procedural

When enacted law fails, we resort to custom; when custom also fails, we resort to natural reason.

Cum lex deficit, recurritur ad consuetudinem; cum et consuetudo deficit, recurritur ad rationem naturalem.

Source: 2 Rolle 298; Bouvier, Max. 136

Natural law is the ultimate backstop — when statute and custom are both silent, the case must be decided by the law written on nature itself.

No one is presumed to act against nature.

Nemo praesumitur facere contra naturam.

Source: Vinnius, 22 Vin. Abr. 154; Bouvier, Max. 142; Weisman, 74e

Courts will not presume that a party intended an act contrary to the natural order — the burden falls on whoever alleges the unnatural act.

Nature makes no leap; neither does law.

Natura non facit saltum; ita nec lex.

Source: Co. Litt. 238; Jackson 606; Wharton; Weisman, 74i

Law develops by orderly progression, not by sudden leaps — radical departures from established principle are suspect on their face.

Nature desires perfection; so does law.

Natura appetit perfectum; ita et lex.

Source: Hobart 144; Jackson 605; Wharton; Weisman, 74n

Both nature and law aim at completeness — a legal proceeding that falls short of its natural object is defective and should be corrected.

The law regards the order of nature.

Lex spectat naturae ordinem.

Source: Co. Litt. 197b; Jackson 533; Weisman, 74m

Courts must take the natural order into account — a legal result that defies the ordinary course of nature is presumptively wrong.

The Law respects the bonds of nature.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 268, max. 78; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, no. 29; Weisman, 74b

(English-origin maxim.) The law recognizes and protects the natural bonds of family — parent and child, husband and wife — as prior to and superior to any civil enactment.

So far as natural law is concerned, all men are equal.

Quod ad jus naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt.

Source: Dig. 50.17.32; Co. Litt. 122b

The common law, rooted in natural law, recognizes no natural hierarchy among free men — all stand equal before the law.

Things derogatory to the common law are strictly interpreted.

Quae sunt in derogatione juris communis stricte interpretantur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 29, p. 221, case 72; Weisman, 18; Weisman, 18a; Weisman, 18c

Any statute or grant that diminishes common law rights must be read as narrowly as possible — the common law yields only what is expressly taken.

Things introduced contrary to the common law are not to be drawn into precedent.

Quae contra jus commune introducta sunt, non trahi in exemplum debent.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Jenk. Cent. 29

Exceptions carved out of the common law remain exceptions — they must not be expanded by analogy or used to justify further erosion of common law rights.

When in doubt, do not act; but a common error sometimes passes into law.

Quod dubitas, ne feceris; communis error facit jus.

Source: Broom, Max. 139; Co. Litt. 186a

A long-standing and universal mistake of law may, over time, acquire the force of law through common acceptance — but fresh doubts should be resolved by inaction, not innovation.

Many things in the common law have been introduced, for the public good, which are inconsistent with abstract reasoning.

Multa in jure communi, contra rationem disputandi, pro communi utilitate introducta sunt.

Source: Co. Litt. 70b; Broom, Max. 158; 2 Co. 75; Weisman, 71g

The common law is practical, not theoretical — it sometimes adopts rules that serve the public good even when pure logic might point elsewhere.

Custom is the best interpreter of the law.

Optima est legis interpres consuetudo.

Source: Dig. 1.3.37; 2 Inst. 18; Broom, Max. 931; Jenk. Cent. 273

When the meaning of a law is disputed, the long-established practice of the People under that law is the surest guide to its true intent.

Custom is observed as law.

Consuetudo pro lege servatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 113; 4 Co. 21

Courts are bound to recognize and enforce customs that meet the requirements of certainty, reasonableness, and long use.

A custom once disallowed cannot again be brought forward.

Consuetudo semel reprobata non potest amplius induci.

Source: Davies 33; Black's 256; Jackson 156; Weisman, 27s

Once a court has rejected a claimed custom, the same custom cannot be revived in later proceedings — the question is settled.

There should be no departure from a common observance.

A communi observantia non est recedendum.

Source: 2 Co. 74; Co. Litt. 186a; Wing. Max. 203; Weisman, 17a

A long-established legal practice or custom carries the force of law until expressly abrogated — cite this to challenge novel statutory interpretations or administrative rules that depart from settled usage without clear constitutional warrant.

