PERSONS, STATUS & CAPACITY

A person is a man considered in light of a certain status.

Persona est homo cum statu quodam consideratus.

Source: Bouvier, Law Dict. 147; Heineccius, Elem. Jur. Civ.; Weisman, 76h

The law does not deal with man in the abstract — it recognizes him through the lens of his legal standing, whether as citizen, infant, husband, guardian, or officer.

Language referring to a person is to be understood as referring to his condition or status.

Sermo relatus ad personam intelligi debet de conditione personae.

Source: 4 Co. 16; Weisman, 22ll; Weisman, 76a

When a law or instrument speaks of a "person," the reference is to the legal condition — not merely to the physical body.

Status is the legal condition of a person.

Status est conditio legalis personae.

Source: Black's Law Dict. (2d) 1107; Dig. 1, 5, 1; Weisman, 76c

Legal status — such as infancy, outlawry, citizenship, or marriage — determines what acts a person may perform and what rights he may exercise.

Capacity is the attribute of a person by which he may exercise civil rights.

Capacitas est attributum personae per quod jura civilia exercere potest.

Source: Sargent v. Burdett, 96 Ga. 111, 22 S.E. 667; Bouvier, Law Dict.; Weisman, 76d

A party who lacks legal capacity — whether by reason of age, unsoundness of mind, or legal disability — cannot bind himself or others by his acts.

A status once established is presumed by law to continue until the contrary appears.

Status semel constitutus praesumitur manere donec contrarium appareat.

Source: Kidder v. Stevens, 60 Cal. 414, 419; Broom, Max. 944; Weisman, 76f

One who was proved competent at one time is presumed competent until evidence to the contrary is produced. The burden lies on him who asserts the change.

No one can improve his condition by his own misdeed.

Nemo potest conditionem suam meliorem facere delicto suo.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 134, 1; Broom, Max. 299; Weisman, 19f; Weisman, 76g

A wrongdoer cannot claim a legal benefit arising from his own wrong — no man shall profit from his own unlawful act.

No one is bound to incapacitate himself.

Nemo tenetur seipsum inhabilitare.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 40; Weisman, 76i

The law will not require a man to destroy his own legal standing or strip himself of rights as a condition of exercising another right.

One placed outside the law is civilly dead.

Extra legem positus est civiliter mortuus.

Source: Co. Litt. 130a; Wharton, Legal Maxims no. 172; Weisman, 36q

Outlawry — the deprivation of the protection of law — was the most severe civil penalty. It could not be imposed except by lawful judgment.

Impersonality neither concludes nor binds.

Impersonalitas non concludit nec ligat.

Source: Co. Litt. 352b; Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims no. 808; Weisman, 61g

A vague or impersonal charge or claim binds no one. The law requires that parties be specifically named and identified.

A corporation is not said to do anything unless it has been deliberated upon collectively.

Universitas vel corporatio non dicitur aliquid facere nisi id sit collegialiter deliberatum.

Source: Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend. (N.Y.) 103, 144; Broom, Max. 694

A municipal corporation or body politic acts only through its formal collective deliberation — individual members acting alone do not bind the body.

A personal connection equals, in law, a man’s own proper interest.

Persona conjuncta aequiparatur interesse proprio.

Source: Bac. Max. 18; Jackson

A party closely connected by blood or legal relationship is treated as having the same interest as one’s own — this applies when determining standing, interest in litigation, or the right to act on behalf of a connected party.

Though a testator may have made a mistake in the proper name or in the surname of the legatee, when it is certain who is the person meant, the legacy is nevertheless valid.

Si quidem in nomine, cognomine, praenomine, legatarii testator erraverit, cum de persona constat, nihilominus valet legatum.

Source: Inst. 2, 20, 29; Jackson

A misnomer in a will does not defeat the bequest when the intended recipient can be identified with certainty from the surrounding circumstances.

Not to be born and to be born dead are the same thing.

Non nasci et natum mori pari sunt.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 129; Bouvier, Max.

A stillborn child acquires no legal personality and transmits no rights — the law recognizes no status where life never began.

He who is in the womb is regarded as already born whenever his benefit is in question.

Qui in utero est pro jam nato habetur quoties de ejus commodo quaeritur.

Source: Dig. 1, 5, 7; Co. Litt. 36; Bouvier, Max.

The unborn child is treated as a living person for purposes of inheritance, guardianship, and any other matter where recognizing his existence serves his interest.

Towns and boroughs [municipal corporations] act as if persons.

Source: Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend. (N.Y.) 103, 144; Weisman, 76j

(English-origin maxim.) Municipal corporations are treated as artificial persons in law and may sue, be sued, hold property, and enter contracts — but only within the powers granted by their charter.

Women are not admissible to public offices.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 237; Dig. 50, 17, 2; 1 Exch. 645; 6 Mees. & W. 216; Weisman, 76l

(English-origin maxim.) Historical maxim — this rule has been abrogated across all American jurisdictions. At common law, women were excluded from holding public office. Note: the Nineteenth Amendment (1920) secured the right to *vote*, not the right to hold office; the exclusion from office was overturned through state constitutional amendments, legislation, and judicial decisions independent of the Nineteenth Amendment.

Capacity relates to soundness of mind or a mind that has full and intelligent knowledge of an act engaged in.

Source: In re Null's Estate, 153 A. 137, 139, 302 Pa. 64; Weisman, 76m

(English-origin maxim.) When challenging the validity of a contract, deed, or will, invoke this maxim to argue that the party lacked the mental competence to understand the nature and consequences of the act.

No one can claim another's status as his own merely because he wishes it.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 76k

(English-origin maxim.) Legal status — whether sui juris, citizen, officer, or any other recognized standing — is determined by law and fact, not by mere assertion or desire. Invoke this to challenge a party who claims an authority, privilege, or standing to which the law has not entitled him.

