procedure

In those things which by common right are conceded to all, the custom of a particular district or place is not to be alleged.

Source: 11 Coke, 85; Weisman, 27a

(English-origin maxim.) A local custom cannot override a universal common-law right — cite this to defeat a municipality's claim that its local practice trumps a right available to all citizens by common right.

Custom is more powerful than grant.

Source: Black's, 907; Weisman, 27f

(English-origin maxim.) Long-established custom carries more authority than a written grant — invoke this when a customary right predates and conflicts with a later conveyance or statutory license.

Things which are done contrary to the custom and usage of our ancestors neither please nor appear right.

Source: 4 Coke, 78; Weisman, 27j

(English-origin maxim.) Innovations that contradict established ancestral practice are presumptively disfavored — cite this to challenge novel government procedures that depart from long-standing customary due process of law.

The antiquity of a custom is to be less regarded than its reasonableness.

Source: Co. Litt. 141a; Weisman, 27p

(English-origin maxim.) A custom's validity rests on its reasonableness, not merely its age — even an ancient custom may be struck down if it is unreasonable, and a newer custom sustained if it is sound.

General customs are such as prevail throughout a country and become the law of that country.

Source: Bodfish v. Fox, 23 Me. 95; Weisman, 27q

(English-origin maxim.) Customs observed uniformly throughout a country become part of its law — cite this to establish that a nationwide practice carries binding legal force even without a statute.

A custom of the truest antiquity is to be retained.

Source: 4 Coke, 78; Weisman, 27v

(English-origin maxim.) A custom of proven antiquity should be preserved and enforced — use this to defend a longstanding practice against legislative or administrative attempts to abolish it.

A court of equity ought to do justice completely and not by halves.

Source: Rice & Adams Corp. v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509, 515; Weisman, 36a

(English-origin maxim.) When equity takes jurisdiction of a cause, it must grant complete relief — a court cannot resolve part of the dispute and leave the rest, as half-justice is no justice at all.

The civil law is what a people establishes for itself.

Source: Inst. 1, 2, 1; Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 424, 426; Weisman, 36h

(English-origin maxim.) The civil law derives its authority from the consent of the people who adopt it — a statute imposed without the people's consent lacks the character of true law.

In the court of chancery ( equity) a man shall not be prejudiced by his mispleading, or defect of form, but according to the truth of the matter; for the decision should be made according to conscience and not according to the rigor of law.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 36f

(English-origin maxim.) Equity looks to substance, not form — a party's right to be heard on the merits cannot be defeated by a technical pleading defect, because the court of conscience is bound to reach the truth of the matter rather than punish imperfect procedure.

Laws derived from the pure source of equity and justice must be founded on the consent of those whose obedience they require.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 36s

(English-origin maxim.) No law is legitimate unless it rests on the consent of the governed — invoke this maxim to challenge any regulation, ordinance, or statute imposed upon the People without their genuine consent, as all just authority flows upward from the sovereign People, not downward from government.

All the powers, being derived from equity, are, even in a court of law, to be construed equitably.

Source: Wharton, III-14

(English-origin maxim.) Even in a court of law, powers derived from equity must be construed equitably — a party may invoke equitable principles to temper the rigid application of a legal power.

Courts of equity delight to do justice, and that not by halves.

Source: Wharton, III-58

(English-origin maxim.) Equity will not stop at half-measures — once a court of conscience undertakes a cause, it must fashion a remedy that fully resolves the matter rather than leaving parties in continuing dispute.

Equitable relief will not be granted to a suitor unless he comes into court with clean hands.

Source: Tripp v. Cook; Wharton, III-84

(English-origin maxim.) A party seeking equitable relief must come to court with clean hands — if the plaintiff has acted inequitably regarding the subject matter of the suit, the court will deny the requested relief.

Equity regards whatever is ordered to be done by one having authority, or what ought to be done, as actually done.

Source: Wharton, III-88

(English-origin maxim.) Equity treats an act that should have been performed as though it was performed — invoke this to enforce obligations that a party was duty-bound to complete but neglected.

Wherever persons agree concerning any particular subject, that, in a court of equity, as against the party himself and any claiming under him voluntarily or with notice, raises a trust.

Source: Wharton, III-384

(English-origin maxim.) When parties agree on a matter, equity will enforce that agreement as a trust against the promisor and anyone claiming under him with notice — this is the foundation of constructive trusts arising from consensual dealings.

Voidable imports a valid act which may be avoided, rather than an invalid act which may be confirmed as such.

Source: Rothberg v. Schmiedeskamp, 134 N.E.2d 544, 546, 334 Mass. 172; Weisman, 62j

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A voidable contract or conveyance stands until the injured party elects to rescind — unlike a void act, it confers rights and imposes duties unless and until affirmatively set aside.

Things shall not be void which may possibly be good.

Source: Bouv. 160; Weisman, 62k

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Courts will construe instruments to sustain their validity wherever possible — a deed or statute that admits of a lawful interpretation will not be declared void when it can be given effect.

Time cannot render valid an act void in its origin.

Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescit.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 29; Weisman, 62l; 4 Co. 2; Bouvier, Max.

No amount of passage of time, acquiescence, or subsequent ratification can cure a jurisdictional defect or an act that was void from inception — an unconstitutional statute does not become constitutional through long enforcement.

He who concedes anything is considered as conceding that without which his concession would be void; or without which the thing itself could not exist.

Qui concedit aliquid concedere videtur et id sine quo concessio est irrita, sine quo res ipsa esse non potuit.

Source: 11 Coke, 52; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 8; Weisman, 62n; Weisman, 4b

A grant implies everything necessary for its enjoyment — a grant of land implies access, a corporate charter implies by-law power, and a delegation of authority carries with it all powers indispensable to its exercise.

A thing which has no effect in law is not an impediment.

Source: Jenk. Cent. Cas. 162; Wing. Max. 727; Weisman, 71b

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A legally void condition, clause, or act cannot obstruct a valid proceeding — a void statute cannot bar an otherwise lawful exercise of right, nor can a defective appointment prevent the office from functioning.

Things favorably considered in law are the treasury, dower, life, and liberty.

Favorabilia in lege sunt fiscus, dos, vita, libertas.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 94; Co. Litt. 341; Weisman, 71c

When a statute or instrument is ambiguous, courts construe it in favor of life, liberty, a widow's dower, and the public fisc — these four interests receive the most favorable presumption at common law.

Law is from everlasting.

Lex est ab aeterno.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 34, case 66; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 71d; Bouvier, Max.

The common law is not a legislative creation but a reflection of eternal principles of justice; no parliament or legislature can claim to have invented rights that pre-exist all positive enactment.

Law is established for the benefit of man.

Hominum causa jus constitutum est.

Source: Black's, 2d. 577; Weisman, 71i

All law exists to serve and protect the People, not to aggrandize government — any construction of a statute that benefits the state at the expense of the individual inverts the purpose of law itself.

The wisdom of the law cannot be valued by money.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 168; Weisman, 71k

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) The principles of justice embedded in the common law transcend monetary valuation — a court cannot put a price on the rule of law itself, nor can damages adequately compensate for the destruction of legal principle.

Law is made to prevent the stronger from having the power to do everything.

Source: Dav. Ir. K.B. 36; Weisman, 71l

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) The law exists as a check on power — government and the powerful may act only within their delegated authority, and the common law protects the weak against the encroachments of the strong.

An act of law shall prejudice no man.

Actus legis nemini facit injuriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 287; Hob. 216; 5 Term, 381, 385; Van Brunt v. Schenck, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 380; Weisman, 71r

When the operation of law itself causes a consequence — such as the vesting of an estate by descent or the merger of legal interests — no party is deemed injured, because the law cannot work injustice by its own necessary action. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.1, 7.4.6.)

Law disfavors improbabilities or impossibilities.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 620, max. 161; p. 606, max. 155; Weisman, 71t

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Courts will not construe a statute or contract to require something impossible or wildly improbable — an interpretation that leads to absurdity is presumed not to have been intended.

Law favors honor and order.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 739, max. 199; Weisman, 71w

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Courts presume that parties acted honorably and in good order — ambiguous acts are construed in favor of lawful conduct, and the law upholds established hierarchies of jurisdiction and authority.

Law favors life, liberty, and dower.

Source: 4 Bacon's Works, 345; Weisman, 71x; Weisman, 71v; Weisman, 89d

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) In every doubtful case, the construction that preserves life, protects liberty, or secures a widow's dower is preferred — these are the interests the common law guards most jealously.

Law favors speeding of men's causes.

Source: Wing. Max. max. 175; Weisman, 71y

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Justice delayed is justice denied — courts should resolve disputes expeditiously, and procedural rules are construed to advance rather than obstruct the prompt determination of cases.

Law favors truth, faith, and certainty.

Source: Wing. Max. max. 154; Weisman, 71z

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Courts construe instruments to uphold truth over falsehood, good faith over bad faith, and certainty over ambiguity — the law rewards honest dealing and clear expression.

The torture or wresting of Laws is the worst kind of torture.

Source: 4 Bacon's Works, 434; Weisman, 71ii

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Twisting a law to punish the innocent or to reach a result it was never designed to achieve is a greater injustice than any physical compulsion — cite this when government distorts a statute beyond its plain meaning to justify an overreach.

Things which are found within the reason of a law are supposed to be within the law itself.

Source: 2 Inst. 689; Weisman, 71qq

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Whatever falls within the spirit and purpose of a law is governed by it, even if not expressly named — a statute prohibiting fraud covers schemes not specifically enumerated if they fall within the mischief the law was enacted to remedy.

He does contrary to the law who does what the law prohibits; he acts in fraud of the law who, the letter of the law being inviolate, uses the law contrary to its intention.

Contra legem facit qui id facit quod lex prohibet; in fraudem vero qui, salvis verbis legis, sententiam ejus circumvenit.

Source: Dig. 1, 3, 29; Weisman, 72a

Compliance with the letter of a statute while subverting its purpose is as unlawful as open violation — cite this against schemes that technically satisfy statutory language but defeat the law's protective intent.

There is something more perfect in things allowed.