A reasonable custom is to be obeyed like law.

Obtemperandum est consuetudini rationabili tanquam legi.

Source: 4 Co. 88; Jackson; Weisman, 27l

A custom that is both reasonable and long-established carries the binding force of law — courts and parties are obligated to respect it as they would a statute.

Equity is a certain perfect reason which interprets and amends the written law, comprehended in no writing, but consisting in right reason alone.

Aequitas est perfecta quaedam ratio, quae jus scriptum interpretatur et emendat; nulla scriptura comprehensa, sed sola ratione consistens.

Source: Co. Litt. 24b; Jackson 35; Weisman, 36j

Equity operates through reason to correct what the written law, by its generality, gets wrong in a particular case — it is the conscience of the law.

Equity is, as it were, equality.

Aequitas est quasi aequalitas.

Source: Co. Litt. 24; Bouvier, Inst. 3725; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 64

The foundation of equity is equal treatment — it ensures that like cases are treated alike and that no party gains an unjust advantage through technicality.

Equity is the correction of the law where, by reason of its generality, it is deficient.

Aequitas est correctio legis generaliter latae, qua parte deficit.

Source: Plowden 375, 467; Jackson 34; Weisman, 36e

When a general rule produces an unjust result in a specific case, equity steps in to supply what the law omits — it does not destroy the rule but tempers its application.

Equity follows the law.

Aequitas sequitur legem.

Source: Talbot 52; Story, Eq. Jur. s. 64; Co. Litt. 24b; Broom, Max. 151; Weisman, 36r; Weisman, 95t

Equity does not override the law — it supplements it. A court of equity applies legal rules to equitable estates and respects the general policy of the law.

Equity does not make law, but assists law.

Aequitas non facit jus, sed juri auxiliatur.

Source: Lofft 379; Weisman, 36d

Equity is not a rival system of law — it is an auxiliary that fills gaps and prevents injustice where the strict letter of the law falls short.

Equity never counteracts the laws.

Aequitas nunquam contravenit leges.

Source: Black's, 2d. 45; Jackson 37; Weisman, 36o

No court of equity may overturn a clear legal rule — its power is to mitigate and supplement, never to contradict or repeal.

Nothing is more unjust than to extend equity too far.

Nihil iniquius quam aequitatem nimis extendere.

Source: Halkerton 103; Weisman, 36g

Equity that exceeds its proper bounds becomes itself a source of injustice — the remedy must remain proportionate to the wrong.

In all things, but especially in law, equity is to be regarded.

In omnibus quidem, maxime tamen in jure, aequitas spectanda sit.

Source: Dig. 50.17.90; Story, Bailm. s. 257; Weisman, 36m

Every legal proceeding must be measured against equity — a technically correct result that works manifest injustice is not the law's purpose.

Law regards equity.

Jus respicit aequitatem.

Source: Co. Litt. 24b; Broom, Max. 143; Weisman, 36i

The common law itself takes equity into account — rigid application that produces inequitable results is contrary to the spirit of the law.

Equity suffers not a wrong without a remedy.

Aequitas non patitur jus deesse remedium.

Source: Bouvier, Inst. n. 3726; Weisman, 36p

Where a legal wrong exists but no legal remedy reaches it, equity will supply the remedy — the maxim forbids any gap between recognized right and available relief.

The court of chancery is the workshop of justice.

Curia cancellaria est officina justitiae.

Source: Coke, 2 Inst. 552; Weisman, 36l

The equity court exists not to follow rigid forms but to forge practical justice — it adapts its tools to the case at hand.

The precepts of the law are these: to live honorably, to harm no one, to render to every one his due.

Juris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.

Source: Inst. 1.1.3; 1 Bl. Comm. 40; Weisman, 71dd

These three precepts define the entire scope of legal duty — every rule of law is an application of one or more of them.

All law has either been derived from the consent of the people, established by necessity, confirmed by custom, or introduced by Divine Providence.

Omne jus aut consensus fecit, aut necessitas constituit, aut firmavit consuetudo, aut quod his defecit Providentia Divina introduxit.

