RELATIONSHIPS & ASSOCIATIONS

The union of male and female is founded upon the law of nature.

Conjunctio maris et feminae est de jure naturae.

Source: 7 Co. 13; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874), p. 505; Weisman, 79f

Marriage is not a creature of statute but a natural institution recognized and protected by the common law.

Not cohabitation but consent makes marriage.

Nuptias non concubitus sed consensus facit.

Source: Coke, Co. Litt. 33a; Dig. 50, 17, 30; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 739

Marriage is constituted by the voluntary agreement of the parties, not by mere cohabitation — consent is its essential element.

Husband and wife are regarded in law as one person.

Vir et uxor censentur in lege una persona.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 27; Co. Litt. 112; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 1065; Weisman, 79i

At common law, husband and wife form a legal unity — the acts, acquisitions, and obligations of one are attributable to both.

Marriages ought to be free.

Matrimonia debent esse libera.

Source: Halk. Max. 86; 2 Kent, Comm. 102; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 568; Weisman, 61l; Weisman, 79d

No external compulsion or unreasonable restraint should be placed upon the right to marry — it is a matter of free choice.

A sentence against marriage never becomes a thing finally adjudged.

Sententia contra matrimonium nunquam transit in rem judicatam.

Source: 7 Co. Rep. 43, 48; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 969; Weisman, 79e

A decree annulling or denying a marriage is never absolutely conclusive — the question of marital status may always be revisited on new evidence.

The presumption is always in favor of the legitimacy of children.

Semper praesumatur pro legitimatione puerorum.

Source: Co. Litt. 126; 5 Co. Rep. 98b; Weisman, 79l

Children born during wedlock are presumed legitimate — the law favors the protection of the innocent over suspicion of the parents.

A betrothal in the present tense is a mutual promise constituting marriage itself.

Sponsalia de praesenti est repromissio.

Source: Co. Litt. 34; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 990

At common law, *sponsalia de praesenti* — a present-tense exchange of vows ("I take thee") — constituted an actual marriage, as distinguished from *sponsalia de futuro* (a promise to marry in the future, i.e., an engagement). The mutual present consent of the parties, not the ceremony, made the marriage.

It is called affinity when two families, divided from one another, are united by marriage, and one of them approaches the confines of the other.

Affinitas dicitur, cum dux cognationes, inter se divise, per nuptias copulantur, et altera ad alterius fines accidit.

Source: Co. Litt. 157; Jackson

Affinity is the legal bond created between each spouse and the blood relatives of the other — it arises solely from marriage and defines the degrees of relationship that the law recognizes between the two kindred groups.

Consent, and not coition, constitutes marriage; and the parties are not able to consent before marriageable years.

Consensus non concubitus facit matrimonium; et consentire non possunt ante annos nubiles.

Source: 6 Co. 22; Jackson; Weisman, 79q

Consent is the foundation of marriage, and consent requires capacity — those below the age of lawful marriage cannot give it, rendering any purported union void.

A subsequent marriage makes the children legitimate so far as relates to the priesthood, not as to the succession, on account of the custom of the kingdom, which is contrary thereto.

Matrimonium subsequens legitimos facit quoad sacerdotium non quoad successionem propter consuetudinem regni quae se habet in contrarium.

Source: Co. Litt. 345; Jackson

At common law, a subsequent marriage of the parents legitimated children born before it for ecclesiastical purposes, but the custom of England did not extend that legitimation to rights of inheritance.

All things which belong to the wife belong to the husband; the wife has no power of her own, the husband has it all.

Omnia quae sunt uxoris sunt ipsius viri; non habet uxor potestatem sui, sed vir.

Source: Co. Litt. 112; Jackson; Weisman, 79o

At common law, the doctrine of coverture merged the wife's legal identity into her husband's — her property and legal capacity were subsumed under his authority during marriage.

Polygamy is the marriage of many husbands or wives at one time.

Polygamia est plurium simul virorum uxorumve connubium.

Source: 3 Inst. 88; Jackson

The law defines polygamy as the simultaneous union of multiple spouses — a practice forbidden at common law and punishable as an offense against the institution of marriage.

A betrothing is the agreement and promise of a future marriage.

Sponsalia dicuntur futurarum nuptiarum conventio et repromissio.

Source: Co. Litt. 34; Jackson

A betrothal (sponsalia) is a mutual promise of future marriage — it creates a binding obligation at law, distinct from the marriage itself but enforceable as an agreement.

A subsequent marriage removes the previous wrong.

Subsequens matrimonium tollit peccatum praecedens.

