COURTS & JUDICIAL PROCESS

No man ought to be a judge in his own cause.

Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa.

Source: 12 Co. 13; Branch, Princ.; Broom, Max. 117; Weisman, 63d

A judge who has a personal interest in the matter before him is disqualified — any judgment rendered under such a conflict is void for want of impartiality.

A man ought not to be judge in his own cause, because he cannot act as both judge and party.

Aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa, quia non potest esse judex et pars.

Source: Co. Litt. 141a; Broom, Max. 117

The prohibition is not merely ethical but structural — the roles of judge and litigant are incompatible and cannot coexist in one person.

A good judge decides according to what is just and right, and prefers equity to strict law.

Bonus judex secundum aequum et bonum judicat, et aequitatem stricto juri praefert.

Source: Co. Litt. 24; Jenk. Cent. 45, case 85; Broom, Max. 77; Weisman, 63c

A judge who mechanically applies the letter while ignoring the substance of justice has failed his office.

A judge must decide according to the facts alleged and proved.

Judex debet judicare secundum allegata et probata.

Source: Dyer 12; Halk. Max. 73; Broom, Max. 102

A judge may not rely on private knowledge or personal investigation — he is bound to what the parties have placed before him through proper procedure.

It is the duty of a judge to declare the law, not to make it.

Judicis est jus dicere, non dare.

Source: Lofft 42; Tray. Leg. Max. 283; Weisman, 63y

Legislation belongs to the legislature; the judicial office is to interpret and apply existing law, never to invent new law from the bench.

A judge does not award more than the claimant himself demands.

Judex non reddit plus quam quod petens ipse requirit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 585; Dig. 10, 3, 18; Weisman, 94v

The court's power is circumscribed by the relief actually requested; a judgment that exceeds the prayer of the complaint is irregular.

A judge cannot be a witness in his own case.

Judex non potest esse testis in propria causa.

Source: 4 Inst. 272; Co. Litt. 6b

One who sits in judgment may not also testify as a fact witness — the dual role destroys the safeguard of impartiality.

It is the duty of a good judge to extend justice.

Boni judicis est ampliare justitiam.

Source: Chan. Prac. 329; 1 Burr. 304; Broom, Max. 79; Weisman, 63k; Weisman, 66b; Weisman, 68p

Where justice requires it, a judge should apply his remedial authority liberally — not to usurp jurisdiction, but to ensure that no wrong goes unremedied for want of procedure.

It is the duty of a good judge to put an end to litigation.

Boni judicis est lites dirimere.

Source: 4 Co. 15; 5 Co. 31a; Broom, Max. 331; Weisman, 65e

A judge who allows suits to multiply and disputes to fester has abdicated his primary function — the resolution of controversies.

It is the duty of a good judge to order judgment executed without delay.

Boni judicis est judicium sine dilatione mandare executioni.

Source: Co. Litt. 289b; Weisman, 63l

Justice delayed is justice denied — a judgment that sits unenforced is an empty formality, not a remedy.

A judge who exceeds his office is not to be obeyed.

Judex qui excedit officium suum non obeditur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 139, case 84; Weisman, 63z

Obedience to judicial authority depends on the judge acting within the bounds of his lawful commission — beyond those bounds, his commands carry no force of law.

The ignorance of the judge is the calamity of the innocent.

Ignorantia judicis est calamitas innocentis.

Source: 2 Inst. 591; Weisman, 63p

The people's liberty depends upon judges who know the law; an ignorant judge is a danger to every man who comes before him.

That law is best which leaves least to the discretion of the judge; that judge is best who leaves least to his own will.

Optima est lex quae minimum relinquit arbitrio judicis; optimus judex qui minimum sibi.

Source: Bacon, Aph. 8, 46; Broom, Max. 84; 1 Kent, Comm. 478; Weisman, 63q

Arbitrary discretion is the enemy of liberty — the more a judge's decision is bound by fixed principles of law, the safer the rights of the people.

The judge is condemned when a guilty person escapes punishment.

Judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur.

Source: Dig. 1, 1, 13; Pub. Syr. Sent.; Weisman, 63g

The public holds the judge accountable for the faithful discharge of his duty — failure to administer justice implicates the judge himself.

Verbal quibbles are unworthy of a judge.

Aucupia verborum sunt judice indigna.

Source: Hob. 348

A judge who seizes upon technicalities of language to defeat the substance of a claim dishonors the bench. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.29.)

A judge must take care that nothing be imposed either more harshly or more leniently than the cause demands; for the reputation of neither severity nor clemency should be pursued.

Respiciendum est judicanti, ne quid aut durius aut remissius constituatur quam causa deposcit; nec enim aut severitatis aut clementiae gloria affectanda est.

Source: 3 Inst. 220

The judge who sentences to make an example, or who pardons to win popularity, has abandoned justice for vanity — the punishment must fit the offense, no more and no less.

A good judge should do nothing from his own judgment or from private inclination, but should pronounce according to law and justice.

Judex bonus nihil ex arbitrio suo faciat, nec propositione domesticae voluntatis, sed juxta leges et jura pronunciet.

Source: 7 Co. 27; Weisman, 63f

Personal opinion has no place on the bench — the judge's duty is to declare the law, not to impose his will.

The judge is the law speaking.

Judex est lex loquens.

Source: 7 Co. 4; Weisman, 63o

The judge is not the master of the law but its voice — he speaks what the law says, not what he wishes it said.

A judge cannot punish a wrong done to himself.

Judex non potest injuriam sibi datam punire.

Source: 12 Co. 113; Weisman, 63u

When the judge is the aggrieved party, he must recuse — self-interest disqualifies him from adjudicating a wrong suffered by himself.

It is punishment enough for a judge that he has God as his avenger.

Judici satis poena est quod Deum habet ultorem.

Source: 1 Leon. 295; Weisman, 63v

The judge who abuses his office may escape human censure, but he answers to a higher tribunal — the weight of divine accountability restrains the conscience of the just.

The judge in his decision ought to follow the rule when the exception is not proved.

Judicis est in pronunciando sequi regulam, exceptione non probata.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 64f

The general rule governs unless the party claiming an exception demonstrates its applicability — the burden of proving the exception falls on the party who invokes it.

Arbitrators are judges.

Compromissarii sunt judices.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 128; Jackson

Persons chosen by the parties to resolve their dispute exercise a judicial function and are bound by the same principles of impartiality and fairness as judges of the court.

The Court of Parliament is governed by its own peculiar laws.

Curia Parliamenti suis propriis legibus subsistit.

Source: 4 Inst. 50; Jackson

Legislative bodies operate under their own rules of procedure, distinct from the rules governing ordinary courts — each branch maintains its own internal governance.

The practice of the Court is the law of the Court.

Cursus curiae est lex curiae.

Source: 3 Buls. 53; Jackson; Weisman, 65j

The established practice and procedure of a court constitutes its governing rule — parties must conform to the court's customary course of proceeding.

Of the good faith and intention of a judge a question cannot be entertained; but it is otherwise as to his knowledge, whether the error be one of law or fact.

De fide et officio judicis non recipitur quaestio; sed de scientia, sive error sit juris sive facti.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 17; Jackson

A judge's motives and good faith are not open to question, but his knowledge of law and fact may be challenged on appeal — the law presumes integrity but not infallibility.

It is unjust to judge of any part unless the whole sentence is examined.

Incivile est nisi tota sententia perspecta de aliqua parte judicare.

Source: Hob. 171; Jackson

No portion of a judgment, instrument, or statute may be construed in isolation — the whole must be read together before any part can be properly understood.

A judge ought always to regard equity.

Judex aequitatem semper spectare debet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 45; Jackson; Weisman, 63s

A judge must look beyond the bare letter of the law to the equitable substance of the case — rigid literalism that produces injustice is a failure of the judicial office.

A judge should have two salts: the salt of wisdom, lest he be insipid; and the salt of conscience, lest he be devilish.

Judex habere debet duos sales: salem sapientiae, ne sit insipidus, et salem conscientiae, ne sit diabolus.

Source: 3 Inst. 147; Jackson; Weisman, 63t

A judge requires both learning and moral integrity — wisdom without conscience produces tyranny, and conscience without wisdom produces disorder.

Judges are not bound to explain the reason of their sentence.

Judices non tenentur exprimere causam sententiae suae.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 75; Jackson; Weisman, 63aa

While it is good practice for judges to state their reasons, the law does not require it — the judgment itself is the authoritative act, not the explanation accompanying it.

It is the duty of a judge to finish the work of each day within that day.

Judicis officium est opus diei in die suo perficere.

Source: 2 Inst. 256; Jackson

Judicial business must not be delayed or carried over indefinitely — a diligent judge disposes of the matters before him promptly.

The law is the safest leader of the army of judges.

Lex est exercitus judicum tutissimus ductor.

Source: 2 Inst. 526; Jackson

Judges who follow the law faithfully are never led astray — the law, not personal judgment, is the surest guide to right decision.

No man ought to be twice vexed, if it be proved to the Court that it be for one and the same cause.

Nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa.

