sovereignty

Natural law is that which holds the same force among all mankind.

Jus naturale est quod apud omnes homines eandem habet potentiam.

Source: Coke, 7 Co. 12; Jackson 473; Weisman, 82e

Natural law is universal — it binds every nation and every court, and no legislature can override it.

Natural law has its foundation in the will of God.

Jus naturale, sive lex naturalis, fundamentum habet in voluntate Dei.

Source: Blackstone, 1 Bl. Comm. 39; Kent, 1 Comm. 2; Weisman, 74f

The authority of natural law rests not on human enactment but on the will of the Creator — it precedes and supersedes all positive law.

The laws of nature are most perfect and unchangeable.

Leges naturae perfectissimae sunt et immutabiles.

Source: Coke, 7 Co. 25; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 74d

Human laws rise and fall, but the laws of nature admit neither amendment nor repeal — any statute contradicting them is void from the beginning.

The force of nature is the greatest.

Natura vis maxima est.

Source: Noy, Max. 26; Coke, 2 Inst. 564; Weisman, 74h

When natural law and positive law conflict, natural law prevails — no human enactment can overcome the force of nature.

That which natural reason has established among all men is called the law of nations.

Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, vocatur jus gentium.

Source: Dig. 1.1.9; Inst. 1.2.1; 1 Bl. Comm. 43; Weisman, 74l

The law of nations is derived from natural law — it represents those principles so fundamental that all civilized peoples recognize them.

An affirmative statute does not derogate from the common law.

Statuta affirmativa non derogant juri communi.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 24; Weisman, 18g

A statute that creates a new right or procedure does not, by that creation, abolish the existing common law remedy — both stand unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.

In England there is no interregnum.

In Anglia non est interregnum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 205; Jackson

The continuity of sovereign authority is never broken — upon the death of one king, the next succeeds instantly, ensuring that the People are never without the protection of law.

Custom leads the willing; law compels the unwilling.

Consuetudo volentes ducit, lex nolentes trahit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 274; Weisman, 27t

Custom governs by consent — those who follow it do so willingly. But when custom hardens into law, it compels even those who resist.

Custom is more powerful than grant.

Source: Black's, 907; Weisman, 27f

(English-origin maxim.) Long-established custom carries more authority than a written grant — invoke this when a customary right predates and conflicts with a later conveyance or statutory license.

All the powers, being derived from equity, are, even in a court of law, to be construed equitably.

Source: Wharton, III-14

(English-origin maxim.) Even in a court of law, powers derived from equity must be construed equitably — a party may invoke equitable principles to temper the rigid application of a legal power.

Equity regards whatever is ordered to be done by one having authority, or what ought to be done, as actually done.

Source: Wharton, III-88

(English-origin maxim.) Equity treats an act that should have been performed as though it was performed — invoke this to enforce obligations that a party was duty-bound to complete but neglected.

The law always intends what is agreeable to reason.

Lex semper intendit quod convenit rationi.

Source: Co. Litt. 78b; Jackson 532; Weisman, 71jj

When a statute or rule admits of two readings, adopt the one that accords with reason — the law never intends an absurd result.

Law is a sacred sanction, commanding what is proper and forbidding what is contrary.

Lex est sanctio sancta, jubens honesta, et prohibens contraria.

Source: Coke, 2 Inst. 587; Jackson 505; Weisman, 90e

The binding force of law rests on its sacred character — it commands what is honorable and forbids what is dishonorable. When it does the reverse, it forfeits its claim to obedience.

The law is the safest shield; under the protection of the law no one is deceived.

Lex est tutissima cassis; sub clypeo legis nemo decipitur.

Source: Coke, 2 Inst. 56; Jackson 506

The law exists to protect — anyone acting within the law and relying on the law's protections is not to be prejudiced by that reliance.

Affiliation cannot be proved.

Filiatio non potest probari.

Source: Co. Litt. 126; Jackson

At common law, paternity could not be directly proved by physical evidence — the law therefore relied on the presumption that a child born in wedlock is the child of the husband.

It is the same thing to say nothing and not to say sufficient.

Idem est nihil dicere et insufficienter dicere.

Source: 2 Inst. 178; Jackson

An insufficient pleading or allegation is treated as no pleading at all — the law requires that claims be stated with enough particularity to inform the opposing party. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.34.)

That which is common is said to be ours.

Id quod commune est, nostrum esse dicitur.

Source: Jackson; Weisman, 70v

Common property belongs to all — each member of the public has an equal interest in public roads, navigable waters, and other common resources.

That which is more remote does not draw to itself that which is nearer, but on the contrary in every case.

Id quod est magis remotum non trahit ad se quod est magis junctum, sed e contrario in omni casu.

Source: Co. Litt. 164; Jackson; Weisman, 95kk

The nearer or more immediate interest prevails over the more remote — a closer connection or claim takes precedence over a distant one.

A new remedy is to be applied to a new case.

In novo casu, novum remedium apponendum est.

Source: 2 Inst. 8; Jackson; Weisman, 94s

When existing remedies are insufficient to address a novel wrong, the law must fashion new remedies — justice is not defeated by the absence of precedent.

All things are presumed against a despoiler.

In odium spoliatoris omnia praesumuntur.

Source: 1 Vern. 19; Jackson; Weisman, 39t; Weisman, 39v; Weisman, 105j

One who destroys or conceals evidence is presumed to have done so because the evidence was against him — every inference is drawn against the spoliator.

Law ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most frequently, and not to those which are unexpected.

Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt, non quae ex inopinato.

Source: D. 1, 3, 8; Jackson; Weisman, 71s

Legislation should address the ordinary course of events, not rare exceptions — laws tailored to unusual cases often produce unjust results in common ones.

A right growing to a possessor accrues to the successor.

Jus superveniens auctori accrescit successori.

Source: Halk. 76; Jackson; Weisman, 58l; Weisman, 103s

A right that attaches to property after its transfer vests in the successor, not in the original holder — the successor takes the benefit of any improvement in title.

The law rejects superfluous, contradictory, and incongruous things.

Lex rejicit superflua, pugnantia, incongrua.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 133; Jackson; Weisman, 71rr

Courts will disregard surplusage, resolve contradictions, and reject absurdities in the construction of legal instruments — clarity and consistency are demanded.

Things permitted are properly united unless the form of law oppose.

Licita bene miscentur, formula nisi juris obstet.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 24; Jackson

Lawful acts may be freely combined unless a specific legal formality prevents it — the law does not prohibit the joining of permissible actions without express cause.

The right line is always preferred to the collateral.

Linea recta semper prefertur transversali.

Source: Co. Litt. 10; Jackson

In matters of descent and inheritance, direct lineage (parent to child) takes precedence over collateral relations (siblings, cousins) — the direct line is always favored.

The greater contains the less.

Majus continet minus.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 208; Jackson

A grant of a greater power necessarily includes all lesser powers within it — one who has authority to do the whole may do any part.

The more worthy draws with it the less worthy.

Majus dignum trahit ad se minus dignum.

Source: 1 Inst. 48; Jackson; Weisman, 95gg

When two things of unequal dignity are joined, the lesser follows the greater — the principal thing governs the accessory.