Source: Reg. Jur. Civ.; Jackson; Weisman, 79p

A subsequent lawful marriage between the parents cures the prior wrong of illegitimacy — the children are thereby legitimated, and the moral fault is removed by the lawful union.

A wife has no power of her own, but is under the government of her husband.

Uxor non est sui juris sed sub potestate viri.

Source: 3 Inst. 108; Jackson; Weisman, 79j

Under the common law doctrine of coverture, the wife's legal capacity was absorbed into her husband's — she could not sue, contract, or hold property independently during the marriage.

It is not lawful to have two wives at one time.

Duos uxores eodem tempore habere non potest.

Source: Inst. 1, 10, 6; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 79a

The law of nature and of nations forbids bigamy — no man may contract a second marriage while a first subsists.

Divorce is called from divertendo, because a man is diverted from his wife.

Source: Co. Litt. 234; Weisman, 79b

(English-origin maxim.) The word 'divorce' signifies the legal turning away of one spouse from another — cite this when tracing the etymology and common-law meaning of divorce in jurisdictional or pleading disputes.

The male sex always includes the female.

Source: Dig. 32, 62; Weisman, 79c

(English-origin maxim.) In the construction of statutes, the masculine gender includes the feminine unless the context requires otherwise — invoke this rule of interpretation when a statute uses only masculine pronouns.

Insanity prevents marriage from being contracted, because consent is needed.

Source: 1 Bl. Comm. 439; Weisman, 79g

(English-origin maxim.) A marriage contracted by a person of unsound mind is void ab initio, because the essential element of consent is absent — cite this to annul a marriage where one party lacked mental capacity at the time of the ceremony.

A wife follows the domicile of her husband.

Source: Tray. Lat. Max. 606; Weisman, 79h

(English-origin maxim.) A married woman's legal domicile follows that of her husband — this common-law rule determined jurisdiction, venue, and voting rights, and is still cited in domicile disputes under traditional choice-of-law analysis.

Wife and son are names of nature.

Source: 4 Bacon's Works, 350; Weisman, 79k

(English-origin maxim.) The relationships of wife and son are created by nature, not by legal artifice — invoke this to argue that the natural family bond is prior to and independent of any civil regulation.

Madness does not allow marriage to be contracted, because consent is required.

Furor contrahi matrimonium non sinit, quia consensu opus est.

Source: Wharton, III-121

Consent is the essence of marriage, and insanity destroys the capacity to consent — cite this to annul a marriage entered into by a person who, at the time of the ceremony, was incapable of understanding the nature of the contract.

Subsequent marriage cures preceding criminality.

Source: Black's, 2d 766; Weisman, 79p

(English-origin maxim.) Marriage legitimates children born before the union — a subsequent marriage between parents cures the illegitimacy of prior-born children.

The father is he whom the marriage indicates.

Pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant.

Source: Co. Litt. 123; Dig. 2, 4, 5; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874), p. 516; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 792; Weisman, 79n

A child born in lawful wedlock is presumed to be the child of the husband — the marriage itself establishes paternity.

The lawful heir is he whom the marriage shows to be so.

Haeres legitimus est quem nuptiae demonstrant.

Source: Co. Litt. 7; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 326; Weisman, 58w

Inheritance follows lawful marriage — at common law, only those born within wedlock possess inheritable blood.

Heir is a name of law; son is a name of nature.

Haeres est nomen juris, filius est nomen naturae.

Source: Bacon, Max. Reg. 11; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 325; Weisman, 58ii

The status of heir is a legal construction tied to rules of succession; the status of son is a fact of nature — the two do not always coincide.

The offspring follows the mother.

Partus sequitur ventrem.

Source: Inst. 2, 1, 19; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 789; Weisman, 58ff

The status and condition of offspring follow the mother — a rule originating in the law of property in animals and applied at civil law to questions of personal status.

That which does not produce any effect in law does not constitute an impediment.

Non praestat impedimentum quod de jure non sortitur effectum.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 4

A thing that has no legal force cannot serve as a bar or obstacle — what is void in law cannot impede a valid right or act.

It is not just to make an elder-born a bastard after his death, who all his life has been accounted legitimate.

Justum non est aliquem antenatum mortuum facere bastardum qui pro tota vita sua pro legitimo habetur.

Source: 8 Co. 101; Jackson; Weisman, 58a

The law will not disturb the settled status of legitimacy after death — one who lived his whole life as legitimate cannot be posthumously bastardized.

The law of England rules that the offspring shall always follow the condition of the father; never that of the mother.

Lex Angliae nunquam matris sed semper patris conditionem imitari partum judicat.