Source: Hob. 159; Weisman, 72d

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A lawful act carries greater weight and perfection than one merely tolerated or overlooked — rights exercised with affirmative legal sanction stand on stronger ground than those existing by sufferance alone.

Where there is no authority to establish, there is no necessity to obey.

Source: Dav. 69; Bouv. 160; Weisman, 72e; Weisman, 11i

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) An act of government made without constitutional authority imposes no obligation on the People — cite this to challenge any regulation, order, or mandate for which no delegated power can be shown.

Laws should bind their own maker.

Patere legem quam ipse tulisti.

Source: Fleta, lib. 1, c. 17, s. 11; Weisman, 72f

A legislature is bound by the laws it enacts — government officers cannot exempt themselves from statutes that bind the People, and any claim of sovereign immunity must yield to the principle that the lawmaker is the first subject of the law.

Law is a general rule of adherence to external acts.

Source: Black's, 700; Weisman, 72g

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) The law governs outward conduct, not private thought — a man's intentions are judged by his acts, and legal obligations attach to what is done or omitted, not to what is merely contemplated.

He who adheres to the letter of the law adheres to its bark.

Qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; 5 Coke, 4b; 11 Coke, 34b; 12 East, 372; Weisman, 72j

A purely literal reading of a statute that ignores its purpose and reason grasps only the surface — courts must look to the spirit and intent of the law, not merely its words, to reach a just construction. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.21.)

The word "thing" has a general signification, because it comprehends corporeal and incorporeal objects, of whatever nature, sort, or species.

Source: 3 Inst. 182; Weisman, 95a

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) "Thing" in law encompasses all species of property — tangible and intangible, real and personal — so a statute or grant referencing "things" or "property" is not limited to physical objects but includes rights, choses in action, and every form of legal interest.

Every general principle [or maxim of law] is its own pledge or warrant; and things that are clearly true are not to be proved.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Co. Litt. 11; Weisman, 95b

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A maxim of law requires no external proof — it is self-authenticating authority that a court may take judicial notice of without supporting evidence, and an opponent cannot demand that a party "prove" a fundamental legal axiom.

From nothing nothing comes.

Ex nihilo nihil fit.

Source: Jackson v. Waldron, 13 Wend. (N.Y.) 178, 221; Root v. Stuyvesant, 18 Wend. (N.Y.) 257, 301; Weisman, 95d; Wharton, III-98

A right, title, or obligation cannot be built upon a nullity — if the foundational act, instrument, or authority is void, everything that purports to derive from it falls with it.

There is no reasoning of principles; no argument is required to prove fundamental rules.

Source: 2 Bulst. 239; Weisman, 95f

(English-origin maxim.) First principles of law — such as the right to life, liberty, and property — need no proof or demonstration; they are self-evident axioms upon which all other legal reasoning depends.

The principle ( or beginning) of anything is the most powerful part of a thing.

Source: 10 Coke, 49; Weisman, 95g

(English-origin maxim.) The origin or foundation of a right, grant, or obligation controls its entire subsequent operation — challenge the root and the whole structure falls.

In conjunctives each part must be true.

Source: Wing. Max. 13; Weisman, 95l

(English-origin maxim.) Where a statute, contract, or condition joins requirements with "and," every element must be satisfied — failure of any one part defeats the whole.

The omission of those things which are tacitly implied is of no consequence.

Source: 2 Bulst. 131; Weisman, 95n; Weisman, 43i

(English-origin maxim.) An instrument is not defective merely because it fails to state what the law already implies — implied terms and conditions are read in as though expressly written.

That shall be preserved which is useful in the beginning.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 23; Bract. 73b; Weisman, 95o

(English-origin maxim.) A provision, grant, or right that served a lawful purpose at its inception should be maintained and enforced rather than discarded by later construction.

Everything contains the element of its own destruction.

Source: 2 Inst. 15; Weisman, 95r

(English-origin maxim.) Every grant of authority carries inherent limits — the very conditions that create a power also define the circumstances under which that power expires or is forfeited.

Multiplicity and indistinctness produce confusion; and questions, the more simple they are, the more lucid.

Source: Hob. 335; Weisman, 95v

(English-origin maxim.) Legal pleadings, instruments, and questions should be framed with simplicity and precision — complexity and vagueness obscure truth and defeat justice.

What is in suspense is considered as not existing during such suspense.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 169, 1; Weisman, 95w

(English-origin maxim.) A right, title, or obligation that is contingent or undetermined has no present legal effect — it cannot be enforced, transferred, or relied upon until the condition resolves.

A consequence should not be drawn from another consequence.

Source: Bouv. 121; Bacon,Aph; Weisman, 95x

(English-origin maxim.) Legal reasoning must proceed from established facts or settled principles, not from inferences stacked upon other inferences — a chain of speculation does not constitute proof.

Not only what is permitted, but what is convenient, is to be considered, because what is inconvenient is illegal.

Source: Co. Litt. 66a; Weisman, 95y

(English-origin maxim.) In construing laws and grants, an interpretation that produces absurd or impracticable results must be rejected in favor of one that operates reasonably and conveniently.

Precision and certainty are often of more importance to the rules of law than their abstract justice.

Source: 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 598, 602; Weisman, 95cc

(English-origin maxim.) Settled and predictable rules — even if imperfect in individual cases — serve the public better than rules that bend to abstract fairness, because certainty allows men to order their affairs.

The greater number contains in itself the less also.

Source: Bract. fol. 16; Dig. 50, 17, 110; Broom, Max. 174; 5 Coke, 115; Jenk. Cent. 208; Bouv. 124; Weisman, 95ii

(English-origin maxim.) A grant or power that encompasses the greater necessarily includes the lesser — one who may convey the whole may convey a part, and one authorized to do the major act may do the minor.

The mind submits reluctantly to the rule of Law.

Source: Hannay v. Eve, 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 242, 247; Weisman, 95mm

(English-origin maxim.) Human nature resists legal constraint, which is precisely why the law must be clear, certain, and firmly enforced — the rule of law exists because men will not voluntarily govern themselves by it.

A thing void ab initio is one that never went into effect.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 62i

(English-origin maxim.) An act, contract, or proceeding that was void from its inception has no legal force at any point — it cannot be ratified, cured, or given effect by lapse of time.

Void in part, void in toto.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 62m

(English-origin maxim.) Where a material part of an instrument or act is void, the entire instrument or act fails — the law will not sever and enforce only the valid portions when the void portion is essential to the whole.

An unconstitutional Act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

Source: Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Weisman, 62p

(English-origin maxim.) Any statute that exceeds the constitutional grant of authority to the legislature is a nullity from the moment of its purported enactment — no citizen is bound to obey it, no officer may enforce it, and no office or right created under it has lawful existence.

The indefinite equals the universal.

Indefinitum equipollet universali.

Source: Wharton, II-258

A grant, statute, or declaration that uses indefinite language without limitation is construed as applying universally — an unrestricted term covers all persons, things, or cases within its class.

The court has nothing to do with what is not before it.

Nihil habet forum ex scena.

Source: Wharton, II-507

A court may only adjudicate matters properly brought before it in the case at bar — it has no authority to reach out and decide questions not raised by the parties or presented in the pleadings.

A party may waive the benefit of any condition or provision made in his behalf, no matter in what manner it may have been made or secured.

Source: Wharton, III-25

(English-origin maxim.) A right or protection established for an individual's benefit may be voluntarily relinquished by that individual, but the waiver must be knowing and intentional — no one else can waive it on his behalf without authority.

A thing that is within the letter of a statute, is not within the statute, unless it be within the intention of the law makers.

Source: Wharton, III-32

(English-origin maxim.) The literal text of a statute does not control if the act in question falls outside the legislature's actual purpose — courts must look to the intent behind the law, not merely its words.

An estimate of the value must be made when a part is lost by eviction.

Bonitatis aestimationem faciendam cum pars evincitur.

Source: Wharton, III-41

When a buyer is dispossessed of part of what he purchased because a superior title prevails, the value of what was lost must be assessed at the time of eviction so that the buyer may recover his just compensation.

A final judgment which contains neither condemnation nor acquittal is not held to be just.

Definitiva sententia quae condemnationem vel absolutionem non continet, pro justa non habetur.

Source: Wharton, III-69

A court's final judgment must resolve the matter definitively by either condemning or acquitting — a judgment that leaves the parties in limbo, deciding nothing, is no judgment at all and may be challenged as a nullity.

The times must be distinguished.

Distinguenda sunt tempora.

Source: Wharton, III-74; Weisman, 100h

In construing statutes, contracts, and rights, the time period matters — what was lawful at one time may be unlawful at another, and the applicable law is determined by the time of the act.

The mandate is extinguished when the will of the mandator has ended.

Extinctum est mandatum, finita voluntate.

Source: Wharton, III-106

An agency or authority granted by one person to another ceases automatically when the grantor revokes his consent, dies, or otherwise terminates his will — the agent's power does not survive the principal's authority.

If an affirmative statute, which is introductive of a new law, direct a thing to be done in a certain manner, that thing shall not, even although there are no negative words, be done in any other manner.

Source: Cook v. Kelley, 12 Abb. Pr. 35, 36; Wharton, III-131

(English-origin maxim.) When a statute prescribes a specific method for performing an act, that method is exclusive — compliance by any other means is invalid even though the statute contains no express prohibition of alternatives.

Residence establishes domicile.

Incolas domicilium facit.

Source: Wharton, III-137

A person's actual dwelling place, where he habitually resides with intent to remain, fixes his legal domicile for purposes of jurisdiction, taxation, and civil status.

The most unjust peace is to be preferred to the most just war.

Iniquissima pax est anteponenda justissimo bello.

Source: Wharton, III-142

The law favors settlement and compromise over litigation — even an imperfect resolution by agreement is preferred to the destruction, expense, and uncertainty of protracted legal combat.

So the law is written.

Ita lex scripta est.

Source: Wharton, III-153

Where the written law is clear and unambiguous, courts must apply it as written without adding to it or subtracting from it — the plain text governs, however harsh the result may seem.

Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things divine and human.

Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia.

Source: Wharton, III-161

True knowledge of the law encompasses both divine law (the moral order established by the Creator) and human law (the civil order established by men) — a jurisprudence that ignores either is incomplete.