No one is born an artificer.

Nemo nascitur artifex.

Source: Co. Litt. 97; Jackson

Skill and knowledge are acquired, not innate — the law recognizes that competence comes through training, and does not presume expertise without evidence of it.

No one is restrained from using several defences.

Nemo prohibetur pluribus defensionibus uti.

Source: Co. Litt. 304; Jackson

A defendant may plead as many defenses as he has available — the law does not force a party to rely on a single ground when multiple grounds exist.

The concealment of discovered treasure is fraudulent.

Occultatio thesauri inventi fraudulosa.

Source: 3 Inst. 133; Jackson

One who discovers treasure trove and conceals it commits a fraud upon the Crown or sovereign — the law requires disclosure of found treasure.

That which is given for all is restored by the contribution of all.

Omnium contributione sarciatur quod pro omnibus datum est.

Source: 4 Bing. 121; Jackson

When one party bears a loss that benefits all, the cost must be shared proportionally — this is the foundation of general average in maritime law and analogous principles elsewhere.

There may be an abuse of everything of which there is a use, virtue alone excepted.

Omnium rerum quarum usus est, potest esse abusus, virtute solo excepta.

Source: Dav. 79; Jackson; Weisman, 25e

Every right and power is susceptible of misuse — the law therefore imposes limits on the exercise of rights to prevent their perversion into instruments of harm.

The risk of a thing sold, and not yet delivered, is the purchaser’s.

Periculum rei venditae, nondum traditae, est emptoris.

Source: Jackson

Once a sale is complete, risk of loss passes to the buyer even before physical delivery — the buyer bears the loss if the goods are destroyed in transit.

Of principles there is no rule.

Principiorum non est ratio.

Source: 2 Buls. 239; Jackson

First principles are self-evident and require no further justification — they are the axioms from which all legal reasoning proceeds and cannot themselves be proved by prior rules.

When provision of party is wanting, provision of law is present.

Quando abest provisio partis, adest provisio legis.

Source: cited 18 C. B. 960; Jackson

Where the parties to a contract have failed to address a particular matter, the law supplies the missing term — default rules fill the gaps that private agreement leaves open.

What I cannot do in person, I cannot do by proxy.

Quod per me non possum, nec per alium.

Source: 4 Co. 24; Jackson

A person cannot circumvent legal restrictions on his own authority by acting through an agent — the agent’s power can never exceed the principal’s.

The kingdom is not divisible.

Regnum non est divisibile.

Source: Co. Litt. 165-166; Jackson; Wharton

Sovereign authority cannot be fractured into independent competing jurisdictions within a single realm — the unity of the sovereign power is essential to the rule of law.

Resignation is a spontaneous relinquishment of one’s own right.

Resignatio est juris proprii spontanea refutatio.

Source: Godb. 284; Jackson

A voluntary resignation extinguishes the right resigned — once freely relinquished, the right cannot be reclaimed absent fraud or duress in the act of resignation.

Scarcely any law can be made which is suitable to all; but it is useful if it regard the greater part.

Vix ulla lex fieri potest quae omnibus commoda sit, sed si majori parti prospiciat utilis est.

Source: Plow. 369; Jackson

No law can satisfy everyone — a law that serves the majority fairly and justly is valid even though it may inconvenience a few. However, the rights of the individual are not subject to majority vote — a law serving the majority cannot violate reserved rights of a minority.

A new judgment does not make new law, but declares the old.

Novum judicium non dat novum jus, sed declarat antiquum.

Source: 10 Co. 42; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 64v

Courts do not create law; they discover and declare what the law has always been — every valid judgment is a recognition of pre-existing principle.

Things which are not valid from the beginning cannot be made valid by a subsequent act.

Quae ab initio non valent, ex post facto convalescere non possunt.

Source: People v. Shall, 9 Cow. (N.Y.) 784; Weisman, 62d; Weisman, 62c

An act void from inception cannot be cured by any subsequent event — cite this to challenge government actions taken without jurisdiction, which remain void regardless of later ratification attempts.

That which is valid in law has legal strength, force, and effect, or incapable of being rightfully overthrown or set aside.

Source: Emerson v. Knapp, 75 Mo.App. 92, 97; Weisman, 62g

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A valid instrument carries the full force of law and cannot be collaterally attacked; opposing parties must show a jurisdictional or constitutional defect to overcome it.

Law favors honor and order.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 739, max. 199; Weisman, 71w

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Courts presume that parties acted honorably and in good order — ambiguous acts are construed in favor of lawful conduct, and the law upholds established hierarchies of jurisdiction and authority.

The word "thing" has a general signification, because it comprehends corporeal and incorporeal objects, of whatever nature, sort, or species.

Source: 3 Inst. 182; Weisman, 95a

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) "Thing" in law encompasses all species of property — tangible and intangible, real and personal — so a statute or grant referencing "things" or "property" is not limited to physical objects but includes rights, choses in action, and every form of legal interest.

Everything contains the element of its own destruction.

Source: 2 Inst. 15; Weisman, 95r

(English-origin maxim.) Every grant of authority carries inherent limits — the very conditions that create a power also define the circumstances under which that power expires or is forfeited.

Laws are imposed, not upon words, but upon things.

Source: 10 Coke, 101; Branch, Princ.; Code 6, 43, 2; Weisman, 71n

(English-origin maxim.) Law governs substance, not labels — the legal effect of an act depends on what it actually is, not on what the parties choose to call it.

Nothing that is inconvenient is lawful.

Nihil quod inconveniens est licitum est.

Source: Co. Litt. 66a, 97b; Jackson 669; Weisman, 73g

"Inconvenient" here means inconsistent or absurd — a legal outcome that produces absurd or self-contradictory results cannot be lawful.

Under pretext of legality, what is illegal ought not to be admitted.

Sub praetextu legalitatis, non debet admitti illicitum.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 728, max. 196; Weisman, 73a

A lawful label on an unlawful act does not sanitize it — the law strips away pretense and judges the substance of the act.

It is lawful to repel force by force, provided it is done with the moderation of blameless defense, not for the purpose of taking revenge, but to ward off injury.

Vim vi repellere licet, modo fiat moderamine inculpatae tutelae, non ad sumendam vindictam, sed ad propulsandam injuriam.

Source: Co. Litt. 162a; Weisman, 73d

Self-defense is a natural right — but it must be proportionate and defensive, not retaliatory. The force used must match the threat, not exceed it.

Necessity makes lawful what is otherwise not lawful.

Aliquid quod non est licitum in lege, necessitas facit licitum.

Source: 10 Co. 61; Noy, Max.

In cases of true necessity — where the preservation of life or the prevention of greater harm demands immediate action — acts otherwise unlawful are excused. But the necessity must be genuine, not manufactured.

What is done contrary to law is deemed not to have been done.

Quod contra legem fit, pro infecto habetur.

Source: 4 Co. 31

An act performed in violation of law is treated as a nullity — it creates no rights, imposes no obligations, and is regarded as though it never occurred.

The laws are silent amid arms.

Silent leges inter arma.