Source: 5 Co. 61; Jackson

Once a cause has been determined, the same matter may not be relitigated between the same parties — double vexation for one cause is prohibited.

No one ought to be his own judge, or the tribunal in his own affairs.

Nemo sibi esse judex vel suis jus dicere debet.

Source: Jackson

Self-judgment is inherently partial — no man can be trusted to adjudicate his own cause impartially, which is why all disputes require an independent tribunal.

It belongs not to the secular Judge to take cognisance of things which are merely spiritual.

Non pertinet ad judicem secularem cognoscere de iis quae sunt mere spiritualia annexa.

Source: 2 Inst. 488; Jackson

Civil courts have no jurisdiction over purely spiritual matters — the temporal and spiritual jurisdictions are separate, and each must respect the bounds of the other.

Let no one depart from the Court of Chancery without a remedy.

Nullus recedat e curia cancellaria sine remedio.

Source: 4 H. 7, 4; Jackson

The equity court exists to provide relief where the common law cannot — no suitor who presents a just cause should leave Chancery without a remedy for his grievance.

The practice of the judges is the interpreter of the laws.

Praxis judicum est interpres legum.

Source: Hob. 96; Jackson; Weisman, 63e

How judges have consistently applied the law in practice is the most reliable guide to its meaning — judicial usage is the living interpretation of enacted text.

How long reasonable time ought to be is not defined by law, but depends upon the discretion of the judges.

Quam longum debet esse rationabile tempus, non definitur in lege, sed pendet ex discretione justiciariorum.

Source: Co. Litt. 56; Jackson; Weisman, 100g

What constitutes "reasonable time" is a question of fact and judicial discretion determined by the circumstances of each case, not by rigid statutory prescription.

Everyone is the manager and judge of his own affairs.

Rerum suarum quilibet est moderator et arbiter.

Source: Co. Litt. 223; Jackson

Every person has the right to manage his own property and private affairs without interference — the law presumes competence and self-governance in one's own domain.

An oath has in it three component parts — truth, justice, and judgment: truth is requisite in the party swearing, justice and judgment in the judge administering the oath.

Sacramentum habet in se tres comites, veritatem, justitiam et judicium: veritas habenda est in jurato, justitia et judicium in judice.

Source: 3 Inst. 160; Jackson; Weisman, 84e

The oath binds both the swearer and the officer — the swearer must speak truth, and the judge must administer the oath justly and with sound judgment.

A multitude of ignorant persons destroys a court.

Multitudo imperitorum perdit curiam.

Source: 2 Inst. 219; Wharton

The quality of justice depends on the competence of those who administer it — filling courts with unqualified persons undermines the entire judicial system.

An act of a judge which does not relate to his office is of no force.

Factum a judice quod ad ejus officium non spectat, non ratum est.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 10 Co. 76; Weisman, 65c

A judge acts with authority only within the scope of his judicial office; anything done outside that scope is void and without legal effect. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.6.)

The offices of magistrates ought not to be sold.

Officia magistratus non debent esse venalia.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 234

The sale of judicial or magisterial office corrupts the administration of justice at its source and is absolutely prohibited.

Judicial offices ought not to be granted before they are vacant.

Officia judicialia non concedantur antequam vacent.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 11 Co. 4

Granting a judicial office before it falls vacant creates a successor-in-waiting with perverse incentives and undermines the independence of the sitting officer.

An equal has no power over an equal.

Par in parem imperium non habet.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Jenk. Cent. 174

No judge may exercise authority over another judge of the same court, for peers in jurisdiction possess no superiority one over another.

An office ought to be injurious to no one.

Officium nemini debet esse damnosum.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

The holding of public office must not become a vehicle for harming the officeholder or the people he serves — office is a trust, not a weapon.

A judge's order is an order made by a judge at chambers, or out of court.

Source: Black's, 664; Weisman, 63b

(English-origin maxim.) A judge's order made in chambers or outside open court carries the same judicial authority as one made in formal session, so long as it is within the judge's jurisdiction.

If you judge, understand.

Source: Bouv. 157; Weisman, 63h

(English-origin maxim.) A judge must fully comprehend the matter before rendering judgment — understanding the facts and the law is the prerequisite of just decision.

Whatever is subject to the authority of a judge is not subject to innovation.

Source: 4 Inst. 66; Weisman, 63m

(English-origin maxim.) A matter already under judicial authority cannot be altered or changed by outside interference — what is before the judge is under his exclusive control until disposed of.

A judge should keep his jurisdiction within the limits of his commission.

Source: 4 Inst. 163; Black's, 2d. 1056; Weisman, 63r

(English-origin maxim.) A judge who exceeds the bounds of his commission acts without authority — every judicial officer must stay within the jurisdiction conferred upon him.

Judges are by no means favorable to things raised recently and subtly against the common law.

Source: Halk. Max. 73; Weisman, 63x

(English-origin maxim.) Courts regard with suspicion novel doctrines raised against established common law principles — innovations that would displace settled law bear a heavy burden of justification.

Things which are done in the king’s court are presumed to be rightly done.

Quae in curia regis acta sunt rite agi praesumuntur.

Source: 3 Bulst. 43; Jackson

Official acts of a court of record carry a presumption of regularity — the party challenging them bears the burden of showing error.

Concerning the fidelity and official conduct of a judge, no question is entertained; but his decisions may be impugned for error of law or fact.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 17; 1 N.Y. 45; Broom, Max. 85; Weisman, 63a

(English-origin maxim.) A judge's personal integrity is presumed, but his legal conclusions are subject to review — challenge the ruling, not the judge.

To questions of fact judges do not answer; to questions of law the jury does not answer.

Ad quaestionem facti non respondent judices; ad quaestionem juris non respondent juratores.

Source: Co. Litt. 295b; Broom, Max. 938; Wharton, Leg. Max. 265

The division between judge and jury is fundamental — the jury finds what happened; the judge declares what the law requires. Neither may usurp the province of the other.

A verdict is, as it were, the utterance of truth; as a judgment is the utterance of law.

Veredictum quasi dictum veritatis; ut judicium quasi dictum juris.

Source: Co. Litt. 226; Weisman, 64n

The jury's verdict carries the authority of truth in fact, just as the court's judgment carries the authority of truth in law — each is final in its own sphere.

Jurors are the judges of fact.

Juratores sunt judices facti.

Source: State of Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall. 1, 4 (1794); Co. Litt. 155b; Weisman, 67b

No judge, however learned, may substitute his opinion of the facts for that of the jury — the jury is the sole and sovereign tribunal on all questions of fact.

Jurors ought to be neighbors, of sufficient estate, and above all suspicion.

Juratores debent esse vicini, sufficientis status, et ab omni suspicione majores.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 141; Weisman, 67a

The jury must be drawn from the community where the dispute arose — strangers without local knowledge and persons of doubtful character undermine the very purpose of trial by peers.

The verdict of twelve good and lawful men is held by the common law to be the declaration of truth.

Duodecim proborum et legalium hominum dictum, per legem communem, veritatis dictum habetur.

Source: Halk. Max. 73; Co. Litt. 155b; Weisman, 67c

The unanimous verdict of a proper jury of twelve is the highest form of factual determination known to the common law — no lesser body may supplant it.

Jurors ought not to be harassed by labors and expenses.

Juratores non debent fatigari laboribus et expensis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 6; Weisman, 67d

The duty of jury service must not be made so burdensome that it deters good men from serving — efficiency in trial procedure protects the institution itself.

The verdict of a jury is a bar in equity.

Veredictum juratorum obstat in aequitate.

Source: Branch, Max. 155; Weisman, 67f; Weisman, 67h

Once a jury has determined the facts, a court of equity may not retry them — the verdict settles the matter.

The witnesses being dead, it must be referred, as to the truth of charters, out of necessity, to the country — i.e. a jury.

Chartarum super fidem, mortuis testibus, ad patriam, de necessitudine, recurrendum est.

Source: Co. Litt. 386; Jackson

When the original witnesses to a document are deceased, the authenticity of the instrument must be determined by a jury drawn from the community where the facts are known.

The laws of war are especially to be preserved in the State.

In republica maxime conservanda sunt jura belli.

Source: 2 Inst. 58; Jackson

Even in wartime, the rules of law must be observed — the state's emergency powers do not extinguish the obligation to conduct warfare according to established legal principles.

Ecclesiastical laws are limited within separate bounds.

Jura ecclesiastica limitata sunt infra limites separatos.

Source: 3 Buls. 53; Jackson

Church law operates within its own defined sphere and may not extend beyond those bounds into the temporal jurisdiction of the civil courts.

Public rights are to be preferred to private.

Jura publica anteferenda privatis.

Source: Co. Litt. 130; Jackson

Where a private claim conflicts with a recognized public right — such as navigation on public waters, passage on public highways, or access to common lands — the public right prevails. This maxim does not authorize government to override individual natural rights in the name of collective benefit.

The special rights of the king are not yielded by general words.

Jura regis specialia non conceduntur per generalia verba.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 103; Jackson

The sovereign's prerogative rights cannot be surrendered or waived by general language — any alienation of royal authority requires explicit and specific terms.

When two rights concur in one person it is the same as if they were in different persons.