The highest law is often the greatest wrong.

Jus summum saepe summa est malitia.

Source: Wharton, III-164

Rigid, literal enforcement of a legal rule without regard to equity or circumstance can produce gross injustice — the law must be tempered by reason, and courts of equity exist precisely to prevent the letter of the law from becoming an instrument of oppression.

Every man is free to determine for himself whether counsel is advantageous to him.

Liberum est cuique apud se explorare an expediat sibi consilium.

Source: Wharton, III-175

No person may be compelled to accept legal counsel against his will — the right to represent oneself (sui juris) is inherent, and the decision whether to seek or follow advice belongs solely to the individual.

The written letter remains.

Litera scripta manet.

Source: Wharton, III-176

Written instruments — contracts, deeds, statutes, constitutions — endure as evidence and bind the parties long after oral promises are forgotten; what is reduced to writing is the controlling record.

A guardian ought not to make profit from the guardianship of his ward.

Lucrum facere ex pupilli tutela tutor non debet.

Source: Wharton, III-178

A fiduciary entrusted with the care of another's person or property — whether guardian, trustee, or public officer — must never use that position for personal gain; any profit derived from the trust belongs to the beneficiary.

The moment of death is the last moment of life.

Mortis momentum est ultimum vitae momentum.

Source: Wharton, III-186

For purposes of inheritance, vesting of rights, and survival of actions, a person is treated as alive until the instant of death — rights that depend on survivorship are determined at that precise moment.

No one is bound by counsel.

Nemo ex consilio obligatur.

Source: Wharton, III-196; Weisman, 77k; Weisman, 84k

Mere advice, whether from an attorney, officer, or any other person, creates no legal obligation on the recipient — a man is bound only by his own acts, contracts, and the operation of law, not by another's opinion.

No partner can alienate more than his own share, even if they are partners in all goods.

Nemo ex sociis plus parte sua potest alienare, etsi totorum bonorum socii sint.

Source: Wharton, III-197

A co-owner or partner may dispose of only his own interest in the common property — he cannot convey, encumber, or destroy the shares belonging to his fellow partners without their consent.

An example does nothing which resolves one dispute by another dispute.

Nil agit exemplum, litem quod lite resolvit.

Source: Wharton, III-203

Citing a contested or uncertain precedent to settle a legal question is no resolution at all — authority relied upon must itself be settled, or the original dispute remains unresolved.

Nothing in vain.

Nil frustra.

Source: Newell v. Wheeler; Wharton, III-205

The law does nothing in vain — every word in a statute, constitution, or instrument is presumed to have meaning and effect, and no provision should be construed as superfluous or idle.

It is not proper to surrender men when the cause has not been heard.

Non decet homines dedere causa non cognita.

Source: Wharton, III-217

No person may be delivered up to punishment, extradition, or forfeiture of liberty without first having his cause examined — due process of law requires that the matter be heard before any surrender of the person.

No statute is to have a retrospect beyond the time of its commencement.

Source: People ex rel. Peake; Wharton, III-222

(English-origin maxim.) Statutes operate prospectively only — a law cannot reach back to punish or alter rights that were vested before its enactment.

Once a mortgage always a mortgage.

Source: Wharton, III-243

(English-origin maxim.) A transaction that is in substance a mortgage cannot be converted into an absolute conveyance by any device of the parties — equity will always permit the mortgagor to redeem, regardless of the form of the instrument.

The punishment may be remitted, but the guilt remains forever.

Poena potest tolli, culpa perennis erit.

Source: Houghtaling v. Kelderhouse, 1 Park. Cr. 241, 242; Wharton, III-252

A pardon removes the penalty but does not erase the underlying wrongful act — the fact of guilt persists regardless of whether punishment is enforced.

A presumption arises from what usually happens.

Praesumptio ex eo quod plerumque fit.

Source: Wharton, III-256

Courts may presume facts based on the ordinary course of events — what commonly occurs is taken as the standard until rebutted by contrary evidence.

The offspring follows the condition of the father.

Proles sequitur sortem paternam.

Source: Wharton, III-258

In questions of status, descent, and inheritance, the child's condition follows the father's — applied in determining legitimacy, citizenship, and rights of inheritance.

Things which individually do not avail, taken together are helpful.

Quae singula non prosunt, juncta juvant.

Source: Hendricks v. Robinson; Wharton, III-261

Pieces of evidence that are individually insufficient may collectively establish a fact — the whole is greater than the sum of its parts in matters of proof.

When what I do is not valid as I do it, let it be valid to the extent that it can be.

Quando quod ago non valeat ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.

Source: Wharton, III-267

An act or instrument that fails in its intended form should be upheld to whatever extent the law permits — the court will give it the greatest effect possible rather than void it entirely.

He who excuses himself accuses himself.

Qui s'excuse s'accuse.

Source: Wharton, III-279

An unsolicited defense or excuse raises suspicion of guilt — one who volunteers justifications before being accused invites the inference that he knows his conduct requires justification.

He who has written himself heir.

Qui se scripsit haeredem.

Source: Wharton, III-281; Weisman, 12e; Weisman, 104g

One who names himself as heir in an instrument he has drafted is regarded with suspicion — a man cannot be the author of his own entitlement to another's estate.

In whatever manner he wishes, in whatever manner he can.

Quocumque modo velit, quocumque modo possit.

Source: Wharton, III-284

A man may dispose of his own property or exercise his own rights by any lawful means he chooses — the law does not prescribe the method where the right itself is established.

That which is granted or reserved in a certain form is not to be drawn into valuation or compensation.

Quod sub certa forma concessum vel reservatum est, non trahitur ad valorem vel compensationem.

Source: Ex parte Miller, 2 Hill 418, 433; Wharton, III-288

When a grant or reservation is made in a specific form, it must be honored in that form — the grantee cannot substitute a money equivalent or different consideration for what was specifically granted.

By rendering each to each.

Reddendo singula singulis.

Source: Wharton, III-295

A rule of construction: when a sentence contains multiple subjects and multiple predicates, each is to be applied to its corresponding counterpart — distributing the words to their proper referents.

A matter adjudged.

Res adjudicata.

Source: Snyder v. Trumpbour, 38 N.Y. 355, 361; Angel v. Hollister, Id. 378, 35 Barb. 308; Wharton, III-298; Weisman, 64x; Weisman, 64y

A matter finally decided on its merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties and cannot be relitigated — the judgment stands as law between them.

A thing sold in good faith ought not to be rescinded on account of a trifling cause.

Res bona fide vendita, propter minimam causam inempta fieri non debet.

Source: Wharton, III-299; Weisman, 50

Good faith sales are not to be undone for minor defects — the law favors the stability of completed transactions and will not set aside a sale for an insignificant reason.

The tie of blood binds men together in benevolence and affection.

Sanguinis conjunctio benevolentia devincit homines et caritate.

Source: Wharton, III-306

The bond of kinship creates natural obligations of care and loyalty — the law recognizes and protects family ties as a foundation of civil society.

The custom of the place where the action is brought must be observed.

Servanda est consuetudo loci ubi causa agitur.

Source: Wharton, III-312; Weisman, 27o

Local custom governs where it is established — courts apply the usage of the place where the matter arises, not the customs of a foreign jurisdiction.

If there is a partnership in any matter and the business is concluded, the partnership is ended.

Si alicujus rei societas sit, et finis negotio impositus est, finitur societas.

Source: Griswold v. Waddington; Wharton, III-313

A partnership formed for a specific purpose terminates when that purpose is accomplished — the venture's completion dissolves the association by operation of law.

Thus I will, thus I command.

Sic volo, sic jubeo.

Source: Wharton, III-315

Attributed to arbitrary power — the assertion of naked will without reason. The maxim is cited to condemn tyrannical commands that rest on authority alone rather than on law and reason.

Will stands in place of reason.

Stat pro ratione voluntas.

Source: Wharton, III-326

In matters of testamentary disposition, the testator's will is itself the reason — he need not justify his bequests. In matters of government, the maxim is cited as a condemnation: where will replaces reason, tyranny begins.

Every bond is dissolved by the same bond by which it was bound.

Unumquodque ligamen dissolvitur eodem ligamine quo ligatur.

Source: Wharton, III-356

An obligation is released by the same formality that created it — a contract under seal is discharged by a release under seal, a debt by payment, a vow by fulfillment.

A word in the imperfect tense signifies a thing still incomplete.

Verbum imperfecti temporis rem adhuc imperfectam significat.

Source: Wharton, III-366

In construing instruments and statutes, verb tense matters — the imperfect tense indicates an action or state that was ongoing and not yet completed at the relevant time.

It appears that one who is deaf and mute cannot make an alienation.

Videtur qui surdus et mutus ne poet faire alienation.

Source: Wharton, III-369

At common law, a person who could neither hear nor speak was presumed to lack the capacity to convey property, because alienation requires the expression of informed consent.

It gathers strength as it goes.

Vires acquirit eundo.

Source: Wharton, III-371

Applied to custom, precedent, and reputation — a principle or practice gains authority through continued and consistent observance over time.

Void things are as no things.

Source: Wharton, III-373

(English-origin maxim.) That which is void has no legal existence — it creates no rights, imposes no duties, and cannot be ratified or validated by the passage of time.

The voice once uttered flies away, the written letter remains.

Vox emissa volat, litera scripta manet.

Source: Wharton, III-375

Spoken words vanish; written instruments endure — the law therefore favors written evidence over oral testimony, and a written contract over a verbal agreement. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.39.)

One who grants a thing is presumed to grant also whatever is essential to its use.

Cuicunque aliquis quid concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest.

Source: Sterricker v. Dickinson, 9 Barb. 518; Troup v. Hurlbut, 10 Id. 359; People v. Hicks, 15 Id. 160; Seymour v. Canandaigua R.R. Co., 25 Id. 310; Wharton, III-B-13

A grant of land surrounded by the grantor's other land implies a right of way over that land. A corporate charter implies the power to make by-laws. Whatever is necessary to enjoy what was granted is considered granted as well.

Where one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he by whose negligence it happened must be the sufferer.

