cannot testify to a negative; they must testify to an affirmative.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Weisman, 39m

(English-origin maxim.) Testimony must be affirmative — a witness can testify to what he saw, heard, or did, but not to what did not happen. Negative proof is inherently weaker than positive proof.

What is proved by record ought not to be denied.

Source: Black's, 2d 986; Weisman, 39o

(English-origin maxim.) Official records are conclusive evidence of what they contain — facts established by record cannot be contradicted by mere assertion.

A witness alleging contrary or contradictory things is not to be heard.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Weisman, 39p

(English-origin maxim.) A witness who contradicts himself destroys his own credibility — self-contradictory testimony is to be disregarded entirely.

To swear is to call God as witness, and is an act of divine worship.

Jurare est Deum in testem vocare, et est actus divini cultus.

Source: 3 Inst. 165; Jackson, No. 459; Weisman, 84j

The oath invokes the highest authority — the Almighty — as surety of truth, making perjury not only a civil offense but a transgression against the divine order.

There is no stronger bond between men than an oath.

Nullum vinculum majus inter homines quam jusjurandum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. Cas. 126, case 54; Weisman, 84a

The oath is the highest form of human undertaking; its binding force exceeds that of any contract or promise because it appeals to conscience and to God.

An oath is indivisible; it cannot be held partly true and partly false.

Juramentum est indivisibile, et non est admittendum in parte verum et in parte falsum.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson, No. 456; Weisman, 84d

Sworn testimony must be taken whole — a tribunal may not selectively accept portions of an oath while rejecting others, because the oath stands or falls as one.

Every oath ought to be founded upon certain knowledge.

Omne sacramentum debet esse de certa scientia.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Weisman, 84f

No person may swear to what he does not know; an oath grounded on conjecture, supposition, or hearsay is void.

In court, no one is believed unless under oath.

In judicio non creditur nisi juratis.

Source: Cro. Car. 64; 3 Inst. 79

All facts presented in a legal proceeding must be established by sworn testimony or affirmation; unsworn statements carry no evidentiary weight.

The divine punishment for perjury is destruction; the human punishment is disgrace.

Perjurii poena divina exitium, humana dedecus.

Source: 3 Inst. 163; Co. Litt. 158

Perjury strikes at the foundation of the legal system; the law regards it with the utmost severity because the oath is the pillar upon which all judicial proceedings rest.

A foolish oath, though false, does not amount to perjury.

Stultum juramentum, licet falsum, tamen non committit perjurium.

Source: 2 Inst. 167; Weisman, 84g

Where an oath is so vague, absurd, or impossible that it cannot affect the matter at issue, its falsity does not constitute the crime of perjury — the substance, not the form, determines the offense.

An oath made between others ought neither to hurt nor to benefit a stranger.

Jusjurandum inter alios factum nec nocere nec prodesse debet.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson, No. 472; Weisman, 84l

The binding force of an oath extends only to the parties involved; third parties are neither bound by, nor entitled to rely upon, sworn statements made in proceedings to which they were not privy.

An oath has three companions — truth, justice, and judgment.

Juramentum habet in se tres comites — veritatem, justitiam, et judicium.

Source: 3 Inst. 160

Truth inheres in the party swearing; justice and judgment inhere in the officer administering the oath. All three must be present for the oath to be lawful.

The oath of an infamous person is not to be received.

Repellitur a sacramento infamis.

Source: Co. Litt. 158; Jackson; Wharton

A person of proven infamy is excluded from giving sworn testimony because his oath carries no credibility — the law will not receive sworn evidence from one whose character is wholly discredited.

The form of taking an oath, though it differs in words, agrees in meaning; for it ought to have this sense, that the Deity be invoked.

Jusjurandi forma verbis differt, re convenit; hunc enim sensum habere debet, ut Deus invocetur.

Source: Grotius, l. 2, c. 13, §10; Wharton; Weisman, 84m

The particular words of an oath may vary by custom or jurisdiction, but the substance is universal — every lawful oath must invoke the Almighty as witness to the truth of what is sworn.

Punishment is due if the words of an oath be false.

Source: Black's, 840; Weisman, 84c

(English-origin maxim.) Perjury — the willful utterance of false words under oath — merits punishment because the oath is the foundation of judicial truth-finding, and its violation undermines the entire system of justice.