Quando duo jura in una persona concurrunt, aequum est ac si essent in diversis.

Source: 2 Preston Abs. 430; Jackson; Weisman, 86o

Where one person holds two distinct legal rights, they are treated as separate and independent — merger of rights in one person does not extinguish either.

The vigilant, and not the sleepy, are assisted by the laws.

Vigilantibus, et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt.

Source: Wing. 692; Jackson

The law rewards diligence and punishes delay — a party who sleeps on his rights forfeits the assistance of the courts.

No one can verify by jury against a record.

Nemo potest contra recordum verificare per patriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 380; Wharton

A court record cannot be contradicted or overturned by jury verdict — the record speaks for itself and is conclusive as to what it contains.

The administration of an oath is an indispensable requisite to the formation of a legal jury.

Source: Lumsden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 485, 486; Weisman, 67e

(English-origin maxim.) Without the administration of an oath, no lawful jury is constituted — the oath is the foundation of the jury's authority and the guarantee of its fidelity.

There can be no valid trial jury of less than 12 men, and a consent even by the defendant to a trial by a less number is absolutely void.

Source: Hunt v. State, 61 Miss. 577, 580, 581; Weisman, 67g

(English-origin maxim.) The common law right to trial by jury means a jury of twelve — a trial by fewer than twelve is void, and no party's consent can validate what the law prohibits.

Justice is the steady and unceasing disposition to render to every man his due.

Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi.

Source: Inst. 1, 1, pr.; Dig. 1, 1, 10; Weisman, 68g

Justice is not occasional or discretionary — it is a permanent obligation owed equally to every person, without respect of station.

Justice is neither to be denied nor delayed.

Justitia non est neganda, non differenda.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 76, 93; 2 Inst. 56; Weisman, 68f

Every refusal to hear a case and every unnecessary delay in its resolution is a species of injustice.

Justice ought to be free, because nothing is more iniquitous than venal justice; full, because justice ought not to halt; and speedy, because delay is a kind of denial.

Justitia debet esse libera, quia nihil iniquius venali justitia; plena, quia justitia non debet claudicare; et celeris, quia dilatio est quaedam negatio.

Source: 2 Inst. 56; Weisman, 68e

The three pillars of justice — accessibility, completeness, and speed — must all be present; the absence of any one corrupts the whole.

Let justice be done, though the heavens fall.

Fiat justitia, ruat coelum.

Source: 1 Lord Mansfield in R. v. Wilkes (1770); Wing. Max. 668; Weisman, 68o

The administration of justice may never be subordinated to convenience, politics, or fear of consequences.

Justice knows neither father nor mother; justice looks to truth alone.

Justitia non novit patrem nec matrem; solam veritatem spectat justitia.

Source: 1 Bulstr. 199; Weisman, 68m

Partiality, favoritism, and respect of persons are the death of justice — the court must be blind to everything except the merits of the cause.

Those matters which are properly transacted in court ought to be committed to due execution.

Ea quae in curia nostra rite acta sunt debitae executioni demandari debent.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; Weisman, 65n

A proceeding duly completed creates a right to enforcement — a court that refuses to execute its own lawful judgments nullifies its own authority.

The law does not fail in dispensing justice.

Lex non deficit in justitia exhibenda.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 31, case 61; Co. Litt. 197; Weisman, 68n

For every wrong the law provides a remedy — where no remedy appears, the deficiency is in the practitioner's knowledge, not in the law itself.

Justice that prevents a wrong is better than justice that punishes it.

Praevalet justitia praeventioni.

Source: 3 Inst. Epil.; Weisman, 68h

Courts and officers should act to prevent injuries where possible, rather than waiting to assess damages after the harm is done.

Hasty justice is the stepmother of misfortune.

Festinatio justitiae est noverca infortunii.

Source: Hob. 97; Weisman, 68d

Speed must never come at the cost of accuracy — a judgment rushed to conclusion without due deliberation is worse than one delayed.

Favor ought not to bend justice, power ought not to break it, nor money to corrupt it.

Favor non debet flectere justitiam, potestas non frangere, pecunia non corrumpere.

Source: Cicero, Fragmenta de Republica; Halk. Max.; Weisman, 68k

The three mortal enemies of justice are influence, force, and bribery — any court susceptible to any of these has ceased to be a court.

It is the duty of justices to administer justice to everyone seeking it from them.

Ad officium justiciariorum spectat, unicuique coram eis placitanti justitiam exhibere.

Source: 2 Inst. 451; Jackson; Weisman, 63j

No suitor who appears before the court may be turned away without a hearing — the judicial duty to administer justice is universal and non-discretionary.

Equity is as it were equality.

Aequitas est quasi aequalitas.

Source: Co. Litt. 24; Jackson; Weisman, 36k

The essence of equity is equal treatment — it intervenes where the strict letter of the law would produce unequal or unconscionable results.

It is not consonant to justice that any accessory should be convicted in the king’s court before some one has been attainted of the fact.

Juri non est consonum quod aliquis accessorius in curia regis convincatur antequam aliquis de facto fuerit attinctus.

Source: 2 Inst. 183; Jackson

An accessory cannot be convicted before the principal — unless the underlying crime is first established against the primary offender, there is no foundation for charging one who merely assisted.

Justice is double; punishing with severity, preventing with lenity.

Justitia est duplex; viz. severe puniens et vere praeveniens.

Source: 3 Inst. Epil.; Jackson; Weisman, 68j

The two arms of justice are punishment after the fact and prevention before it — the law is most effective when it deters wrongs before they occur through gentle warning, reserving harsh measures for those who offend nonetheless.

Justice strengthens the throne.

Justitia firmatur solium.

Source: 3 Inst. 140; Jackson

The authority of government is sustained by the just administration of law — a ruler who dispenses justice secures his own legitimacy, while injustice undermines it.

It is always safer to err in acquitting than in punishing: on the side of mercy, than of strict justice.

Tutius semper est errare acquietando quam in puniendo, ex parte misericordiae quam ex parte justitiae.

Source: H. H. P.C. 290; Jackson; Weisman, 64o

When the court is uncertain, it is better to let a guilty man go free than to punish an innocent one — mercy in doubt is the safer course for the preservation of justice.

Justice is an excellent virtue and pleasing to the Most High.

Justitia est virtus excellens et altissimo complacens.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 4 Inst. 58; Weisman, 68l

The administration of justice is not merely a civic function but a duty that accords with divine order — the judge who dispenses true justice serves both man and God.

The law favors justice and right.

Source: Wing. Max. 141; Weisman, 68i

(English-origin maxim.) In every doubtful case, the law leans toward justice and right — legal presumptions and constructions always favor the just outcome.

Faith is the sister of justice.

Source: Halk. Max. 77; Weisman, 68q

(English-origin maxim.) Good faith and justice are inseparable — without fidelity to promises and honest dealing, the administration of justice is impossible.

Justice is prior to liberty.

Source: Halk. Max. 77; Weisman, 68r

(English-origin maxim.) Justice must be established before liberty can be enjoyed — without a just legal order, liberty degenerates into license and chaos.

It is the property of a Judge to administer justice, not to give it.

Source: Lofft, 42; Weisman, 68s

(English-origin maxim.) A judge's duty is to administer the existing law, not to create new rights or grant favors — the judge declares what the law is, he does not invent what it should be.

Every presumption of the law must be in aid of justice.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 68a

(English-origin maxim.) Legal presumptions exist to advance justice, not to defeat it — a presumption that operates to deprive a man of his recognized rights or to shield wrongdoing perverts its own purpose and must yield to the truth of the matter.

It is not just and right that he who exposes the faults of a guilty person should be condemned on that account; for it is proper and expedient that the offense of the guilty should be known.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 68c

(English-origin maxim.) The People's right to expose malfeasance by public officers or private wrongdoers is essential to self-governance — one who brings the guilty to light serves justice and cannot be punished for doing so. This principle undergirds the right of remonstrance, petition, and the freedom of speech secured by the First Amendment.

What has been agreed to be done, and what ought to be done, shall, for the advancement of justice, be regarded as done.

Source: Wharton, III-377

(English-origin maxim.) Equity treats as done that which ought to have been done — when parties have agreed to perform an act, or justice requires it, the law regards the act as already accomplished.

A judicial act performed before one who is not the proper judge is void; but a ministerial act, from whomsoever it proceeds, may be ratified.

Actus judiciarius coram non judice irritus habetur, de ministeriali autem a quocunque provenit ratum esto.

Source: Lofft 458; Broom, Max. 92

The distinction between judicial and ministerial acts is critical — only ministerial defects may be cured after the fact; a void judgment for want of jurisdiction cannot be made valid by ratification.

He who exercises jurisdiction beyond his proper limits cannot be obeyed with safety.

Qui extra jurisdictionem suam judicat, tuto non paretur.

Source: Dig. 2, 1, 20; 10 Co. 77; Story, Confl. Laws §539

Obedience to a court acting outside its jurisdiction is not merely optional — it is affirmatively dangerous, because the proceedings are void and any act taken in reliance on them is without legal protection.

Where jurisdiction is given, those powers also are deemed granted without which the jurisdiction cannot be exercised.