The crime carries the person.

Crimen trahit personam.

Source: Wharton, III-60; Weisman, 26w

Invoke this maxim to establish that criminal jurisdiction attaches to the person of the offender — wherever the accused is found, the court with jurisdiction over the crime may reach him.

A municipality and a decuria function in the place of a person.

Personae vice fungitur municipium et decuria.

Source: Wharton, III-251

A municipality acts in the capacity of a legal person and may hold rights, incur obligations, and appear in court — but only through its duly authorized officers acting within their delegated power.

Some persons are of their own right; some are subject to the right of another.

Quaedam personae sui juris sunt, quaedam alicui juri subjectae.

Source: Wharton, III-259

This maxim distinguishes those who hold full legal autonomy (sui juris) from those under another's authority (alieni juris), such as minors under a parent or wards under a guardian — the distinction determines who may bind himself by contract or appear in his own name.

Seals and statues affixed to a house are not counted among the furnishings of the house, but are part of the house itself.

Sigilla et statuae affixae instrumento domus non continentur, sed domus portio sunt.

Source: Wharton, III-316

Fixtures permanently attached to a building — such as seals, statues, or other ornaments affixed to the structure — pass with the conveyance of the building itself and need not be separately mentioned in the deed.

Where one of two innocent persons must suffer by the wrong of another, the one who enables such other to commit the wrong must bear the consequences.

Source: Wharton, III-382

(English-origin maxim.) When a third party's wrong injures one of two innocent persons, the loss falls on the one whose act or omission enabled the wrongdoer — invoke this to shift liability to the party who created the opportunity for the fraud or trespass.

When the rights of the king and of the subject concur, those of the king are to be preferred.

Quando jus domini regis et subditi concurrunt jus regis praeferri debet.

Source: 9 Co. 129; Jackson

Where the sovereign and a subject hold competing claims to the same right or property, the sovereign's claim takes precedence — though in the American system this principle is constrained by the constitutional reservation of rights to the People.

Names are the marks of things.

Nomina sunt notae rerum.

Source: 11 Co. 20; Godolphin; Bouvier, Law Dict. 142; Weisman, 81d; Weisman, 81g

A name identifies and distinguishes a thing. To lose the name is to lose the distinction between one thing and another.

An error in the name is nothing when there is certainty as to the body or person.

Nil facit error nominis cum de corpore vel persona constat.

Source: 11 Co. 21; Broom, Max. 634; 2 Kent, Comm. 292; Weisman, 81b

A misspelling or mistake in a name does not defeat a proceeding when the true identity of the party is clear from the circumstances.

A name is, as it were, the designation of a thing.

Nomen est quasi rei notamen.

Source: 6 Co. 66; Co. Litt. 86

The name serves to point to the thing — it has no independent existence apart from what it signifies.

If you know not the names of things, the knowledge of things themselves perishes.

Nomina si nescis, perit cognitio rerum.

Source: Co. Litt. 86; Weisman, 81h

Precise legal terminology is not pedantry — it is the means by which distinctions in law are preserved and communicated.

Names are changeable, but things remain the same.

Nomina sunt mutabilia, res autem immobiles.

Source: 6 Co. 66

A thing retains its identity regardless of the label placed upon it. Renaming a tax a "fee" does not change its nature.

The presence of the body cures an error in the name; the truth of the name cures an error in the description.

Praesentia corporis tollit errorem nominis; et veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis.

Source: Broom, Max. 637, 639, 640; Bacon, Max. reg. 25; 6 T.R. 675; Weisman, 81j

When the person or thing is physically present and identified, no mistake in the written name can defeat jurisdiction or process.

The names of things ought to be understood not according to the opinion of individuals but according to common usage.

Nomina rerum non sunt distinguenda secundum opinionem singulorum, sed secundum communem usum.

Source: Dig. 33, 10, 7, 2; Weisman, 81i

Legal terms are defined by their established common-law meaning — not by a private or novel interpretation adopted by one party.

A thing is named from its principal part.

Res denominatur a principaliori parte.

Source: 5 Co. 47; Weisman, 81f

When classifying a transaction or instrument, the law looks to its predominant character — not to an incidental feature.

From a great number of signs, true identity is ascertained.

Ex multitudine signorum colligitur identitas vera.

Source: Bacon, Max. 103, reg. 25, 29; Broom, Max. (3d Lond. ed.) 569; Weisman, 56a

Identity is established not by a single mark but by the convergence of multiple distinguishing characteristics — the same principle that governs identification of persons, things, and legal instruments.

The same thing, called by different names, does not change the difference between things.

Eadem res appellando nominibus diversis non mutat differentiam rerum.

Source: Cincinnati R.R. v. Kentucky, 115 U.S. 321, 337

Renaming a tax a "fee," or a penalty a "regulation," does not change its true nature — the law looks to the substance, not the label applied to it.

A name is called from the word "to know," because it makes recognition.

Nomen dicitur a noscendo, quia notitiam facit.

Source: 6 Co. 65; Jackson

The purpose of a name is identification — it exists to make a person or thing knowable and distinguishable, so that legal rights and obligations can attach to the correct party.

He who cannot be known from himself, may be known from his associate.

Source: Moore, 817; Weisman, 56b

(English-origin maxim.) When a party cannot be identified on his own, his identity may be established through his known associates — cite this in tracing the identity of an unknown principal through his agent or confederate.

Identity of a thing means the sameness in all that constitutes the objective reality of a thing.

Source: State v. Evjue, 33 N.W.2d 305, 309; Weisman, 56c

(English-origin maxim.) To establish identity in law, one must show complete sameness in every material characteristic — a partial resemblance is insufficient where the question is whether two things are truly one and the same.

Identity ordinarily connotes exactness.

Source: Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.2d 40, 44; Weisman, 56d

(English-origin maxim.) Proof of identity requires exactness — invoke this maxim to challenge an identification that rests on approximate or general similarities rather than precise correspondence.

