LOGIC, REASON & MISCELLANY

An argument drawn from inconvenience is valid in law, for the law will not permit any inconvenience.

Argumentum ab inconvenienti est validum in lege.

Source: Co. Litt. 66a; Broom, Max. 184; Weisman, 8g

When an interpretation of law would produce absurd or impractical results, the inconvenience itself is evidence that the interpretation is wrong.

An argument drawn from authority is the strongest in law.

Argumentum ab auctoritate est fortissimum in lege.

Source: Co. Litt. 254a; Broom, Max. 68; Weisman, 8i

Precedent and authoritative texts are the firmest ground for legal argument — the reported cases are the best proof of what the law is.

An argument from division of the subject is of the greatest force in law.

Argumentum a divisione est fortissimum in jure.

Source: Co. Litt. 213b; 6 Co. 60; Weisman, 8a

A question dissected into its constituent parts is most readily answered — division clarifies where generality obscures.

An argument from a similar case, or from analogy, is valid in law.

Argumentum a simili valet in lege.

Source: Co. Litt. 191; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 8d

Where no direct authority exists, the law permits reasoning from like cases to like — analogy bridges the gap between settled principle and new facts.

An argument deduced from impossibility greatly avails in law.

Argumentum ab impossibili plurimum valet in lege.

Source: Co. Litt. 92; Broom, Max. 190; Weisman, 8f

If a proposed construction of law would require the impossible, the construction must be rejected — the law never demands what cannot be done.

An argument from the greater to the less does not hold in the negative; conversely it does.

Argumentum a majori ad minus negativum non valet; converso valet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 281; Weisman, 8b

That a greater power is denied does not prove a lesser one is also denied; but that a greater power is granted proves the lesser is included.

No argument can be drawn against the use of a thing from its abuse.

Ab abusu ad usum non valet consequentia.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Broom, Max. 17; Weisman, 8h

The misuse of a right or power does not prove the right or power itself is defective — abuse is an argument for correction, not abolition.

An argument drawn from things commonly happening is frequent in law.

Argumentum a communiter accidentibus in jure frequens est.

Source: Broom, Max. 44; Co. Litt. 191; Weisman, 8j

The law reasons from ordinary experience — what usually happens is the baseline for legal presumption.

The negation of a conclusion is error in law.

Negatio conclusionis est error in lege.

Source: Wing. 268; Jackson; Weisman, 37k

To deny a conclusion that follows necessarily from established premises is itself a legal error; the law demands that reasoning be carried to its logical end.

An inconvenience does not solve an argument.

Incommodum non solvit argumentum.

Source: Bouvier

The fact that a legal proposition leads to practical inconvenience does not refute its logical validity; inconvenience may call for legislative remedy but does not defeat a sound argument.

Principles prove; they are not proved.

Principia probant, non probantur.

Source: 3 Co. 40; Bouvier; Weisman, 39y

First principles are the axioms of the law — they are the starting points of reasoning, not the conclusions; they are accepted as self-evident and used to prove other propositions.

There is no disputing against one who denies principles.

Contra negantem principia non est disputandum.

Source: Co. Litt. 43; Bouvier; Weisman, 95qq

Rational discourse requires agreed premises; he who denies the foundational principles of law places himself beyond the reach of argument. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.47.)

Reason and authority are the two brightest lights in the world.

Ratio et auctoritas duo clarissima mundi lumina.

Source: 4 Co. Inst. 320; Bouvier

The law rests on two pillars — rational principle and established precedent; where both converge, the law speaks with its greatest force. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.260.)

The reason of the law is the soul of the law.

Ratio legis est anima legis.

Source: Bouvier; Weisman, 60a

Every law has a reason, and that reason is its animating principle; when the reason of a rule ceases, the rule itself ceases — for a law without reason is a body without a soul.

The laws consist not in being read, but in being understood.

Non in legendo sed in intelligendo leges consistunt.

Source: 8 Co. 167; Bouvier

Mere recitation of the letter is not knowledge of the law; true comprehension requires grasping the reason and purpose behind the text — the law lives in its meaning, not its words.

Novelty benefits not so much by its utility as it disturbs by its novelty.

Novitas non tam utilitate prodest quam novitate perturbat.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 167; Bouvier

Innovation in the law is to be approached with caution — a new rule may offer some advantage, but the disruption of settled expectations often outweighs the gain.

He who approbates does not reprobate, [it is an unsound argument to both accept and reject the same thing.].

Source: Black's, 2d. 978; Weisman, 8c

(English-origin maxim.) A party who accepts the benefits of an instrument or transaction may not simultaneously reject its burdens — he must take the whole or none.

The cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused.

Causa causae est causa causati.

Source: 12 Mod. 639; Bouv. 119; Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 177; Weisman, 14f

Liability traces backward through the chain of causation — he who sets the first cause in motion is answerable for the final effect.

The cause and origin is the substance of the thing.

Causa et origo est materia negotii.

Source: 1 Co. 99; Wing. Max. 41, max. 21; Weisman, 14b; Weisman, 35k

To understand a transaction, look to its origin — the root cause reveals the true nature of the matter.

In law, the immediate and not the remote cause is looked at.

In jure, non remota causa, sed proxima, spectatur.

Source: 12 East 648; 3 Kent, Comm. 302; Bacon, Max. reg. 1; Weisman, 14c

The law fixes responsibility on the proximate cause — the nearest link in the chain — not on speculative or distant origins.

The effect follows the cause.

Effectus sequitur causam.

Source: Wing. Max. 226; Weisman, 14d

Where a lawful cause produces a result, the result partakes of the character of the cause; where the cause is unlawful, so is the effect.

Things are construed according to what was the cause of them.

Res construuntur secundum id quod fuit causa earum.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 4; Weisman, 14j

The purpose for which an instrument was created governs its construction — the reason for the thing illuminates the meaning of the thing.

When the cause ceases, the effect ceases.

Cessante causa, cessat effectus.

Source: Co. Litt. 70; Jackson

When the reason for a rule or obligation no longer exists, the rule or obligation itself expires; the law does not perpetuate effects whose cause has been removed.