In law, none is credited unless he is sworn. All facts must, when established by witnesses, be under oath or affirmation.

Source: Cro. Car. 64; Bouv. 130; Weisman, 84h

(English-origin maxim.) No testimony is credited in legal proceedings unless given under oath or affirmation; unsworn declarations are not evidence and cannot establish any fact before the court.

An infamous person is repelled or prevented from taking an oath.

Source: Co. Litt. 158; Bract. fol. 185; Weisman, 84i

(English-origin maxim.) A person whose character has been destroyed by conviction of an infamous crime is barred from taking an oath, because the law cannot trust the sworn word of one who has demonstrated contempt for truth.

All things are presumed to have been done rightly and in due form.

Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta.

Source: Co. Litt. 232b; Broom, Max. 847; Best, Ev. §300; Weisman, 89f

Until contrary proof is adduced, the law presumes that official acts were performed lawfully and that regular procedures were followed.

A presumption of law and from the law — a conclusive presumption.

Praesumptio juris et de jure.

Source: Co. Litt. 6b; Broom, Max.; Best, Ev.

Certain presumptions are so firmly established in law that no contrary evidence is permitted to rebut them; the law treats the presumed fact as conclusively established.

A strong presumption has great weight in law.

Praesumptio violenta valet in lege.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 56, case 3; Co. Litt. 6b; Weisman, 89c

Where the circumstances raise a violent presumption — one so strong as to amount to full proof — it operates with the force of direct evidence and shifts the burden to the opposing party. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.253.)

All things are presumed in favor of life, liberty, and innocence.

In favorem vitae, libertatis, et innocentiae omnia praesumuntur.

Source: Lofft, 125; Jackson, No. 379

When facts are doubtful, every presumption is made in favor of the accused and against forfeiture of life or liberty — the law will not presume guilt.

A presumption stands until the contrary is proved.

Praesumptio donec probetur in contrarium.

Source: Hob. 297; 3 Bl. Comm. 371; Weisman, 89e

Rebuttable presumptions have the force of proof until overcome by competent evidence to the contrary; the party challenging the presumption bears the burden.

The presumption always favors the one who denies.

Praesumptio semper est pro negante.

Source: 10 Clark & F. 534; Weisman, 89j

Because proof lies on the affirmative party, the law presumes in favor of the one who denies until the affirmative proposition is established.

All things are presumed against a despoiler.

Omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem.

Source: Broom, Max. 938; Best, Ev. §303

Where a party destroys or suppresses evidence, the law raises every presumption against him — he who silences the proof is presumed to fear its voice.

Nothing unjust is to be presumed in law.

Nihil iniquum est praesumendum in jure.

Source: 4 Co. 72; Co. Litt. 78; Weisman, 89h

The law will not presume that any party acted unjustly, dishonorably, or unlawfully; wrongdoing must be affirmatively proved.

What is clearly apparent needs no proof.

Quod constat clare non debet verificari.

Source: 10 Mod. 150; 9 Co. 54

When a fact is manifest to the court, requiring formal proof of it wastes the tribunal's time and insults its intelligence.

The extremes being proved, the intermediate things are presumed.

Probatis extremis, praesumuntur media.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 207; 1 Greenl. Ev. §20; Weisman, 39s

Where the beginning and end of a transaction are proved, the law presumes the intervening steps occurred in regular order.

From length of time, all things are presumed to have been done in due form.

Ex diuturnitate temporis, omnia praesumuntur solemniter esse acta.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 6; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 20

Where an act has stood unchallenged for a great length of time, the law presumes that all necessary formalities were observed in its execution.

When doubts arise, the most generous and benign presumptions are to be preferred.

Nobiliores et benigniores praesumptiones in dubiis sunt praeferendae.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

In cases of doubt, the law favors the presumption that is most favorable and least injurious, rather than the harsher interpretation. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.4.8.)

Presumptions arise from what generally happens.

Source: Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 425, 475; Weisman, 89a

(English-origin maxim.) Presumptions are drawn from the ordinary course of events — what usually happens in similar circumstances provides the basis for inferring what happened in the case at hand.

Odious and dishonest acts are not presumed in law.