A name is accepted if it errs not in substance.

Source: 6 Coke, 66; Weisman, 81a

(English-origin maxim.) A misnomer that does not alter the substance of the name will not defeat a legal proceeding — if the person or thing intended is otherwise clear, an immaterial error in the name is disregarded.

A name is not sufficient if a thing or subject for it does not exist by law or by fact.

Source: 4 Coke, 107b; Weisman, 81c

(English-origin maxim.) A name in a legal instrument is void if there is no corresponding person or thing in law or in fact — cite this to challenge a grant, bequest, or charge directed to a nonexistent entity.

Initials are no legal part of a name, the authorities holding the full Christian name to be essential.

Source: Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 147 U.S. 47, 58; Weisman, 81e

(English-origin maxim.) Initials alone are legally insufficient to identify a person — the full Christian name must appear in process, indictments, and conveyances, and the use of initials where the full name was required may be grounds to quash.

Names are mutable, but things are immutable. A name may be true or false, or may change, but the thing itself always maintains its identity.

Source: 6 Coke, 66; Weisman, 81g

(English-origin maxim.) Labels change; substance does not. A thing is what it is regardless of the name applied to it — renaming a tax as a fee, or a right as a privilege, does not alter its true nature.

The nature of man is changeable; the law, however, is always the same.

Natura hominis est mutabilis; lex autem semper eadem.

Source: Branch, Princ.; cf. Co. Litt. 379b

Law is founded on fixed principles, not on the shifting inclinations of those who happen to hold power. The fickleness of human nature is precisely why law must be stable.

A madman has no will.

Furiosi nulla voluntas est.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 5; Broom, Max. 99; Weisman, 24x; Weisman, 103u

One who is insane cannot form the legal intent necessary to make a binding contract, execute a deed, or commit a crime requiring mens rea.

A madman is punished by his madness alone.

Furiosus solo furore punitur.

Source: Co. Litt. 247b; Broom, Max. 15

The insane cannot be held criminally responsible — their affliction is itself their penalty.

Anger is a brief madness.

Ira furor brevis est.

Source: Beardsley v. Maynard, 4 Wend. (N.Y.) 336, 355; Horace, Epistles I.2.62

Acts done in the heat of passion are treated with some mitigation — but unlike true insanity, anger does not fully excuse the act.

He is insane who, reason being cast away, does everything with violence and rage.

Furiosus est qui, abjecta ratione, omnia cum impetu et furore facit.

Source: 4 Co. 128; Weisman, 55c

Insanity in law is defined not by diagnosis but by the abandonment of reason — the test is functional, not medical.

If you are moved to anger by insults, you publish them; if you despise them, they are forgotten.

Si injuriam movearis, profers eam; si contemnas, extinguis.

Source: 3 Inst. 198; Weisman, 55e

The wise course when provoked is to ignore the provocation — responding amplifies the harm; silence extinguishes it.

He acts with guile who demands that which he will have to return.

Dolo facit qui petit quod restituere oportet.

Source: Broom, Max. 346; Dig. 50, 17, 173, 3; Weisman, 55f

One who brings a claim knowing he has no right to retain the remedy sought acts fraudulently and will be met with an equitable defense.

To him to whom nothing is enough, nothing is base.

Cui parum est nihil, nihil ei turpe est.

Source: 4 Inst. 53; Weisman, 55b

Unchecked appetite — whether for power, wealth, or control — recognizes no moral boundary. The law guards against this tendency by limiting authority to its grant.

Drunkenness both inflames and reveals every crime.

Omne crimen ebrietas et incendit et detegit.

Source: Co. Litt. 247; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 26k

Intoxication strips away restraint and exposes the true disposition — it is both an accelerant of wrongdoing and a window into character.

He who offends while drunk must be punished when sober.

Qui peccat ebrius, luat sobrius.

Source: Cary 133; Bouvier, Max.

Voluntary intoxication is no defense — a man who drinks and then commits wrong chose to impair his own judgment and must bear the full consequence.

Anger is a short insanity.

Source: Beardsley v. Maynard, 4 Wend. (N.Y.) 336, 355; Weisman, 55d

(English-origin maxim.) Anger, like temporary insanity, may mitigate but does not excuse — courts consider provocation in reducing the grade of an offense, but the law never permits rage to serve as a complete defense.

To cover reproach with reproach is to lay mud upon mud.

Source: Bulst. 86; Weisman, 55g

(English-origin maxim.) Answering defamation with defamation only compounds the wrong — a party who retaliates with his own reproachful language forfeits the clean hands needed to seek equitable relief.

Human nature does not change with time or environment.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 55a

(English-origin maxim.) The foundational principles of law are rooted in unchanging human nature — invoke this maxim to rebut arguments that constitutional rights or common law principles are "outdated" and must yield to modern conditions. The Founders secured rights against the same tendencies toward tyranny that exist in every age.

Discretion is to know through the law what is just.

Discretio est scire per legem quid sit justum.

Source: 10 Co. 140; Weisman, 69a

True discretion is not personal preference — it is the informed application of settled legal principles to the facts at hand.

By reasoning we arrive at lawful reason.

Ratione pervenitur ad legitimam rationem.

Source: Litt. s. 386; Co. Litt. 232b

Legal conclusions must be reached through a chain of reasoning traceable to established principles — not by decree or arbitrary assertion.

To know the laws is not to hold to their mere words, but their force and power.

Scire leges non hoc est verba earum tenere, sed vim ac potestatem.

Source: Dig. 1, 3, 17; 1 Kent, Comm. 462; Weisman, 69m

The letter of the law must yield to its spirit when the two conflict — he who grasps only the words without the meaning knows nothing.

To know and to be bound to know are regarded in law as equivalent.