He who overthrows the cause overthrows its future effects.

Source: 10 Coke, 51; Weisman, 14e

(English-origin maxim.) Defeating the root cause extinguishes every consequence that flows from it — strike down the foundation and the structure built upon it falls.

It shall have effect as far as it can have effect.

Source: Cowp. 600; 4 Kent, Comm. 493; Shep. Touch. 87; Weisman, 14g

(English-origin maxim.) An instrument or act that cannot operate as intended will nonetheless be given whatever legal effect it can lawfully support — the law saves what can be saved.

Remove the cause and the effect will cease.

Source: 2 Bl. Comm. 203; Weisman, 14i

(English-origin maxim.) Eliminating the cause of a legal obligation or wrong terminates its ongoing effects — this maxim supports actions to enjoin continuing harm at its source.

When that which I do does not have effect as I do it, let it have as much effect as it can; i.e., in some other way.

Source: Troup v. Blodget, 16Johns. (N.Y.) 172, 178; Vandervolgen v. Yates, 3 Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 242, 261; 4 Kent, Comm. 493; Weisman, 14k

(English-origin maxim.) Where an instrument fails in its primary purpose, the law will give it effect in any alternative capacity it can lawfully support rather than declare it a total nullity.

He who fails in a syllable fails in his whole cause.

Source: Bract. fol. 211; Weisman, 14l

(English-origin maxim.) Precision in pleading is essential — a defect in a single material particular may be fatal to the entire cause, reflecting the ancient rigor of the common law forms of action.

A vague and uncertain cause is not a reasonable cause.

Source: 5 Coke, 57; Weisman, 14m

(English-origin maxim.) A cause of action resting on speculation or conjecture is legally insufficient — the court requires a definite, ascertainable cause before it will hear the case.

The word 'cause' in its ordinary and usual definition may be deemed to mean that which occasions or effects a result.

Source: Kemp v. John Charlton & Sons, 169 F.2d 203, 206; Weisman, 14p

(English-origin maxim.) The legal definition of 'cause' aligns with common understanding: it is that which directly occasions or brings about the result in question, not a remote or speculative antecedent.

A necessary cause; a cause without which the effect in question could not have happened.

Causa sine qua non.

Source: Hayes v. R.R. Co., 111 U.S. 228; Weisman, 14n

The "but for" test of causation — if the injury would not have occurred without the defendant's act, that act is a necessary cause and liability may attach.

To cause is to bring about, to bring into existence.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 14o

(English-origin maxim.) Causation in law means bringing something into existence — a person causes an event when his act is the efficient means by which it occurs.

That is certain which can be made certain.

Id certum est quod certum reddi potest.

Source: 2 Bl. Comm. 143; 1 Bouv. Inst. 78; 4 Kent, Comm. 462; Broom, Max. 624; Weisman, 15a

An instrument is not void for uncertainty if there exists a means to ascertain its meaning — the law asks only that certainty be attainable, not that it be immediately apparent.

Uncertain things are held for nothing.

Incerta pro nullis habentur.

Source: Dav. Ir. K.B. 33; 1 Rolle 465; Weisman, 15b

An allegation, a grant, or an instrument so vague that its meaning cannot be ascertained is treated as if it does not exist.

That is certain which can be made certain; but that is more certain which is certain of itself.

Certum est quod certum reddi potest; sed id magis certum est quod de se certum est.

Source: 9 Co. 47a; Broom, Max. 624

While both forms satisfy the law, a self-evident term is always preferred over one requiring extrinsic proof — precision in drafting eliminates future dispute.

Too great subtlety is disapproved in law.

Nimia subtilitas in jure reprobatur.

Source: 4 Co. 5; Broom, Max. (3d Lond. ed.) 175; Weisman, 15f

Overly fine distinctions that serve no practical purpose are rejected — the pretense of hyper-precision can itself destroy genuine certainty.

The law always intends what is agreeable to reason; the law compels no one to do vain or useless things.

Lex semper intendit quod convenit rationi; lex neminem cogit ad vana seu inutilia.

Source: Co. Litt. 78b; Broom, Max. 252; Hob. 96

An interpretation that makes a statute or instrument irrational or purposeless is presumed wrong — the law is a creature of reason.

Where the law is uncertain, there is no law.

Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum.

Source: Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 1181; Bouv. 160; 2 Salk. 512; Weisman, 15e

A statute so vague that no citizen can know its command is a nullity — the law must speak clearly enough to be obeyed.

An uncertain quantity vitiates the act.

Incerta quantitas vitiat actum.

Source: 1 Roll. R. 465; Bouvier

Where the subject matter of an instrument — the quantity conveyed, the sum promised, the obligation undertaken — is left uncertain, the act is void; the law requires that what is done be done with sufficient definiteness to be enforceable. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.96.)

The law requires, not conjecture, but certainty.

Source: Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. 120, 124; Weisman, 15d

(English-origin maxim.) A verdict or ruling may not rest on conjecture — the evidence must establish the facts with reasonable certainty before a party may recover.

Law that is deficient is better than law that is uncertain.

Source: Lofft. 395; Weisman, 15h

(English-origin maxim.) A legal system with gaps is preferable to one riddled with ambiguity — it is better to have no rule on a point than a rule so vague that no one can follow it.

There must be sufficient positive facts proved to take a matter out of the realm of conjecture and presumption to that of certainty.

Source: Reynolds v. Blaisdell, 49A. 42, 43, 23 R.I. 16; Weisman, 15k

(English-origin maxim.) To prevail on a claim, the proponent must present sufficient affirmative evidence to elevate the matter from mere possibility to reasonable certainty — speculation is not proof.

Too great certainty destroys certainty itself.

Source: Lofft, 244; Weisman, 15m

(English-origin maxim.) Over-specification can be self-defeating — an instrument so narrowly drawn that it fails to cover the very situation intended is worse than one stated in broader terms.

An act of legislature to have force of law must be intelligibly expressed and when too vague is a nullity.