Source: Dig. 1.3.40; Broom, Max. 616; Weisman, 71gg

There are only four sources of law — consent, necessity, custom, and divine decree. Any purported law that cannot trace its origin to one of these is no law at all.

Laws are made to no purpose except for those who are subject and obedient.

Leges in vanum conficiuntur, nisi iis subjicientibus et obedientibus.

Source: Branch, Princ.; 7 Co. 13; Weisman, 72m

A law that binds no one accomplishes nothing — law derives its force from the obedience of the governed.

The law does not arise from the rule, but the rule from the law.

Non ex regula jus sumatur, sed ex jure quod est regula fiat.

Source: Trayner, Lat. Max. 384; Dig. 50.17.1; Weisman, 95bb

Maxims and rules are summaries of the law, not its source — when the maxim and the underlying law diverge, the law governs.

The foundation being removed, the superstructure falls.

Sublato fundamento, cadit opus.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 106; Broom, Max. 169; Weisman, 95j

Destroy the jurisdictional basis, the constitutional authority, or the factual predicate of a legal proceeding, and the entire proceeding collapses.

An integral part being removed, the whole is taken away.

Sublata parte integrante, tollitur totum.

Source: Coke, 8 Co. 41; Weisman, 95s

When an essential element of a statute, contract, or proceeding is struck down, the remainder cannot stand — the parts depend on the whole.

Reason is the soul of law; when the reason of the law changes, the law itself changes.

Ratio est legis anima; mutata legis ratione, mutatur et lex.

Source: Co. Litt. 70b, 122a; 7 Co. 7; Broom, Max. 159; Jackson 917; Weisman, 71uu

When the underlying reason for a rule has ceased to exist, the rule itself ceases — no law survives the death of the reason that gave it life.

The reason of the law ceasing, the law itself ceases.

Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex.

Source: Co. Litt. 70b; 2 Bl. Comm. 390; Broom, Max. 159; Weisman, 14a; Weisman, 71vv

A statute enacted to address a specific evil or condition becomes void in its application when that evil or condition no longer exists.

Extremities or subtleties of law are not law.

Apices juris non sunt jura.

Source: Co. Litt. 304b; 10 Co. 126; Wing. Max. 19; Broom, Max. 188; Weisman, 71hh

Hair-splitting technical arguments that pervert the clear purpose of a rule are to be rejected — the law is substance, not sophistry.

Law arises from fact.

Ex facto jus oritur.

Source: Broom, Max. 102; Jackson 243; Weisman, 71q; Weisman, 30n

Legal rights and duties arise from concrete facts, not from abstract propositions — the court must first establish the facts before it can apply the law.

The law compels no one to do vain or useless things.

Lex neminem cogit ad vana seu inutilia peragenda.

Source: 5 Co. 21a; Co. Litt. 197b; Broom, Max. 252; Jackson 510; Weisman, 72c; Weisman, 72k

No court order or statutory requirement can lawfully demand a futile act — if compliance would serve no purpose, the requirement is void.

The laws are adapted to those cases which most frequently occur.

Ad ea quae frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur.

Source: 2 Inst. 187; Dig. 1.3.3

Law cannot anticipate every possible circumstance — it addresses the ordinary course of events, and rare or extraordinary cases do not invalidate a rule that serves the common situation.

The operation of the law is firmer and more powerful than the will of man.

Firmior et potentior est operatio legis quam dispositio hominis.

Source: Co. Litt. 102a; Weisman, 71tt

No private arrangement can override what the law itself commands — the legal consequences attached to an act by operation of law prevail over any contrary intention of the parties.

Later laws prevail over those which preceded them.

Constitutiones tempore posteriores potiores sunt his quae ipsas praecesserunt.

Source: Dig. 1.4.4; Weisman, 88f

When two laws conflict and cannot be reconciled, the later enactment governs — the sovereign will most recently expressed is the one in force.

An adjournment is to appoint a day or to give a day.

Adjournamentum est ad diem dicere seu diem dare.

Source: 4 Inst. 27; Jackson; Weisman, 65z

An adjournment is not a dismissal but a continuance — the matter remains pending and must be taken up on the appointed day.

Alienation of property is favoured by the law rather than accumulation.

Alienatio rei praefertur juri accrescendi.