Scire et scire debere aequiparantur in jure.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 551; Bouvier, Law Dict. 129; Weisman, 69l

Constructive knowledge is as potent as actual knowledge. One who should have known the law or the facts is treated as if he did know them.

Equal knowledge on both sides makes the contracting parties equal.

Scientia utrinque par pares contrahentes facit.

Source: 3 Burr. 1910; Broom, Max. 774; Jackson, Lat. for Law. no. 959; Weisman, 24o

A contract formed where one party withholds material knowledge from the other is not a contract between equals — and may be voidable for that disparity.

No one is bound to give information about things he is ignorant of, but everyone is bound to know that which he gives information about.

Nemo tenetur informare quod nescit, sed quisquis scire quod informat.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Black's Law Dict. (2d) 815; Weisman, 69q

One who volunteers information warrants its truth. Ignorance excuses silence — it does not excuse affirmative misrepresentation.

No one is compelled to sell his own property, even at a just price.

Nemo cogitur rem suam vendere, etiam justo pretio.

Source: Lofft, 569; Weisman, 91ee

A man's property is his own and cannot be taken from him by compulsion, even upon the offer of fair market value — the right of the owner to refuse to sell is absolute, and no government or private party may force a sale against the owner's will without his consent.

It profits little to know what ought to be done, if you do not know how it is to be done.

Parum est scire quid fieri debet, si non cognoscas quomodo sit facturum.

Source: 2 Inst. 503; Weisman, 69x

Knowledge of a right is worthless without knowledge of the remedy — the common law provides both the right and the procedure to enforce it.

Not to believe rashly is the sinew of wisdom.

Non temere credere est nervus sapientiae.

Source: 5 Co. 114; Weisman, 69r

The law distrusts credulity. A party who acts on unverified assertions bears the risk of their falsity.

Many men know many things; no man knows everything.

Multi multa, nemo omnia novit.

Source: 4 Inst. 348; Weisman, 69s

The law does not demand omniscience. It requires reasonable diligence — not perfection of knowledge.

No one can properly understand a part until he has read the whole.

Nemo aliquam partem recte intelligere potest antequam totum perlegit.

Source: 3 Co. Rep. 59; Jackson; Weisman, 69d

A statute, contract, or instrument must be read in its entirety before any single clause can be properly construed — isolated reading of provisions leads to misinterpretation.

Of things relating to each other, one being known, the other is also known.

Relativorum, cognito uno, cognoscitur et alterum.

Source: Cro. Jac. 539; Jackson

Correlative terms define each other — when one side of a legal relationship is established (e.g., right and duty, principal and agent, trustee and beneficiary), the other side is necessarily implied. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.255.)

Plain truths need not be proved.

Perspicua vera non sunt probanda.

Source: Co. Litt. 16; Bouvier, Max.

What is self-evident requires no proof — the law does not demand that a party prove what every reasonable man already knows to be true. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.4.8.)

By reasoning we come to true reason.

Source: Litt. s. 386; Weisman, 69b

(English-origin maxim.) Sound legal reasoning, carefully applied, leads to correct conclusions. Courts and advocates must reason from established principles rather than from assumptions or speculation.

The knowledge of smatterers is mixed ignorance.

Source: 8 Coke, 159; Weisman, 69f

(English-origin maxim.) Superficial knowledge of the law is worse than none at all, because it breeds false confidence — courts distrust arguments built on half-understood authorities, and counsel must master principles before invoking them.

Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things Divine and human; the science of the just and the unjust.

Source: Dig. 1, 1, 10, 2; Inst. 1, 1, 1; Bract. 3; People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 290, 295; Weisman, 69g

(English-origin maxim.) True jurisprudence encompasses both divine and human law and demands the ability to distinguish the just from the unjust — invoke this definition to remind a tribunal that law is a moral science, not mere procedure.

He who questions well learns well.

Source: 3 Bulst. 227; Weisman, 69b; Weisman, 69h

(English-origin maxim.) Effective cross-examination and forensic inquiry are the engines of truth — a lawyer who asks the right questions will uncover what no amount of passive observation reveals.

To know properly is to know a thing in its reason, and by its cause. We are truly said to know anything, where we know the true cause thereof.

Source: Co. Litt. 183b; Weisman, 69i

(English-origin maxim.) True understanding of a legal rule requires knowing its reason and cause — cite this to challenge a party who invokes a rule mechanically without understanding the principle that animates it.

We are ignorant of many things which would not be hidden from us if the reading of old authors was familiar to us.

Source: 10 Coke, 73; Weisman, 69j

(English-origin maxim.) Many modern legal errors arise from neglect of the old authorities — counsel should study Coke, Blackstone, and the ancient reports, because the principles established there remain the foundation of the common law.

Things universal are better known than things particular.

Source: 2 Rolle, 294; Weisman, 69k

(English-origin maxim.) General principles of law are more universally understood than the particular rules derived from them — begin any argument from the broad maxim before descending to the specific application.

No man is bound to have foreknowledge of a Divine or a future event.

Source: 10 Coke, 55a; Weisman, 69u

(English-origin maxim.) No person can be held liable for failing to foresee an act of God or an unforeseeable future event — invoke this to defeat a negligence claim premised on the expectation of superhuman foresight.

It is necessary that given persons, lands and estates should be comprehended in a declaration of uses.

Source: 9 Coke, 9; Weisman, 69w

(English-origin maxim.) A declaration of uses must specify the persons, lands, and estates affected with particularity — a vague or general declaration that fails to identify the beneficiaries and the property is void for uncertainty.

Notice is named from a knowledge being had; and notice ought not to halt, [i.e., be imperfect.].

Source: 6 Coke, 29; Weisman, 69y

(English-origin maxim.) Legal notice must be complete and definite — a notice that is partial, ambiguous, or otherwise imperfect fails to accomplish its purpose and does not bind the party to whom it is directed.