Source: Co. Litt. 123; Jackson

Under English common law, legitimate children take the status and condition of their father — a rule distinct from the civil law maxim partus sequitur ventrem, which applies to illegitimate offspring.

It is not just to make an elder-born a bastard after his death, who during his lifetime was accounted legitimate.

Non est justum aliquem antenatum post mortem facere bastardum qui toto tempore vitae suae pro legitimo habebatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 244; Jackson

A restatement of 4.2.6 — the law strongly disfavors posthumous attacks on legitimacy, protecting the settled expectations of inheritance and status.

Parent is a name general to every kind of blood-relationship.

Parens est nomen generale ad omne genus cognationis.

Source: Co. Litt. 80; Jackson

The term "parent" in law is not limited to the immediate father and mother but extends broadly to all ancestors and blood-kindred — it is a word of general application.

Children born under a legitimate marriage follow the condition of the father.

Cum legitima nuptiae factae sunt, patrem liberi sequuntur.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 58i

Where marriage is lawful, the children take the status and condition of the father — the complement to the rule that illegitimate offspring follow the mother.

Paternal power should consist in affection, not in atrocity.

Patria potestas in pietate debet, non in atrocitate consistere.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 11r

The authority of a parent over a child is grounded in love and nurture, not in violence or tyranny — the law restrains paternal power that degenerates into cruelty.

Children are of the blood of their parents, but the father and mother are not of the blood of their children.

Pueri sunt de sanguine parentum, sed pater et mater non sunt de sanguine puerorum.

Source: 3 Co. 40; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 58s

The bloodline runs downward for purposes of descent and inheritance — children inherit from parents, but the parent does not inherit from the child by the same rule.

He who is born out of lawful matrimony follows the condition of the mother.

Qui nascitur sine legitimo matrimonio, matrem sequitur.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 58gg

Where there is no lawful marriage, the child takes the status of the mother — the counterpart of the rule that legitimate offspring follow the father.

The offspring of a legitimate bed knows not his mother more certainly than his father.

Partus ex legitimo thoro non certius noscit matrem quam genitorem suum.

Source: Fortes. c. 42; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

In lawful marriage, both parents stand on equal footing as to the child — the father's identity is as certain as the mother's, because the marriage itself establishes paternity.

Let the master answer.

Respondeat superior.

Source: 4 Inst. 114; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874), p. 843; Wharton, *Legal Maxims* (1878), Max. LXXXV; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 939

The master is liable for injuries caused by his servant acting within the scope of employment — authority carries responsibility.

The act of a servant in those things in which he is ordinarily employed is held to be the act of the master.

Factum a servo in iis in quibus opera ejus communiter adhibita est, factum domini habetur.

Source: Lofft, 227; Weisman, 96a

When a servant does what he is usually directed to do, the master cannot disclaim the act — habitual employment is implied authority.

Whatever is acquired by the servant is acquired for the master.

Quicquid acquiritur servo acquiritur domino.

Source: Dig. 41, 1, 10, 1; Co. Litt. 117; Weisman, 96g

The acquisitions of a servant acting in that capacity belong to the master — the servant's hand is the master's hand.

The master must answer for the acts of his servant.

Dominus respondeat de factis servi sui.

Source: Lofft, 229; 4 Inst. 114; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1337; Weisman, 96e

The master cannot direct the work and disclaim the consequences — the liability follows the authority.

Personal services follow the person.

Servitia personalia sequuntur personam.

Source: 2 Inst. 374; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 3, § 11; Weisman, 96f

Obligations of personal service are attached to the individual and cannot be transferred to another without consent — a man's labor is his own.

The lord (owner) suffers the loss.

Damnum sentit dominus.

Source: Jackson

The risk of loss falls on the owner — the master who holds dominion over property bears the burden when it is damaged or destroyed.

A theft is the fraudulent handling of another’s property with an intention of stealing, the proprietor, whose property it was, not willing it.

Furtum est contrectatio rei alienae fraudulenta, cum animo furandi, invito illo domino cujus res illa fuerat.

Source: 3 Inst. 107; Jackson

Theft requires three elements: fraudulent handling, intent to steal, and the absence of the owner’s consent — without all three, no theft is committed.

It is not theft where the commencement of the detention arises through the will of the owner of the thing detained.

Furtum non est ubi initium habet detentionis per dominum rei.

Source: 3 Inst. 107; Jackson

Where possession originated with the owner's consent, the subsequent retention does not constitute theft — the initial lawful delivery negates the element of unlawful taking.

Use is the master of things; experience the mistress of things.

Magister rerum usus; magistra rerum experientia.