Source: Sandford v. Handy, 3 Wend. 368; Koot v. French, 13 Id. 573; Griswold v. Haven, 35 N.Y. 595; Exchange Bank v. Monteath, 26 N.Y. 505, 513; Wharton, III-B-34

(English-origin maxim.) Between two innocent parties, the loss falls on the one whose negligence enabled the wrong — applied independently of agency law.

Law respects matter of substance more than matter of circumstance.

Source: Wing. Max. 382, max. 101; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 39; Weisman, 71aa

(English-origin maxim.) Substance prevails over form — the law looks to the essential nature of a transaction rather than its incidental details or procedural trappings.

Extremities, or mere subtleties of law, are not rules of law.

Source: Co. Litt. 304b; 10 Coke, 126; Wing. Max. 19, max. 14; Broom, Max. 188; Weisman, 71hh

(English-origin maxim.) Hyper-technical readings and extreme extensions of legal rules are not themselves law — the law does not reward those who push principles beyond their reasonable scope.

The law does not care for, or recognize, very small or trifling matters.

Source: Hob. 88; C.L.M.; Weisman, 71kk

(English-origin maxim.) De minimis non curat lex — the law will not concern itself with trivial matters. A fractional error, an insignificant deviation, a negligible harm will not sustain an action.

Laws are imposed, not upon words, but upon things.

Source: 10 Coke, 101; Branch, Princ.; Code 6, 43, 2; Weisman, 71n

(English-origin maxim.) Law governs substance, not labels — the legal effect of an act depends on what it actually is, not on what the parties choose to call it.

The disposition of the law is more equitable than that of man.

Source: 8 Coke, 152; Weisman, 71tt

(English-origin maxim.) The law, when allowed to operate according to its settled principles, produces more just results than the arbitrary discretion of any individual.

An ambassador fills the place of the king by whom he is sent, and is to be honoured as he is whose place he fills.

Legatus regis vice fungitur a quo destinatur et honorandus est sicut ille cujus vicem gerit.

Source: 12 Co. 17; Jackson; Weisman, 51f

An ambassador or delegate acts in the name and with the authority of the one who sent him — an affront to the delegate is an affront to the principal.

Mistaken notions about one's legal rights are not sufficient to bar prosecution for crime.

Source: Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 238; Weisman, 77m

(English-origin maxim.) A person's mistaken belief about his legal rights does not excuse criminal conduct — ignorance of the law is no defense, even when the defendant sincerely believed he was within his rights.

The law favors common right.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 547, max. 144; Weisman, 82r; Weisman, 82f

(English-origin maxim.) When a statute or grant is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the common right of all the people rather than in favor of a private or exclusive privilege.

A right not vested in a person living, but merely exists in the consideration and contemplation of law, is said to be in abeyance.

Source: Co. Litt. 342; Weisman, 86h

(English-origin maxim.) A right that is not yet vested in any living person but exists in contemplation of law is said to be in abeyance — it is not destroyed but merely suspended until a person qualifies to receive it.

No man ought to be affected in his rights by the judgment or decree of any court, without an opportunity of being previously heard in his own defense.

Source: Wharton, III-208

(English-origin maxim.) Due process of law requires that no person's rights be taken or diminished by any judgment or decree without the opportunity to be heard in his own defense — a judgment entered without notice and hearing is void.

Jurisdiction is the power to declare the law; and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.

Source: Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18; Weisman, 66f

(English-origin maxim.) When a court loses jurisdiction over a matter, its only remaining function is to announce that fact and dismiss the case — any order entered after jurisdiction ceases is void.

The grant of jurisdiction implies the grant of all powers necessary to its exercise.

Source: 1 Kent, Comm. 339; Dig. 2, 1, 2; Weisman, 66h

(English-origin maxim.) A court that has been granted jurisdiction over a subject matter possesses all incidental powers necessary to exercise that jurisdiction effectively, without needing a separate grant for each power.

Whoever has an ordinary jurisdiction is ordinary of that place.

Source: Co. Litt. 344; Weisman, 66k

(English-origin maxim.) The holder of ordinary jurisdiction over a place is the recognized judicial authority there — cite this to establish which court or officer has inherent jurisdiction over a locale.

Decisions are, as it were, jurisdictions.

Source: Halk. Max. 73; Weisman, 66n

(English-origin maxim.) Judicial decisions effectively define the boundaries and substance of jurisdiction — each decision is an exercise of jurisdictional power and in turn shapes the scope of that power for future cases.

Women are not admissible to public offices.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 237; Dig. 50, 17, 2; 1 Exch. 645; 6 Mees. & W. 216; Weisman, 76l

(English-origin maxim.) Historical maxim — this rule has been abrogated across all American jurisdictions. At common law, women were excluded from holding public office. Note: the Nineteenth Amendment (1920) secured the right to *vote*, not the right to hold office; the exclusion from office was overturned through state constitutional amendments, legislation, and judicial decisions independent of the Nineteenth Amendment.

Capacity relates to soundness of mind or a mind that has full and intelligent knowledge of an act engaged in.

Source: In re Null's Estate, 153 A. 137, 139, 302 Pa. 64; Weisman, 76m

(English-origin maxim.) When challenging the validity of a contract, deed, or will, invoke this maxim to argue that the party lacked the mental competence to understand the nature and consequences of the act.

No one can claim another's status as his own merely because he wishes it.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 76k

(English-origin maxim.) Legal status — whether sui juris, citizen, officer, or any other recognized standing — is determined by law and fact, not by mere assertion or desire. Invoke this to challenge a party who claims an authority, privilege, or standing to which the law has not entitled him.

The crime carries the person.

Crimen trahit personam.

Source: Wharton, III-60; Weisman, 26w

Invoke this maxim to establish that criminal jurisdiction attaches to the person of the offender — wherever the accused is found, the court with jurisdiction over the crime may reach him.

A municipality and a decuria function in the place of a person.

Personae vice fungitur municipium et decuria.

Source: Wharton, III-251

A municipality acts in the capacity of a legal person and may hold rights, incur obligations, and appear in court — but only through its duly authorized officers acting within their delegated power.

Some persons are of their own right; some are subject to the right of another.

Quaedam personae sui juris sunt, quaedam alicui juri subjectae.

Source: Wharton, III-259

This maxim distinguishes those who hold full legal autonomy (sui juris) from those under another's authority (alieni juris), such as minors under a parent or wards under a guardian — the distinction determines who may bind himself by contract or appear in his own name.

Seals and statues affixed to a house are not counted among the furnishings of the house, but are part of the house itself.

Sigilla et statuae affixae instrumento domus non continentur, sed domus portio sunt.

Source: Wharton, III-316

Fixtures permanently attached to a building — such as seals, statues, or other ornaments affixed to the structure — pass with the conveyance of the building itself and need not be separately mentioned in the deed.

Where one of two innocent persons must suffer by the wrong of another, the one who enables such other to commit the wrong must bear the consequences.

Source: Wharton, III-382

(English-origin maxim.) When a third party's wrong injures one of two innocent persons, the loss falls on the one whose act or omission enabled the wrongdoer — invoke this to shift liability to the party who created the opportunity for the fraud or trespass.

When the rights of the king and of the subject concur, those of the king are to be preferred.

Quando jus domini regis et subditi concurrunt jus regis praeferri debet.

Source: 9 Co. 129; Jackson

Where the sovereign and a subject hold competing claims to the same right or property, the sovereign's claim takes precedence — though in the American system this principle is constrained by the constitutional reservation of rights to the People.

Error of law injures. A mistake of the law has an injurious effect; that is, the party committing it must suffer the consequences.

Source: Mackeld. Rom. Law, s. 178; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 139, note; 4 Bouv. Inst. n. 3828; Weisman, 37b

(English-origin maxim.) A party who acts under a mistaken understanding of the law bears the consequences of that mistake — ignorance of law is no excuse, and equity will not relieve against its effects.

It is safer to err on the gentler side or the side of mercy.

Source: 3 Inst. 220; Weisman, 37e

(English-origin maxim.) When the law is doubtful, courts should err on the side of mercy — invoke this in sentencing arguments or where a harsh construction and a lenient one are equally plausible.

An error made by a clerk should not injure or prejudice; a clerical error may be corrected.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 23, 324; Dig. 34, 5, 3; Weisman, 37g

(English-origin maxim.) A clerical or scrivener's error in a record, deed, or judgment may be corrected without prejudice to any party — the substance of the act controls, not the scribe's inadvertent mistake.

A man is presumed to be simple [minded] who makes a mistake in his own name.

Source: Code. 6, 24, 14; Van Alst v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 148, 161; Weisman, 37i

(English-origin maxim.) A man who misstates or misspells his own name raises a presumption of incapacity or fraud — cite this to challenge the authenticity of a document signed under a garbled version of the signer's name.

The mistakes of the writer ought not to harm.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 324; Weisman, 37l

(English-origin maxim.) Errors introduced by the drafter or copyist of a legal instrument do not invalidate the instrument — the parties should not suffer for the writer's mistake when the true intent is clear.

Ignorance of the fact excuses; ignorance of the law excuses not. Every man must be taken to be cognizant of the law; otherwise there is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance may not be carried.

Source: 1 Coke, 177; Broom, Max. 253; 4 Bouv. Inst. n. 3828; Weisman, 57f

(English-origin maxim.) Ignorance of fact may excuse a party from liability, but ignorance of law never does — every person is conclusively presumed to know the law, and no claim of unfamiliarity will serve as a defense.

A mistake in point of law is, in criminal cases, no sort of defense.

Source: 4 Bl. Comm. 27; 4 Steph. Comm. 81; Broom, Max. 253; 7 Car. P. 456; 2 Kent, Comm. 491, and note; Weisman, 57g

(English-origin maxim.) In criminal prosecutions, a defendant cannot escape liability by claiming he did not know his act was illegal — the law presumes knowledge of its own commands, and mistake of law is no defense to a criminal charge.

The law judges a man's previous intentions by his subsequent acts.

Source: Wharton, III-339

(English-origin maxim.) A man's earlier intentions are illuminated by his later deeds — invoke this maxim to demonstrate that subsequent conduct confirms or contradicts the intent claimed at the time of the original act.

Words ought to be made subservient to the intent, not contrary to it.