It is sometimes expedient to forget what you know.

Etiam oblivisci quod scis interdum expedit.

Source: Weisman, 69v

Discretion and prudence sometimes require setting aside what one knows — applied to situations where strict enforcement of knowledge would produce unjust or impractical results.

Ignorance of the law does not excuse.

Ignorantia juris non excusat.

Source: 4 Bouv. Inst. no. 3828; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 111; 2 Co. 36; 4 Bl. Comm. 27; Broom, Max. 253

Every man is presumed to know the law. This presumption is necessary to the functioning of any legal system — without it, the most brazen violator would have the readiest defense.

Ignorance of the law excuses no one, for all are presumed to know the law.

Ignorantia legis neminem excusat; omnes enim praesumuntur legem scire.

Source: 1 Co. 177; Broom, Max. 253; Rankin v. Mortimere, 7 Watts (Pa.) 374

The presumption of legal knowledge is universal and cannot be rebutted by a claim of personal unfamiliarity with the law.

Ignorance of fact excuses.

Ignorantia facti excusat.

Source: 2 Co. 3b; 2 Kent, Comm. 491; Code 1, 18, 10; Broom, Max. 253; Weisman, 57c; Weisman, 57d

Acts done and contracts made under a material mistake of fact are voidable. The distinction between ignorance of law (no excuse) and ignorance of fact (grounds for relief) is fundamental.

Ignorance of those things which one is bound to know does not excuse.

Ignorantia eorum quae quis scire tenetur non excusat.

Source: Hale, P.C. 42; Broom, Max. 267; 4 Bl. Comm. 27; Weisman, 57a

Where a duty to know exists — as with an officer of the court or a fiduciary — ignorance is treated as negligence, not as innocence.

The law aids the ignorant.

Lex succurrit ignoranti.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 15; Weisman, 44i; Weisman, 57h

Equity steps in where strict law would punish a party who acted in genuine ignorance of a material fact — particularly where the other party possessed superior knowledge.

Ignorance of one's own right does not prejudice the right.

Ignorantia juris sui non praejudicat juri.

Source: Lofft. 552; Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 130, 19 Am. Dec. 353; Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims no. 805; Weisman, 57j

A right exists whether or not the holder knows he possesses it. Ignorance of the right delays its exercise but does not destroy it.

Want of skill is reckoned as fault.

Imperitia culpae adnumeratur.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 132; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 1004; 2 Kent, Comm. 588; Weisman, 44q

One who holds himself out as possessing a skill — a physician, attorney, or artisan — is liable for the consequences of his incompetence. His ignorance is his negligence.

It is a general rule that ignorance of law prejudices, but not ignorance of fact.

Regulae generalis est quod omnis ignorantia legis praejudicat, non facti.

Source: Code 1, 18, 10; 2 Kent, Comm. 491; 4 Bl. Comm. 27

This is the master rule from which the two branches — law and fact — flow. A mistake of law furnishes no ground to rescind agreements or reclaim money paid; a mistake of fact may.

A mistake of law is no defense in criminal cases.

Error in jure in criminalibus non est defensio.

Source: 4 Bl. Comm. 27; 4 Steph. Comm. 81; Broom, Max. 253

Criminal liability cannot be avoided by pleading that the accused did not know his act was unlawful. The law is equally binding on the learned and the unlearned.

It is ignorance when we do not know our own rights.

Ignorantia est cum jura nostra non cognoscimus.

Source: Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 130, 19 Am. Dec. 353; Weisman, 57e

The most dangerous form of ignorance is not ignorance of the law in general, but ignorance of one's own particular rights — for a man who does not know his rights cannot defend them.

An error which is not resisted is approved.

Error qui non resistitur, approbatur.

Source: Doct. and Stud. c. 70; Jackson; Weisman, 37d

A party who has knowledge of an error and fails to object or correct it in a timely manner is deemed to have accepted it — silence in the face of a known mistake operates as ratification.

Error lurks in general expressions.

In generalibus latet error.

Source: Jackson; Weisman, 37m

Broad or vague language in statutes, contracts, and pleadings is more likely to contain or conceal error than precise and particular language — specificity is the safeguard against hidden mistakes.

A minor is to be assisted: a mistake of youth is easy.

Succurritur minori: facilis est lapsus juventutis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 47; Jackson

Courts extend relief to minors who err in legal transactions because youth naturally lacks the judgment to avoid such mistakes — the law protects against the consequences of immaturity.

He is not deceived who knows himself to be deceived.

Non decipitur qui scit se decipi.

Source: 5 Co. 60; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 29k

One who enters a transaction knowing the other party's deception cannot later claim injury from the fraud — knowledge of the trick negates the harm.

Let him who wishes to be deceived, be deceived.

Qui vult decipi, decipiatur.

Source: 1 de G. M. & G. 687; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 29u

The law will not rescue a man from the consequences of deception he willingly embraced — voluntary blindness to fraud forfeits the right to complain of it.

Error of law injures. A mistake of the law has an injurious effect; that is, the party committing it must suffer the consequences.

Source: Mackeld. Rom. Law, s. 178; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 139, note; 4 Bouv. Inst. n. 3828; Weisman, 37b

(English-origin maxim.) A party who acts under a mistaken understanding of the law bears the consequences of that mistake — ignorance of law is no excuse, and equity will not relieve against its effects.

It is safer to err on the gentler side or the side of mercy.

Source: 3 Inst. 220; Weisman, 37e

(English-origin maxim.) When the law is doubtful, courts should err on the side of mercy — invoke this in sentencing arguments or where a harsh construction and a lenient one are equally plausible.

An error made by a clerk should not injure or prejudice; a clerical error may be corrected.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 23, 324; Dig. 34, 5, 3; Weisman, 37g

(English-origin maxim.) A clerical or scrivener's error in a record, deed, or judgment may be corrected without prejudice to any party — the substance of the act controls, not the scribe's inadvertent mistake.