Source: Larkin v. Consolidated Telegraph, 85 N.Y.S. (2d) 631; Weisman, 15g

(English-origin maxim.) A statute so vague that a reasonable person cannot determine its meaning violates due process of law and is void — the legislature must express its commands with sufficient intelligibility to be obeyed.

That which is certain is fixed or stated, precise or exact, free from doubt or question.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 15l

(English-origin maxim.) Legal certainty requires that rights, obligations, and commands be stated with precision sufficient to be understood and obeyed — a law or instrument so indefinite that reasonable men must guess at its meaning fails the standard of certainty and cannot bind the People.

In doubtful cases, the more favorable construction is to be preferred.

In dubiis, benigniora praeferenda sunt.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Dig. 50, 17, 56; 2 Kent, Comm. 557; Weisman, 22v; Weisman, 22mm; Weisman, 32a

Where an instrument or statute admits of two readings, the one more favorable to liberty, to the accused, or to the grantee is preferred.

In a doubtful matter, the negative is to be understood rather than the affirmative.

In re dubia, magis inficiatio quam affirmatio intelligenda.

Source: Godb. 37; Cycl. Dict. 518; Weisman, 32e

Where doubt exists as to whether a power has been granted, the presumption is that it has not been — the negative protects against the expansion of authority beyond what was intended.

In doubt, the gentler or safer course is to be followed.

In dubio, pars mitior est sequenda.

Source: Bouv. 130; Dig. 50, 17, 56; Weisman, 22y; Weisman, 32f

Uncertainty counsels restraint — where either severity or leniency might be justified, the law leans toward the milder result.

In doubtful cases, there is no presumption in favor of the will.

In dubiis, non praesumitur pro testamento.

Source: Cro. Car. 51; Weisman, 32b

A testamentary instrument clouded by ambiguity is not presumed to speak — the burden falls on the proponent to demonstrate intent.

Inquire into doubtful points, for by reasoning we arrive at legal truth.

Quaere de dubiis, quia per rationes pervenitur ad legitimam rationem.

Source: Litt. s. 443; Co. Litt. 264b

Doubt is not a destination but a point of departure — the law commands inquiry, not paralysis.

When there is doubt, the accused is to be acquitted.

Cum in dubio est, reus est absolvendus.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 125; cf. 1 Hale P.C. 310

The foundational rule of criminal law — doubt belongs to the accused, and the state bears the full weight of proof.

When you doubt about a thing, do not do it.

Quod dubitas, ne feceris.

Source: 1 Hale P.C. 310; cf. Dig. 50, 17, 12; Weisman, 32g

Doubt is a counsel against action — where the lawfulness of a course is uncertain, abstention is the safer path.

In cases of doubt, the more generous and more favorable presumptions are to be preferred.

Nobiliores et benigniores praesumptiones in dubiis sunt praeferendae.

Source: Reg. Jur. Civ.; Jackson

Where the facts permit more than one inference, the law prefers the presumption that is more generous and more favorable to the party, rather than the harsher one. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.3.12.)

Things which are inserted for the purpose of removing doubt do not injure the common law.

Quae dubitationis tollendae causa inseruntur, communem legem non laedunt.

Source: Co. Litt. 205; Jackson; Weisman, 18d; Weisman, 71ll

Clarifying provisions added to remove ambiguity do not alter or diminish the existing common law; they explain without changing.

In a doubtful case, that is the construction of the law which the words indicate.

Source: Bouv. 130; Weisman, 32d

(English-origin maxim.) When a provision is ambiguous, the plain meaning of the words as written is the safest guide to construction — the text itself resolves the doubt.

Whatever is done in excess is prohibited by law.

Quicquid in excessu actum est, lege prohibetur.

Source: 2 Inst. 107; Co. Litt. 44

Excess in the exercise of any power or right is itself unlawful — the law permits the proper use of authority but condemns its overreach. (Duplicate maxim — see also 7.7.12.)

The useful is not vitiated by the useless.

Utile per inutile non vitiatur.

Source: Dyer 392; Broom, Max. 627; Dig. 50, 17, 94; Weisman, 62h

Surplus or unnecessary language in a deed, statute, or pleading does not destroy the operative and valid portions — the good survives the waste.

All excess is reprehended in law.

Omne nimium in lege reprobatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 44; 2 Inst. 107

Moderation is a first principle — every exercise of power, every pleading, every remedy must be proportionate to its purpose.

Every worthier thing draws to it the less worthy, though the latter be more ancient.

Omne magis dignum trahit ad se minus dignum, sit antiquius.

Source: Co. Litt. 355; Bouvier

Where two rights or interests conflict, the more dignified or important prevails and absorbs the lesser — rank and worth, not mere priority in time, determine which governs.

The greater always includes the less.

In eo quod plus sit, semper inest et minus.

Source: D. 50, 17, 110; Jackson

He who is granted the greater power possesses by implication every lesser power necessary to its exercise.

Common custom is better than royal grant.

Plus valet vulgaris consuetudo quam regalis concessio.

Source: Co. Cop. § 31; Jackson

A right established by long and general custom of the People carries greater weight than a right conferred by royal privilege; the People's practice outranks the sovereign's gift.

When more is done than ought to be done, that which ought to have been done is considered to have been done.

Quando plus fit quam fieri debet, videtur etiam illud fieri quod faciendum est.

Source: 8 Co. 85; Jackson

Where an act exceeds what was required, the law treats the required portion as validly performed; the excess does not vitiate the lawful part.

The law is the highest inheritance that the king possesses, for by the law both he and all his subjects are ruled; and if there were no law, there would be neither king nor inheritance.

Le ley est le plus haut enheritance que le roy ad, car per le ley il mesme et touts ses sujets sont rules, et si le ley ne fuit, nul roy ne nul enheritance serra.

Source: 1 J. H. 6, 63; Wharton

The law is supreme over both sovereign and subject; without it, neither authority nor property can exist — the law is the foundation of all order.

The law would rather suffer a mischief than an inconvenience.

Le ley voit plus tost suffer un mischiefe que un inconvenience.