Ubi jurisdictio data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potest.

Source: Dig. 2, 1, 2; 1 Kent, Comm. 339

The grant of jurisdiction carries with it every power necessary to its effective exercise — but no more; implied powers cannot exceed the original grant.

Every jurisdiction has its own bounds.

Unaquaeque jurisdictio suos fines habet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 137

No court's authority is unlimited — every tribunal is confined to the territory, subject matter, and persons within its lawful commission.

The order of things is thrown into confusion if each person does not preserve his own jurisdiction.

Rerum ordo confunditur si unicuique jurisdictio non servetur.

Source: 4 Inst. Proem.

When courts overstep their jurisdictional boundaries — or fail to exercise the jurisdiction properly vested in them — the entire system of ordered justice breaks down.

Jurisdiction over the principal matter draws to itself jurisdiction over the accessory.

Jurisdictio principalis trahit ad se accessoriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 493; Bract. 481; Weisman, 66c

A court with jurisdiction over the main controversy may also determine incidental and subsidiary questions arising from it.

He who has jurisdiction to acquit has jurisdiction to bind.

Qui habet jurisdictionem absolvendi habet jurisdictionem ligandi.

Source: 12 Co. 59; Weisman, 66i

The power to release necessarily implies the power to restrain — jurisdiction cannot be exercised in only one direction.

Where a man offends, there shall he be punished.

Ubi quis delinquit, ibi punietur.

Source: 3 Inst. 24; Bract. fol. 154b

Jurisdiction in criminal matters belongs to the place where the offense was committed — transporting a cause to a distant forum deprives the accused of his right to be tried by jurors of the vicinage.

The plaintiff follows the forum of the defendant.

Actor sequitur forum rei.

Source: Branch, Max. 4; Jackson; Weisman, 99t

The plaintiff must bring his action in the court that has jurisdiction over the defendant — a man is entitled to be sued in his own forum, not dragged to a distant tribunal.

A judgment given by an improper judge is of no moment.

Judicium a non suo judice datum nullius est momenti.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 11 Co. 76

A judgment rendered by a court or judge lacking jurisdiction over the matter is void from the beginning and imposes no obligation on any party.

An action is not given to one who has not been injured.

Actio non datur non damnificato.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 69; Broom, Max. 768; Weisman, 59w; Weisman, 75e

Standing requires actual injury — a man who has suffered no wrong has no cause of action, no matter how objectionable the conduct of another may be.

Every action proceeds in its own course.

Actio quaelibet it sua via.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 77; Weisman, 2c; Weisman, 75f

Each form of action has its own established procedure — a party must choose the correct form or his action fails.

The correct forms of action are to be carefully preserved.

Actionum genera maxime sunt servanda.

Source: Lofft 460

The forms of action are not mere technicalities but safeguards — they define the nature of the controversy and the relief available.

No one acquires a right of action from his own wrongdoing.

Nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur actionem.

Source: Broom, Max. 297; Wing. Max. 131

The law will not reward misconduct — a party who engineers the very situation he complains of has no standing to seek relief.

No one is bound to accuse himself.

Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare.

Source: Wing. Max. 486; 1 Bl. Comm. 443; Weisman, 49c; Weisman, 75r; Weisman, 77l

The privilege against self-incrimination is not a modern statutory creation but an ancient common law maxim — no man may be compelled to furnish evidence against himself.

No one is bound to arm his adversary against himself.

Nemo tenetur armare adversarium contra se.

Source: Wing. Max. 665; Weisman, 75x; Weisman, 77j; Weisman, 99l

A party is not required to disclose his strategy, theory of the case, or evidence that would aid his opponent — the adversarial system presupposes that each side prepares its own case.

Every action is a complaint.

Omnis actio est loquela.

Source: Co. Litt. 292a; Weisman, 75k

The essence of every legal action is the plaintiff's grievance — without a grievance properly stated, there is no action.

A prison ought to be used for the keeping of men, not for their punishment.

Carcer ad homines custodiendos, non ad puniendos, dari debet.

Source: Co. Litt. 260

Imprisonment before conviction is custody, not punishment — the gaol holds the accused for trial, not to inflict suffering. Any pretrial condition that punishes before judgment perverts the purpose of confinement.

The action has not accrued within six years.

Actio non accrevit infra sex annos.

Source: Jackson

Actions must be brought within the prescribed limitation period — a claim not pursued within six years is barred, because the law favors repose and finality.

The defrauding of one person does not afford an action to another.

Alterius circumventio alii non praebet actionem.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 49; Jackson

Only the person actually defrauded has standing to bring an action — a third party cannot claim a right of action arising from a fraud committed against someone else.

A judicial writ fails not through defect of form.

Breve judiciale non cadit pro defectu formae.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 43; Jackson; Weisman, 65g

A writ issued by the court is not voided by a mere formal defect — substance prevails over form in judicial process.

No prescription runs against a person unable to bring an action.

Contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio.

Source: Jackson; Weisman, 75z; Weisman, 99d

The statute of limitations does not run against one who is legally incapable of suing — minority, imprisonment, insanity, or other disability tolls the prescriptive period.

There is no exception against an action which entirely destroys an exception.

Exceptio nulla est versus actionem quae exceptionem perimit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 106; Jackson

A defense cannot be raised against an action that itself extinguishes the very ground of that defense — a plea that would destroy the foundation of the exception it invokes is self-defeating.

An action does not arise from a base cause.

Ex turpi causa non oritur actio.

Source: Cowp. 843; Jackson

No court will lend its aid to a party whose claim is founded upon his own immoral or illegal conduct — the law will not enforce a right arising from turpitude.

Every plaint and every action for injuries is limited within certain times.

Omnis querela et omnis actio injuriarum limitata est infra certa tempora.

Source: Co. Litt. 114; Jackson; Weisman, 75l

All legal actions are subject to limitation periods — the law requires claims to be brought within a reasonable time to prevent stale demands and preserve certainty.

An impediment being removed, an action emerges.

Remoto impedimento, emergit actio.

Source: Wing. 20; Jackson

When a legal disability or obstruction that prevented suit is removed, the right of action revives — the impediment suspended the remedy but did not destroy the underlying right.

No one who may condemn is unable to acquit.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 37; Weisman, 65d

(English-origin maxim.) The power to condemn necessarily includes the lesser power to acquit — a court with jurisdiction to punish also has jurisdiction to absolve.

The court has nothing to do with what is not before it.

Nihil habet forum ex scena.

Source: Bacon, Max.; Bouv. 141; Weisman, 65f

A court confines itself to the matter properly before it and will not decide issues that have not been raised or presented by the parties.

Summonses or citations should not be granted before it is expressed on what ground they ought to be issued.

Source: 12 Coke, 47; Weisman, 65i

(English-origin maxim.) No summons or citation should issue without a stated ground — the court must know the basis of the claim before compelling a party to appear.

An act of the court shall prejudice no man.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 118; 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 245-255; Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed. 115; Weisman, 65l

(English-origin maxim.) No person shall be harmed by an act of the court itself — when delay, error, or procedural defect is the court's own doing, the parties must not suffer for it.

An example [in judicial proceedings] does no good which settles one question by another.

Source: Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. (N.Y.) 44, 49; Weisman, 65m

(English-origin maxim.) A judicial precedent that resolves one disputed question only by raising another is of no value — a good example settles more than it disturbs.

In courts or judicial proceedings, infancy is aided or favored.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 46, case 89; Weisman, 65p

(English-origin maxim.) Courts afford special protection to minors in judicial proceedings — the interests of children are guarded with particular care, and their disabilities are not held against them.

In a trial, credence is given only to those who are sworn.

Source: Cro. Car. 64; Weisman, 65q

(English-origin maxim.) Only sworn testimony is competent evidence in a trial — unsworn statements carry no weight and cannot be the basis of judicial findings.

Sunday is dies non juridicus -that is it is not a court day, or a day for judicial proceedings, or legal purposes.

Source: Co. Litt. 135a; Noy, Max. 2; Wing. Max. 7, max. 5; Broom, Max. 21; Plowd. 265; Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, 327; VanVechten v. Paddock, 12 Johns. (N.Y.) 178, 180; Weisman, 65t

(English-origin maxim.) Sunday is not a day for judicial proceedings — legal acts performed on the Lord's day are void unless statute expressly provides otherwise.

That which is endless is reprobated in law.

Source: 12 Coke, 24; Weisman, 65v

(English-origin maxim.) The law condemns proceedings that lead to no conclusion — endless litigation is reprobated because it denies the finality that justice requires.

Judicial acts require the exercise of some judicial discretion, ministerial acts require none.

Source: Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Vt. 510; Weisman, 65w

(English-origin maxim.) Judicial acts require the judge to exercise discretion and judgment, while ministerial acts are performed mechanically according to fixed rules with no room for independent decision.

It is unbecoming to surrender men when no cause is shown.

Source: In re Washburn, 4 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 106, 114, 8 Am. Dec. 548; Weisman, 65aa

(English-origin maxim.) No person should be surrendered to another jurisdiction without cause shown — extradition and surrender require a demonstrated legal basis.