Source: Co. Litt. 229; Jackson; Weisman, 95oo

Practical use and lived experience are the truest teachers of the law — abstract theory yields to the lessons of actual practice and custom.

The people is the greatest master of error.

Maximus erroris populus magister.

Source: Bac. Max.; Jackson; Weisman, 37h

Popular opinion is the most fertile source of error — the multitude may be led astray more easily than the individual, and the law does not follow mere popular sentiment.

No man can be tenant and lord.

Nemo potest esse tenens et dominus.

Source: Gilb. Ten. 142; Jackson

The same person cannot simultaneously hold the position of tenant (one who holds of another) and lord (one from whom the holding derives) — the two statuses are incompatible in the same subject.

A treasure belongs to the king, and not to the lord of a liberty, unless it be through special words.

Thesaurus competit domino regi, et non domino libertatis, nisi sit per verba specialia.

Source: Fitz. Corone, 281; Jackson

Treasure trove belongs to the Crown by default — a lord of a franchise or liberty has no claim to it unless his grant contains express words conferring that right.

Treasure-trove is an ancient hiding of money, &c., of which no recollection exists, so that it now has no owner.

Thesaurus inventus est vetus dispositio pecuniae, &c., cujus non extat modo memoria, adeo ut jam dominum non habeat.

Source: 3 Inst. 132; Jackson

Treasure trove is defined by its antiquity and the absence of any known owner — money or valuables hidden so long ago that no living person can claim them belong to the sovereign by prerogative.

The master is liable for injury done by his servant.

Source: Lofft, 229; Weisman, 96b

(English-origin maxim.) Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is liable for injuries caused by his servant acting within the scope of employment — cite this to hold an employer accountable for the torts of his employee.

Free servants are in general all free persons who let, hire, or engage their services to another.

Source: Black's, 2d. 1075; Weisman, 96c

(English-origin maxim.) Any free person who voluntarily hires out his services to another is classified as a servant for purposes of the master-servant relationship — cite this to establish the employment relationship and the duties flowing from it.

He is not presumed to consent who obeys the orders of his father or his master.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 4; Weisman, 96d

(English-origin maxim.) One who acts under the command of a father or master is not presumed to have freely consented to the act — invoke this to defeat an argument that the subordinate ratified or volunteered the conduct in question.

One is a servant who is employed by a master to perform service in his affairs and whose physical conduct in performance of the service is controlled by the master.

Source: Evans v. Board of Ed. of Hays, 284 P. 2d 1068, 1071; Weisman, 96h

(English-origin maxim.) The defining feature of the master-servant relationship is the master's right to control the physical conduct of the servant's performance — cite this to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor.

He who acts through another acts himself.

Qui facit per alium facit per se.

Source: Co. Litt. 258; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874), pp. 817-818; Wharton, *Legal Maxims* (1878), Max. LXV; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 859

A principal is bound by the acts of his agent done within the scope of authority — he cannot delegate the act and disclaim the consequence.

He who commands a thing to be done is held to have done it himself.

Qui mandat ipse fecisse videtur.

Source: Story, *Bailments* § 147; Dig. 50, 17, 169; Weisman, 4j

The one who directs the act bears the same responsibility as the one who performs it — the command is the cause, and the cause answers.

A delegate cannot delegate.

Delegatus non potest delegare.

Source: 9 Co. 77; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874), p. 840; 2 Kent, Comm. 633; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 180; Weisman, 4e

One entrusted with authority by another cannot sub-delegate that authority without express permission — confidence is personal, not transferable.

Every ratification relates back and is equivalent to a prior command.

Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 207; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 766

When a principal ratifies an unauthorized act of his agent, the ratification is treated as though the principal had originally commanded it — approval after the fact binds as fully as instruction before.

Ratification is equivalent to a command.

Ratihabitio mandato comparatur.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 60; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 916

To ratify is to adopt — once the principal assents to what was done in his name, he is as bound as though he had ordered it from the beginning.

What one cannot do by himself, he cannot do through another.

Quod quis non potest per se, non potest per alium.

Source: 4 Co. 24b; 11 Co. 87a; Jenk. Cent. 237; Weisman, 4c

No man may enlarge his own authority by the artifice of employing an agent — the agent's power can never exceed the principal's.

Whatever is acquired by the agent is acquired for the principal.

Quicquid acquiritur ab agente acquiritur principali.

Source: Story, *Agency* § 403

The agent's acquisitions within the scope of his authority vest immediately in the principal — the agent holds as the principal's hand, not as his own.

The same person cannot be both the doer and the one to whom the thing is done.

Idem agens et patiens esse non potest.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 40; Weisman, 4a

An agent cannot deal with himself on behalf of his principal — one cannot be both buyer and seller, grantor and grantee, in the same transaction.