A man is presumed to be simple [minded] who makes a mistake in his own name.

Source: Code. 6, 24, 14; Van Alst v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 148, 161; Weisman, 37i

(English-origin maxim.) A man who misstates or misspells his own name raises a presumption of incapacity or fraud — cite this to challenge the authenticity of a document signed under a garbled version of the signer's name.

The mistakes of the writer ought not to harm.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 324; Weisman, 37l

(English-origin maxim.) Errors introduced by the drafter or copyist of a legal instrument do not invalidate the instrument — the parties should not suffer for the writer's mistake when the true intent is clear.

Ignorance of the fact excuses; ignorance of the law excuses not. Every man must be taken to be cognizant of the law; otherwise there is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance may not be carried.

Source: 1 Coke, 177; Broom, Max. 253; 4 Bouv. Inst. n. 3828; Weisman, 57f

(English-origin maxim.) Ignorance of fact may excuse a party from liability, but ignorance of law never does — every person is conclusively presumed to know the law, and no claim of unfamiliarity will serve as a defense.

A mistake in point of law is, in criminal cases, no sort of defense.

Source: 4 Bl. Comm. 27; 4 Steph. Comm. 81; Broom, Max. 253; 7 Car. P. 456; 2 Kent, Comm. 491, and note; Weisman, 57g

(English-origin maxim.) In criminal prosecutions, a defendant cannot escape liability by claiming he did not know his act was illegal — the law presumes knowledge of its own commands, and mistake of law is no defense to a criminal charge.

The law assists the ignorant.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 15; Weisman, 57h

(English-origin maxim.) The law provides protection to those who act in genuine ignorance of fact — where a person is ignorant through no fault of his own, the law steps in to prevent injustice.

The act does not make one guilty unless the mind be guilty.

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

Source: 3 Inst. 107; 7 T.R. 514; Broom, Max. 306; Lofft 37

Criminal liability requires both a wrongful act and a wrongful intent. Neither alone suffices — the union of the two constitutes the crime.

An act done against my will is not my act.

Actus me invito factus non est meus actus.

Source: Bract. fol. 101b; Peloubet, Legal Maxims no. 62; Broom, Max. 270; Weisman, 2q

No man can be charged with the consequences of an act to which he did not consent. Compelled acts are not voluntary acts — and only voluntary acts give rise to legal liability.

The will and the purpose distinguish offenses.

Voluntas et propositum distinguunt maleficia.

Source: Bract. fol. 2b, 101b; Hob. 123

The same physical act may be innocent or criminal depending on the intent behind it. Intent is the dividing line between accident and offense.

My intention gives name to my act.

Intentio mea imponit nomen operi meo.

Source: Bract. fol. 2b, 101b; Hob. 123

The character of an act is determined by the purpose for which it was done — the same blow may be self-defense, accident, or murder depending on the intent behind it.

The act and the intent must both concur to constitute a crime.

Actus et intentio debent concurrere ut constituant crimen.

Source: 7 T.R. 514; Broom, Max. 306; Howard v. Sexton, 4 N.Y. 157, 159

A criminal prosecution must prove both the outward act (actus reus) and the inward intent (mens rea). Failure on either element defeats the charge.

Intentions ought to be subordinate to the laws, not the laws to intentions.

Intentio inservire debet legibus, non leges intentioni.

Source: Co. Litt. 314a, 314b; Weisman, 66l

No man's private purpose can override the settled law. This applies with equal force to legislators who attempt to bend the law to their desired ends.

Outward acts reveal the inner secrets.

Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta.

Source: Broom, Max. (3d ed.) 270; 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 115; 8 Co. 291

When direct proof of intent is unavailable, the law infers intent from conduct. A man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his deliberate acts.

Without knowledge, intent cannot exist.

Sine scientia intentio esse non potest.

Source: Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711; Weisman, 60m

Intent presupposes knowledge of the relevant facts. One who is genuinely ignorant of a material circumstance cannot have formed the specific intent the law requires.

A hidden intention is bad and disfavored in law.

Intentio caeca mala est et in jure odibilis.

Source: 2 Bulstr. 179

The law disfavors secret reservations. One who conceals his true purpose while inducing another to act on a false representation acts fraudulently.

The intention amounts to nothing unless some effect follows.

Intentio cadit ad nihil nisi sequatur aliquis effectus.

Source: 1 Rolle, 226; Bouvier, Law Dict. 143; Weisman, 60c

Mere intention, without any overt act in furtherance of it, creates no legal liability. The law punishes acts, not thoughts.

The testator’s intention is to be regarded in wills.

Mens testatoris in testamentis spectanda est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 277; Jackson

In construing a will, the paramount object is to ascertain and give effect to the testator’s intention as expressed in the instrument — technical rules of construction yield to the maker’s manifest purpose.

He who errs does not consent.

Non consentit qui errat.

Source: 1 Bouv. Inst. no. 581; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 39ff

Consent founded on mistake is no consent at all — a contract or waiver procured through the other party’s error is voidable at the election of the mistaken party.

He does not appear to have retained consent who has changed anything under the direction of a threatening party.

Non videtur consensum retinuisse si quis ex praescripto minantis aliquid immutavit.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 21n

Consent extracted by threat or coercion is no consent — a man who acts under duress acts not from his own will but from the will of his oppressor.

Every consent removes error.

Omnis consensus tollit errorem.

Source: 2 Inst. 123; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 37c

When a party, fully informed, freely consents to the terms of a transaction, his consent cures any prior defect of error — knowing ratification validates the act.

He who is silent appears to consent.

Qui tacet consentire videtur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 32; Bouvier, Max.

Silence in the face of an assertion or claim, where one has the duty and opportunity to speak, is treated as acquiescence — the law imputes consent to him who could object but does not.