Source: Litt. s. 321; Wharton; Weisman, 71bb

The law tolerates a particular injury to one party sooner than it will permit a general inconvenience affecting the whole system of law. In the American system, however, the rights of the individual are themselves part of systemic integrity — the Bill of Rights exists precisely because the Founders understood that sacrificing individual liberty for systemic convenience without due process of law is itself the greater inconvenience.

Surplusage does not spoil the remaining part if that is good in itself.

Source: Dyer, 392; Broom, Max. 627; Weisman, 41d

(English-origin maxim.) Unnecessary or excess language in an instrument does not invalidate the operative provisions — if the essential clauses are sound, the surplusage is simply disregarded.

Necessity has no law.

Necessitas non habet legem.

Source: Plowd. 18a; Broom, Max. 17; Hob. 144

Where genuine necessity compels, the strict letter of the law yields — but the necessity must be real and present, not speculative or manufactured.

A good thing required by necessity is not good beyond the limits of the necessity.

Bonum necessarium extra terminos necessitatis non est bonum.

Source: Hob. 144; Weisman, 83a

The exception carved by necessity extends only as far as the necessity itself — once the emergency passes, the ordinary law resumes its full authority.

Necessity makes that lawful which otherwise is not lawful.

Necessitas facit licitum quod alias non est licitum.

Source: 10 Co. 61; 2 Inst. 326; Fleta, lib. 5, c. 23, s. 14; Weisman, 83c

An act that would ordinarily be unlawful may be justified by true necessity — but the actor bears the burden of proving the necessity was genuine and the response proportionate.

Nothing is more just than that which is necessary.

Nihil tam justum est quam quod necessarium est.

Source: Dav. Ir. K.B. 12; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 83e

Justice and necessity converge — when the law recognizes a true need, meeting that need is itself an act of justice.

Necessity overrules the law.

Necessitas vincit legem.

Source: Hob. 144; Cooley, Const. Lim. (4th ed.) 747; Plowd. 18a; Weisman, 83h

Necessity is the supreme exception — but it is the narrowest one, and the party invoking it must demonstrate that no lawful alternative existed.

That which necessity compels, it justifies.

Quod necessitas cogit, defendit.

Source: Hale, P.C. 54; Weisman, 83f

The defense of necessity is complete when the compulsion is shown — what a man is forced to do by irresistible necessity, the law will not punish.

Necessity is the law of the time and of the place.

Necessitas est lex temporis et loci.

Source: Hob. 159; 1 Hale P.C. 54

Necessity is always measured against the particular moment and circumstances — what is necessary today may not be tomorrow, and what is necessary here may not be elsewhere.

In cases of extreme necessity, all things are in common.

In casu extremae necessitatis, omnia sunt communia.

Source: Hale, P.C. 54; Weisman, 83g

At the extremity of need — shipwreck, famine, imminent peril — private property gives way to the common right of survival, and the taker is excused by the emergency.

Public necessity is greater than private.

Necessitas publica major est quam privata.

Source: Bacon, Max. in Reg. 5; Bouvier

Under the monarchy, the Crown's public necessity overrode private claims without limit. In the American system, public necessity may temporarily subordinate private convenience, but it cannot destroy the reserved rights of the People without due process of law — and the government bears the burden of proving genuine necessity, not merely invoking it. (Duplicate maxim — see also 2.1.13.)

What is introduced of necessity is never introduced except when necessary.

Quod est ex necessitate nunquam introducitur, nisi quando necessarium.

Source: 2 Rol. Rep. 512; Jackson; Weisman, 83l

The exception of necessity is self-limiting; it arises only when the necessity is present and ceases the moment it is no longer required.

What is necessarily understood is not wanting.

Quod necessarie intelligitur, id non deest.

Source: 1 Bulst. 71; Jackson; Weisman, 69c

What the law necessarily implies need not be expressly stated; an instrument is not defective for omitting what every reasonable reader would understand to be included.

What is necessary is lawful.

Quod est necessarium est licitum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 76, case 45; Weisman, 83b

Necessity justifies what would otherwise be unlawful — when no alternative exists, the law permits acts done out of genuine necessity that it would not otherwise sanction.

A fortuitous event is not to be expected, and no one is bound to foresee it.

Casus fortuitus non est sperandus, et nemo tenetur divinare.

Source: 4 Co. 66; Hardr. 82 arg.; Broom, Max. 260; Weisman, 1b

The law does not charge a man with anticipating the unforeseeable — liability attaches only to events within the range of reasonable expectation.

Negligence, carelessness, or misconduct are not to be regarded as accidents.

Neglegentia, incuria, aut malefacta pro accidentibus non habenda sunt.

Source: Citizens Nat. Bank v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio Dec. 685, 687; Weisman, 1d

An event caused by human fault is not an accident — the label of "accident" cannot shield a party whose own negligence produced the harm.

No one is held to answer for the effects of a superior force or of a fortuitous event, unless his own fault has contributed.

Nemo tenetur ad impossibile; nec casus fortuitos praestat.

Source: Fleta, lib. 2, c. 72, s. 16; 4 Co. 66; Weisman, 1c

Acts of God, storms, insurrection, and irresistible forces excuse performance — but only where the party's own conduct did not invite or amplify the disaster.

Laws can neither prevent accidents nor equally protect all against them.

Leges neque accidentia praecavere neque aequaliter contra ea omnes protegere possunt.

Source: Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 465; Weisman, 1e

The law is not an insurer against all misfortune — it governs human conduct, not the operations of chance.

An unusual event is not presumed.

Casus insolitus non praesumitur.

Source: 4 Co. 66; cf. Dig. 22, 3, 1

Legal presumptions are built on ordinary experience — extraordinary events are not anticipated, and liability for them must be proved, not assumed.

Where blood is spilled, the case is unpardonable.

Nec veniam, effuso sanguine, casus habet.

Source: 3 Inst. 57; Jackson

The plea of accident is unavailable where homicide results; the shedding of blood strips the act of any claim to pardon on grounds of mere misfortune.