Faith must be kept; the simplicity of the law of nations must prevail.

Fides servanda est; simplicitas juris gentium praevaleat.

Source: Story, *Agency* § 192; Dig. 2, 14, 1

Good faith is the foundation of all dealings — both between private parties and between nations. An agent is bound by the confidence reposed in him, and in the law of nations, simplicity and directness of dealing must prevail over technical evasion.

The accessory right does not lead, but follows its principal.

Accessorium non ducit, sed sequitur suum principale.

Source: Finch, Law, 128; Jackson; Weisman, 26x

An accessory right has no independent existence — it follows the fate of the principal right to which it is attached, and cannot be enforced or maintained without it.

In high treason there is no accessory, but principal alone.

In alta proditione nullus potest esse accessorius sed principalis solummodo.

Source: 3 Inst. 138; Jackson; Weisman, 26y

In cases of high treason, the law makes no distinction between principal and accessory — all participants are treated as principals, because the offense is so grave that every degree of participation bears equal guilt.

No one is called an accessory after the fact but he who knew the principal to have committed a felony and received and comforted him.

Nullus dicitur accessorius post feloniam, sed ille qui novit principalem feloniam fecisse et illum receptavit et comfortavit.

Source: 3 Inst. 138; Jackson; Weisman, 26g

Accessory-after-the-fact liability requires both knowledge of the felony and an affirmative act of harboring or aiding the felon — mere passive knowledge is not enough.

No one shall be called a principal felon except the party actually committing the felony, or the party present aiding and abetting in its commission.

Nullus dicitur felo principalis nisi actor, aut qui praesens est abettans aut auxilians ad feloniam faciendam.

Source: 3 Inst. 138; Jackson; Weisman, 26h

A principal in felony is either the person who commits the act or one who is physically present and actively assists — absence from the scene makes one an accessory, not a principal.

When the principal does not hold, the incidents thereof ought not to obtain.

Quum principalis causa non consistit, ne ea quidem quae sequuntur locum habent.

Source: D. 50, 17, 129; Jackson

When the principal cause or right fails, all subsidiary rights and incidents that depend upon it also fail — the accessory cannot survive the principal.

The principal being taken away, its adjunct is also taken away.

Sublato principali tollitur adjunctum.

Source: Co. Litt. 389; Jackson

When the principal thing is removed or destroyed, everything attached to or dependent upon it is likewise extinguished — the adjunct has no separate existence.

A mandatary cannot exceed the bounds of his authority.

Mandatarius terminos sibi positos transgredi non potest.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 53; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

An agent or officer who acts beyond the limits of his commission acts without authority — his excess is void and binds no one. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.133.)

An agent is a person authorized by another to act on his account and under his control.

Source: Wasilowski v. Park Bridge Corp., 156 F.2d 612, 614; Weisman, 4d

(English-origin maxim.) An agent is defined by authorization, action on another's account, and subjection to another's control — cite this to establish or dispute the existence of an agency relationship.

Faith must be observed. An agent must not violate the confidence reposed in him.

Source: Story,Ag. s. 192; Weisman, 4f

(English-origin maxim.) An agent owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty and good faith to his principal — invoke this to hold an agent liable for breach of trust, self-dealing, or unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.

An agent, as such, does not have title to the principal's property, although he may be intrusted with possession, and although he may have power to pass title.

Source: Rogers v. U.S. Rubber Co., 20 A.2d 626, 627, 91 N.H. 398; Weisman, 4h

(English-origin maxim.) Mere possession by an agent does not vest title in him — cite this to defeat a claim of ownership by an agent who holds the principal's property, even where the agent has apparent authority to transfer it.

An assigner is clothed with the rights of his principal.

Source: Halk. Max. 14; Broom, Max. 3d Land. ed. 415; Wing. Max. 56; Weisman, 4i

(English-origin maxim.) An assignee steps into the shoes of his assignor and holds the same rights the assignor possessed — cite this to establish that an assignee may enforce every right the principal could have enforced.

Every principal thing draws the accessory to itself.

Omne principale trahit ad se accessorium.

Source: Wharton, III-235; Weisman, 95pp

When the principal thing is granted, transferred, or extinguished, the accessory follows — cite this to argue that a conveyance of the principal estate carries with it all easements, incidents, and appurtenances attached to it.

Whatever things or rights that are acquired by an agent are acquired for his principal.

Source: Story, Ag. s. 403; Weisman, 4g

(English-origin maxim.) An agent's acquisitions belong to the principal — the agent is merely the instrument, and whatever he obtains in the course of the agency vests in the one he serves.