Verba intentioni, et non e contra, debent inservire.

Source: Wharton, III-362; Weisman, 60d; Weisman, 60l

Words in a contract, statute, or instrument must serve the intent of the parties or the legislature, not override it. When literal language conflicts with clear intent, courts follow the intent.

An agent is a person authorized by another to act on his account and under his control.

Source: Wasilowski v. Park Bridge Corp., 156 F.2d 612, 614; Weisman, 4d

(English-origin maxim.) An agent is defined by authorization, action on another's account, and subjection to another's control — cite this to establish or dispute the existence of an agency relationship.

Faith must be observed. An agent must not violate the confidence reposed in him.

Source: Story,Ag. s. 192; Weisman, 4f

(English-origin maxim.) An agent owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty and good faith to his principal — invoke this to hold an agent liable for breach of trust, self-dealing, or unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.

An agent, as such, does not have title to the principal's property, although he may be intrusted with possession, and although he may have power to pass title.

Source: Rogers v. U.S. Rubber Co., 20 A.2d 626, 627, 91 N.H. 398; Weisman, 4h

(English-origin maxim.) Mere possession by an agent does not vest title in him — cite this to defeat a claim of ownership by an agent who holds the principal's property, even where the agent has apparent authority to transfer it.

An assigner is clothed with the rights of his principal.

Source: Halk. Max. 14; Broom, Max. 3d Land. ed. 415; Wing. Max. 56; Weisman, 4i

(English-origin maxim.) An assignee steps into the shoes of his assignor and holds the same rights the assignor possessed — cite this to establish that an assignee may enforce every right the principal could have enforced.

Every principal thing draws the accessory to itself.

Omne principale trahit ad se accessorium.

Source: Wharton, III-235; Weisman, 95pp

When the principal thing is granted, transferred, or extinguished, the accessory follows — cite this to argue that a conveyance of the principal estate carries with it all easements, incidents, and appurtenances attached to it.

It is difficult that one man should sustain the place of two.

Source: 4 Coke, 118; Weisman, 61b

(English-origin maxim.) The law disfavors placing one person in two incompatible roles — cite this to challenge a dual appointment or conflict of interest where one man is asked to serve as both judge and party, or agent for opposing principals.

He who first offends causes the strife.

Source: Bouv. 152; Weisman, 61c

(English-origin maxim.) The first aggressor bears the blame for the conflict that follows — cite this to establish that the party who initiated the wrong cannot complain of the consequences that flowed from his own provocation.

Transactions between strangers may benefit, but cannot injure those who are not parties to them.

Source: 6 Coke, 1; Co. Litt. 132; Broom, Max. 954, 967; Weisman, 61j

(English-origin maxim.) Contracts and transactions between third parties may incidentally benefit a non-party but can never impose a burden or obligation on him — cite this to defeat a claim that a stranger to an agreement is bound by its terms.

He who condemns the precept condemns the party giving it.

Source: 12 Coke, 96; Weisman, 61k

(English-origin maxim.) To attack the authority of a command is to attack the one who issued it — cite this to argue that defiance of a lawful order is contempt of the authority behind it.

No man can forfeit another's right.

Source: Fleta, lib. 1, c. 28, s. 11; Weisman, 61m; Weisman, 86b

(English-origin maxim.) No person can, by his own act or default, forfeit or destroy a right belonging to another — cite this to protect a third party's vested right from being extinguished by someone else's misconduct.

A personal connection is equivalent to one's own interest; nearness of blood is as good a consideration as one's own interest.

Source: Bacon, Max. 72, reg; Weisman, 61n

(English-origin maxim.) A close blood relationship is treated as equivalent to a personal stake — cite this to establish standing or interest when a parent, child, or spouse seeks to act on behalf of a family member.

Personal things cannot be done by another.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 14; Weisman, 61o

(English-origin maxim.) Acts that are inherently personal — such as taking an oath, giving testimony, or exercising a personal trust — cannot be performed by a substitute and must be done by the person himself.

Personal things die with the person.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 16; Weisman, 61q

(English-origin maxim.) Rights and obligations that are purely personal — such as a personal license, a penal liability, or the duty to perform a personal service — expire with the death of the holder and do not pass to heirs or assigns.

Whose is the advantage, his also should be the disadvantage.

Source: Black's, 2d. 304; Weisman, 61r

(English-origin maxim.) He who enjoys the benefit must also bear the burden — cite this to prevent a party from claiming the advantages of a transaction while disclaiming its corresponding obligations.

Relation never defeats collateral acts.

Source: 18 Vin. Abr. 292; Weisman, 93b

(English-origin maxim.) The doctrine of relation back does not defeat collateral acts performed in good faith during the interval — cite this to protect third-party transactions that occurred before the relation back took effect.

Relation shall never make good a void grant or devise of the party.

Source: 18 Vin. Abr. 292; Weisman, 93c

(English-origin maxim.) A void grant or devise cannot be rescued by the doctrine of relation — if the original instrument was void ab initio, no subsequent event can breathe life into it.

Things incident cannot be severed.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 3, c. 1, n. 12; Weisman, 93e

(English-origin maxim.) Incidents that are inseparably attached to a principal right or estate cannot be severed from it — cite this to prevent a party from claiming the incident while disclaiming the principal, or vice versa.

Things incident pass by the grant of the principal.

Source: Seymour v. C & N R.R. Co., 25 Barb. (N.Y.) 284, 310; Weisman, 93f

(English-origin maxim.) A grant of the principal carries with it all its incidents — cite this to argue that a conveyance of an estate automatically transfers the easements, privileges, and appurtenances that belong to it.

That is incident which inseparably belongs to, connected with, or inherent in another thing, called the principal.

Source: Black's, 611; Weisman, 93g

(English-origin maxim.) An incident is something inseparably connected to or inherent in the principal thing — cite this definition to establish that a claimed right or obligation is truly incidental and therefore passes automatically with the principal.

When suspicion between men is suggested, it is easily entertained.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 61f

(English-origin maxim.) Once suspicion is planted between parties, human nature readily embraces it — courts must therefore demand proof rather than innuendo, because mere suggestion of wrongdoing, without evidence, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence or good faith that the law recognizes in every man.

The law favors mutual recompense.

Source: Wing. Max. 100; Weisman, 61h

(English-origin maxim.) The law prefers that obligations flow both ways — where one party has conferred a benefit, the other ought to render an equivalent return. This principle undergirds the common-law doctrine of consideration and prevents one-sided exactions by ensuring that every enforceable agreement rests on mutual exchange.

A grant must be construed with certainty as to the thing granted.

Concessio per regem fieri debet de certitudine.

Source: Bract. fol. 15b; 9 Co. 46; Bacon, Max.

No grant is valid unless the subject of the grant can be identified with certainty — vagueness defeats a conveyance.

A penal action is not given against an heir, unless such heir is benefited by the wrong.

Source: Black's, 2d. 25; 2 Inst. 442; Weisman, 58t

(English-origin maxim.) An heir is not liable for the penal consequences of his ancestor's wrongs unless the heir has personally benefited from those wrongs — punishment does not pass by descent.

Contracts have no locality. The obligation of a contract is purely personal, and actions to enforce it may be brought anywhere.

Source: 2 Inst. 231; 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 340, 363; Story, Confl. Laws, s. 362; Weisman, 24e

(English-origin maxim.) A contract is a personal obligation that travels with the parties and may be enforced in any jurisdiction where the defendant can be found — the obligation has no fixed locality.

He confirms the use of a thing who removes the abuse of it.

Source: Moore, 764; Weisman, 20c; Weisman, 62a

(English-origin maxim.) Correcting an abuse of a right is not an attack on the right itself — removing the misuse strengthens and confirms the lawful use.

An exception which confirms the law explains the law.

Source: 2 Bulst. 189; Weisman, 20d; Weisman, 40f

(English-origin maxim.) An exception to a rule confirms the rule's general applicability — the very existence of a stated exception proves that the rule governs all other cases.

He who confirms does not give.

Source: Inst. no. 2069; 2 Bouv; Weisman, 20f; Weisman, 11t

(English-origin maxim.) Confirmation does not constitute a new grant — to confirm is merely to strengthen what already exists, not to create a new right.

An injury is done to him of whom a reproachful thing is said, or concerning whom an infamous song is made.

Source: 9 Coke, 60; Weisman, 59l

(English-origin maxim.) Defamation — whether by spoken word, written libel, or satirical song — constitutes a legal injury to the person whose reputation is attacked.

No one should be injured by that which has taken place between other parties.

Source: Dig. 12, 2, 10; Weisman, 59u

(English-origin maxim.) A stranger to a transaction or proceeding cannot be prejudiced by it — no man should suffer injury from the acts of parties with whom he had no dealing.

Remedy signifies the judicial means for enforcing a right or redressing a wrong.

Source: Walters v. City of Ottawa, 88 N.E. 651, 654, 240 Ill. 259; 240 Ill; Weisman, 94f

(English-origin maxim.) A remedy is the judicial means by which a right is enforced or a wrong is redressed — without a remedy, a right exists only on paper.

Recovery, i.e., restitution, is had by sentence of a judge of a thing wrongfully extorted or detained.

Source: Co. Litt. 154a; Weisman, 94g

(English-origin maxim.) Restitution is the judicial restoration of property wrongfully taken or withheld — the court compels the return of what was unlawfully seized or detained.

If you judge, understand.

Source: Bouv. 157; Weisman, 63h

(English-origin maxim.) A judge must fully comprehend the matter before rendering judgment — understanding the facts and the law is the prerequisite of just decision.

Whatever is subject to the authority of a judge is not subject to innovation.

Source: 4 Inst. 66; Weisman, 63m

(English-origin maxim.) A matter already under judicial authority cannot be altered or changed by outside interference — what is before the judge is under his exclusive control until disposed of.

A judge should keep his jurisdiction within the limits of his commission.

Source: 4 Inst. 163; Black's, 2d. 1056; Weisman, 63r

(English-origin maxim.) A judge who exceeds the bounds of his commission acts without authority — every judicial officer must stay within the jurisdiction conferred upon him.

Judges are by no means favorable to things raised recently and subtly against the common law.