An unforeseen event, occurring without the will or design of the person whose mere act causes it, is known as an accident.

Source: Burkhard v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 102 Pa. 262; 102 Pa; Weisman, 1a

(English-origin maxim.) An accident, in law, is distinguished from negligence by the absence of design or fault — cite this definition to distinguish unavoidable misfortune from actionable carelessness.

An event is vainly expected from which no effect follows.

Source: Black's, 2d. 527; Weisman, 38c

(English-origin maxim.) An event from which no legal consequence follows is not cognizable by the law — the courts do not take notice of occurrences that produce no effect.

What an attempt is, is not defined in law.

Conatus quid sit, non definitur in jure.

Source: 2 Bulstr. 277; 6 Co. 42

The law treats attempt as a flexible concept — it arises from the facts of each case rather than from a rigid statutory definition.

An attempt does not harm unless a consequence follows.

Conatus nemini nocet nisi sequatur effectus.

Source: 11 Co. 98; Cycl. Dict. 700

A bare attempt without result is generally not actionable at common law — the law measures harm by what was accomplished, not merely by what was intended.

The attempt becomes of consequence, if the effect follows.

Conatus consequitur effectum, si effectus sequatur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 55; Bouv. 145

An attempt that reaches its object is no longer merely an attempt — it merges into the completed act and bears the full consequence.

An attempt is an intent to do a particular criminal thing with an act toward it falling short of the thing intended.

Conatus est intentio facere rem particularem criminalem cum actu tendente sed deficiente.

Source: State v. Davis, 229 A.2d 842, 844, 108 N.H. 158

Two elements define an attempt: the specific intent to commit the act, and an overt step toward its commission that falls short of completion.

An overt act, failure, interception, or prevention in the execution of a crime are factors inherent in the concept of an attempt.

Actus manifestus, defectus, interceptio, vel praeventio in executione criminis sunt factores conatus.

Source: People v. Urbana, 163 N.E.2d 511, 514, 18 Ill. 2d 81

The law recognizes attempt wherever a crime was begun in earnest but did not reach fruition — whether by the actor's own failure, external interception, or voluntary abandonment.

Time is the devourer of things; for time is a means of destroying obligations and actions, because time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their own rights.

Tempus est edax rerum; tempus enim modus tollendi obligationes et actiones, quia tempus currit contra desides et sui juris contemptores.

Source: Bract. fols. 100b, 101; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 4, s. 5, §12

He who sleeps on his rights may lose them — the passage of time is the law's penalty for inaction.

A day begun is held as complete.

Dies inceptus pro completo habetur.

Source: Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 367; 2 Bulstr. 305; Weisman, 100c

For legal purposes, a day is indivisible — once begun, it is reckoned as if fully elapsed.

An uncertain day is held as a condition.

Dies incertus pro conditione habetur.

Source: Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 367; cf. Dig. 36, 2, 5; Weisman, 100d

Where an obligation is fixed to a day that may or may not arrive, the day is treated as a condition precedent — the obligation does not mature until the uncertain event occurs.

Distinguish times, and you will harmonize the laws.

Tempora distingue, et concordabis leges.

Source: 1 Co. 24; Branch, Princ.

Laws that appear contradictory may simply belong to different eras — understanding when each was enacted resolves the apparent conflict.

The law does not take notice of fractions of a day.

Lex non curat de minimis; de fractionibus diei non curat lex.

Source: Lofft 572; Co. Litt. 135a; Weisman, 100k

The law deals in whole days — hours and minutes are beneath its notice unless a statute specifically requires finer measurement.

Delays in law are odious.

Dilationes in lege sunt odiosae.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier; Weisman, 71h

The law abhors delay because delay is the enemy of justice — a right deferred is a right diminished, and the courts will not tolerate dilatory tactics that prolong the resolution of disputes.

Delay is disapproved of in law.

Mora reprobatur in lege.

Source: Bouvier

The law censures unreasonable delay in the assertion of rights and the prosecution of remedies — he who delays without cause forfeits the law's sympathy and may forfeit the right itself.

An accuser is not to be heard after a reasonable time unless he can account satisfactorily for the delay.

Accusator post rationabile tempus non est audiendus, nisi se bene de omissione excusaverit.

Source: Moor. 817; Jackson; Weisman, 99x

Stale accusations are disfavored; he who delays bringing a charge must explain the delay or forfeit the right to prosecute.

Concerning the death of a man, no delay is long.

De morte hominis nulla est cunctatio longa.

Source: Co. Litt. 184; Jackson; Weisman, 99s

In cases involving homicide, no lapse of time bars the prosecution; the gravity of the offense overrides the ordinary prejudice against stale claims.

The Lord’s Day (Sunday) is not juridical, or a day for legal proceedings.

Dies Dominicus non est juridicus.

Source: Co. Litt. 185; Jackson

Sunday is excluded from the reckoning of legal days; judicial acts performed on the Lord’s Day are void by ancient common law tradition.

A man may be capable and incapable at different times.

Homo potest esse habilis et inhabilis diversis temporibus.

Source: 5 Co. 98; Jackson

Legal capacity is not fixed; a person's competence to act may vary with age, condition, or circumstance, and the law judges capacity at the time the act was performed.

In customs, not the length of time but the strength of the reason should be considered.

In consuetudinibus, non diuturnitas temporis sed soliditas rationis est consideranda.

Source: Co. Litt. 141; Jackson

A custom is validated not merely by its age but by the soundness of its underlying reason; an unreasonable custom, however ancient, is no law.

The law dislikes delay.

Lex reprobat moram.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 35; Jackson

Delay in the administration of justice is condemned; the law demands promptness in the assertion of rights and the dispatch of proceedings.

Long time and long use, which exceeds the memory of man, suffices in law.

Longum tempus et longus usus, qui excedit memoriam hominum, sufficit pro jure.

Source: Co. Litt. 115; Jackson

Immemorial usage — practice so old that no one remembers its origin — is presumed lawful and establishes right as effectively as a grant or statute.

Delay on the part of a debtor ought not to be injurious to a creditor.

Mora debitoris non debet esse creditori damnosa.