When an action is brought to annul a proceeding, the defendant cannot plead such proceeding in bar.

Source: Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed. 154; Wing. Max. 647; Weisman, 75a

(English-origin maxim.) When a suit is brought to annul a proceeding, the defendant cannot use that very proceeding as a bar to the action — the matter in dispute cannot serve as its own defense.

The action in rem is that by which we seek our property which is possessed by another, and is always against him who possesses the property.

Source: Dig. 44, 7, 25; Bract. fol. 102; Weisman, 75b

(English-origin maxim.) An action in rem is directed against the property itself and follows it into the hands of whoever possesses it — the claim attaches to the thing, not the person.

No one goes to law without an action, and no one can bring an action without a writ or bill.

Source: Bract. fol. 112; Fleta, 1.2, c. 13, s. 4; Weisman, 75c

(English-origin maxim.) Access to the courts requires a formal writ or bill — no action can be commenced without the proper originating process.

No one is prohibited from making use of several defenses.

Source: Co. Litt. 304a; Wing. Max. 479; Weisman, 75g

(English-origin maxim.) A party may plead as many defenses as are available to him — the law does not force a defendant to choose a single ground when multiple valid defenses exist.

No one maintains an action arising out of his own wrong.

Source: Broom, Max. 297; Weisman, 75i

(English-origin maxim.) A party who caused the very wrong he complains of cannot maintain an action based on that wrong — no man may be both the author of an injury and the claimant for its redress.

He who has once relinquished or renounced his action cannot bring it again.

Source: 8 Coke, 59a; Weisman, 75j

(English-origin maxim.) Once a party voluntarily abandons or relinquishes a cause of action, it cannot be revived — the right to sue, once surrendered, is extinguished forever.

No action arises out of an immoral consideration.

Source: 2 Peters (27 U.S.) 539; Cycl. Diet. 375; Weisman, 75m

(English-origin maxim.) A cause of action founded on an immoral or illegal consideration is void — the courts will not enforce agreements rooted in wrongdoing.

The action in personam is that by which we sue him who is under obligation to us to do something or give something.

Source: Dig. 44, 7, 25; Bract. 101b; Dig. 50, 17, 41; Weisman, 75n

(English-origin maxim.) An action in personam lies against a specific person who is under a personal obligation to do or give something — it follows the debtor, not the property.

When an action is merely criminal, it can be instituted from the beginning either criminally or civilly.

Source: Bract. 102; Weisman, 75p

(English-origin maxim.) Where the same act gives rise to both criminal and civil liability, the aggrieved party may choose to pursue either remedy from the outset.

In every action where two distresses concur, that is, in rem and in personam, that is to be chosen which is most dreaded, and which binds most firmly.

Source: Bract. fol. 372; Fleta, l. 6, c. 14, s. 28; Weisman, 75q

(English-origin maxim.) When both an action in rem and an action in personam are available, counsel should choose the more powerful remedy — the one that binds more firmly and is most likely to compel compliance.

Every man is liable to be sued wrongfully or without cause.

Source: Dow v. Johnson, 10 Otto (100 U.S.) 158, 193; Weisman, 75s

(English-origin maxim.) The possibility of being sued without cause is a burden every man bears — the law provides remedies for frivolous suits but cannot prevent them from being filed.

In civil matters agency ( or service) excuses, but not so in criminal matters.

Source: Lofft. 228; Tray. Leg. Max. 243; Weisman, 75t

(English-origin maxim.) In civil matters, acting as an agent or servant excuses personal liability, but in criminal cases the agent remains personally responsible for his own criminal acts regardless of who directed them.

A matter, the validity of which is at issue in legal proceedings, cannot be set up as a bar [impediment] thereto.

Source: Bac. Max. reg. 2; Weisman, 75u

(English-origin maxim.) A proceeding whose validity is the very question at issue cannot be pleaded as a bar to the suit challenging it — to allow otherwise would make every void act self-validating.

When the foundation fails, all goes to the ground; as, where the cause of action fails, the action itself must of necessity fail.

Source: Wing. Max., 113, 114, max. 40; Broom, Max. 180; Noy, Max. 5, max. 12; Weisman, 75w

(English-origin maxim.) When the foundation of a cause of action is destroyed, the entire action collapses — if the underlying right or fact is eliminated, no superstructure of claims can stand upon it.

The end of litigation is justice.

Source: Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 258; Weisman, 75y

(English-origin maxim.) The ultimate purpose of all litigation is the attainment of justice — procedure is a means, not an end, and must yield when it obstructs rather than serves justice.

A right of action can not arise out of fraud.

Source: Cowp. 343; Broom, Max. 729; Weisman, 75aa; Weisman, 105i

(English-origin maxim.) A party who obtained his position through fraud cannot maintain an action to enforce it — fraud vitiates everything it touches and bars the fraudster from judicial relief.

The decree ( or act) of a court shall prejudice no man.

Actus curiae neminem gravabit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 118; Weisman, 65b

When a court's own act — such as delay, clerical error, or procedural oversight — causes harm to a party, the court must ensure that party is not prejudiced by the court's mistake.

Constitutions and laws precede the judiciary.

Source: Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (48 U.S.) 1, 52; Weisman, 65u

(English-origin maxim.) The judiciary is subordinate to the constitution and the laws — judges derive their authority from written law and cannot act beyond what the constitution and statutes authorize.

The judge is counsel for the prisoner.

Judex est consiliarius rei.

Source: Weisman, 65x

In criminal proceedings, the judge has a duty to protect the rights of the accused — particularly an unrepresented defendant — by ensuring that the trial is conducted fairly and that the prisoner understands the proceedings against him.

Everyone is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Source: C.L.M.; Lofft, 121; Weisman, 65y

(English-origin maxim.) The presumption of innocence is a foundational right recognized at common law and secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments — the sovereign People cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property by the state unless guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt through due process of law.

A lawsuit signifies every action, whether it be in rem or in personam.

Lis mota litem significat omnem actionem, sive sit in rem sive in personam.

Source: Co. Litt. 292

The term "suit" encompasses all forms of legal proceeding — the distinction between actions against the thing and actions against the person does not alter the fundamental nature of litigation.

When the plaintiff does not prove his case, the defendant is acquitted.

Actore non probante, reus absolvitur.

Source: Hob. 103; Weisman, 99cc

The burden of proof rests on the party who asserts — if the plaintiff fails to establish his claim, judgment goes for the defendant as a matter of course.

No man can be at once suitor and judge.

Nemo potest esse simul actor et judex.

Source: Broom, Max. 117; Weisman, 99f

The integrity of the judicial process depends on the absolute separation of the roles of advocate and adjudicator.

The condition of the possessor is better, and that of the defendant better than the plaintiff's.

Melior est conditio possidentis, et rei quam actoris.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 126; Broom, Max. 715, 740

When the equities are equal, the law favors the party in possession and the party defending — the plaintiff who would disturb the status quo bears the heavier burden.

No man ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause.

Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.

Source: 5 Co. 61; Broom, Max. 327; Dig. 50, 17, 57

The prohibition against double jeopardy and duplicative litigation is fundamental — once a matter has been properly determined, it may not be relitigated between the same parties.

No one is heard who advances his own disgrace.

Nemo auditur qui suam allegat turpitudinem.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 16; Broom, Max. 160; 4 Inst. 279

A party who makes contradictory allegations — or who confesses his own wrongdoing in the course of his pleading — destroys his own case.

During the pendency of a suit, nothing should be changed.

Lite pendente nihil innovetur.

Source: Co. Litt. 344; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §406

Once litigation is underway, neither party may unilaterally alter the subject matter — alienation, destruction, or material change pending suit is void as against the litigation.

It is in the interest of the state that there be an end to litigation.

Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.

Source: Co. Litt. 303b; Broom, Max. 331, 343; Jenk. Cent. 61; Weisman, 59p; Weisman, 99y

Perpetual litigation is a public evil — the law provides limitations, res judicata, and finality doctrines precisely because disputes must end.

A trial should always be had where the jurors can be best informed.

Judicium semper fieri debet ubi juratores melius scire possunt.

Source: 7 Co. 1b; Weisman, 99z

Venue serves the search for truth — the trial belongs in the community where the facts are known and witnesses are available.

The burden of proof lies on the plaintiff.

Actori incumbit onus probandi.

Source: Hob. 103; Jackson; Weisman, 39n; Weisman, 39dd; Weisman, 99j

The party who asserts a claim bears the obligation of proving it — the defendant need prove nothing until the plaintiff has established a prima facie case.

In things preceding judgment the plaintiff is favoured.

In preparatoriis ad judicium favetur actori.

Source: 2 Inst. 57; Jackson; Weisman, 64cc

In the pre-trial and preparatory stages of litigation, the law gives the plaintiff a favorable construction to ensure his case reaches a hearing on the merits.

A traitor is punished that one and not all may perish.

Reus laesae majestatis punitur, ut pereat unus ne pereant omnes.

Source: 4 Co. 124; Jackson

The severe punishment of treason serves the public good — the destruction of one who betrays the commonwealth preserves the safety of all its members.