That which is first in intention is last in operation.

Source: Bacon, Max; Weisman, 60b

(English-origin maxim.) The ultimate purpose of an act is conceived first but accomplished last — in construing a statute or trust, look to the end the maker intended, understanding that the final result is the true measure of the design.

It is to the intention that all law applies. Law always regards the intention.

Source: Black's, 2d, 70; Bouv. 118; Weisman, 60e

(English-origin maxim.) Every rule of law bends toward effectuating the intention behind it — when construing a contract, will, or statute, the intention of the maker governs over the bare letter of the text.

Outward acts indicate the inward intent.

Source: Broom, Max. 3. 270; 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 115; 8 Coke, 291; Weisman, 60f

(English-origin maxim.) A person's intent is proved by his conduct — when direct evidence of mental state is unavailable, courts infer intention from the outward acts and circumstances surrounding the deed.

Language is the exponent of the intention. The language of a statute or instrument is the best guide to the intention.

Source: Broom, Max. 622; Weisman, 60g

(English-origin maxim.) The words of a statute or instrument are the primary evidence of the maker's intent — begin every exercise of construction with the plain language before resorting to extrinsic aids.

Your intention (or disposition) gives name (or character) to your work or act.

Source: Bract. fol. 2b, 101b; Hob. 123; Weisman, 60i

(English-origin maxim.) The character of an act depends on the intention with which it was done — the same physical act may be lawful or unlawful depending on the actor's purpose, and the law judges accordingly.

Previous intentions are judged by subsequent acts.

Source: Dumont v. Smith, 4 Denio (N.Y.) 319, 320; Weisman, 60k

(English-origin maxim.) When a party's prior intent is disputed, his subsequent conduct is the best evidence of what he originally intended — cite this to prove or disprove the existence of a prior agreement or design.

The law judges a man's previous intentions by his subsequent acts.

Source: Wharton, III-339

(English-origin maxim.) A man's earlier intentions are illuminated by his later deeds — invoke this maxim to demonstrate that subsequent conduct confirms or contradicts the intent claimed at the time of the original act.

Words ought to be made subservient to the intent, not contrary to it.

Verba intentioni, et non e contra, debent inservire.

Source: Wharton, III-362; Weisman, 60d; Weisman, 60l

Words in a contract, statute, or instrument must serve the intent of the parties or the legislature, not override it. When literal language conflicts with clear intent, courts follow the intent.

The mind of the king is presumed to be in conformity with the law, and with what it should be, especially in doubtful cases.

Eadem mens praesumitur regis quae est juris, et quae esse debet, praesertim in dubiis.

Source: Hob. 154; Jackson

The sovereign's intent is presumed to align with what the law requires — in cases of ambiguity, the sovereign's acts are construed as lawful rather than unlawful.

Right and obligation are correlative terms.

Jus et obligatio sunt correlata.

Source: Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 281; cf. Blackstone, 1 Comm. 123

Every right held by one person implies a corresponding duty in another to respect it. Where there is no duty, there is no right — and where there is a right, there must be a remedy for its violation.

It is safe not to obey him who has no right.

Tutum est non habenti jus ei non parere.

Source: Hob. 146; Weisman, 34a

Obedience is owed only to lawful authority. An officer who commands without jurisdiction may be lawfully refused — and the refusal is not contempt but right.

A neglected duty often injures as much as a duty wrongfully performed.

Neglecta officii saepe tantum contra bonos interest quantum officium male administratum.

Source: Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 295; Weisman, 34h

The officer who fails to act when duty demands it is as liable as the officer who acts unlawfully. Maladministration includes both commission and omission.

No one is bound to do what is impossible.

Nemo ad impossibile tenetur.

Source: Black's Law Dict. (2d); Jenk. Cent. 7; Co. Litt. 231b; Weisman, 34g

An obligation that cannot be performed is void. This applies to contractual duties, statutory commands, and court orders alike.

That which concerns all ought to be borne by all.

Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus supportari debet.

Source: 2 Inst. 14; Bracton; Broom, Max. 745; Wingate, Max. 106; Weisman, 34e

Public burdens — taxes, defense, and civic obligation — must be shared equally. No class of persons may be singled out to bear a disproportionate weight.

If the form is not observed, the annulment of the act follows.

Non observata forma, infertur adnullatio actus.

Source: 12 Co. 7; Broom, Max. 64

An officer who fails to follow the required procedure has not performed his duty — his act is void, not merely voidable.

He who does not do what he ought to do is not deemed to do what he does.

Qui non facit quod facere debet, non videtur facere quod facit.

Source: Branch, Princ.; cf. 4 Co. 24b

A half-performed duty is no duty performed. An officer who goes through the motions without fulfilling the substance of his obligation has done nothing the law recognizes.

He who betrays his country is like the insane sailor who bores a hole in the ship that carries him.

Qui patriam prodit est similis insano nauta qui navem perfundit.

Source: 3 Inst. 36; Weisman, 34f

The officer who undermines the very system of law that gives him authority destroys his own foundation. Treason against the constitution is self-destruction.

Those who do not preserve the law of the land justly incur the brand of infamy.

Qui leges terrae non servant, juste merentur infamiae inustionem.

Source: 3 Inst. 221; Weisman, 34d

Public officers who disregard the law they swore to uphold earn disgrace in the eyes of the law — their dishonor is a matter of public record.

No one is bound to criminate himself.

Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare.

Source: Wing. Max. 486; Wharton

The privilege against self-incrimination is a natural right — no tribunal, officer, or proceeding may compel a man to furnish evidence against himself.

An office ought to be injurious to no one.

Officium nemini debet esse damnosum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 101; Bouvier, Max.

Public office is a trust, not a weapon — the power of office must never be turned against the officer's own constituents or used to harm those it was created to serve.

He who can and ought to forbid a thing, and does not, commands it.