Source: Pothier; Jackson

The creditor must not suffer loss because the debtor is slow to perform; the debtor bears the cost of his own delay, including interest and consequential damages.

Neither time nor place affects the king.

Nec tempus nec locus occurrit regi.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 190; Jackson

Statutes of limitation and rules of venue do not run against the sovereign; the Crown is not barred by lapse of time or confined by locality in asserting its rights.

Prescription is a title by authority of law, deriving its force from use and time.

Praescriptio est titulus ex usu et tempore substantiam capiens ab auctoritate legis.

Source: Co. Litt. 118; Jackson

Prescriptive title arises from continuous use over time and is confirmed by operation of law; it is not a grant from any person but a right born of established practice.

What is first is truer; and what is first in time is better in law.

Quod prius est verius est; et quod prius est tempore potius est jure.

Source: Co. Litt. 347; Jackson

Priority in time confers priority in right; the first in time has the superior claim, and later interests must yield to earlier ones.

The time is to be considered.

Source: 1 Coke, 16a; Bloss v. Toby, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 327; Owens v. Missionary Society, 14 N.Y. 380, 393, 67 Am. Dec. 160; Weisman, 100b; Weisman, 102c

(English-origin maxim.) The time at which an act occurred or a right accrued is a material fact — the validity and effect of legal transactions must be judged by the law and circumstances prevailing at the relevant date.

Lapse of time does not bar the commonwealth.

Source: The State v. Purcell, 16 Tex. 305; Weisman, 100f

(English-origin maxim.) Statutes of limitation do not run against the sovereign — the state's claims are not barred by delay, because public rights belong to the whole people and cannot be forfeited by the negligence of officers.

Time expresses both a precise point and an interval between two points.

Source: Black's, 1156; Weisman, 100j

(English-origin maxim.) The word 'time' in legal instruments may refer either to a specific moment or to a duration — construction depends on whether the context requires a point or an interval.

International law originates in the law of nature and is founded upon certain divine decrees which have separated nations and men.

Jus gentium oritur ex lege naturae et fundatur super certis decretis divinis quae nationes et homines separaverunt.

Source: Co. Litt.; cf. 1 Kent, Comm. 2; Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Proleg.; Weisman, 102e; Weisman, 102h

The law of nations rests on natural law — it is not mere convention but reflects the moral order ordained by Providence for the governance of peoples.

The law of nations is that which regulates the intercourse of nations.

Jus gentium est quod inter gentes regit commercium.

Source: 1 Kent, Comm. 1, 4

International law governs the relations between sovereign nations — it is the framework within which treaties, commerce, and war are conducted.

Conditions are made by the conqueror, to be observed by the conquered.

Conditiones fert victor, quas servat victus.

Source: Maxim of the Law of Nations; Weisman, 102a

The terms of peace belong to the victor — but this maxim is qualified by the next: an unjust aggressor acquires no right, however complete his victory.

An aggressor who puts himself into a state of war with another and unjustly invades another's right can never, by such unjust war, come to have a right over the conquered.

Aggressor qui se in statum belli cum altero ponit, et injuste jus alterius invadit, nunquam per tale bellum injustum jus super victum acquirere potest.

Source: Locke, Two Treatises of Government, bk. 2, c. 16, §176; Weisman, 102j

Conquest by unjust aggression conveys no legitimate sovereignty — right cannot spring from wrong, and a people subjected by force retain their natural rights.

The People have given their governors no power to wage unjust war, for they never had such power themselves.

Populus gubernatoribus suis nullam potestatem dedit bellum injustum gerendi, quia ipsi talem potestatem nunquam habuerunt.

Source: Locke, Two Treatises of Government, bk. 2, c. 16, §179; Weisman, 102l

The government's war power is delegated by the People — since no individual has the natural right to wage unjust war, the People could not delegate that right to their government.

Enemies are those whom we declare war upon, or who declare it against us; all others are traitors or pirates.

Hostes sunt qui nobis vel quibus nos bellum decernimus; ceteri proditores vel piratae sunt.

Source: 7 Co. 24; Weisman, 102f

The law distinguishes between a lawful enemy — entitled to the protections of the law of war — and an outlaw who operates without sovereign authority.

Peace is to be secured by victory, not by negotiation. Cicero's Writings.

Source: Weisman, 102b

(English-origin maxim.) Lasting peace is established not through concession or negotiation from a position of weakness, but through the decisive assertion of right — victory secures what diplomacy alone cannot.

International law is affected by positive (written) law, founded on usage, consent, and agreement.

Source: 1 Kent, Comm. 2; Weisman, 102i

(English-origin maxim.) The rules governing relations among nations derive much of their operative force from established practice, usage, and express agreement (treaties and conventions). This maxim describes the mechanism by which international law functions in practice — it does not diminish the supremacy of natural law, which remains the foundation against which all positive law, domestic or international, is measured.

In the midst of arms, the laws are silent.

Inter arma enim silent leges.

Source: Weisman, 102g

This maxim describes a practical reality of armed conflict: during active hostilities, the ordinary machinery of courts and civil process cannot function. It does not, however, authorize the suspension of fundamental rights — natural rights persist even when courts are silenced, and the return of peace demands the immediate restoration of legal process.

It is best and most prudent to have commercial intercourse with all nations, but political ties with none.

Source: Weisman, 102k

(English-origin maxim.) A nation should trade freely with all but entangle itself politically with none — commercial openness and political independence are the twin pillars of sound foreign policy.

One may destroy a man who makes war upon him, as he may kill a wolf or a lion, because such men are not under the ties of the common-law of reason.

Source: Locke, Treat. 2, 3, 16; Weisman, 102d

(English-origin maxim.) One who wages war abandons the protection of law — by resorting to force outside the law, he places himself outside its protection and may be met with force in kind.

Human things never prosper where divine things are neglected.

Nunquam prosperae res humanae ubi negliguntur divinae.

Source: Co. Litt. 15; Wing. Max. 2; Weisman, 49b

The common law rests on the premise that temporal order depends on reverence for the divine — a society that abandons its moral foundations invites its own destruction.