Source: Halk. Max. 73; Weisman, 63x

(English-origin maxim.) Courts regard with suspicion novel doctrines raised against established common law principles — innovations that would displace settled law bear a heavy burden of justification.

Things which are done in the king’s court are presumed to be rightly done.

Quae in curia regis acta sunt rite agi praesumuntur.

Source: 3 Bulst. 43; Jackson

Official acts of a court of record carry a presumption of regularity — the party challenging them bears the burden of showing error.

The administration of an oath is an indispensable requisite to the formation of a legal jury.

Source: Lumsden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 485, 486; Weisman, 67e

(English-origin maxim.) Without the administration of an oath, no lawful jury is constituted — the oath is the foundation of the jury's authority and the guarantee of its fidelity.

There can be no valid trial jury of less than 12 men, and a consent even by the defendant to a trial by a less number is absolutely void.

Source: Hunt v. State, 61 Miss. 577, 580, 581; Weisman, 67g

(English-origin maxim.) The common law right to trial by jury means a jury of twelve — a trial by fewer than twelve is void, and no party's consent can validate what the law prohibits.

The law favors justice and right.

Source: Wing. Max. 141; Weisman, 68i

(English-origin maxim.) In every doubtful case, the law leans toward justice and right — legal presumptions and constructions always favor the just outcome.

Faith is the sister of justice.

Source: Halk. Max. 77; Weisman, 68q

(English-origin maxim.) Good faith and justice are inseparable — without fidelity to promises and honest dealing, the administration of justice is impossible.

Justice is prior to liberty.

Source: Halk. Max. 77; Weisman, 68r

(English-origin maxim.) Justice must be established before liberty can be enjoyed — without a just legal order, liberty degenerates into license and chaos.

It is the property of a Judge to administer justice, not to give it.

Source: Lofft, 42; Weisman, 68s

(English-origin maxim.) A judge's duty is to administer the existing law, not to create new rights or grant favors — the judge declares what the law is, he does not invent what it should be.

Every presumption of the law must be in aid of justice.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 68a

(English-origin maxim.) Legal presumptions exist to advance justice, not to defeat it — a presumption that operates to deprive a man of his recognized rights or to shield wrongdoing perverts its own purpose and must yield to the truth of the matter.

It is not just and right that he who exposes the faults of a guilty person should be condemned on that account; for it is proper and expedient that the offense of the guilty should be known.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 68c

(English-origin maxim.) The People's right to expose malfeasance by public officers or private wrongdoers is essential to self-governance — one who brings the guilty to light serves justice and cannot be punished for doing so. This principle undergirds the right of remonstrance, petition, and the freedom of speech secured by the First Amendment.

What has been agreed to be done, and what ought to be done, shall, for the advancement of justice, be regarded as done.

Source: Wharton, III-377

(English-origin maxim.) Equity treats as done that which ought to have been done — when parties have agreed to perform an act, or justice requires it, the law regards the act as already accomplished.

The court has nothing to do with what is not before it.

Nihil habet forum ex scena.

Source: Bacon, Max.; Bouv. 141; Weisman, 65f

A court confines itself to the matter properly before it and will not decide issues that have not been raised or presented by the parties.

Summonses or citations should not be granted before it is expressed on what ground they ought to be issued.

Source: 12 Coke, 47; Weisman, 65i

(English-origin maxim.) No summons or citation should issue without a stated ground — the court must know the basis of the claim before compelling a party to appear.

An act of the court shall prejudice no man.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 118; 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 245-255; Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed. 115; Weisman, 65l

(English-origin maxim.) No person shall be harmed by an act of the court itself — when delay, error, or procedural defect is the court's own doing, the parties must not suffer for it.

An example [in judicial proceedings] does no good which settles one question by another.

Source: Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. (N.Y.) 44, 49; Weisman, 65m

(English-origin maxim.) A judicial precedent that resolves one disputed question only by raising another is of no value — a good example settles more than it disturbs.

In courts or judicial proceedings, infancy is aided or favored.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 46, case 89; Weisman, 65p

(English-origin maxim.) Courts afford special protection to minors in judicial proceedings — the interests of children are guarded with particular care, and their disabilities are not held against them.

In a trial, credence is given only to those who are sworn.

Source: Cro. Car. 64; Weisman, 65q

(English-origin maxim.) Only sworn testimony is competent evidence in a trial — unsworn statements carry no weight and cannot be the basis of judicial findings.

Sunday is dies non juridicus -that is it is not a court day, or a day for judicial proceedings, or legal purposes.

Source: Co. Litt. 135a; Noy, Max. 2; Wing. Max. 7, max. 5; Broom, Max. 21; Plowd. 265; Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, 327; VanVechten v. Paddock, 12 Johns. (N.Y.) 178, 180; Weisman, 65t

(English-origin maxim.) Sunday is not a day for judicial proceedings — legal acts performed on the Lord's day are void unless statute expressly provides otherwise.

That which is endless is reprobated in law.

Source: 12 Coke, 24; Weisman, 65v

(English-origin maxim.) The law condemns proceedings that lead to no conclusion — endless litigation is reprobated because it denies the finality that justice requires.

Judicial acts require the exercise of some judicial discretion, ministerial acts require none.

Source: Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Vt. 510; Weisman, 65w

(English-origin maxim.) Judicial acts require the judge to exercise discretion and judgment, while ministerial acts are performed mechanically according to fixed rules with no room for independent decision.

It is unbecoming to surrender men when no cause is shown.

Source: In re Washburn, 4 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 106, 114, 8 Am. Dec. 548; Weisman, 65aa

(English-origin maxim.) No person should be surrendered to another jurisdiction without cause shown — extradition and surrender require a demonstrated legal basis.

When an action is brought to annul a proceeding, the defendant cannot plead such proceeding in bar.

Source: Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed. 154; Wing. Max. 647; Weisman, 75a

(English-origin maxim.) When a suit is brought to annul a proceeding, the defendant cannot use that very proceeding as a bar to the action — the matter in dispute cannot serve as its own defense.

The action in rem is that by which we seek our property which is possessed by another, and is always against him who possesses the property.

Source: Dig. 44, 7, 25; Bract. fol. 102; Weisman, 75b

(English-origin maxim.) An action in rem is directed against the property itself and follows it into the hands of whoever possesses it — the claim attaches to the thing, not the person.

No one goes to law without an action, and no one can bring an action without a writ or bill.

Source: Bract. fol. 112; Fleta, 1.2, c. 13, s. 4; Weisman, 75c

(English-origin maxim.) Access to the courts requires a formal writ or bill — no action can be commenced without the proper originating process.

No one is prohibited from making use of several defenses.

Source: Co. Litt. 304a; Wing. Max. 479; Weisman, 75g

(English-origin maxim.) A party may plead as many defenses as are available to him — the law does not force a defendant to choose a single ground when multiple valid defenses exist.

No one maintains an action arising out of his own wrong.

Source: Broom, Max. 297; Weisman, 75i

(English-origin maxim.) A party who caused the very wrong he complains of cannot maintain an action based on that wrong — no man may be both the author of an injury and the claimant for its redress.

He who has once relinquished or renounced his action cannot bring it again.

Source: 8 Coke, 59a; Weisman, 75j

(English-origin maxim.) Once a party voluntarily abandons or relinquishes a cause of action, it cannot be revived — the right to sue, once surrendered, is extinguished forever.

No action arises out of an immoral consideration.

Source: 2 Peters (27 U.S.) 539; Cycl. Diet. 375; Weisman, 75m

(English-origin maxim.) A cause of action founded on an immoral or illegal consideration is void — the courts will not enforce agreements rooted in wrongdoing.

The action in personam is that by which we sue him who is under obligation to us to do something or give something.

Source: Dig. 44, 7, 25; Bract. 101b; Dig. 50, 17, 41; Weisman, 75n

(English-origin maxim.) An action in personam lies against a specific person who is under a personal obligation to do or give something — it follows the debtor, not the property.

When an action is merely criminal, it can be instituted from the beginning either criminally or civilly.

Source: Bract. 102; Weisman, 75p

(English-origin maxim.) Where the same act gives rise to both criminal and civil liability, the aggrieved party may choose to pursue either remedy from the outset.

In every action where two distresses concur, that is, in rem and in personam, that is to be chosen which is most dreaded, and which binds most firmly.

Source: Bract. fol. 372; Fleta, l. 6, c. 14, s. 28; Weisman, 75q

(English-origin maxim.) When both an action in rem and an action in personam are available, counsel should choose the more powerful remedy — the one that binds more firmly and is most likely to compel compliance.

Every man is liable to be sued wrongfully or without cause.

Source: Dow v. Johnson, 10 Otto (100 U.S.) 158, 193; Weisman, 75s

(English-origin maxim.) The possibility of being sued without cause is a burden every man bears — the law provides remedies for frivolous suits but cannot prevent them from being filed.

In civil matters agency ( or service) excuses, but not so in criminal matters.

Source: Lofft. 228; Tray. Leg. Max. 243; Weisman, 75t

(English-origin maxim.) In civil matters, acting as an agent or servant excuses personal liability, but in criminal cases the agent remains personally responsible for his own criminal acts regardless of who directed them.

A matter, the validity of which is at issue in legal proceedings, cannot be set up as a bar [impediment] thereto.

Source: Bac. Max. reg. 2; Weisman, 75u

(English-origin maxim.) A proceeding whose validity is the very question at issue cannot be pleaded as a bar to the suit challenging it — to allow otherwise would make every void act self-validating.

When the foundation fails, all goes to the ground; as, where the cause of action fails, the action itself must of necessity fail.

Source: Wing. Max., 113, 114, max. 40; Broom, Max. 180; Noy, Max. 5, max. 12; Weisman, 75w

(English-origin maxim.) When the foundation of a cause of action is destroyed, the entire action collapses — if the underlying right or fact is eliminated, no superstructure of claims can stand upon it.

The end of litigation is justice.

Source: Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 258; Weisman, 75y

(English-origin maxim.) The ultimate purpose of all litigation is the attainment of justice — procedure is a means, not an end, and must yield when it obstructs rather than serves justice.

A right of action can not arise out of fraud.