Source: Co. Litt. 185a; Jackson

The law favors the free transfer of property over its indefinite accumulation in one hand — policies that restrict alienation are disfavored.

To conceal is one thing, to be silent another.

Aliud est celare, aliud tacere.

Source: Jackson

Mere silence is not fraud, but active concealment is — the distinction between withholding information and affirmatively hiding it determines liability.

That which is assigned takes with it for its use the rights of the assignor.

Assignatus utitur jure auctoris.

Source: Hal. Max. 14; Jackson

An assignee stands in the shoes of his assignor and acquires no greater right than the assignor possessed — one cannot transfer more than one has.

Against a man denying principles there is no disputing.

Contra negantem principia non est disputandum.

Source: Co. Litt. 343; Jackson

One who refuses to accept first principles places himself beyond the reach of rational argument — debate requires shared premises. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.1.12.)

The body — i.e. the gist — of the offence.

Corpus delicti.

Source: Jackson

Before any person can be convicted of a crime, the corpus delicti — the fact that a crime was actually committed — must first be established by evidence independent of any confession.

A deceiver deals in general terms.

Dolosus versatur in generalibus.

Source: 2 Co. 34; Jackson; Weisman, 29c

Vague and general language in a contract or representation is a hallmark of fraud — the honest party speaks with specificity, while the deceiver hides behind ambiguity. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.6.13, 7.2.14.)

Those things which seldom happen are not rashly to be taken into account in transacting business.

Ea quae raro accidunt, non temere in agendis negotiis computantur.

Source: D. 50, 17, 64; Jackson; Weisman, 35l

The law does not require parties to guard against every remote contingency — reasonable foresight, not perfect foresight, is the standard.

To refer errors to their principles is to refute them.

Errores ad sua principia referre, est refellere.

Source: 3 Inst. 15; Jackson; Wharton; Weisman, 37j

The surest way to expose a legal error is to trace it back to the principle from which it claims to derive — when the principle does not support the conclusion, the error is laid bare.

An event is that which follows from the cause; and is called an event because it results from causes.

Eventus est qui ex causa sequitur; et dicitur eventus quia ex causis evenit.

Source: 9 Co. 81; Jackson; Weisman, 38a

The law traces consequences to their causes — liability attaches to the cause, not to the mere occurrence of the event.

Examples illustrate, but do not restrict, the law.

Exempla illustrant, non restringunt, legem.

Source: Co. Litt. 240; Jackson; Weisman, 22l

Examples given in a statute or instrument serve to clarify its meaning but do not limit its scope — the law extends beyond the specific instances named.

Fee-tail — that is, an inheritance within a certain limit.

Feodum taliatum, i.e. haereditas in quandam certitudinem limitata.

Source: Litt. § 18; Jackson

A fee-tail restricts the inheritance to a particular line of heirs — the estate descends only to the specified class and reverts when that line is exhausted.

We generally interpret in favour of the promisor.

Fere secundum promissorem interpretamur.

Source: D. 45, 1, 99; Jackson

Ambiguities in an obligation are construed in favor of the one who made the promise — the promisor is not held to more than he clearly undertook.

The end puts an end to litigations.

Finis finem litibus imponit.

Source: 3 Co. 78; Jackson; Weisman, 75h

A final judgment concludes the dispute — the law demands that litigation reach an end and that parties be bound by the outcome.

Navigable rivers and ports are public; therefore the right of fishing there is common to all.

Flumina et portus publica sunt, ideoque jus piscandi omnibus commune est.

Source: Jackson

Navigable waters are held in common for the benefit of all the People — no private party may monopolize what belongs by nature to the public.

Happy is he who can apprehend the causes of things.

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.

Source: Co. Litt. 231; Jackson

Understanding the root causes of legal disputes, rather than merely their symptoms, is the mark of true legal wisdom.

The custody of the law is stronger than that of man.

Fortior est custodia legis quam hominis.

Source: 2 Rol. Rep. 325; Jackson

Property or persons in the custody of the law are more securely held than in any private custody — the protection of law is the strongest safeguard available.

The law does not regard the fraction of a day.

Fractionem diei non recipit lex.

Source: Lofft, 572; Jackson

For purposes of legal computation, a day is treated as an indivisible unit — the law does not generally inquire into what hour of the day an act was performed.