Source: Co. Litt. 78; Jackson v. Miller, 6 Wend. (N.Y.) 228, 231, 21 Am. Dec. 316; Nichols v. Pinner, 18 N.Y. 295, 300; Weisman, 89g

(English-origin maxim.) The law will not presume that any person acted dishonorably or committed an odious act; wrongdoing must be affirmatively proved, not inferred from mere suspicion.

No impossible or dishonorable things are to be presumed; but only things true, honorable, and possible.

Source: Co. Litt. 78; Weisman, 89k

(English-origin maxim.) Courts will not presume the impossible or the dishonorable; all presumptions favor what is true, honorable, and within the realm of possibility.

A quality which ought to form a part is easily presumed.

Source: Black's, 2d. 973; Weisman, 89m

(English-origin maxim.) Where a quality naturally belongs to a thing or transaction, the law readily presumes its presence without requiring separate proof — what ordinarily accompanies a thing is presumed to be part of it.

Presumptions are conjectures from probable proof, assumed for purposes of evidence.

Praesumptiones sunt conjecturae ex signo verisimili ad probandum assumptae.

Source: Weisman, 89l

Presumptions are inferences drawn from probable signs, adopted as proof until rebutted — they serve the tribunal by supplying what direct evidence cannot always furnish.

Strong presumption is full proof.

Source: Co. Litt. 6b; Weisman, 89b

(English-origin maxim.) A presumption of sufficient strength is equivalent to direct proof — when circumstances point overwhelmingly to a conclusion, the law treats it as established.

Things manifest do not require proof.

Manifesta probatione non indigent.

Source: 7 Co. 40b; Co. Litt. 16

Plain and obvious facts need not be proved; to require formal evidence of what everyone can see would burden the proceeding without advancing truth.

That which appears to the court does not need the aid of witnesses.

Quod constat curiae opere testium non indiget.

Source: 2 Inst. 662; Weisman, 39i

Where a fact is within the court's own knowledge — from its records, its observation, or matters of which it takes judicial notice — witness testimony is unnecessary.

Judicial notice is a form of evidence.

Source: Mann v. Mann, 172 P.2d 369, 375, 76 Cal. App. 2d 32; Weisman, 39gg

(English-origin maxim.) Courts take judicial notice of facts so universally known or so readily verifiable from authoritative sources that they require no formal proof; such notice operates as evidence in the proceeding.

Of things which do not appear and things which do not exist, the rule is the same.

De non apparentibus, et non existentibus, eadem est ratio.

Source: 5 Co. 6; Jenk. Cent. 207; Jackson, No. 185

What is not brought before the court is treated as though it does not exist at all; a party who fails to produce evidence of a fact may not rely upon it.

Common opinion is of two kinds: the common opinion of the people, and the opinion which arises from law and custom.

Communis opinio est duplex, viz., opinio vulgaris, et opinio quae oritur ex jure et consuetudine.

Source: Co. Litt. 186a; Wing. Max. 203

The courts distinguish between popular rumor (which has no evidentiary value) and the settled understanding of law and practice (which may be received as authority).

The names of things ought to be understood according to common usage, not according to the opinions of individuals.

Nomina rerum debent intelligi secundum communem usum, non secundum opiniones privatorum.

Source: Dig. 33, 10, 7, 2; Weisman, 17b

Words in legal instruments are construed by their common and established meaning; a private or idiosyncratic definition cannot override the understanding shared by the community.

First principles prove; they are not proved.

Principia probant, non probantur.

Source: 3 Co. 40a, 50a

Fundamental axioms of law — like the rules of evidence themselves — are self-evident foundations; they are to be approved and applied, not themselves subjected to proof.

Plain truths need not be proved.

Perspicua vera non sunt probanda.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 16

What is obvious and undeniable requires no formal evidence — the law does not demand proof of what no reasonable person would dispute. (Duplicate maxim — see also 3.4.13.)

It matters not what is known to the judge, if it is not known to him judicially.

Non refert quid notum sit judici, si notum non sit in forma judicii.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Buls. 115

A judge's private knowledge cannot substitute for evidence properly before the court — what the judge knows as a man is irrelevant unless established through the formal record. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.165.)

Common opinion is good authority in law.