The success of a defendant depends on a perfect case; his loss arises from some defect.

Source: 11 Coke, 68a; Weisman, 99b

(English-origin maxim.) A defendant prevails only when his case is without defect — a single flaw in the defense is enough to undo it, while success requires perfection at every point.

During a litigation nothing should be changed.

Source: Co. Litt. 344; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 406; Secombe v. Steele, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 94, 106; Weisman, 99e

(English-origin maxim.) The status quo must be preserved during litigation — no party may alter the subject matter of the dispute while the suit is pending, lest the court's eventual judgment be rendered meaningless.

A suit is a civil warfare; for as the plaintiffs are armed with actions, and, as it were, girded with swords, so the defendants are fortified with pleas, and are defended, as it were, by shields.

Source: Hob. 20; Bract. 339b; Weisman, 99k

(English-origin maxim.) Litigation is a form of regulated combat — plaintiffs attack with their claims and defendants defend with their pleas, and the contest is governed by strict procedural rules.

A suit which is based upon a writing ought not to vary from the writing.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 65; Weisman, 99m

(English-origin maxim.) A suit founded on a written instrument must conform to the terms of that writing — the plaintiff cannot vary from the document upon which he bases his claim.

No man can be sued a second time for the same cause of action, if once judgment has been rendered.

Source: Broom, Max. 327, 348; Dig. 50, 17, 41; Weisman, 99n

(English-origin maxim.) Once a final judgment has been rendered on a cause of action, the same matter cannot be relitigated between the same parties — this is the principle of res judicata.

No one can sue without a writ.

Source: Fleta, lib. 2, c. 13, s. 4; Weisman, 99p

(English-origin maxim.) A writ is the indispensable foundation of every lawsuit — without proper originating process, the court has no authority to hear the case.

Whichever of two parties has the division, the other has the choice.

Source: Co. Litt. 166; Weisman, 99u

(English-origin maxim.) When one party divides a disputed matter, the other party has the right of first choice — this ensures fairness by giving the divider an incentive to divide equally.

He in vain sues, who cannot prosecute his judgment with effect.

Source: Fleta, lib. 6, c. 37, s. 9; Weisman, 99v

(English-origin maxim.) A plaintiff who cannot enforce a judgment gains nothing by obtaining it — the law discourages suits where the remedy, even if granted, would be illusory.

No one can sue in the name of another.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 123; Weisman, 99aa

(English-origin maxim.) A man must bring suit in his own name — no one may litigate on behalf of another without proper legal authority such as power of attorney or guardianship.

An issue (or suit) requires terms of contradiction. To constitute an issue, there must be an affirmative on one side and a negative on the other.

Source: Black's, 258; Jenk. Cent. 117; Weisman, 99bb

(English-origin maxim.) A triable issue requires opposing assertions — one side must affirm and the other must deny, for without contradiction there is no dispute for the court to resolve.

Alienation pending a suit is void.

Source: Branch, Max. 117; Weisman, 99ee

(English-origin maxim.) A transfer of property made while a lawsuit concerning that property is pending is void — the law prevents parties from defeating the court's jurisdiction by disposing of the subject matter during litigation.

Not twice for the same thing.

Non bis in idem.

Source: Weisman, 99r

No person may be subjected to a second prosecution, suit, or proceeding for the same cause — whether in criminal law (double jeopardy) or civil law (res judicata), the matter once determined is settled and cannot be relitigated.

A plaintiff is not to be heard who has advanced anything against authority.

Source: Black's, 2d 28; Bouv. 116; Weisman, 99c

(English-origin maxim.) One who acts contrary to the authority of the law has no standing to be heard — a plaintiff whose own position contradicts established legal authority cannot maintain his suit.

One making contradictory allegations is not to be heard.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 16; Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed. 160; 4 Inst. 279; Commonwealth v. Pejepscut, 10 Mass. 155, 163; Weisman, 99g

(English-origin maxim.) A party who asserts contradictory positions destroys his own credibility — the law refuses to entertain self-contradictory pleading.

Where the death of a human being is concerned, no delay is considered long.

Source: Co. Litt. 134; Weisman, 99s

(English-origin maxim.) In matters of life and death, no procedural delay is justified — the law treats urgency as paramount when human life is at stake.

Words make the plea.

Verba faciunt placitum.

Source: 5 Mod. 458; Weisman, 87e

A plea is defined by what is actually stated — the court will not supply allegations the pleader failed to make.

He who does not deny, admits.

Qui non negat, fatetur.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 503; Dig. 50, 17, 142; Weisman, 26a; Weisman, 87h; Weisman, 99dd

Silence in the face of a properly served allegation operates as an admission — what is not specifically denied is taken as conceded.

Two negatives do not make an issue.

Duae negationes non faciunt placitum.

Source: Lofft 415

An issue requires affirmation on one side and denial on the other — mutual negation produces no question for the court to decide.

Nothing can be demanded before the time when, by the nature of things, it can be performed.

Nihil peti potest ante id tempus quo per rerum naturam persolvi possit.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 186

A premature demand is no demand at all — the cause of action must be ripe before the court will entertain it. (Duplicate maxim — see also 6.5.4.)

The issue proves the act.

Exitus acta probat.

Source: Co. Litt. 232b; Broom, Max. 259

An allegation stands or falls by its outcome at trial — the result of the proceeding is the ultimate test of whether the claim was well-founded.

An ambiguous plea ought to be construed against the party who pleads it.

Ambiguum placitum interpretari debet contra proferentem.

Source: Co. Litt. 303b; Bacon, Max. reg. 3; Weisman, 87o

The burden of clarity falls on the pleader — obscurity in a plea is resolved against the party who had the opportunity to speak plainly and chose not to.

A plea denying the facts is the last resort.

Exceptio falsi est omnium ultima.

Source: Dig. 44, 1, 22; Broom, Max. 457; Weisman, 87b

Before resorting to a flat denial, a defendant should exhaust every other defense — demurrer, confession and avoidance, justification — because a denial puts the entire matter at issue.

Every plea is a complaint.

Omne placitum est querela.

Source: Co. Litt. 292a

Every act of pleading, whether by plaintiff or defendant, is in substance an appeal to the court for relief.

When the order of pleading is observed, the law is observed.

Quando ordo placitandi servatur, lex servatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 303a; Broom, Max. 188; Weisman, 87n

Procedural regularity is not a formality but a safeguard — when the prescribed sequence of pleading is followed, each party's rights are preserved.

It is not permitted to adduce a plea of the matter in issue as a bar thereto.

Non potest adduci exceptio ejusdem rei cujus petitur dissolutio.

Source: Bac. Max. 22; Jackson

A party cannot use the very matter under dispute as a defense against the action seeking to resolve it — the subject of the suit cannot simultaneously be its own bar.

A plea of a matter of which a dissolution is sought by the action is null.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 37, case 71; Bacon, Max. reg. 2; Weisman, 87a

(English-origin maxim.) When a suit seeks to dissolve or annul a matter, the defendant cannot plead that very matter in bar — the thing sought to be destroyed cannot serve as its own shield.

A false plea is the basest of all things.

Source: Bouv. 126; Weisman, 87c

(English-origin maxim.) A false plea is the most dishonorable act in legal proceedings — to lie to the court under the protection of judicial process is the basest abuse of the law's trust.

There can be no plea against an action which destroys the matter of the plea.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 106, case 2; Weisman, 87d

(English-origin maxim.) A plea cannot stand when the action, if successful, would destroy the very matter pleaded — a defense that the action itself would eliminate is no defense at all.

He is defeated by the plea that the action have been assigned.

Source: Cheesebrough v. Millard, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 409, 414; Weisman, 87g

(English-origin maxim.) A defendant is barred by a plea showing that the cause of action has been assigned to another — the original plaintiff, having transferred his right, can no longer maintain the suit.

Two negative pleas do not form an issue.

Source: Lofft, 415; Weisman, 87i

(English-origin maxim.) In pleading, two negative assertions cannot create a triable issue. An issue requires an affirmative on one side and a negative on the other — two denials leave nothing for the court to determine.

Whatever is offered by the defendant as sufficient to defeat the cause of action stated in the plaintiffs declaration, either by way of denial, justification, or confession, is a plea.

Source: Jewett Car Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 107 Fed. 622, 624; Weisman, 87j

(English-origin maxim.) Any matter the defendant raises to defeat the plaintiff's claim — whether denial, justification, or confession and avoidance — constitutes a plea and must conform to the rules of pleading.

The defendant by a plea becomes plaintiff.

Source: Best, Ev. 294, s. 252; Weisman, 87k

(English-origin maxim.) When a defendant interposes an affirmative plea, he takes on the burden of proving it — in that respect he becomes a plaintiff as to the matter pleaded.

Pleas [i.e., actions] are personal, real, and mixed.

Source: Co. Litt. 284; Weisman, 87l

(English-origin maxim.) Pleas are classified as personal (affecting the person), real (affecting property), and mixed (affecting both) — the classification determines the procedure and form of the action.

It sometimes happens that a plea which seems prima facie just, nevertheless is injurious and unequal.