Source: Cowp. 343; Broom, Max. 729; Weisman, 75aa; Weisman, 105i

(English-origin maxim.) A party who obtained his position through fraud cannot maintain an action to enforce it — fraud vitiates everything it touches and bars the fraudster from judicial relief.

The decree ( or act) of a court shall prejudice no man.

Actus curiae neminem gravabit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 118; Weisman, 65b

When a court's own act — such as delay, clerical error, or procedural oversight — causes harm to a party, the court must ensure that party is not prejudiced by the court's mistake.

Constitutions and laws precede the judiciary.

Source: Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (48 U.S.) 1, 52; Weisman, 65u

(English-origin maxim.) The judiciary is subordinate to the constitution and the laws — judges derive their authority from written law and cannot act beyond what the constitution and statutes authorize.

The judge is counsel for the prisoner.

Judex est consiliarius rei.

Source: Weisman, 65x

In criminal proceedings, the judge has a duty to protect the rights of the accused — particularly an unrepresented defendant — by ensuring that the trial is conducted fairly and that the prisoner understands the proceedings against him.

Everyone is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Source: C.L.M.; Lofft, 121; Weisman, 65y

(English-origin maxim.) The presumption of innocence is a foundational right recognized at common law and secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments — the sovereign People cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property by the state unless guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt through due process of law.

The success of a defendant depends on a perfect case; his loss arises from some defect.

Source: 11 Coke, 68a; Weisman, 99b

(English-origin maxim.) A defendant prevails only when his case is without defect — a single flaw in the defense is enough to undo it, while success requires perfection at every point.

During a litigation nothing should be changed.

Source: Co. Litt. 344; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 406; Secombe v. Steele, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 94, 106; Weisman, 99e

(English-origin maxim.) The status quo must be preserved during litigation — no party may alter the subject matter of the dispute while the suit is pending, lest the court's eventual judgment be rendered meaningless.

A suit is a civil warfare; for as the plaintiffs are armed with actions, and, as it were, girded with swords, so the defendants are fortified with pleas, and are defended, as it were, by shields.

Source: Hob. 20; Bract. 339b; Weisman, 99k

(English-origin maxim.) Litigation is a form of regulated combat — plaintiffs attack with their claims and defendants defend with their pleas, and the contest is governed by strict procedural rules.

A suit which is based upon a writing ought not to vary from the writing.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 65; Weisman, 99m

(English-origin maxim.) A suit founded on a written instrument must conform to the terms of that writing — the plaintiff cannot vary from the document upon which he bases his claim.

No man can be sued a second time for the same cause of action, if once judgment has been rendered.

Source: Broom, Max. 327, 348; Dig. 50, 17, 41; Weisman, 99n

(English-origin maxim.) Once a final judgment has been rendered on a cause of action, the same matter cannot be relitigated between the same parties — this is the principle of res judicata.

No one can sue without a writ.

Source: Fleta, lib. 2, c. 13, s. 4; Weisman, 99p

(English-origin maxim.) A writ is the indispensable foundation of every lawsuit — without proper originating process, the court has no authority to hear the case.

Whichever of two parties has the division, the other has the choice.

Source: Co. Litt. 166; Weisman, 99u

(English-origin maxim.) When one party divides a disputed matter, the other party has the right of first choice — this ensures fairness by giving the divider an incentive to divide equally.

He in vain sues, who cannot prosecute his judgment with effect.

Source: Fleta, lib. 6, c. 37, s. 9; Weisman, 99v

(English-origin maxim.) A plaintiff who cannot enforce a judgment gains nothing by obtaining it — the law discourages suits where the remedy, even if granted, would be illusory.

No one can sue in the name of another.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 123; Weisman, 99aa

(English-origin maxim.) A man must bring suit in his own name — no one may litigate on behalf of another without proper legal authority such as power of attorney or guardianship.

An issue (or suit) requires terms of contradiction. To constitute an issue, there must be an affirmative on one side and a negative on the other.

Source: Black's, 258; Jenk. Cent. 117; Weisman, 99bb

(English-origin maxim.) A triable issue requires opposing assertions — one side must affirm and the other must deny, for without contradiction there is no dispute for the court to resolve.

Alienation pending a suit is void.

Source: Branch, Max. 117; Weisman, 99ee

(English-origin maxim.) A transfer of property made while a lawsuit concerning that property is pending is void — the law prevents parties from defeating the court's jurisdiction by disposing of the subject matter during litigation.

Not twice for the same thing.

Non bis in idem.

Source: Weisman, 99r

No person may be subjected to a second prosecution, suit, or proceeding for the same cause — whether in criminal law (double jeopardy) or civil law (res judicata), the matter once determined is settled and cannot be relitigated.

A plea of a matter of which a dissolution is sought by the action is null.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 37, case 71; Bacon, Max. reg. 2; Weisman, 87a

(English-origin maxim.) When a suit seeks to dissolve or annul a matter, the defendant cannot plead that very matter in bar — the thing sought to be destroyed cannot serve as its own shield.

A false plea is the basest of all things.

Source: Bouv. 126; Weisman, 87c

(English-origin maxim.) A false plea is the most dishonorable act in legal proceedings — to lie to the court under the protection of judicial process is the basest abuse of the law's trust.

There can be no plea against an action which destroys the matter of the plea.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 106, case 2; Weisman, 87d

(English-origin maxim.) A plea cannot stand when the action, if successful, would destroy the very matter pleaded — a defense that the action itself would eliminate is no defense at all.

He is defeated by the plea that the action have been assigned.

Source: Cheesebrough v. Millard, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 409, 414; Weisman, 87g

(English-origin maxim.) A defendant is barred by a plea showing that the cause of action has been assigned to another — the original plaintiff, having transferred his right, can no longer maintain the suit.

Two negative pleas do not form an issue.

Source: Lofft, 415; Weisman, 87i

(English-origin maxim.) In pleading, two negative assertions cannot create a triable issue. An issue requires an affirmative on one side and a negative on the other — two denials leave nothing for the court to determine.

Whatever is offered by the defendant as sufficient to defeat the cause of action stated in the plaintiffs declaration, either by way of denial, justification, or confession, is a plea.

Source: Jewett Car Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 107 Fed. 622, 624; Weisman, 87j

(English-origin maxim.) Any matter the defendant raises to defeat the plaintiff's claim — whether denial, justification, or confession and avoidance — constitutes a plea and must conform to the rules of pleading.

The defendant by a plea becomes plaintiff.

Source: Best, Ev. 294, s. 252; Weisman, 87k

(English-origin maxim.) When a defendant interposes an affirmative plea, he takes on the burden of proving it — in that respect he becomes a plaintiff as to the matter pleaded.

Pleas [i.e., actions] are personal, real, and mixed.

Source: Co. Litt. 284; Weisman, 87l

(English-origin maxim.) Pleas are classified as personal (affecting the person), real (affecting property), and mixed (affecting both) — the classification determines the procedure and form of the action.

It sometimes happens that a plea which seems prima facie just, nevertheless is injurious and unequal.

Source: Inst. 4, 14, 1, 2; Weisman, 87m

(English-origin maxim.) A plea may appear valid on its face yet prove unjust in application — courts must examine the substance and effect of a plea, not merely its formal sufficiency.

Sentence is not given upon matters that are not clear.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 7, case 9; Weisman, 64k

(English-origin maxim.) A court will not render judgment on a matter that is unclear or unresolved — the facts must be sufficiently established before sentence can be pronounced.

Realities must dominate the judgment by a court.

Source: Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360; Weisman, 64q

(English-origin maxim.) A court must decide cases based on actual facts and real-world conditions, not abstract theories or artificial constructions — practical realities govern judicial outcomes.

Judgment in error is a judgment rendered by a court of error on a record sent up from an inferior court.

Source: Black's, 666; Weisman, 64r

(English-origin maxim.) A judgment in error is the decision of an appellate court reviewing the record of a lower court for legal mistakes — it is the mechanism by which errors of law are corrected.

That which appears not is not; and nothing appears judicially before judgment.

Quod non apparet non est ; et non apparet judicialiter ante judicium.

Source: 2 Inst; Weisman, 64t

What does not appear in the record does not exist for judicial purposes — nothing is judicially cognizable until it is properly presented and entered before the court.

Every act is to be judged by the intention of the doer.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 64u

(English-origin maxim.) The intention behind an act is the measure by which it is judged — the same outward conduct may be lawful or unlawful depending on the purpose that animated it.

Of [respecting] like things, [in like cases,] the judgment is to be the same.

Source: 7 Coke, 18; Weisman, 64hh

(English-origin maxim.) Like cases must receive like judgments — consistency in judicial decisions is essential to the rule of law, and similar facts demand similar outcomes.

The law does not define exactly, but trusts in the judgment of a good man.

Source: Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 475, 6 Am. Dec. 88; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 493; Weisman, 64ii

(English-origin maxim.) Where the law leaves a matter to discretion, it trusts the judgment of a reasonable and upright man — judicial discretion means sound judgment, not arbitrary will.

In nearly all penal judgments, immaturity of age and imbecility of mind are favored.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 108; Broom, Max. 314; Weisman, 64kk

(English-origin maxim.) In criminal sentencing, youth and mental incapacity are treated as mitigating factors — the law extends greater leniency to those whose age or condition diminishes their culpability.

It is improper to give judgment or pass sentence without looking at the whole case.

Source: Dig. 1, 3, 24; Hob. 171a; 8 Coke, 117b; Weisman, 64dd

(English-origin maxim.) A judge must examine the entirety of the evidence and law before rendering judgment — deciding on a partial view of the case is unjust.

It is not a new thing that prior statutes shall give place to later ones.

Source: Dig. 1. 3. 26; 1. 1. 4; Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed 27; Weisman, 88a

(English-origin maxim.) Later statutes supersede earlier ones when they conflict — this is a longstanding principle, not a modern innovation, and applies whenever two laws cannot be harmonized.

Precedents have as much law as justice.

Source: Bouv. 149; Weisman, 88b

(English-origin maxim.) Precedents are only as authoritative as the justice underlying them — a precedent that embodies injustice has no more binding force than the flawed reasoning that produced it.

It is best not to unsettle things which are originally established.