Source: Co. Litt. 186a; Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 528, 577, 49 Am. Dec. 189; Weisman, 17c

(English-origin maxim.) The settled opinion of learned and experienced persons on a point of law or practice carries authoritative weight and may be cited as a legitimate source of legal reasoning.

Common knowledge includes matters of learning, experience, history, and facts of which judicial notice may be taken, and may be referred to in argument of counsel.

Source: Shelley v. Chilton's Adm'r, 32 S.W.2d 974, 977; 236 Ky. 221; Weisman, 17e

(English-origin maxim.) Matters of history, learning, and common experience fall within judicial notice and may be referenced by counsel in argument without the need for formal evidentiary proof.

The law dispenses what common use has approved.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 17g; Weisman, 71ff

(English-origin maxim.) The common law draws its authority from the customs and usages long recognized by the People — where a practice has been universally and peaceably adopted, the law confirms and enforces it as an expression of the People's sovereign will.

Truth is the mother of justice.

Veritas est justitiae mater.

Source: Halk. Max. 185; Weisman, 101m

Justice cannot exist apart from truth; every legal proceeding is, at its foundation, a search for truth, and any process that obscures truth undermines justice.

Truth fears nothing but concealment.

Veritas nihil veretur nisi abscondi.

Source: 9 Co. 20b; Weisman, 101g

Truth is its own defense; the only thing that can defeat it is suppression. He who hides evidence betrays the truth and obstructs justice.

The suppression of the truth is the expression of a falsehood.

Suppressio veri, expressio falsi.

Source: Addington v. Allen, 11 Wend. (N.Y.) 374, 417; Wharton, Max.; Weisman, 101e

He who deliberately conceals a material fact is as culpable as one who affirmatively states what is untrue; silence, when there is a duty to speak, is a species of fraud.

He who does not freely speak the truth is a betrayer of the truth.

Qui non libere veritatem pronuntiat, proditor est veritatis.

Source: 4 Inst. Epil.; Bouv. 152; Weisman, 101b

The duty to speak truth is affirmative; a witness or officer who withholds what he knows to be true is as much a traitor to justice as one who speaks falsehood.

The law never operates without reason; truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from God.

Lex nunquam sine ratione; veritas a quocunque dicitur a Deo est.

Source: 4 Inst. 153

Truth is not diminished by the rank or station of the one who speaks it; the humblest witness may establish a fact that overturns the most powerful claim.

Truth of the name removes the error of description.

Veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 614; Co. Litt.; Weisman, 101j

Where the identity of a person or thing is established with certainty, an error in the description does not defeat the instrument — truth of substance prevails over error of form.

Truth is lost by too much disputation.

Veritas nimium altercando amittitur.

Source: Hob. 344

Excessive argument and procedural wrangling obscure the truth rather than illuminating it; simplicity and directness serve justice better than prolixity.

The law suffers nothing contrary to truth.

Lex non patitur aliquid contra veritatem.

Source: 2 Inst. 252; Weisman, 101c

No fiction, no presumption, and no procedural rule may be carried so far as to contradict established truth; where truth is known, it must prevail.

Truth not sufficiently defended is overcome; and he who does not disapprove, approves.

Veritas, quae non sufficienter defenditur, opprimitur; et qui non improbat, approbat.

Source: 3 Inst. 27; Weisman, 101l

Silence in the face of falsehood operates as consent; he who knows the truth and fails to defend it bears responsibility for the falsehood that prevails.

Painted error appears in many things more probable than naked truth; and again and again conquers truth by reasoning.

Error fucatus nuda veritate in multis est probabilior; et saepenumero rationibus vincit veritatem error.

Source: 2 Co. 78; Jackson

A well-dressed falsehood often appears more plausible than plain truth — advocates and tribunals must guard against sophisticated arguments that obscure simple facts.

False spelling or false grammar does not vitiate a grant.

Falsa orthographia, sive falsa grammatica, non vitiat concessionem.

Source: 9 Co. 48; Jackson; Weisman, 30i

A grant, deed, or other instrument is not defeated by mere errors of spelling or grammar when the meaning and intent are clear — substance prevails over form. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.2.14.)

Judgments are as it were the dicta of the law, and are received as truth.

