Maxim 1.5.294
The word "thing" has a general signification, because it comprehends corporeal and incorporeal objects, of whatever nature, sort, or species.
Source: 3 Inst. 182; Weisman, 95a
Difficulty 3/5 — Intermediate
Explanation
(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) "Thing" in law encompasses all species of property — tangible and intangible, real and personal — so a statute or grant referencing "things" or "property" is not limited to physical objects but includes rights, choses in action, and every form of legal interest.
Where this applies
- A statute taxes all 'things of value' transferred at death, and the court holds this includes not only land and goods but also patents, copyrights, and contractual rights.
- A grant of 'all my things' in a will is construed to include both the testator's furniture and his stock portfolio because 'thing' encompasses corporeal and incorporeal property.
- A lien statute applies to 'things' attached to real property, and the court rules it covers both physical fixtures and intangible rights like air rights or mineral rights.
Legal domains
Cite this maxim
NeCede Max. 1.5.294 — The word "thing" has a general signification, because it comprehends corporeal and incorporeal objects, of whatever nature, sort, or species. — 3 Inst. 182; Weisman, 95a
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