Source: 4 Inst. 70; Cicero, Pro Milone 4.11; Weisman, 9d

In times of open conflict or armed tumult, the ordinary processes of law are necessarily suspended — but this maxim is a description of fact, not a license for tyranny; the moment arms are laid down, the law resumes its full authority.

The law would rather tolerate a private loss than a public evil.

Lex citius tolerare vult privatum damnum quam publicum malum.

Source: Co. Litt. 152

Between private hardship and public harm, the law accepts the former to prevent the latter — but this is a principle of last resort, not a license to sacrifice individual rights at will. In the American system, this principle is bounded by the Bill of Rights — no public interest can destroy a secured right.

The law of necessity is the law of time — that is, of the present instant.

Lex necessitatis est lex temporis, id est instantis.

Source: Hob. 159; 8 Co. 69; Weisman, 83i

Necessity justifies only what the immediate moment demands — once the emergency passes, the ordinary law resumes. No permanent rule can be built on temporary necessity.

The construction of law obtains the force of law.

Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier, Max.

An authoritative interpretation of a law has the same binding effect as the law itself — courts are bound not only by the text but by its received meaning. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.1.19.)

The voice of legislators is a living voice, to impose laws on things, not on words.

Legislatorum est viva vox, rebus et non verbis, legem imponere.

Source: 10 Co. 101

Legislation addresses realities, not verbal abstractions — the law binds conduct, not language, and its force attaches to substance, not to form.

Not everything that is permitted is honorable.

Non omne quod licet honestum est.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 144; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 52e

The law tolerates many things it does not approve — legality is the floor, not the ceiling, of right conduct.

That which is lawful is constituted or authorized by law; rightful; conformable to law; allowed by law; legitimate; competent.

Source: Ohio Auto. Spr. Co. v. Fender, 141 N.E. 269, 275; Weisman, 73j

(English-origin maxim.) "Lawful" means authorized by law, conformable to law, and legitimate — cite this definition to distinguish lawful authority from mere power exercised without legal sanction.

The principle distinction between the terms 'lawful' and 'legal' is that the former contemplates the substance of law, the latter the form of law.

Source: Black's, 703; Weisman, 73k

(English-origin maxim.) "Lawful" refers to the substance of law (conformity with right and justice) while "legal" refers merely to the form of law (compliance with procedural requirements) — an act may be legal in form yet unlawful in substance.

If the object is to regulate a thing it cannot be prohibited, for the power to regulate is not the power to prohibit.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 90f

(English-origin maxim.) When the People delegate a power to regulate, that delegation does not include the power to destroy through prohibition — a regulatory scheme that operates as a de facto ban exceeds the delegated authority and is void as an act beyond the scope of the trust.

The law makes the government, not the government the law.

Lex facit regem, non rex legem.

Source: Bracton; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 17; C.L.M.; Weisman, 51b

Government derives its existence from law — it cannot place itself above the law that created it.

All political power is inherent in the People by decree of God; none can exist except it be derived from them.

Omnis potestas a Deo est; nulla nisi a Deo ordinata.

Source: American constitutional maxim; cf. Romans 13:1; Va. Declaration of Rights §2 (1776); Weisman, 51o

Sovereignty resides in the People, not in the government. Every exercise of government power must trace back to a grant from the People.

The welfare of the People is the supreme law.

Salus populi est suprema lex.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 12; 13 Co. 139; Broom, Max. 1; Weisman, 71j

The object of government is the protection and preservation of the rights of the People — not its own power or convenience.

The king ought not to be under any man, but under God and under the law, for the law makes the king.

Rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub Deo et lege, quia lex facit regem.

Source: Bracton, lib. 1, c. 5; 12 Co. 65

Government authority is bounded above by God and below by law — it is never above either. This is the constitutional bedrock: government officers are servants of the law, not masters of the People.

Power is not conferred but for the public good.

Potentia non est nisi ad bonum.

Source: Bouvier, Max.

All governmental power exists for the benefit of the governed — power exercised against the public good is power abused and is without lawful authority.

Power ought to follow justice, not precede it.

Potentia debet sequi justitiam, non antecedere.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 11n

Justice determines the rule; power enforces it — when power acts first and seeks justification after, the result is tyranny, not government.

Laws are imposed on things, not on words.

Leges non verbis sed rebus sunt impositae.

Source: Coke, 10 Co. 101; Weisman, 71n

Government action is judged by its substance and effect, not by the label given to it. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.32.)

The end of a thing is to be attended to.

Finis rei attendendus est.

Source: 3 Co. Inst. 51

The end for which government was instituted — protection of rights — determines the measure of its lawful action.

Public necessity is greater than private.

Necessitas publica major est quam privata.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 12; Noy, Max.

When genuine public necessity exists, it takes precedence — but the necessity must be real, not manufactured, and the remedy proportionate. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.6.9.)

The king ought to judge only according to law.

Rex non debet judicare sed secundum legem.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 9

No government officer may exercise discretion contrary to law — all judgments, decisions, and exercises of authority must conform to the law as established, not to the officer's personal will.

It concerns the State that judgments be not rescinded.

Interest reipublicae res judicatas non rescindi.

Source: 2 Inst. 359; Jackson

The finality of judgments serves the public interest by preventing endless relitigation — settled matters should remain settled unless fundamental error of jurisdiction is shown.

It is to the advantage of the State that everyone uses his property properly.

Interest reipublicae ut quilibet re sua bene utatur.

Source: 6 Co. 37; Jackson

Under the monarchy, the Crown's interest in property use was supreme. In the American system, government's interest in the proper use of property is delegated from the People and limited by the owner's natural right — regulation must serve the genuine public good, not merely expand government control over private dominion, and no right may be taken without due process of law.

The king can do nothing other than what he can do by law.

Nihil aliud potest rex quam quod de jure potest.

Source: 11 Co. Rep. 74; Jackson

The sovereign's power is bounded by law — any act beyond what the law authorizes is ultra vires and void.

The government cannot load a citizen with imposition against his will or consent.

Source: 2 Coke, 61; Weisman, 51a; Weisman, 59g

(English-origin maxim.) The government cannot burden a citizen with obligations, taxes, or conditions without lawful authority derived from the consent of the governed — an imposition that exceeds the powers delegated by the People is ultra vires and void.

The laws themselves desire that they should be governed by right.

Source: Co. Litt. 174b; Weisman, 51d; Weisman, 71ee

(English-origin maxim.) The laws themselves demand that they be administered according to right and justice — an officer who administers the law contrary to right acts against the very nature of law.

No one should hold two offices at the same time.

Source: 4 Inst. 100; Weisman, 51e

(English-origin maxim.) Dual office-holding creates conflicts of interest and concentrates power — challenge an official who holds incompatible offices on the ground that the offices cannot lawfully be united in one person.

The absence of him who is employed in the service of the state, should not be prejudicial to him nor to others.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 140; Weisman, 51g

(English-origin maxim.) A person absent on public service shall not be prejudiced thereby — his rights, deadlines, and legal standing are preserved as though he were present, and third parties cannot take advantage of his service-related absence.

Lapse of time does not bar the commonwealth.