Qui potest et debet vetare, jubet.

Source: 2 Inst. 146; Bouvier, Max.

The officer or guardian who has the power and duty to prevent a wrong but stands idle is treated as having authorized it — silence in the face of duty is complicity.

He who does not repel a wrong when he can, occasions it.

Qui non propulsat injuriam quando potest, infert.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 105c

The duty to act against injustice is not optional for those in authority — passive acquiescence in wrong is itself a form of wrongdoing.

Right and obligation are considered by all ethical writers as correlative terms.

Source: Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 281; Weisman, 34i

(English-origin maxim.) Every right implies a corresponding obligation and vice versa — cite this to argue that a party who asserts a right must also acknowledge the duty that accompanies it, and one who bears a duty may enforce the correlative right.

A man may obey the law and yet be neither honest nor a good neighbor.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 34b

(English-origin maxim.) Mere legal compliance does not satisfy the demands of natural law or equity — a man may shelter behind the letter of the statute while violating every principle of good conscience. This maxim reinforces why equity looks beyond technical legality to the substance of a party's conduct and the dictates of natural justice.

A minor has the power to make his condition better, but not worse.

Minor potestatem habet conditionem suam meliorare, non deteriorem facere.

Source: Co. Litt. 337; Broom, Max. 496

An infant may accept a beneficial grant or settle a debt, but cannot bind himself to an onerous contract or convey away his property to his own prejudice.

A minor cannot take an oath.

Minor jurare non potest.

Source: Co. Litt. 172b; Litt. 289; Weisman, 80b

Because an oath binds the conscience and carries legal penalties for its breach, the law does not permit a minor — who cannot fully appreciate these consequences — to swear one.

A minor before coming of age cannot act in a case of property.

Minor ante tempus agere non potest in casu proprietatis.

Source: 2 Inst. 291; Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims no. 1256; Weisman, 80d

Transactions involving real property require full legal capacity. A minor's deed of conveyance is voidable at his election upon reaching majority.

A minor is not bound to answer during his minority, except as a matter of favor in a cause of dower.

Minor non tenetur respondere durante minori aetate, nisi in causa dotis.

Source: 3 Bulstr. 143; Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims no. 1261; Weisman, 80h

The law shields infants from the burden of litigation. They are not compelled to defend or plead until they reach the age at which they can do so with full understanding.

A minor ought not to be guardian of a minor, for he who knows not how to govern himself is presumed to govern others badly.

Minor non debet esse custos minoris; alios enim praesumitur male regere qui seipsum regere nescit.

Source: Co. Litt. 88b; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 10; Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims no. 1259; Weisman, 80c

Guardianship requires a degree of judgment and prudence that the law presumes an infant does not possess. The protector must be at least as capable as the one he protects.

An infant does not differ much from a lunatic.

Infans non multum a furioso distat.

Source: Bract. l. 3, c. 2, s. 8; Dig. 50, 17, 5, 40; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. ss. 223, 224, 242; Weisman, 76e

Both infants and the insane lack the legal capacity to bind themselves. The law protects both on the same principle — neither can consent with understanding.

The law favors minors.

Lex favet minoribus.

Source: Jenk. Cent. case 97; Jenk. Cent. case 47; Weisman, 80g

In all doubtful cases, the law leans in favor of protecting the interests of infants. This is not indulgence but necessity — those who cannot protect themselves must be protected by the law.

A guardian may make the estate of an heir in his custody better, not worse.

Custos statum haeredis in custodia existentis meliorem, non deteriorem, facere potest.

Source: 7 Co. 7; Weisman, 53a

The guardian holds a fiduciary position — he may improve the ward's estate by prudent management but may not diminish it by waste, sale, or self-dealing.

If a guardian commit fraud upon his ward, he shall be removed from the guardianship.

Si custos fraudem pupillo fecerit, a custodia removendus est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 39; Weisman, 53c

The guardian who betrays his trust forfeits his office. The remedy is immediate removal — the law does not leave a ward in the hands of a proven fraudster.

A guardian ought not to make money from the guardianship of his ward.

Tutor non debet lucrari ex tutela.

Source: Manning v. Manning's Ex'rs, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 527, 535; Dig. 26, 7, 33; Weisman, 53b

The guardianship is a trust, not a profit center. Any benefit the guardian extracts from the ward's estate is a breach of duty and must be disgorged.

The law will provide for orphans, the insane, and the poor as though it were their guardian and curator.

Lex orbis, insanis, et pauperibus pro tutore atque curatore providebit.

Source: Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims; cf. Jenk. Cent. 97; 3 Co. Inst. 6

Where no private guardian exists, the law itself steps into the role of protector for those who cannot protect themselves — orphans, the insane, and the destitute.

A infant is not supposed to be able to suffer, i.e., to do an act to his own prejudice.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 110, 2; Weisman, 80e

(English-origin maxim.) An infant is presumed incapable of performing any act to his own prejudice — invoke this to void a minor's improvident conveyance, waiver, or admission as beyond his legal capacity.

A minor who is under twelve years of age cannot be outlawed, nor placed without the law, because before such age he is not under any law, nor in decennary.

Minor, qui infra aetatem 12 annorum fuerit, utlegari non potest, nec extra legem poni, quia ante talem aetatem, non est sub lege aliqua.

Source: Co. Litt. 128; Wharton, II-436; Weisman, 80f

A child under twelve cannot be outlawed or subjected to the penalties of law, because he is not yet considered to be within the law's jurisdiction — cite this when challenging any legal proceeding brought against a very young child.

A delinquent provoked by anger ought to be punished more mildly.

Source: 3 Inst. 55; Weisman, 80i; Weisman, 92o

(English-origin maxim.) A wrongdoer who acted under provocation of anger deserves a lighter punishment than one who acted with deliberate calculation — invoke this in mitigation at sentencing.