No one is compelled against his will to remain in a partnership.

Nemo invitus compellitur ad communionem.

Source: Dig. 10, 3, 28; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915); Selden v. Vermilya, 2 Sandf. (N.Y.) 568, 593

Partnership rests on mutual consent — the moment any partner withdraws that consent, the association is dissolved.

When any partner renounces the partnership, the partnership is dissolved.

Cum aliquis renunciaverit societati, solvitur societas.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 118; Weisman, 85b

A single partner's withdrawal ends the partnership for all — the law will not bind a man to an association he has repudiated.

The partner of my partner is not my partner.

Socii mei socius meus socius non est.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 47, 1; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 984; Weisman, 85e

Partnership is a personal relation — it does not extend by implication to persons with whom one has no direct agreement.

A partnership is dissolved by the death of a partner.

Morte socii solvitur societas.

Source: Inst. 3, 26, 5; Dig. 17, 2; Weisman, 85h

Because partnership rests on personal trust and consent, the death of any partner extinguishes the relationship — the survivor carries on alone or not at all.

Several partners are as one body, inasmuch as they hold one right.

Participes plures sunt quasi unum corpus, in eo quod unum jus habent.

Source: Co. Litt. 164; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 787; Weisman, 85g

Partners are united by their shared interest in the common property — as to third parties, they act and are treated as a single entity.

When the subject is extinguished, the incident ceases.

Extinctione subjecti, tollitur adjunctum.

Source: Inst. 3, 26, 6; Kent, Comm. 52, n.; Weisman, 85c

When the business for which a partnership was formed is completed or destroyed, the partnership itself ceases — the incident cannot survive the principal.

In a common matter the condition of the one forbidding is the stronger.

In re communi potior est conditio prohibentis.

Source: Dig. 10, 3, 28; 3 Kent, Comm. 45

Where partners disagree about the use of common property, the one who says no prevails over the one who says yes — in co-ownership, the veto rules.

No one should be retained in a partnership against his will.

Source: Selden v. Vermilya, 2 Sandf. (N.Y.) 568, 593; United Ins. Co. v. Scott, 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 106, 114; Weisman, 85a

(English-origin maxim.) Partnership is a voluntary association — any partner may withdraw at will, and no court will compel a man to remain bound in a partnership against his consent.

One co-proprietor can exercise no authority over the common property against the will of the other.

Source: Dig. 10, 3, 28; Weisman, 85d

(English-origin maxim.) No co-owner may exercise dominion over common property against the will of another co-owner — cite this to enjoin a partner or joint tenant from unilateral use, alteration, or disposition of shared property.

In a partnership the condition of one who forbids is the more favorable.

Source: Black's, 607; Weisman, 85f

(English-origin maxim.) In a partnership dispute over the use of common property, the partner who objects prevails over the partner who proposes — the veto power in co-ownership is stronger than the power to act.

Where a thing is owned in common or shared equally, it is agreed that the cause of him prohibiting its use is the better.

Source: Dig. 10, 3, 28; 3 Kent, Comm. 45; 16 Johns. (N.Y.) 438, 491; Weisman, 85i

(English-origin maxim.) Where property is held in common, the party who forbids its use has the stronger position — cite this to block a co-owner's attempt to use or dispose of shared property without unanimous consent.

By the law of nature it is not just that anyone be enriched at the loss or injury of another.

Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 206; 2 Kent, Comm. 336; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 461; Weisman, 59n

No man may profit from harm done to another — unjust enrichment offends the first principles of natural justice.

A thing done between others ought not to injure a person who is a stranger to it.

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.

Source: Co. Litt. 132, 182; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874), pp. 954, 967; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 932

Transactions between strangers may benefit but cannot bind or injure those who are not parties — no man's rights are diminished by the acts of others done without his consent.

No one should intermeddle with a thing that in no way concerns him.

Nemo debet se immiscere rei ad se nihil pertinenti.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 18, case 32; Weisman, 61d

A stranger to a matter has no standing to interfere — the law forbids officious intermeddling in the affairs of others.

Personal things follow the person.

Personalia personam sequuntur.

Source: Flanders v. Cross, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 516; Weisman, 61p

Rights and obligations that are personal in nature are attached to the individual and cannot be separated from him.

A personal action dies with the person.

Actio personalis moritur cum persona.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 16; Noy, Max. 6; Weisman, 86q

Claims arising from purely personal wrongs perish with the death of the party injured — they do not pass to heirs or representatives.

He who receives the advantage ought also to bear the disadvantage.

Cujus est commodum ejus debet esse incommodum.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 10; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 962; Weisman, 12f

Benefit and burden are inseparable — the man who takes the profit must bear the risk.