Source: 2 Inst. 273; 1 Bl. Comm. 247; Hob. 347; 10 Barb. (N.Y.) 139; 16 Tex. 305; Weisman, 51l

(English-origin maxim.) Under the monarchy, this meant the Crown's claims were never barred by delay. In the American system, the People are the sovereign — their reserved rights are not extinguished by the passage of time, and no government actor may claim that the People waited too long to assert a right that was never surrendered.

Men must turn square corners when they deal with the government.

Source: Rock Island R.R. v. U.S., 254 U.S. 141, 143; Weisman, 51m

(English-origin maxim.) Those who deal with the government must comply strictly with all conditions and requirements — equitable excuses for non-compliance that might work between private parties will not avail against the sovereign.

Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation.

Source: U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652; Weisman, 51n

(English-origin maxim.) Accepting a benefit or privilege from government subjects the recipient to greater regulatory oversight — licensees and grant recipients face conditions that ordinary citizens do not. Government often creates privileges where rights already exist, so that it may regulate what it otherwise cannot. Where the People know and assert their rights, no privilege — and no regulation attached to it — is necessary.

Obedience makes government, not the name by which it is called.

Source: Weisman, 51c; C.L.M.

(English-origin maxim.) The legitimacy of government rests on the voluntary obedience of the People, not on titles or labels — invoke this to argue that a body calling itself "government" has no authority if the People have not consented to obey it, and that any institution demanding obedience must demonstrate its lawful basis for that claim.

Were the executive power not to have a right of restraining the encroachments of the legislative body, the latter would become despotic.

Source: Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws; Weisman, 51j

(English-origin maxim.) The executive power must have the ability to check legislative overreach — without this restraint, the legislature becomes despotic, which is the foundation for the executive veto and separation of powers.

The main object of government is the protection and preservation of personal rights, private property, and public liberties, and upholding the law of God.

Source: Weisman, 51p

(English-origin maxim.) Government exists to protect personal rights, private property, and public liberties — any government action that undermines these objects is contrary to the very purpose for which government was established.

A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, virtue, and original law, are indispensably necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty and good government.

Source: Weisman, 51q

(English-origin maxim.) The People must regularly return to first principles of justice and original law to preserve liberty — cite this constitutional maxim (found in many state constitutions) to justify challenging government drift from foundational limits.

As usurpation is the exercise of power, which another has a right to; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body can have a right to.

Source: Locke, Treat. 2, 18, 199; Weisman, 51r

(English-origin maxim.) Usurpation is exercising power that belongs to another; tyranny is exercising power beyond any lawful right — both are unlawful, but tyranny is the graver offense because no one can ever have a right to it.

The king can do no wrong.

Rex non potest peccare.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 9; 2 Roll. R. 304; Broom, Max. 52

Under the monarchy, this meant the Crown was presumed to act lawfully. There is no king in America — the People are sovereign. When a government officer acts outside his delegated authority, the presumption of lawful action vanishes, and the act is void as ultra vires. The People, as sovereign, can do no wrong because it is from them that all lawful authority flows.

A foreigner is one who is born out of the territory—that is, the government—of the king.

Extraneus est subditus qui extra terram, i.e. potestatem regis, natus est.

Source: 7 Co. 16; Jackson

Citizenship and allegiance attach to the place of birth and the sovereignty under which one is born — a person born outside the jurisdiction owes no natural allegiance to it.

An ambassador fills the place of the king by whom he is sent, and is to be honoured as he is whose place he fills.

Legatus regis vice fungitur a quo destinatur et honorandus est sicut ille cujus vicem gerit.

Source: 12 Co. 17; Jackson; Weisman, 51f

An ambassador or delegate acts in the name and with the authority of the one who sent him — an affront to the delegate is an affront to the principal.

Royal prerogatives pertaining to the Crown depart from the Crown by the consent of the kings.

Libertates regales ad coronam spectantes ex concessione regum a corona exierunt.

Source: 2 Inst. 496; Jackson

Royal prerogatives are not inherent but derived from law; they may be relinquished or limited by the sovereign's own consent or by constitutional constraint.

All subjects are the king’s servants.

Omnes subditi sunt regis servi.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 126; Jackson

The relationship between sovereign and subject is reciprocal — protection in exchange for allegiance, allegiance in exchange for protection.

That which is the property of nobody, belongs to our lord the king.

Quod nullius est, est domini regis.

Source: Fleta, 1. 8; Jackson

Property that belongs to no one reverts to the sovereign — in the American system, to the People collectively through the state.

The king is both legal and politic.

Rex est legalis et politicus.

Source: Lane, 27; Jackson

The sovereign possesses both a legal capacity (bound by law) and a political capacity (exercising discretion within legal bounds) — neither is unlimited.

The king never dies.

Rex nunquam moritur.

Source: Branch, Max. 5th ed. 197; Jackson

The office of sovereign is perpetual even though the holder changes — governmental continuity survives the death of any individual officer.

The king is always presumed to attend to the business of the realm, for the public good of all.

Rex semper praesumitur attendere ardua regni pro bono publico omnium.

Source: 4 Co. 56; Jackson

Government officers are presumed to act in the public interest — but this presumption is rebuttable when their acts demonstrably serve private interests instead.

No summonses or citations are permitted to be served within the king’s palace.

Summonitiones aut citationes nullae liceant fieri infra palatium regis.

Source: 3 Inst. 141; Jackson

The sovereign's residence is immune from service of process, preserving the dignity and uninterrupted function of the sovereign office.

Treasure does not belong to the king, unless no one knows who hid it.

Thesaurus non competit regi, nisi quando nemo scit qui abscondit thesaurum.

Source: 3 Inst. 132; Jackson

Found treasure belongs to the finder unless no owner can be identified, in which case it reverts to the sovereign — the state's claim is secondary to that of any known owner.

A delegated authority cannot be again delegated.

Delegata potestas non potest delegari.

Source: 2 Inst. 597; Broom, Max. 840; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1300; Weisman, 11a

Government power delegated by the People cannot be sub-delegated to private actors, corporations, or agencies without express constitutional authorization.

The derivative power cannot be greater than the original from which it is derived.

Derivativa potestas non potest esse major primitiva.

Source: Noy, Max. 16; Wing. Max. 66; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3; Weisman, 11b

Government cannot exercise a power greater than what the People delegated to it. What the People reserved, the government never possessed.

Nothing is so becoming to authority as to live in accordance with the laws.

Nihil tam proprium imperio quam legibus vivere.

Source: Fleta, lib. 1, c. 17, s. 11; Weisman, 11c

Authority is legitimate only when exercised within the bounds of law. An officer who acts outside the law acts without authority.

No one can do indirectly what he cannot do directly.

Nemo potest facere per obliquum quod non potest facere per directum.

Source: 1 Inst. 56; Broom, Max. 347; Weisman, 2y

A government that lacks authority to regulate a right directly cannot use licensing, taxation, or contract to achieve the same result by indirection. The foundation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.

When anything is commanded, everything by which it can be accomplished is also commanded.

Quando aliquid mandatur, mandatur et omne per quod pervenitur ad illud.

Source: 5 Co. 116; Weisman, 11g

A grant of authority includes the means necessary to exercise it — but no more. The grant must exist before the means can be implied.

A power is strictly interpreted.