Source: Inst. 4, 14, 1, 2; Weisman, 87m

(English-origin maxim.) A plea may appear valid on its face yet prove unjust in application — courts must examine the substance and effect of a plea, not merely its formal sufficiency.

Hear the other side.

Audi alteram partem.

Source: Broom, Max. 113; 6 Co. 52a; 4 Bl. Comm. 283

No judgment may be rendered against any person without giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard — this is the irreducible minimum of due process of law.

The antecedent has relation to that which next follows unless thereby the meaning of the sentence would be impaired.

Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio, nisi impediatur sententia.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 180; Jackson

A relative word or clause refers to the nearest antecedent unless that construction would produce an absurd or unintelligible result. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.1.)

A thing adjudged is received as truth.

Res judicata pro veritate accipitur.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 207; 2 Kent, Comm. 120; Broom, Max. 328

Once a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered final judgment, the matters determined therein are conclusive between the parties — they may not be relitigated, even if the judgment was wrong.

A judgment is, as it were, a declaration of law.

Judicium est quasi juris dictum.

Source: Co. Litt. 39a, 168a; 2 Inst. 537; Weisman, 64aa

Every judgment carries the force of law for the parties — it is not merely the judge's opinion but the law's own pronouncement applied to the facts found.

A thing adjudged makes white black, black white, crooked straight, and straight crooked.

Res judicata facit ex albo nigrum, ex nigro album, ex curvo rectum, ex recto curvum.

Source: 1 Bouv. Inst. no. 840; Weisman, 64z

The power of final judgment is absolute — however unjust the result may appear, once finally determined it becomes the legal truth and alters all rights accordingly.

He who determines any matter without hearing both sides, though he may have decided rightly, has not done justice.

Qui aliquid statuerit, parte inaudita altera, aequum licet dixerit, haud aequum fecerit.

Source: 6 Co. 52a; 4 Bl. Comm. 283; Seneca, Medea 199; Weisman, 64bb

The rightness of the result does not cure a defective process — justice requires that both sides be heard, regardless of whether the outcome would have been the same.

Judgment is not to be pronounced on a matter that is not clear.

Non sententia de re non liquida proferenda est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 7, case 9

A court should never rush to judgment on doubtful facts — where the evidence is ambiguous or incomplete, the court must withhold decision until the matter is properly illuminated.

A judgment ought not to be illusory; it ought to have its proper effect.

Judicium non debet esse illusorium; suum effectum habere debet.

Source: 2 Inst. 341; Weisman, 64l

A judgment that cannot be enforced is a mockery of justice — every judgment must be capable of producing a real result.

That which is to be resolved once for all should be long deliberated upon.

Deliberandum est diu quod statuendum est semel.

Source: 12 Co. 74; Weisman, 65o; Weisman, 75o

Final determinations demand thorough consideration — haste in matters of permanent consequence is the enemy of sound judgment.

Matters adjudged between other parties create no prejudice to those who were not parties.

Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt.

Source: Dig. 44, 2, 1; Dig. 42, 1, 63

A judgment binds only the parties to the proceeding — strangers to the suit are not affected by it, because they had no opportunity to be heard.

In doubt, always prefer the safer course.

In dubio, semper id quod tutius est praeferendum.

Source: Branch, Princ.; 2 Hale, P.C. 290; Broom, Max. 326

When the court is uncertain, it is always safer to err on the side of mercy and acquittal than on the side of punishment — doubt favors the accused.

Where the opinions are equal, the defendant is acquitted.

Ubi sententiae concordant, reus absolvitur.

Source: 4 Inst. 64; Weisman, 64g

A divided court cannot condemn — when the tribunal is evenly split, the result is the same as if no judgment had been entered, and the defendant goes free.

A new judgment does not create new law, but declares the old.

Novum judicium non dat novum jus, sed declarat antiquum.

Source: 10 Co. 42; Jackson

Adjudication reveals existing law — it does not invent it. Every judgment is retroactive in the sense that it declares what the law always was.

An interlocutory judgment may be recalled, but a final judgment may not.

Sententia interlocutoria revocari potest, definitiva non potest.

Source: Bac. Max.; Weisman, 64j

Preliminary rulings remain open to correction throughout the proceeding, but once the court renders its definitive judgment, the matter is settled — finality is the seal of justice.

An absolute sentence requires no exposition.

Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget.

Source: 2 Inst. 533; Jackson

A clear and unambiguous judgment needs no interpretation — where the court has spoken plainly, no gloss or commentary may alter its meaning. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.1.16.)

An award is a judgment.

Arbitrium est judicium.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 137; Jackson; Weisman, 64c

An arbitral award carries the same force as a court judgment — it is binding on the parties and enforceable as law.

The most favourable construction is to be placed on general or doubtful expressions.

Benignior sententia in verbis generalibus seu dubiis est praeferenda.

Source: 4 Co. 15; Jackson; Weisman, 22d; Weisman, 94k

When language is vague or susceptible of multiple meanings, the interpretation that is most favorable and least burdensome to the party affected is to be preferred.

The intention, the count, and the foundation, ought to be certain, and so ought the thing to be which is brought for judgment.

Certa debet esse intentio, et narratio, et certum fundamentum, et certa res quae deducitur in judicium.

Source: Co. Litt. 303a; Jackson; Weisman, 64p

Every element of a legal proceeding must be stated with certainty — vague or indefinite claims deprive the opposing party of fair notice and prevent the court from rendering a proper judgment.

A person confessing a judgment is deemed as adjudged, and in a manner is condemned by his own sentence.

Confessus in judicio pro judicato habetur, et quodammodo sua sententia damnatur.

Source: 11 Co. 30; Jackson

A confession of judgment is equivalent to a verdict — the party who admits the claim against him is bound by his own admission as firmly as if a jury had found against him.

Execution is the execution of the law according to the judgment.

Executio est executio juris secundum judicium.

Source: 3 Inst. 212; Jackson; Weisman, 42a

Execution must conform strictly to the terms of the judgment — an officer who departs from the judgment in carrying it out acts without authority.

He who flees judgment confesses his guilt.

Fatetur facinus qui judicium fugit.

Source: 3 Inst. 14; Jackson; Weisman, 64m

Flight from justice is treated as an admission of guilt — a man who evades the court's process demonstrates consciousness of his own wrongdoing.

Judgment in presumption of law is given contrary to inclination.

Judicium redditur in invitum, in praesumptione legis.

Source: Co. Litt. 248; Jackson; Weisman, 64d

Default judgments and judgments based on legal presumption are entered against the unwilling party — the law acts upon those who refuse to participate in the process.

Every conclusion of a good and true judgment arises from good and true premises, and sayings of juries.

Omnis conclusio boni et veri judicii sequitur ex bonis et veris praemissis et dictis juratorum.

Source: Co. Litt. 226; Jackson; Weisman, 64gg

Sound judgments rest on sound foundations — a just conclusion can only follow from truthful premises established by the jury's findings of fact.

A thing certain must be brought to judgment.

Oportet quod certa res deducatur in judicium.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 84; Jackson

The subject matter of a lawsuit must be definite and identifiable — the court cannot adjudicate a claim that is vague, indefinite, or uncertain in its object.

Judgments frequently become matured by deliberation, never by hurried process.

Judicia in deliberationibus crebro maturescunt, in accelerato processu nunquam.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 210; Weisman, 64ee

Sound judgment requires careful deliberation — haste in judicial proceedings produces error, not justice.

A compromise is brought into affinity with judgments.

Source: Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 571; Weisman, 64b

(English-origin maxim.) A settlement or compromise between parties is treated with the same finality as a judgment — once agreed, it binds the parties and cannot be reopened absent fraud or mistake.

Sentence is not given upon matters that are not clear.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 7, case 9; Weisman, 64k

(English-origin maxim.) A court will not render judgment on a matter that is unclear or unresolved — the facts must be sufficiently established before sentence can be pronounced.

Realities must dominate the judgment by a court.

Source: Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360; Weisman, 64q

(English-origin maxim.) A court must decide cases based on actual facts and real-world conditions, not abstract theories or artificial constructions — practical realities govern judicial outcomes.

Judgment in error is a judgment rendered by a court of error on a record sent up from an inferior court.

Source: Black's, 666; Weisman, 64r

(English-origin maxim.) A judgment in error is the decision of an appellate court reviewing the record of a lower court for legal mistakes — it is the mechanism by which errors of law are corrected.

That which appears not is not; and nothing appears judicially before judgment.

Quod non apparet non est ; et non apparet judicialiter ante judicium.

Source: 2 Inst; Weisman, 64t

What does not appear in the record does not exist for judicial purposes — nothing is judicially cognizable until it is properly presented and entered before the court.

Every act is to be judged by the intention of the doer.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 64u

(English-origin maxim.) The intention behind an act is the measure by which it is judged — the same outward conduct may be lawful or unlawful depending on the purpose that animated it.

Of [respecting] like things, [in like cases,] the judgment is to be the same.

Source: 7 Coke, 18; Weisman, 64hh

(English-origin maxim.) Like cases must receive like judgments — consistency in judicial decisions is essential to the rule of law, and similar facts demand similar outcomes.