No one ought to be enriched by another's loss.

Nemo debet alterius jactura locupletari.

Source: Dig. 6, 1, 48, 65; 2 Kent, Comm. 336; Jenk. Cent. 4; Weisman, 61a

The principle of unjust enrichment gives rise to restitution — what is gained at another's expense must be restored.

A burden ought not to be imposed upon one man by the act of another.

Gravamen non concedendum est alicui per factum alterius.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 74; 2 Kent, Comm. 646

No man may be saddled with obligations he did not assume — liability requires either personal action or personal consent.

No man ought to be burdened in consequence of another's act.

Nemo ex alterius facto praegravari debet.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 2k

Each man answers for his own acts — the consequences of one person's conduct cannot be shifted onto an innocent party who had no part in it.

It is difficult that one man should sustain the place of two.

Source: 4 Coke, 118; Weisman, 61b

(English-origin maxim.) The law disfavors placing one person in two incompatible roles — cite this to challenge a dual appointment or conflict of interest where one man is asked to serve as both judge and party, or agent for opposing principals.

He who first offends causes the strife.

Source: Bouv. 152; Weisman, 61c

(English-origin maxim.) The first aggressor bears the blame for the conflict that follows — cite this to establish that the party who initiated the wrong cannot complain of the consequences that flowed from his own provocation.

Transactions between strangers may benefit, but cannot injure those who are not parties to them.

Source: 6 Coke, 1; Co. Litt. 132; Broom, Max. 954, 967; Weisman, 61j

(English-origin maxim.) Contracts and transactions between third parties may incidentally benefit a non-party but can never impose a burden or obligation on him — cite this to defeat a claim that a stranger to an agreement is bound by its terms.

He who condemns the precept condemns the party giving it.

Source: 12 Coke, 96; Weisman, 61k

(English-origin maxim.) To attack the authority of a command is to attack the one who issued it — cite this to argue that defiance of a lawful order is contempt of the authority behind it.

No man can forfeit another's right.

Source: Fleta, lib. 1, c. 28, s. 11; Weisman, 61m; Weisman, 86b

(English-origin maxim.) No person can, by his own act or default, forfeit or destroy a right belonging to another — cite this to protect a third party's vested right from being extinguished by someone else's misconduct.

A personal connection is equivalent to one's own interest; nearness of blood is as good a consideration as one's own interest.

Source: Bacon, Max. 72, reg; Weisman, 61n

(English-origin maxim.) A close blood relationship is treated as equivalent to a personal stake — cite this to establish standing or interest when a parent, child, or spouse seeks to act on behalf of a family member.

Personal things cannot be done by another.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 14; Weisman, 61o

(English-origin maxim.) Acts that are inherently personal — such as taking an oath, giving testimony, or exercising a personal trust — cannot be performed by a substitute and must be done by the person himself.

Personal things die with the person.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 16; Weisman, 61q

(English-origin maxim.) Rights and obligations that are purely personal — such as a personal license, a penal liability, or the duty to perform a personal service — expire with the death of the holder and do not pass to heirs or assigns.

Whose is the advantage, his also should be the disadvantage.

Source: Black's, 2d. 304; Weisman, 61r

(English-origin maxim.) He who enjoys the benefit must also bear the burden — cite this to prevent a party from claiming the advantages of a transaction while disclaiming its corresponding obligations.

Relation never defeats collateral acts.

Source: 18 Vin. Abr. 292; Weisman, 93b

(English-origin maxim.) The doctrine of relation back does not defeat collateral acts performed in good faith during the interval — cite this to protect third-party transactions that occurred before the relation back took effect.

Relation shall never make good a void grant or devise of the party.

Source: 18 Vin. Abr. 292; Weisman, 93c

(English-origin maxim.) A void grant or devise cannot be rescued by the doctrine of relation — if the original instrument was void ab initio, no subsequent event can breathe life into it.

Things incident cannot be severed.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 3, c. 1, n. 12; Weisman, 93e

(English-origin maxim.) Incidents that are inseparably attached to a principal right or estate cannot be severed from it — cite this to prevent a party from claiming the incident while disclaiming the principal, or vice versa.

Things incident pass by the grant of the principal.

Source: Seymour v. C & N R.R. Co., 25 Barb. (N.Y.) 284, 310; Weisman, 93f

(English-origin maxim.) A grant of the principal carries with it all its incidents — cite this to argue that a conveyance of an estate automatically transfers the easements, privileges, and appurtenances that belong to it.

That is incident which inseparably belongs to, connected with, or inherent in another thing, called the principal.