The Christian religion is a part of the common law of England.

Religio Christiana est pars juris communis Angliae.

Source: Lofft 327; Taylor's Case, 1 Vent. 293; 3 Keb. 607; Weisman, 49i

The common law historically recognized Christianity as part of its moral foundation — not as an established church, but as the source of the moral principles upon which the law was built.

No man warring for God should be troubled by secular business.

Nemo militans Deo implicetur negotiis secularibus.

Source: Co. Litt. 70; 2 Tim. 2:4; Weisman, 49j

Those devoted to religious ministry are, by ancient custom, exempt from certain temporal obligations — the law honors the separation between the sacred calling and worldly affairs.

That is the highest law which favors religion.

Ea est summa lex quae pro religione facit.

Source: 10 Mod. 117, 119; Broom, Max. 19; 5 Co. 14b; Weisman, 49f

Where competing interpretations exist, the one that honors religious liberty and the moral order is preferred — the law favors the sacred over the profane.

What is given to the church is given to God.

Quod Ecclesiae datur, Deo datur.

Source: 2 Inst. 590; Weisman, 49k

Property dedicated to religious use is held in trust for a sacred purpose — its diversion to secular ends is a breach of that trust.

Reason is a ray of the divine light.

Ratio est radius divini luminis.

Source: Co. Litt. 232; Weisman, 49d

Human reason is a gift of Providence — the law built upon reason participates in the divine order, and an unreasonable law is contrary to both God and nature. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.259.)

That which is against divine law is repugnant to society and is void.

Quod contra Legem Divinam est, repugnat societati et vanum est.

Source: Co. Litt.; cf. 4 Co. Inst. 37; Broom, Max. 19; Weisman, 49l

No human law that contradicts the law of God can bind in conscience or in right — the divine law is the ultimate standard against which all human legislation is measured.

The cause of the Church is equal to public causes; and for the best of reasons — it is the cause of religion.

Causa ecclesiae publicis causis aequiparatur; et summa est ratio quae pro religione facit.

Source: Co. Litt. 341; Jackson

Matters concerning the Church are treated with the same gravity as matters of public interest; the law accords religious causes the highest dignity.

The clergy should not be placed in temporal offices.

Clerici non ponentur in officiis.

Source: Co. Litt. 96; Jackson

Those ordained to sacred ministry are exempt from secular office; the separation of spiritual and temporal callings is a settled principle of the common law.

The Church does not die.

Ecclesia non moritur.

Source: 2 Inst. 8; Jackson

The Church, as a corporation sole, has perpetual legal existence; it never dies, and its property and obligations pass unbroken through time.

A parish is a place in which the population of a certain church resides.

Parochia est locus quo degit populus alicujus ecclesiae.

Source: 5 Co. 67; Jackson

A parish is defined by its territorial boundaries and the congregation dwelling within them; it is both a geographic and an ecclesiastical unit of the common law.

Where the Divinity is insulted the case is unpardonable.

Nec veniam, laeso numine, casus habet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 167; Weisman, 49a

An offense against the Divine Majesty admits of no pardon through accident or mistake — where sacred things are violated, no plea of inadvertence will serve as defense.

It is more serious to hurt Divine than temporal majesty.

Source: 11 Coke, 29; Weisman, 49e

(English-origin maxim.) Offenses against God and the moral law are regarded as more grievous than offenses against temporal authority — the common law grades culpability by the dignity of the interest injured.

That consideration is strongest which determines in favor of religion.

Source: Co. Litt. 341a; 5 Coke, 14b; Dig. 11, 7, 43; Weisman, 49g

(English-origin maxim.) When competing legal considerations are weighed, the one that favors religion carries the greatest weight — the law preferentially protects the sacred over the secular.

No one was ever a great man without some Divine inspiration. Cicero.

Source: Bouv. 141; Weisman, 49h

(English-origin maxim.) This maxim recognizes divine inspiration as the wellspring of extraordinary human achievement — the law acknowledges a higher order that shapes the capacities of men.

A bishop need not obey any mandate save the king’s.

Episcopus alterius mandato quam regis non tenetur obtemperare.

Source: Co. Litt. 134; Jackson

A bishop’s temporal allegiance runs to the sovereign alone; no inferior officer or magistrate may command the bishop’s obedience in matters of governance.

No other than the king can command the bishop to make an inquisition.

Nullus alius quam rex possit episcopo demandare inquisitionem faciendam.

Source: Co. Litt. 134; Jackson

The power to direct a bishop to conduct an inquiry belongs exclusively to the sovereign; no lesser authority may co-opt the ecclesiastical office for investigative purposes.

Commerce ought to be common, and not to be converted into a monopoly and the private gain of a few.

Commercia debent esse communia, non in monopolium et privatum paucorum quaestum convertenda.

Source: 3 Inst. 181, in marg.; Weisman, 35a

The right to trade is a common right — its restriction to favored parties for their private enrichment is contrary to the public good and the common law.

Money is the just medium and measure of commutable things.

Pecunia est justum medium et mensura rerum commutabilium.

Source: Dav. Ir. K.B. 18; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 922; Weisman, 35e

Money provides the neutral standard by which unlike goods and services can be compared and exchanged — it is the common denominator of commerce.

It is called a monopoly when one person alone buys up the whole of one kind of commodity, fixing a price at his own pleasure.

Monopolium dicitur, cum unus solus aliquod genus mercaturae universum emit, pretium ad suum libitum statuens.

Source: 11 Co. 86; Weisman, 35f

Monopoly is identified by its two marks: exclusive control and arbitrary pricing — wherever both are present, the law recognizes an injury to the public right of commerce.

Goods are worth as much as they can be sold for.

Res merx valet quantum vendi potest.

Source: Shep. Touch. 142; 3 Inst. 305; Weisman, 35g

Market value is determined by the willing buyer — the law measures worth not by sentiment, cost, or aspiration, but by what the marketplace will actually pay.

A workman for hire promises the skill of his art; he who receives payment for his art must deliver workmanlike performance.