Potestas stricte interpretatur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 17, case 29; Weisman, 11p

Government power is construed narrowly. What is not granted is withheld. Ambiguity in a grant of power is resolved against the government and in favor of the People's retained rights.

In the greatest power there is the least freedom [license].

In maxima potentia minima licentia.

Source: Hob. 159; Weisman, 11d

The more powerful the government office, the more tightly bound it is by law. Supreme power carries supreme obligation.

An equal has no power over an equal.

Par in parem non habet imperium.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 174; Broom, Max. 111; Weisman, 11k

One citizen has no inherent authority over another. Government authority exists only by delegation from the People as a whole, not from any individual over another.

The edict of the sovereign contrary to right is of no force.

Rescriptum principis contra jus non valet.

Source: Reg. Civ. Jur.

No executive order, proclamation, or governmental directive that contravenes established right has any validity — the form of authority does not overcome the substance of right.

He who has authority to do the more important act shall not be debarred from doing that of less importance.

Cui licet quod majus non debet quod minus est non licere.

Source: 4 Co. 28; Jackson

He who possesses the greater power is not to be denied the lesser — a grant of authority to do the major act necessarily includes authority for all subordinate acts required to accomplish it.

Lawful authority should receive a strict interpretation, unlawful authority a wide and extended one.

Mandata licita strictam recipiunt interpretationem, sed illicita latam et extensam.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 16; Jackson

Lawful commands are confined to their strict terms to prevent overreach, while unlawful commands are read broadly to expose the full extent of their illegality.

The supreme power may loose, but cannot bind, itself.

Potestas suprema seipsam dissolvere potest, ligare non potest.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 19; Jackson

The highest power can release itself from its own constraints but cannot permanently bind its successors — no legislature can enact an irrepealable statute.

Private loss is compensated by public good.

Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 85; 7 C. B. 266; Jackson

Individual inconvenience may be tolerated when a legitimate public purpose is served — but the public good must be genuine, not a pretext for private benefit.

A delegate cannot have a delegate.

Vicarius non habet vicarium.

Source: Jackson

A deputy or delegate has no power to appoint a sub-deputy — delegated authority rests with the person to whom it was entrusted and cannot be passed further.

A man commanding not too strictly is best obeyed.

Remissus imperanti melius paretur.

Source: 3 Inst. 233; Bouvier, Max.

Authority exercised with temperance earns willing obedience — the officer who governs mildly governs most effectively, while the tyrant breeds resistance.

That power is to no purpose which never comes into act, or which is never exercised.

Source: 2 Coke, 51; Weisman, 11e; Weisman, 11o

(English-origin maxim.) A delegated power that is never actually exercised is as if it did not exist — cite this to argue that an authority claimed but never used has been effectively abandoned or waived.

Power can never be delegated which the authority said to delegate never possessed itself.

Source: N.J. Steam Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. (47 U.S.) 344, 407; Weisman, 11f

(English-origin maxim.) An agent or officer cannot delegate authority that was never granted to the principal in the first place — cite this to challenge subdelegations of power where the original delegating body lacked the authority itself.

Supreme power can dissolve itself.

Source: Bacon, Max. VI; Black's, 2d. 1181; Dav. Ir. KB. 69; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 11h

(English-origin maxim.) The supreme sovereign power has the inherent ability to dissolve itself — this principle underlies the People's right to alter or abolish their form of government when it no longer serves them.

Liberty is the natural power of doing whatever one pleases, except that which is restrained by law or force.

Libertas est naturalis facultas ejus quod cuique facere libet, nisi quod de jure aut vi prohibetur.

Source: Co. Litt. 116; Dig. 1, 5, 4; Inst. 1, 3, 1; Weisman, 47b

The default state of every person is liberty. Restriction is the exception, requiring lawful authority.

He is to be judged impious and cruel who does not favor liberty.

Impius et crudelis judicandus est qui libertati non favet.

Source: Co. Litt. 124; Weisman, 47f

A judge, officer, or legislator who construes law against liberty acts against the very purpose of his office.

Liberty is a thing beyond all price.

Libertas inaestimabilis res est.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 106; Weisman, 47c

Liberty cannot be bargained away, taxed, or valued in money. It is not a commodity subject to exchange.

No man can renounce the country in which he was born, nor abjure the obligation of his allegiance.

Nemo patriam in qua natus est exuere, nec ligeantiae debitum ejurare possit.

Source: Co. Litt. 129; Broom, Max. 75

Under the monarchy, the subject owed perpetual allegiance to the Crown and could not renounce it. In the American system, allegiance flows from birthright, not from government grant — but the natural right of expatriation is recognized. The Declaration of Independence itself was an act of renouncing allegiance, establishing that the People may dissolve political bonds when government ceases to protect their rights.

The civil laws reduce an ungrateful freedman to his original slavery, but the laws of England regard a man once manumitted as ever after free.

Libertinum ingratum leges civiles in pristinam servitutem redigunt; sed leges Angliae semel manumissum semper liberum judicant.

Source: Co. Litt. 187; Jackson

Under the common law of England, once a person is freed from bondage the freedom is permanent and irrevocable — liberty, once granted, cannot be recalled for ingratitude or any other cause.

All men are freemen or slaves.

Source: Inst. 1, 3, pr.; Fleta, 1. 1, c. 1, s. 2; Bouv. 145; Weisman, 47g

(English-origin maxim.) Every person is either free or enslaved — there is no intermediate status. Cite this to resist the creation of quasi-servitudes through licensing regimes, conditions on travel, or administrative controls on liberty.

The laws of nature are immutable.

Jura naturae sunt immutabilia.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bacon, Aph.; Weisman, 74c

Natural rights do not change with the times, with legislation, or with judicial doctrine. What was a right at the founding remains a right today.

Natural liberty is the power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature.

Libertas naturalis est potestas agendi ut quis velit, absque ullo impedimento vel coactione, nisi lege naturae.

Source: 1 Bl. Comm. 125; Weisman, 47h

The only inherent restraint on natural liberty is the law of nature itself — not legislative enactment, not executive decree, not judicial construction.

Individual liberties are antecedent to all government.

Libertates individuales sunt ante omnem gubernationem.

Source: American constitutional maxim; Declaration of Independence (1776); state bills of rights; Weisman, 51i

Rights existed before government was instituted. Government was created to secure rights, not to grant them. What preceded government cannot be taken by government.

What is mine cannot be taken away without my consent.

Quod meum est sine me auferri non potest.

Source: Bouvier, Max.

Property is a natural right — no government, corporation, or individual may deprive a man of what is his except by his own voluntary act or by due process of law.

No one is considered to act with guile, or to be a wrong-doer, who uses his own right.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 55; Broom, Max. 130; Amer. Ins. Co. v. Griswold, 14 Wend. (N.Y.) 399, 492; Weisman, 86k

(English-origin maxim.) No one is considered to act in bad faith or commit a wrong merely by exercising his own legal right — cite this to defeat claims of malice or tortious conduct where the defendant was simply using a right he lawfully possessed.

The right of arms is necessary where laws are deficient.

Jus armorum est necessarium ubi deficiunt leges.