Source: Black's, 611; Weisman, 93g

(English-origin maxim.) An incident is something inseparably connected to or inherent in the principal thing — cite this definition to establish that a claimed right or obligation is truly incidental and therefore passes automatically with the principal.

When suspicion between men is suggested, it is easily entertained.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 61f

(English-origin maxim.) Once suspicion is planted between parties, human nature readily embraces it — courts must therefore demand proof rather than innuendo, because mere suggestion of wrongdoing, without evidence, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence or good faith that the law recognizes in every man.

The law favors mutual recompense.

Source: Wing. Max. 100; Weisman, 61h

(English-origin maxim.) The law prefers that obligations flow both ways — where one party has conferred a benefit, the other ought to render an equivalent return. This principle undergirds the common-law doctrine of consideration and prevents one-sided exactions by ensuring that every enforceable agreement rests on mutual exchange.

You ought to know with whom you deal.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 61i

(English-origin maxim.) Every party to a transaction bears the duty of ascertaining the identity, capacity, and authority of the person with whom he deals — ignorance of a counterparty's lack of authority or title is no defense when reasonable inquiry would have revealed it.

The law favors dower; it is the reward of chastity, therefore let it be preserved.

Doti lex favet; praemium pudoris est, ideo parcatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 31, 81; Jenk. Cent. 50; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 208; Weisman, 33a

Dower holds a favored position in the law — once it attaches, it can be defeated only by the wife's own consent or by divorce.

Where there is no marriage, there is no dower.

Ubi nullum matrimonium, ibi nulla dos est.

Source: Co. Litt. 32; 2 Bl. Comm. 130; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 1031b; Weisman, 33b

Dower is an incident of lawful marriage — without the marriage, the right to dower does not arise.

Causes of dower, life, liberty, and revenue are among the things favored in law.

Causae dotis, vitae, libertatis, fisci, sunt inter favorabilia in lege.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 284; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 96

The law extends special solicitude to dower, life, and liberty — these causes receive every favorable presumption and every benefit of doubt.

A woman who voluntarily leaves her husband and commits adultery loses her dower, unless her husband takes her back of his own accord.

Sponte virum fugiens mulier et adultera facta, dote sua careat, nisi sponsi sponte retracta.

Source: Co. Litt. 37; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 991; Weisman, 33d

Dower is the reward of fidelity — voluntary desertion and adultery forfeit the right, but the husband's reconciliation restores it.

Dower ought not to be sought from dower.

Dos de dote peti non debet.

Source: 4 Co. 122b; Weisman, 33f

A widow cannot claim dower out of lands already assigned as dower to another — the right extends only to the husband's own estate, not to the dower of a prior wife.

Co-heirs are deemed as one person on account of the unity of right which they possess.

Cohaeredes sunt quasi unum corpus, propter unitatem juris quod habent.

Source: Co. Litt. 163; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 116; Weisman, 58k

Co-heirs stand in a collective relation to the inherited estate — their unity of interest demands they act in concert, and the law treats them accordingly.

An heir under twenty-one years of age shall not be held to answer, except in the case of dower.

Haeres minor uno et viginti annis non respondebit, nisi in casu dotis.

Source: Moor, 348; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 327; Weisman, 58x

The law protects the minor heir from suit during his minority — but dower, being among the most favored causes, is the single exception.

Legitimacy is the lawful consequence of lawful marriage.

Legitimatio est legis consequentia matrimonii legitimi.

Source: Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. 472, 595 (1853); Weisman, 79m

The rights of inheritance and succession flow from the fact of legitimate birth — and legitimate birth flows from lawful marriage.

In law, a dower is a provision for a widow; upon her husband's death, out of his lands or tenements for her support and the nurture of her children.

Source: Co. Litt. 30a; 2 Bl. Comm. 130; 4 Kent, Comm. 35; Chaplin v. Hill, 1 R.I. 452; Hoy v. Varner, 100 Va. 600, 42 S.E. 690; Weisman, 33e

(English-origin maxim.) Dower is the widow's common-law entitlement to a life estate in one-third of her husband's lands — cite this when establishing a surviving spouse's right to a share of the deceased's real property.

A legitimate dower belongs to every woman of all lands and tenements of which her husband possessed in his own right, as of fee, etc.

Dos rationabilis vel legitima est cujuslibet mulieris de quocunque tenemento tertia pars omnium terrarum et tenementorum.

Source: Co. Litt. 336; Weisman, 33c

At common law, every widow was entitled to a life estate in one-third of all lands her husband held in fee during the marriage — this right attached by operation of law and could not be defeated by the husband's conveyance.