Source: Green v. Hudson River R. Co., 28 Barb. (N.Y.) 91, 22; Weisman, 88c

(English-origin maxim.) Established legal principles should not be lightly disturbed — stability in the law is a value in itself, and settled rules should be overturned only for compelling reasons.

A particular case, left unprovided for by statute, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed prior to such statute.

Source: Broom, Max. 46; Weisman, 88d

(English-origin maxim.) When a statute fails to address a particular case, the pre-existing law governs — the silence of the legislature does not create a void but leaves the matter to the law as it stood before the statute.

We are to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettled things which are not established.

Source: Yates vs. Lansing, 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 395, 428; Moore vs. Lyons, 25 Wend. (N.Y.) 119, 142; Weisman, 88h

(English-origin maxim.) Courts should follow established precedents and avoid reliance on unsettled or novel propositions — stability and predictability in the law are essential to liberty.

Precedents are principles of law which are also conclusions, or decision in a cause; and not a process of reasoning or illustration or analogy.

Source: Rodwell v. Rowland, (N.C.) 50 S.E. 319, 327; Weisman, 88k

(English-origin maxim.) A precedent is a decision, not an argument — it establishes a principle of law by its holding, not by any reasoning, analogy, or illustration that may accompany it.

Things done in one action cannot be taken as evidence in another, unless it be between the same parties.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 11; Weisman, 39a

(English-origin maxim.) Proceedings and findings in one action cannot serve as evidence in a different action unless both actions involve the same parties, because strangers to the first case had no opportunity to test the evidence.

A witness is a person who is present at and observes a transaction.

Source: State v. Desforges, 47 La. Ann. 1167, 17 So. 811; McDonald v. Robertson, 104 F.2d 945, 948; Weisman, 39ee

(English-origin maxim.) A witness is one who was present and perceived the transaction firsthand; this definition excludes those who merely heard about the event or arrived after the fact.

Common knowledge includes matters of learning, experience, history, and facts of which judicial notice may be taken, and may be referred to in argument of counsel.

Source: Shelley v. Chilton's Adm'r, 32 S.W.2d 974, 977; 236 Ky. 221; Weisman, 17e

(English-origin maxim.) Matters of history, learning, and common experience fall within judicial notice and may be referenced by counsel in argument without the need for formal evidentiary proof.

Acts required to be done by law do not admit of qualification.

Source: Hob. 153; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 2b

(English-origin maxim.) When the law mandates a specific act — such as recording a deed or filing within a deadline — no party may attach conditions or qualifications to the performance; it must be done precisely as the law commands.

Certain legal consequences are attached to the voluntary act of a person.

Source: Duncan v. Landis, 106 Fed. 839; Weisman, 2e

(English-origin maxim.) A person who voluntarily performs an act is bound by the legal consequences that flow from it, regardless of whether he foresaw or intended those consequences.

Things which are done simultaneously with an act are supposed to be inherent in it; to be a constituent part of it.

Source: Co. Litt. 236b; Weisman, 2f

(English-origin maxim.) Contemporaneous acts and declarations made at the time of a transaction are admissible as part of the res gestae — they are woven into the act itself and inseparable from it.

Environment illuminates the meaning of acts, as context does that of words.

Source: Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 33; Weisman, 2g

(English-origin maxim.) The circumstances surrounding an act — its time, place, and setting — are essential to determining its legal character, just as context gives meaning to language.

Where there is no principal, there can be no accessory.

Ubi non est principalis non potest esse accessorius.

Source: 4 Coke, 43; Weisman, 2i

Without a principal act or offense, no accessory liability can exist — the accessory charge is entirely dependent on the commission of the primary act.

Your motive gives a name to your act.

Source: Bract. 2b, 101b; Weisman, 2j

(English-origin maxim.) The intent behind an act determines its legal classification — the same physical deed may be lawful or unlawful depending on the motive that animates it.

A repugnant act cannot be brought into being, i.e., cannot be made effectual.

Source: Plowd. 355; Weisman, 2l; Weisman, 62b

(English-origin maxim.) An act that contradicts itself or is internally inconsistent is void — the law will not give effect to what is self-defeating.

When many join in one act, the law will construe it as the act of him who could best accomplish it.

Source: Noy, Max. 38; Weisman, 2m

(English-origin maxim.) Where several persons participate in a single transaction, the law attributes the act to the party with the authority or capacity to perform it, such as the grantor in a deed or the officer with jurisdiction.

One may not do an act to himself.

Source: Bouv. 146; Weisman, 2n

(English-origin maxim.) A man cannot be both grantor and grantee, obligor and obligee, in the same transaction — the law requires distinct parties for a valid legal act.

Take away the will, and every action will be indifferent.

Source: Bract. 2; Weisman, 2o

(English-origin maxim.) Without voluntary intent, no act carries moral or legal significance — this principle is the foundation of the defense of compulsion and the requirement of mens rea.

Every man is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own voluntary act.

Source: Greenl. Ev. s. 18; 9 East, 277; Weisman, 2p

(English-origin maxim.) Invoke this presumption to establish intent from conduct — a party who performs a voluntary act cannot later disclaim the foreseeable results by professing ignorance of their consequences.

External acts indicate undisclosed thoughts.

Source: 8 Coke, 146b; Weisman, 2t

(English-origin maxim.) Where a party's subjective intent is unknown, the court infers it from outward conduct — overt acts are the law's window into hidden purpose.

All actions in the world are limited within certain periods.

Source: Bract. 52; Weisman, 2u

(English-origin maxim.) No cause of action endures forever — statutes of limitation reflect this principle by fixing a definite period within which every claim must be brought or be forever barred.

A party's own act should prejudice himself, not his adversary.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 155; Weisman, 2v

(English-origin maxim.) Where one party's conduct creates a legal disadvantage, the burden falls on the actor himself — no man should profit from shifting the consequences of his own deed to another.

When there is doubt about an act, it receives interpretation from the (known) feelings of the actor.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 68, 1; Weisman, 2w

(English-origin maxim.) When a deed or transaction is ambiguous, the known disposition and prior declarations of the actor supply the key to construction.

There is no surer way to find out what parties meant, than to see what they have done.

Source: Brooklyn Ins. Co. v. Dutcher, 5 Otto (95 U.S.) 269, 273; Weisman, 2z

(English-origin maxim.) The practical construction placed on an agreement by the parties' own conduct is the best evidence of their mutual intent — actions speak louder than recitals.

A party who is silent when he ought to speak shall not be permitted to speak afterwards to the prejudice of those who have been induced to act upon such omission to speak.

Source: Wharton, III-26

(English-origin maxim.) A party who remains silent when duty requires him to speak is estopped from later asserting a position that contradicts the reliance others placed on his silence.

No person, by his own transgression, can create a cause of action in his own favor, against another.

Source: Briggs v. Easterly; Wharton, III-215

(English-origin maxim.) A wrongdoer cannot manufacture a cause of action from his own transgression — the law will not allow a party to benefit from his own wrong.

Prescription and execution do not pertain to the validity of the contract, but to the time and manner of bringing the action.

Praescriptio et executio non pertinent ad valorem contractus, sed ad tempus et modum actionis instituendae.

Source: Wharton, III-255

The statute of limitations and the mode of enforcement affect only procedure, not the underlying validity of the contract — a barred action does not mean the obligation never existed.

He is repelled by the exception of actions to be assigned.

Repellitur exceptione cedendarum actionum.

Source: Wharton, III-297

A party who has failed to assign or transfer an action when required may be barred by the exception — the defense lies against him who has neglected to cede what ought to have been ceded.

Old age alone and of itself does not vitiate a gift, a will, or a transaction.

Sola ac per se senectus donationem, testamentum, aut transactionem non vitiat.

Source: Wharton, III-321

Advanced age, standing alone, is no ground to set aside a deed, will, or contract — incapacity must be proved by evidence of mental infirmity, not merely by the passage of years.

Authority to execute a deed must be given by deed.

Source: 4 Term, 313; Cooper v. Rankin, 5 Binn. (Penn.) 613; Weisman, 30e

(English-origin maxim.) The authority to execute a deed on behalf of another must itself be conferred by deed — a bare parol authorization is insufficient to support a formal conveyance.

The deed of one should not hurt another.

Source: Co. Litt. 152; Weisman, 30g

(English-origin maxim.) No person should be prejudiced by the deed of a stranger — the acts of one party cannot impose obligations or forfeitures upon another who is not privy to the instrument.

When a deed contains a general clause, and afterwards descends to special words, consistent with the general clause, the deed is to be construed according to the special words.

Source: 8 Coke, 154; Weisman, 30h

(English-origin maxim.) Where a deed opens with a general grant and then specifies particular terms consistent with it, the special words control the construction — the general yields to the specific.

The intention is to be taken for the deed.

Voluntas reputabatur pro facto.

Source: 3 Inst; Weisman, 30k; Weisman, 51b; Weisman, 104z

Where the intent to execute a deed is clearly established but formal completion is prevented by death or other cause, equity may treat the intention as equivalent to the act.

No man can contravene or contradict his own deed.

Source: 2 Inst. 66; Weisman, 30l; Weisman, 2aa

(English-origin maxim.) A party who has executed a deed is estopped from denying its terms — his solemn act binds him, and he may not contradict what he has formally declared.

Special clauses are comprised in general ones.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 147; Weisman, 16f

(English-origin maxim.) A specific clause that falls within the scope of a general provision does not limit or narrow the general clause — the special is understood as already included within the general.

Particular clauses inserted in agreements to avoid doubts and ambiguity do not prejudice the general law.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 81; Weisman, 16h

(English-origin maxim.) Explanatory clauses inserted in an agreement for the sake of clarity do not override or restrict the general principles of law that would otherwise apply.

Hasty counsels are rarely prosperous.

Source: 4 Inst. 57; Weisman, 3a

(English-origin maxim.) Decisions made in haste are prone to error — the law favors deliberation over impulse, and precipitate counsels yield poor results.

In many counselors there is safety.

Source: 4 Inst. 1; Weisman, 3h

(English-origin maxim.) Complex and weighty matters benefit from the collective wisdom of many advisors — a plurality of counsel reduces the risk of error and oversight.