Source: Common law maxim; cf. 2 Inst. 574

When the law fails to protect the citizen, the citizen retains the natural right to protect himself. The right of arms is the last safeguard of all other rights.

The laws permit the taking up of arms against the armed.

Arma in armatos sumere jura sinunt.

Source: 2 Inst. 574; Broom, Max. 26; Weisman, 9a

The right to bear arms includes the right to use them in defense against armed aggression — whether from private actors or tyrannical government.

Jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good, on account of the necessity of dispensing justice.

Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate juris dicundi.

Source: 10 Co. 73a; Weisman, 66e

Jurisdiction exists to serve the public — not to expand government power. When jurisdiction is used against the public interest, it is perverted from its purpose.

One who exercises jurisdiction out of his territory is not obeyed with impunity.

Extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur.

Source: Dig. 2, 1, 20; 10 Co. 77; Story, Confl. Laws §539; Weisman, 66m

An officer acting outside his jurisdictional bounds acts without authority. Obedience to such ultra vires commands is not required and may be dangerous.

Every jurisdiction has its own bounds.

Quaelibet jurisdictio cancelos suos habet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 137; Weisman, 66g

No jurisdiction is unlimited. The limits of jurisdiction are as important as the grant of jurisdiction. What is outside the boundary is beyond the power.

The order of things is confounded if every one preserves not his jurisdiction.

Ordo judiciorum confunditur si unusquisque jurisdictionem suam non servet.

Source: 4 Inst. Proem.; Weisman, 66j

When courts or officers exceed their jurisdiction, the entire legal order breaks down. Jurisdictional limits protect the People by ensuring that no single authority becomes unchecked.

Statutes are confined to their own territory, and have no extraterritorial effect.

Statuta suo clauduntur territorio, nec ultra territorium disponunt.

Source: Story, Confl. Laws §20; Broom, Max.; Weisman, 66d

A state's statutes have no force beyond its borders. A statute of one jurisdiction cannot bind the citizens of another.

The appointment of justices is by the sovereign; but ordinary jurisdiction is from the law.

Designatio justiciariorum est a rege; jurisdictio vero ordinaria a lege.

Source: 4 Inst. 74

While the executive may appoint judges, the jurisdiction those judges exercise comes from the law itself, not from the appointing authority — the judge's power is defined by law, not by the will of whoever placed him on the bench.

Jurisdiction is the power to declare the law; and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.

Source: Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18; Weisman, 66f

(English-origin maxim.) When a court loses jurisdiction over a matter, its only remaining function is to announce that fact and dismiss the case — any order entered after jurisdiction ceases is void.

The grant of jurisdiction implies the grant of all powers necessary to its exercise.

Source: 1 Kent, Comm. 339; Dig. 2, 1, 2; Weisman, 66h

(English-origin maxim.) A court that has been granted jurisdiction over a subject matter possesses all incidental powers necessary to exercise that jurisdiction effectively, without needing a separate grant for each power.

Decisions are, as it were, jurisdictions.

Source: Halk. Max. 73; Weisman, 66n

(English-origin maxim.) Judicial decisions effectively define the boundaries and substance of jurisdiction — each decision is an exercise of jurisdictional power and in turn shapes the scope of that power for future cases.

No one is bound to incapacitate himself.

Nemo tenetur seipsum inhabilitare.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 40; Weisman, 76i

The law will not require a man to destroy his own legal standing or strip himself of rights as a condition of exercising another right.

A corporation is not said to do anything unless it has been deliberated upon collectively.

Universitas vel corporatio non dicitur aliquid facere nisi id sit collegialiter deliberatum.

Source: Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend. (N.Y.) 103, 144; Broom, Max. 694

A municipal corporation or body politic acts only through its formal collective deliberation — individual members acting alone do not bind the body.

Though a testator may have made a mistake in the proper name or in the surname of the legatee, when it is certain who is the person meant, the legacy is nevertheless valid.

Si quidem in nomine, cognomine, praenomine, legatarii testator erraverit, cum de persona constat, nihilominus valet legatum.

Source: Inst. 2, 20, 29; Jackson

A misnomer in a will does not defeat the bequest when the intended recipient can be identified with certainty from the surrounding circumstances.

To him to whom nothing is enough, nothing is base.

Cui parum est nihil, nihil ei turpe est.

Source: 4 Inst. 53; Weisman, 55b

Unchecked appetite — whether for power, wealth, or control — recognizes no moral boundary. The law guards against this tendency by limiting authority to its grant.

Intentions ought to be subordinate to the laws, not the laws to intentions.

Intentio inservire debet legibus, non leges intentioni.

Source: Co. Litt. 314a, 314b; Weisman, 66l

No man's private purpose can override the settled law. This applies with equal force to legislators who attempt to bend the law to their desired ends.

The testator’s intention is to be regarded in wills.

Mens testatoris in testamentis spectanda est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 277; Jackson

In construing a will, the paramount object is to ascertain and give effect to the testator’s intention as expressed in the instrument — technical rules of construction yield to the maker’s manifest purpose.

It is safe not to obey him who has no right.

Tutum est non habenti jus ei non parere.

Source: Hob. 146; Weisman, 34a

Obedience is owed only to lawful authority. An officer who commands without jurisdiction may be lawfully refused — and the refusal is not contempt but right.

A neglected duty often injures as much as a duty wrongfully performed.

Neglecta officii saepe tantum contra bonos interest quantum officium male administratum.

Source: Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 295; Weisman, 34h

The officer who fails to act when duty demands it is as liable as the officer who acts unlawfully. Maladministration includes both commission and omission.

That which concerns all ought to be borne by all.

Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus supportari debet.

Source: 2 Inst. 14; Bracton; Broom, Max. 745; Wingate, Max. 106; Weisman, 34e

Public burdens — taxes, defense, and civic obligation — must be shared equally. No class of persons may be singled out to bear a disproportionate weight.

He who does not do what he ought to do is not deemed to do what he does.

Qui non facit quod facere debet, non videtur facere quod facit.

Source: Branch, Princ.; cf. 4 Co. 24b

A half-performed duty is no duty performed. An officer who goes through the motions without fulfilling the substance of his obligation has done nothing the law recognizes.

He who betrays his country is like the insane sailor who bores a hole in the ship that carries him.

Qui patriam prodit est similis insano nauta qui navem perfundit.

Source: 3 Inst. 36; Weisman, 34f

The officer who undermines the very system of law that gives him authority destroys his own foundation. Treason against the constitution is self-destruction.

Those who do not preserve the law of the land justly incur the brand of infamy.

Qui leges terrae non servant, juste merentur infamiae inustionem.

Source: 3 Inst. 221; Weisman, 34d

Public officers who disregard the law they swore to uphold earn disgrace in the eyes of the law — their dishonor is a matter of public record.

An office ought to be injurious to no one.

Officium nemini debet esse damnosum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 101; Bouvier, Max.

Public office is a trust, not a weapon — the power of office must never be turned against the officer's own constituents or used to harm those it was created to serve.

He who does not repel a wrong when he can, occasions it.

Qui non propulsat injuriam quando potest, infert.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 105c

The duty to act against injustice is not optional for those in authority — passive acquiescence in wrong is itself a form of wrongdoing.