Artifex debet esse peritus artis suae; qui mercedem pro arte sua accipit, peritiam artis praestare debet.

Source: 2 Kent, Comm. 588; Story, Bailm. s. 428; Weisman, 35j

Every hired craftsman impliedly warrants competence — payment for professional services carries with it the obligation of professional quality.

It is inequitable to permit some to trade, and to prohibit others.

Iniquum est alios permittere, alios inhibere mercaturam.

Source: 3 Co. Inst. 181; Bouvier; Weisman, 35o

The right to engage in commerce belongs equally to all — selective enforcement that allows some to trade while barring others from the same market is a species of injustice the law will not countenance.

Usury is odious in law.

Usura est odium in lege.

Source: Bouv. 161; 3 Inst. 151; Weisman, 35s

The exaction of excessive interest is condemned at common law as a species of oppression — the lender who extracts more than a just return perverts the purpose of money.

Let every one employ himself in what he knows.

Source: 11 Coke, 10; Weisman, 35b; Weisman, 69o

(English-origin maxim.) A person should confine himself to his own trade or profession — one who ventures beyond his competence assumes the risk of error and may not claim the protections afforded to a skilled practitioner.

An insane person who knows not what he does cannot make a bargain, nor transact any business.

Furiosus stipulare non potest, nec aliquid negotium agere, qui non intelligit quid agit.

Source: 4 Coke, 126; Weisman, 35c

A person who lacks the mental capacity to understand the nature of a transaction cannot be bound by it — contracts and bargains require a meeting of minds, and an insane person has no mind to give.

The term 'merchandise' belongs to movable things only.

Source: Dig. 50, 16, 66; Weisman, 35h

(English-origin maxim.) The term 'merchandise' applies only to movable goods — real property and fixtures are not merchandise, and laws governing the sale of goods do not automatically apply to them.

Merchandise is whatever can be sold.

Source: Baldwin v. Williams, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 365; Weisman, 35i

(English-origin maxim.) The legal definition of merchandise is broad: anything capable of being bought and sold in commerce qualifies, regardless of its physical form or character.

The words "current money" designate current at the time of payment.

Source: Dav. 20; Black's, 2d. 1200; Weisman, 35m

(English-origin maxim.) A contract calling for payment in 'current money' requires tender in whatever currency is legal tender at the time of payment, not at the time the contract was made.

For concerning anything which occurs without deceit or wrong on the part of the vendor, the vendor is secure.

Source: Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 198; 4 Pick; Weisman, 35p

(English-origin maxim.) A seller who acts without deceit or wrongdoing is not liable for defects unknown to him — the risk of latent defects falls on the buyer absent fraud or express warranty.

He at whose risk a thing is done, should receive the profits arising from it.

Source: Black's, 2d. 1182; Weisman, 35q

(English-origin maxim.) Risk and reward travel together — the party who bears the risk of loss in a venture is entitled to receive the profits arising from it.

Services which are incapable of division are to be performed in whole by each individual.

Source: 6 Coke, 1; Weisman, 35t

(English-origin maxim.) Where a service or obligation is by its nature indivisible, each person bound by it must perform the whole — partial performance by one does not discharge the rest.

It is natural that he who bears the charge of a thing should receive the profits.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 10; Weisman, 35u

(English-origin maxim.) He who bears the expense and burden of maintaining a thing is naturally entitled to its fruits — the law connects the duty of care to the right of profit.

No one is prohibited from following several kinds of businesses or several arts.

Source: 11 Coke, 54a; Weisman, 35v

(English-origin maxim.) Every person has the right to pursue multiple trades, professions, or occupations — the law does not confine a man to a single calling.

No man is bound for the advice he gives.

Nemo tenetur ex consilio suo respondere.

Source: Story, Bailm. s. 155; Dig. 50, 17, 47; Weisman, 3b

Advice freely given does not create liability in the advisor — the person who receives counsel bears the risk of acting on it.

A simple recommendation does not bind the party offering it.

Simplex commendatio non obligat.

Source: Dig. 4, 3, 37; 2 Kent, Comm. 485; Broom, Max. (3d Lond. ed.) 700; Weisman, 3d

A mere endorsement or suggestion — as distinguished from a warranty or guarantee — imposes no obligation on the recommender.

Every one is free to ascertain for himself whether advice is advantageous to his interests.

Unicuique licet explorare an consilium sibi commodum sit.

Source: Upton v. Vail, 6 Johns. (N.Y.) 181, 184; 5 Am. Dec. 210; Weisman, 3e

The recipient of advice is not a passive vessel — the law presumes every man capable of evaluating counsel and choosing whether to follow it.

A wise man does everything advisedly.

Sapiens omnia agit cum consilio.

Source: 4 Inst. 4; Weisman, 3g

Deliberation is the mark of wisdom — the law rewards the prudent and penalizes the rash.

The advice of many is requisite in great affairs.

Multorum consilio opus est in rebus magnis.

Source: 4 Inst. 1; Weisman, 3f

Weighty decisions demand broad counsel — the law recognizes that complex matters require collective wisdom, not solitary judgment.

Opinion is of two kinds: common opinion, which springs up among grave and discreet men and has the appearance of truth; and opinion which springs up among light and foolish men, without the semblance of truth.

Opinio est duplex, scilicet communis quae inter graves et discretos homines oritur et veritatem habet, et opinio quae inter leves et vulgares homines oritur sine veritatis specie.

Source: 4 Co. 107; Weisman, 3c

Not all opinion carries equal weight — the law distinguishes between the considered judgment of the learned and the idle talk of the uninformed.

Hasty counsels are rarely prosperous.

Source: 4 Inst. 57; Weisman, 3a

(English-origin maxim.) Decisions made in haste are prone to error — the law favors deliberation over impulse, and precipitate counsels yield poor results.

In many counselors there is safety.

Source: 4 Inst. 1; Weisman, 3h

(English-origin maxim.) Complex and weighty matters benefit from the collective wisdom of many advisors — a plurality of counsel reduces the risk of error and oversight.