Judicia sunt tanquam juris dicta, et pro veritate accipiuntur.

Source: 2 Inst. 587; Jackson; Weisman, 64e

A final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is presumed to state the law correctly and is treated as conclusive truth until reversed on appeal or vacated for jurisdictional defect.

Monuments which we call records are the vestiges of truth and antiquity.

Monumenta quae nos recorda vocamus sunt veritatis et vetustatis vestigia.

Source: Co. Litt. 118; Jackson

Official records carry the weight of established truth and historical fact — they are the permanent evidence of what was done and decided, and are presumed accurate until rebutted.

Impossibilities or dishonesty are not to be presumed; but honesty, and truth, and possibility.

Nulla impossibilia aut inhonesta sunt praesumenda; vera autem et honesta et possibilia.

Source: Co. Litt. 78; Jackson

The law always presumes in favor of what is honest, true, and possible — dishonesty and impossibility must be proved, never assumed.

Truth, by whomsoever pronounced, is from God.

Veritas, a quocunque dicitur, a Deo est.

Source: 4 Inst. 153; Jackson; Weisman, 101f

This is a restatement of 9.5.5 from a different source — truth has divine origin and carries the same authority regardless of the rank or station of the one who speaks it.

To lie is to go against the mind.

Mentiri est contra mentem ire.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 8 Buls. 260

A lie is a deliberate contradiction of what the speaker knows to be true — it is an offense against the faculty of reason itself, not merely against the hearer. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.137.)

We can do nothing against truth.

Nihil possumus contra veritatem.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Doct. & Stu. Dial. 2, c. 6

Truth is indestructible — no artifice, no legal fiction, and no exercise of power can alter or overcome what is objectively true. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.256.)

Truth is lost by excessive altercation.

Source: Hob. 344; Weisman, 101k

(English-origin maxim.) Excessive dispute and prolonged argument obscure rather than reveal the truth; courts and advocates should seek clarity and directness rather than exhaustive contention.

A man may not insist at different times on the truth of each of two conflicting allegations, according to the promptings of his private interest.

Source: Wharton, III-16

(English-origin maxim.) A party who asserts one version of facts in one proceeding and a contradictory version in another is estopped — the law forbids blowing hot and cold to serve shifting private interests.

Good faith requires that what is agreed upon shall be done.

Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat.

Source: Dig. 19, 2, 21; Dig. 19, 1, 50; Dig. 50, 8, 2, 13; Weisman, 5g; Weisman, 50c

The law demands performance of agreements honestly made; good faith is not merely an aspiration but a binding obligation.

Good faith does not permit the same thing to be demanded twice.

Bona fides non patitur ut bis idem exigatur.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 57; 9 Co. 53; Broom, Max.; Weisman, 50a; Weisman, 50e

A party who has received satisfaction cannot in good faith demand it again; double recovery is repugnant to equity and conscience.

A possessor in good faith is liable only for that which has actually come to him.

Bona fide possessor, in id tantum quod ad se pervenerit, tenetur.

Source: 2 Inst. 285; Dig.; Weisman, 50f

He who holds property believing his title to be lawful is accountable only for the benefit he actually received, not for speculative or consequential gains.

A good-faith possessor makes the fruits he has gathered and consumed his own.

Bona fide possessor facit fructus perceptos et consumptos suos.

Source: Tray. Max. 57; Dig.; Weisman, 50b

Where a person holds property in genuine good faith, the profits and fruits he has consumed before notice of a superior title are his by right; the law protects innocent use.

Good faith must be observed.

Bona fides servanda est.

Source: Coolidge v. Brigham, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 547, 551; Dig.; Weisman, 50d

The principle of good faith pervades every department of law — contracts, property, procedure, and public office alike — and its violation is a ground for relief in all of them.

Fraud corrupts everything it touches.

Fraus omnia corrumpit.

Source: 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §395; Broom, Max.

Where fraud is established, it vitiates the entire transaction — no part of an instrument or proceeding tainted by fraud may stand, for the corruption extends to the whole.

Advice, unless fraudulent, does not create an obligation.

Consilii, non fraudulenti, nulla est obligatio.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

One who gives honest counsel in good faith incurs no liability for the consequences of that advice — only when advice is given with intent to deceive does it become actionable.