A treasure belongs to the king, and not to the lord of a liberty, unless it be through special words.

Thesaurus competit domino regi, et non domino libertatis, nisi sit per verba specialia.

Source: Fitz. Corone, 281; Jackson

Treasure trove belongs to the Crown by default — a lord of a franchise or liberty has no claim to it unless his grant contains express words conferring that right.

What one cannot do by himself, he cannot do through another.

Quod quis non potest per se, non potest per alium.

Source: 4 Co. 24b; 11 Co. 87a; Jenk. Cent. 237; Weisman, 4c

No man may enlarge his own authority by the artifice of employing an agent — the agent's power can never exceed the principal's.

A mandatary cannot exceed the bounds of his authority.

Mandatarius terminos sibi positos transgredi non potest.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 53; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

An agent or officer who acts beyond the limits of his commission acts without authority — his excess is void and binds no one. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.133.)

An agent, as such, does not have title to the principal's property, although he may be intrusted with possession, and although he may have power to pass title.

Source: Rogers v. U.S. Rubber Co., 20 A.2d 626, 627, 91 N.H. 398; Weisman, 4h

(English-origin maxim.) Mere possession by an agent does not vest title in him — cite this to defeat a claim of ownership by an agent who holds the principal's property, even where the agent has apparent authority to transfer it.

One co-proprietor can exercise no authority over the common property against the will of the other.

Source: Dig. 10, 3, 28; Weisman, 85d

(English-origin maxim.) No co-owner may exercise dominion over common property against the will of another co-owner — cite this to enjoin a partner or joint tenant from unilateral use, alteration, or disposition of shared property.

Property is the proper right by which a man uses his own thing.

Proprietas est jus proprium, quo quis re sua utitur.

Source: Blackstone, 2 Bl. Comm. 2; 1 Bl. Comm. 138

Property is not a privilege granted by government — it is an inherent right of use and dominion over what belongs to a man.

A thing belonging to no one naturally belongs to the first taker.

Res nullius naturaliter fit primi occupantis.

Source: Dig. 41.1.3; 2 Bl. Comm. 258; Taylor v. The Cato, 1 Pet. Adm. 53

Abandoned or ownerless things become the property of whoever first takes possession of them.

Rights of dominion are transferred without title or delivery, by prescription, to-wit, long and quiet possession.

Source: Co. Litt. 113; Weisman, 91y

(English-origin maxim.) Long and quiet possession, undisturbed by any adverse claim, transfers dominion without deed or delivery — time perfects title.

Every innovation disturbs more by its novelty than it benefits by its utility.

Omnis innovatio plus novitate perturbat quam utilitate prodest.

Source: 2 Co. 36; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874)

The law disfavors unnecessary change — established customs and settled property rights should not be lightly overturned for the sake of novelty.

Tenure is a compact contrary to the common nature of the fee, put into a contract.

Tenor est pactio contra communem feudi naturam ac rationem in contractu interposita.

Source: Wright, Ten. 21; Jackson

Tenure modifies the natural freedom of the fee by imposing conditions of service or obligation — it is an artificial arrangement that restricts what would otherwise be absolute ownership.

Every entry on lands without the owner's leave, or authority of law, is a trespass.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 70c

(English-origin maxim.) The right to exclude others from one's land is among the most ancient rights secured by the common law — any unauthorized entry, whether by a private party or a government agent acting without lawful warrant or the owner's consent, constitutes a trespass actionable at law regardless of whether actual damage is shown.

A home is a social unit formed by a family living together in one dwelling.

Domus est societas quaedam a familia cohabitante formata.

Source: Anaya v. Foundation Res. Ins. Co., 414 P.2d 848, 849; Weisman, 54h

The home is defined not by walls but by the family within — a dwelling becomes a home when a family makes it the seat of their common life.

Every person has exclusive dominion over the soil which he absolutely owns; hence such owner has the exclusive right of hunting and fishing on his land, and the waters covering it.

Omnis persona habet exclusivam dominationem super solum quod absolute possidet.

Source: L. Realty Co. v. Johnson, 92 Minn. 363, 365; Weisman, 70j

Absolute ownership carries absolute dominion over every use of the land — including every creature and watercourse upon it.

To present is no more than to give or offer on the spot.

Source: Co. Litt. 120; Weisman, 48p

(English-origin maxim.) To present a thing is to deliver it on the spot — presentment is an immediate, in-person act of giving or offering, not a future promise.

He who is permitted to do the greater may with greater reason do the less.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 21; Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed. 165; Shep. Touch. 429; Weisman, 52f

(English-origin maxim.) He who is authorized to do the greater thing is by necessary implication authorized to do the lesser — a grant of broad power includes every narrower power within it.

A greater inheritance comes to every one of us from right and the laws than from parents.

Major haereditas venit unicuique nostrum a jure et legibus quam a parentibus.

Source: 2 Inst. 56; Weisman, 58kk

The rights and liberties secured by law are a greater patrimony than any estate of land or goods — every man inherits the common law itself.

Consent makes the law.

Consensus facit legem.

Source: Branch, Princ.; BL4 "Consent"; Weisman, 21b

No law, contract, or obligation binds a man without his consent — the foundation of every lawful agreement.

He who can exercise his will has the right to refuse to consent.

Qui potest velle, jus habet nolendi.

Source: Dig. 50, 7, 3

The power to consent necessarily includes the power to withhold consent — no man can be compelled to agree, and any purported consent obtained through coercion, deception, or duress is void. Cite this to challenge government programs or corporate terms that treat silence or participation as consent when no genuine choice was offered.

An individual's power to contract is unlimited.

Source: Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74; Weisman, 24u

(English-origin maxim.) A natural person's freedom to enter contracts is unlimited — the power to bind oneself by agreement is an inherent right that no government may abridge without due process of law.

Every man has liberty to renounce those privileges which have been conferred for his benefit.

Cuilibet licet renuntiare juri pro se introducto.

Source: Code 1, 3, 51; Code 2, 3, 29

A man may freely waive a personal privilege — but he cannot waive a right that belongs to the People, because it is not his alone to surrender.

He who bears the burden should also enjoy the benefit.

Qui sentit onus, sentire debet et commodum.

Source: 1 Co. 99a; Broom, Max. 638; Weisman, 12g

The People who bear the burden of taxation, obedience, and civic duty are entitled to the benefit of protection and liberty — the equation must balance.

It matters not whether a revocation is by words or by acts.

Non refert an quis revocet verbis aut factis.

Source: Cro. Car. 49; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 7b

Conduct inconsistent with a prior grant operates as revocation just as effectively as express words — the People's withdrawal of consent need not be formal.

Whose it is to institute, his it is also to abrogate.

Cujus est instituere, ejus est abrogare.

Source: Broom, Max. 785; Wing. Max.; Weisman, 7k; Weisman, 77e

The power to create includes the power to destroy. The People who established the constitution and government retain the exclusive power to alter or abolish both — no creature of the constitution can claim that power for itself.

A thing is dissolved in the same manner by which it was created.

Eodem modo quo quid constituitur, eodem modo destruitur.