The law does not define exactly, but trusts in the judgment of a good man.

Source: Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 475, 6 Am. Dec. 88; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 493; Weisman, 64ii

(English-origin maxim.) Where the law leaves a matter to discretion, it trusts the judgment of a reasonable and upright man — judicial discretion means sound judgment, not arbitrary will.

In nearly all penal judgments, immaturity of age and imbecility of mind are favored.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 108; Broom, Max. 314; Weisman, 64kk

(English-origin maxim.) In criminal sentencing, youth and mental incapacity are treated as mitigating factors — the law extends greater leniency to those whose age or condition diminishes their culpability.

It is improper to give judgment or pass sentence without looking at the whole case.

Source: Dig. 1, 3, 24; Hob. 171a; 8 Coke, 117b; Weisman, 64dd

(English-origin maxim.) A judge must examine the entirety of the evidence and law before rendering judgment — deciding on a partial view of the case is unjust.

The execution of law does no injury.

Executio juris non habet injuriam.

Source: 2 Rolle 301; Co. Litt. 289b; Weisman, 42e

When the law is properly applied and its judgments duly executed, no one can complain of injury — the enforcement of a lawful judgment is itself a lawful act.

Execution is the end and the fruit of the law.

Executio est finis et fructus legis.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; Bank of U.S. v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 51, 64; Weisman, 42b

The entire judicial process — pleading, trial, judgment — exists for one purpose: execution. A system that pronounces judgments but cannot enforce them is a system of words, not of law. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.13, 1.5.31.)

The effect of law consists in its execution.

Effectus legis in executione consistit.

Source: Co. Litt. 289b; Weisman, 42c; Weisman, 71ss

Law that is not enforced is law in name only — the real measure of any legal system is whether its judgments and decrees are carried into effect.

Executions are preferred to all other processes.

Executiones omni processu praeferuntur.

Source: Co. Litt. 287, 289

Once a judgment has been obtained, the writ of execution takes priority over other legal processes — the party who has prevailed is entitled to the fruits of his victory without further delay.

Where the prescribed form is not observed, the act is annulled.

Non observata forma, infertur adnullatio actus.

Source: 12 Co. 7; Co. Litt. 303a

Execution must follow the form prescribed by law — an execution conducted in violation of established procedure is void and conveys no rights.

When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself does not cease, but its enforcement may.

Cessante ratione legis, non cessat ipsa lex sed effectus.

Source: 4 Co. 38a; Broom, Max. 159

A law remains on the books even when circumstances change — but its practical enforcement depends on the continued existence of the conditions that gave rise to it.

Not only what is lawful, but what is fitting, must be considered; because nothing that is unfitting is lawful.

Non solum quid liceat, sed quid sit conveniens est considerandum; quia nihil quod est inconveniens est licitum.

Source: Co. Litt. 66a

In the execution of law, the manner matters as much as the authority — lawful power exercised in an oppressive or unreasonable fashion ceases to be lawful.

Non-enforcement does not abolish the law.

Desuetudo non tollit legem.

Source: Louisville & N. R.R. v. U.S., 282 U.S. 740, 759; Weisman, 42f

The failure to enforce a law does not repeal it — the law remains in force and may be invoked at any time, regardless of how long it has gone unenforced.

It is not enough that a sentence has been given unless it is committed to execution.

Parum est latam esse sententiam nisi mandetur executioni.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 289

A judgment without execution is an empty pronouncement — the law's work is not complete until its decrees are carried into effect.

Stand by decisions and do not disturb settled matters.

Stare decisis et non quieta movere.

Source: Johnson v. Western Union Tele. Co. (N.C.) 57 S.E. 122, 124; Co. Litt.; Broom, Max.

Stability in the law is essential to liberty — when courts reverse settled principles on every new occasion, no man can know his rights and no contract is secure.

We are to judge by laws, not by examples.

Non exemplis sed legibus judicandum est.

Source: 4 Co. 33b; 4 Bl. Comm. 405

Precedent is a guide, not a master — when a prior decision conflicts with the law itself, the law prevails and the precedent must yield.

Things introduced contrary to the reason of the law ought not to be drawn into precedent.

Quae contra rationem juris introducta sunt, non debent trahi in consequentiam.

Source: 12 Co. 75; Dig. 1, 3, 14; Dig. 50, 17; Weisman, 88e

An aberrant decision — one that contradicts established legal principles — should be confined to its facts and never extended to new cases.

Things accepted on account of necessity ought not to be drawn into precedent.

Quae propter necessitatem recepta sunt, non debent in argumentum trahi.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 162; Weisman, 83k; Weisman, 88g

Emergency measures are exceptions, not rules — what the law tolerates under extraordinary circumstances must not become the standard for ordinary times.

One absurdity being established, an infinity follows.

Uno absurdo dato, infinita sequuntur.

Source: 1 Co. 102; Weisman, 88i

A single bad precedent opens the door to endless subsequent errors — the first departure from sound principle must be corrected before it spawns a chain of injustice.

The old way is the safe way.

Via antiqua via est tuta.

Source: Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 223; 10 Co. 142; Weisman, 88j

Established practice, tested by time and experience, is more trustworthy than novel theory — innovation in the law should be approached with caution.

Antiquity did nothing without a good reason.

Antiquitas nihil fecit sine ratione bona.

Source: Co. Litt. 65; Weisman, 88l

Before discarding a longstanding legal principle, one should first understand why it was adopted — the presumption is that our predecessors acted wisely.

Later laws abrogate prior conflicting ones.

Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.

Source: Dig. 1, 4, 4; Broom, Max. 27, 29; 2 Rolle 410; Weisman, 88p

When a new statute directly conflicts with an earlier one, the later enactment prevails — but the repeal must be clear, not merely implied.

Let it be done as it has been accustomed to be done.

Fiat ut fieri consuevit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 116, case 39; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 88m

Established usage carries the force of law — courts should follow customary practice unless it has been shown to conflict with a higher principle.

It is perilous to introduce new and untried things.

Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas inducere.

Source: Co. Litt. 379a; Weisman, 88o

Legal innovation should be incremental and cautious — sweeping changes untested by experience risk undermining the settled expectations upon which all men have ordered their affairs.

A case omitted and forgotten is left to the disposal of the common law.

Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur.

Source: 5 Co. 87; Weisman, 99h

Where the legislature has failed to address a matter, the gap is not a void — the common law fills every silence. No court may supply what the statute omits; the common law already governs.

The latter decisions are stronger in law.

Judicia posteriora sunt in lege fortiora.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 8 Co. 97

In matters of procedure and statutory construction, the latest decision is presumed to carry greater weight, as it reflects the most deliberate consideration. This procedural presumption, however, does not license courts to depart from the original meaning of a constitution or statute — a later decision is not stronger merely for being later.

Faith or credit is to be given to the last decisions.

Judiciis posterioribus fides est adhibenda.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 13 Co. 14

Where prior and later decisions conflict on the same point, the later decision is given credit as the more considered statement of the law. This maxim does not validate judicial drift — a recent opinion that departs from original constitutional meaning is not thereby superior to an older one that faithfully applied it.

Precedents that pass sub silentio are of little or no authority.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 16 Vin. 499

(English-origin maxim.) A prior decision that did not actually consider or address the point in question carries no weight as precedent on that point — authority requires deliberate adjudication.

It is not a new thing that prior statutes shall give place to later ones.

Source: Dig. 1. 3. 26; 1. 1. 4; Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed 27; Weisman, 88a

(English-origin maxim.) Later statutes supersede earlier ones when they conflict — this is a longstanding principle, not a modern innovation, and applies whenever two laws cannot be harmonized.

Precedents have as much law as justice.

Source: Bouv. 149; Weisman, 88b

(English-origin maxim.) Precedents are only as authoritative as the justice underlying them — a precedent that embodies injustice has no more binding force than the flawed reasoning that produced it.

It is best not to unsettle things which are originally established.

Source: Green v. Hudson River R. Co., 28 Barb. (N.Y.) 91, 22; Weisman, 88c

(English-origin maxim.) Established legal principles should not be lightly disturbed — stability in the law is a value in itself, and settled rules should be overturned only for compelling reasons.

A particular case, left unprovided for by statute, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed prior to such statute.

Source: Broom, Max. 46; Weisman, 88d

(English-origin maxim.) When a statute fails to address a particular case, the pre-existing law governs — the silence of the legislature does not create a void but leaves the matter to the law as it stood before the statute.

We are to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettled things which are not established.

Source: Yates vs. Lansing, 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 395, 428; Moore vs. Lyons, 25 Wend. (N.Y.) 119, 142; Weisman, 88h

(English-origin maxim.) Courts should follow established precedents and avoid reliance on unsettled or novel propositions — stability and predictability in the law are essential to liberty.

Precedents are principles of law which are also conclusions, or decision in a cause; and not a process of reasoning or illustration or analogy.

Source: Rodwell v. Rowland, (N.C.) 50 S.E. 319, 327; Weisman, 88k

(English-origin maxim.) A precedent is a decision, not an argument — it establishes a principle of law by its holding, not by any reasoning, analogy, or illustration that may accompany it.