Source: 2 Rolle 21, 39; Jenk. Cent. 74; Broom, Max. 884, 891; 6 Co. 53; Weisman, 24jj

An obligation created by words is dissolved by words; an obligation of consent is dissolved by withdrawal of consent — the remedy mirrors the creation.

All have liberty to renounce those things which have been established in their favor.

Omnes licentiam habere renuntiare his quae pro se introducta sunt.

Source: Code 2, 3, 29; Broom, Max. 625; Weisman, 7i

A man may renounce a personal privilege — but this maxim does not extend to the renunciation of inalienable rights, which are not his alone to surrender.

It is not the rigor but the inexpediency of laws and acts of authority which make them tyrannical.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 25a

(English-origin maxim.) A law does not become tyrannical merely because it is strict; tyranny arises when law serves no just purpose or exceeds the scope of the authority delegated by the People. Legislation that bears no rational connection to the security of natural rights is an act of arbitrary power, not of lawful governance.

He who does not repel an injury when he can, invites it.

Qui non repellit injuriam quando potest, inducit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 271; Weisman, 59f

A man who has the power to resist a wrong and does nothing makes himself partly responsible for the harm that follows — rights must be defended or they will be lost.

An oath has in it three component parts — truth, justice, and judgment: truth is requisite in the party swearing, justice and judgment in the judge administering the oath.

Sacramentum habet in se tres comites, veritatem, justitiam et judicium: veritas habenda est in jurato, justitia et judicium in judice.

Source: 3 Inst. 160; Jackson; Weisman, 84e

The oath binds both the swearer and the officer — the swearer must speak truth, and the judge must administer the oath justly and with sound judgment.

A judge should keep his jurisdiction within the limits of his commission.

Source: 4 Inst. 163; Black's, 2d. 1056; Weisman, 63r

(English-origin maxim.) A judge who exceeds the bounds of his commission acts without authority — every judicial officer must stay within the jurisdiction conferred upon him.

No one maintains an action arising out of his own wrong.

Source: Broom, Max. 297; Weisman, 75i

(English-origin maxim.) A party who caused the very wrong he complains of cannot maintain an action based on that wrong — no man may be both the author of an injury and the claimant for its redress.

Common opinion is good authority in law.

Source: Co. Litt. 186a; Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 528, 577, 49 Am. Dec. 189; Weisman, 17c

(English-origin maxim.) The settled opinion of learned and experienced persons on a point of law or practice carries authoritative weight and may be cited as a legitimate source of legal reasoning.

The king is not bound by any statute if he be not expressly named therein.

Roy n'est lie per ascun statute si il ne soit expressement nosme.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 307; Wharton

The sovereign is not presumed to be included in the operation of a statute unless the statute expressly names him — a principle of construction, not of immunity.

Public and private law is that which is collected from natural principles, either of nations or in states; and what in written law is called *jus*, by the law of England is said to be right.

Jus publicum et privatum est quod ex naturalibus praeceptis, aut gentium, aut civilibus est collectum; et quod in jure scripto jus appellatur, id in lege Angliae rectum esse dicitur.

Source: Co. Litt. 158; Jackson

All law — public and private — derives from natural principles; the English common law term "right" corresponds to the civil law term *jus*, both rooted in the law of nature.

Authority to execute a deed must be given by deed.

Source: 4 Term, 313; Cooper v. Rankin, 5 Binn. (Penn.) 613; Weisman, 30e

(English-origin maxim.) The authority to execute a deed on behalf of another must itself be conferred by deed — a bare parol authorization is insufficient to support a formal conveyance.

Common custom is better than royal grant.

Plus valet vulgaris consuetudo quam regalis concessio.

Source: Co. Cop. § 31; Jackson

A right established by long and general custom of the People carries greater weight than a right conferred by royal privilege; the People's practice outranks the sovereign's gift.

The law is the highest inheritance that the king possesses, for by the law both he and all his subjects are ruled; and if there were no law, there would be neither king nor inheritance.

Le ley est le plus haut enheritance que le roy ad, car per le ley il mesme et touts ses sujets sont rules, et si le ley ne fuit, nul roy ne nul enheritance serra.

Source: 1 J. H. 6, 63; Wharton

The law is supreme over both sovereign and subject; without it, neither authority nor property can exist — the law is the foundation of all order.

Neither time nor place affects the king.

Nec tempus nec locus occurrit regi.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 190; Jackson

Statutes of limitation and rules of venue do not run against the sovereign; the Crown is not barred by lapse of time or confined by locality in asserting its rights.

International law originates in the law of nature and is founded upon certain divine decrees which have separated nations and men.

Jus gentium oritur ex lege naturae et fundatur super certis decretis divinis quae nationes et homines separaverunt.

Source: Co. Litt.; cf. 1 Kent, Comm. 2; Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Proleg.; Weisman, 102e; Weisman, 102h

The law of nations rests on natural law — it is not mere convention but reflects the moral order ordained by Providence for the governance of peoples.

The law of nations is that which regulates the intercourse of nations.

Jus gentium est quod inter gentes regit commercium.

Source: 1 Kent, Comm. 1, 4

International law governs the relations between sovereign nations — it is the framework within which treaties, commerce, and war are conducted.

Conditions are made by the conqueror, to be observed by the conquered.

Conditiones fert victor, quas servat victus.

Source: Maxim of the Law of Nations; Weisman, 102a

The terms of peace belong to the victor — but this maxim is qualified by the next: an unjust aggressor acquires no right, however complete his victory.

An aggressor who puts himself into a state of war with another and unjustly invades another's right can never, by such unjust war, come to have a right over the conquered.

Aggressor qui se in statum belli cum altero ponit, et injuste jus alterius invadit, nunquam per tale bellum injustum jus super victum acquirere potest.

Source: Locke, Two Treatises of Government, bk. 2, c. 16, §176; Weisman, 102j

Conquest by unjust aggression conveys no legitimate sovereignty — right cannot spring from wrong, and a people subjected by force retain their natural rights.

The People have given their governors no power to wage unjust war, for they never had such power themselves.

Populus gubernatoribus suis nullam potestatem dedit bellum injustum gerendi, quia ipsi talem potestatem nunquam habuerunt.

Source: Locke, Two Treatises of Government, bk. 2, c. 16, §179; Weisman, 102l

The government's war power is delegated by the People — since no individual has the natural right to wage unjust war, the People could not delegate that right to their government.

Enemies are those whom we declare war upon, or who declare it against us; all others are traitors or pirates.

Hostes sunt qui nobis vel quibus nos bellum decernimus; ceteri proditores vel piratae sunt.

Source: 7 Co. 24; Weisman, 102f

The law distinguishes between a lawful enemy — entitled to the protections of the law of war — and an outlaw who operates without sovereign authority.

A parish is a place in which the population of a certain church resides.

Parochia est locus quo degit populus alicujus ecclesiae.

Source: 5 Co. 67; Jackson

A parish is defined by its territorial boundaries and the congregation dwelling within them; it is both a geographic and an ecclesiastical unit of the common law.

Where the Divinity is insulted the case is unpardonable.

Nec veniam, laeso numine, casus habet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 167; Weisman, 49a

An offense against the Divine Majesty admits of no pardon through accident or mistake — where sacred things are violated, no plea of inadvertence will serve as defense.