Inheritance never ascends.

Hereditas nunquam ascendit.

Source: Glanville, l. 7, c. 1; Jackson

Under the feudal rule, property descended to heirs below but never passed upward to ancestors — this maxim was later modified by statute in most jurisdictions.

Homicide, or the slaughter of a man, is the killing of a man by a man.

Homicidium vel hominis caedium, est hominis occisio ab homine facta.

Source: 3 Inst. 54; Jackson

Homicide is defined by its essential elements — the killing of one human being by another — and includes all degrees from justifiable to criminal.

Wicked rumours spread abroad are the forerunners of rebellion.

Improbi rumores dissipati sunt rebellionis prodromi.

Source: 2 Inst. 226; Jackson

False and malicious reports, when circulated among a people, breed discontent and lawlessness — this maxim warns that seditious falsehood is a harbinger of insurrection, not a harmless exercise of speech.

Speech is the indication of thought.

Index animi sermo est.

Source: Jackson

A person’s words are taken as evidence of his intent — the law judges the mind by what the mouth declares.

Want of finality in law is reprehensible.

Infinitum in jure reprobatur.

Source: 9 Co. 45; Jackson

The law abhors endless proceedings — every dispute must reach a final determination, and procedural devices that perpetuate litigation are disfavored.

In law every definition is dangerous.

In jure omnis definitio periculosa est.

Source: Jackson

Legal definitions risk being either too broad or too narrow — a rigid definition may exclude what should be included or include what should be excluded.

All things are presumed against a despoiler.

In odium spoliatoris omnia praesumuntur.

Source: 1 Vern. 19; Jackson; Weisman, 39t; Weisman, 39v; Weisman, 105j

One who destroys or conceals evidence is presumed to have done so because the evidence was against him — every inference is drawn against the spoliator.

He who finds a notorious libel and does not destroy it is punished.

Inveniens libellum famosum et non corrumpens punitur.

Source: Moor. 813; Jackson

At common law, a libelous publication was considered so dangerous to the peace that anyone who found one and failed to destroy it was punishable — the maxim reflects the severity with which the common law treated defamatory writings.

Let the interpretation be always such that the disposition may prevail.

Ita semper fiat relatio ut valeat dispositio.

Source: 6 Co. Rep. 76; Jackson

When construing a legal instrument, the interpretation that gives effect to the intended disposition is preferred over one that defeats it.

The law of England is a law of mercy.

Lex Angliae est lex misericordiae.

Source: 2 Inst. 315; Jackson

The English common law tradition, inherited by the American system, is grounded in mercy — harsh or oppressive constructions are disfavored whenever a merciful reading is available.

The law punishes a lie.

Lex punit mendacium.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 15; Jackson; Weisman, 71m

Falsehood before a tribunal — whether by perjury, fraud, or suppression of truth — is punishable because the administration of justice depends on truthful testimony.

Natural allegiance is restrained by no barriers, reined by no bounds, stopped by no limits.

Ligeantia naturalis nullis claustris coercetur, nullis metis refrenatur, nullis finibus premitur.

Source: 7 Co. 10; Jackson

The natural-born allegiance a man owes to the land of his birth is universal and cannot be confined by territorial boundaries or artificial distinctions.

A manor is called from “manendo,” according to its excellence, a seat, great, fixed, and firm.

Manerium dicitur a manendo, secundum excellentiam, sedes magna, fixa et stabilis.

Source: Co. Litt. 58; Jackson

The manor, as the permanent seat of lordship and governance, signifies stability — its fixed nature is the basis of the feudal land tenure system and the rights attached thereto.

The right of coining money is comprehended amongst those rights of royalty which are never separated from the kingly sceptre.

Monetandi jus comprehenditur in regalibus quae nunquam a regio sceptro abdicantur.

Source: Dav. 18; Jackson

The power to coin money is a sovereign prerogative that cannot be delegated away — in the American system, this power is vested exclusively in Congress by Article I, Section 8.

A negative destroys a negative, and both make an affirmative.

Negatio destruit negationem, et ambo faciunt affirmativum.

Source: Co. Litt. 146; Jackson; Weisman, 95z

In the construction of legal instruments, a double negative creates an affirmative — “not without consent” means “with consent.”

Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.

Negligentia semper habet infortuniam comitem.

Source: Co. Litt. 246; Jackson

He who neglects his duty or his property invites harm — negligence is the mother of loss, and the law does not relieve those who fail to exercise ordinary care.

No one is presumed to be forgetful of his own eternal welfare, and more particularly in the moment of death.

Nemo presumitur esse immemor suae aeternae salutis, et maxime in articulo mortis.

Source: 6 Co. 76; Jackson; Weisman, 103l

Deathbed declarations are given special weight because a person facing death is presumed to speak truthfully, being mindful of his eternal soul and the judgment to come.

Nothing more preserves in tranquillity and concord those subjected to the Government than a due administration of the laws.

Nihil infra regnum subditos magis conservat in tranquillitate et concordia quam debita legum administratio.

Source: 2 Inst. 158; Jackson

Public peace depends on faithful law enforcement — when officials administer the law justly and consistently, order follows; when they do not, discord and resistance arise.

Not what the testator wished, but what he said, is considered in construing a will.

Non quod voluit testator, sed quod dixit in testamento inspicitur.

Source: Jackson

Courts construe wills by the words actually used, not by speculation about unexpressed intent — the written text governs over any alleged secret purpose.

Confirmation is not valid unless he who confirms is either in possession of the thing itself or of the right of which confirmation is to be made; and in like manner, unless he to whom confirmation is made is in possession.

Non valet confirmatio, nisi ille, qui confirmat, sit in possessione rei vel juris unde fieri debet confirmatio; et eodem modo, nisi ille cui confirmatio fit, sit in possessione.

Source: Co. Litt. 295; Jackson; Weisman, 20g

A confirmation conveys no interest unless both parties — the confirmer and the person confirmed — already hold some interest in the subject matter.

All crimes done openly are lighter.

Omnia delicta in aperto leviora sunt.

Source: 8 Co. 127; Jackson

Offenses committed openly are treated less severely than those done in secret — concealment implies a consciousness of guilt that aggravates the offense.

Partners are, as it were, capable of a share, or taking a part, because the thing is common among them by reason of the plurality of persons.

Participes, quasi partis capaces, sive partem capientes, quia res inter eas est communis, ratione plurium personarum.

Source: Co. Litt. 146; Jackson

The concept of partnership rests on shared ownership — each partner holds a proportionate interest in the common property, and none may claim the whole to the exclusion of the others.

It is not enough that sentence be given unless it be carried to execution.

Parum est latam esse sententiam nisi mandetur executioni.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; Jackson

A judgment without enforcement is an empty declaration — the administration of justice is complete only when the sentence is actually executed.

Protection begets subjection, and subjection protection.

Protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem.

Source: Co. Litt. 65; Jackson

The duty of allegiance and the right to protection are reciprocal — when the sovereign protects, the subject owes obedience; when the sovereign fails to protect, the obligation of allegiance is correspondingly diminished.

What is not read is not believed.

Quod non legitur non creditur.

Source: 4 Inst. 304; Jackson; Weisman, 69t

A document not produced and read before the tribunal has no evidentiary weight — the court believes only what has been properly placed before it.

The law requires not what is vain and useless.

Quod vanum et inutile est, lex non requirit.

Source: Co. Litt. 319; Jackson

The law never demands a futile act — compliance with a requirement that would serve no purpose is not legally compelled.

We dispense with the forms of law rather than that crimes and wrongs should go unpunished.

Receditur a placitis juris potius quam injuriae et delicta maneant impunita.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 12; Jackson

Procedural technicalities must not become shields for injustice — when rigid adherence to form would allow a wrong to escape correction, the form yields.

Resignation is a spontaneous relinquishment of one’s own right.

Resignatio est juris proprii spontanea refutatio.

Source: Godb. 284; Jackson

A voluntary resignation extinguishes the right resigned — once freely relinquished, the right cannot be reclaimed absent fraud or duress in the act of resignation.

The value of a thing is estimated according to its worth in money; but the value of money is not estimated by reference to the thing.

Res per pecuniam aestimatur et non pecunia per res.

Source: 9 Co. 76; Jackson; Weisman, 35r

Money is the universal standard of value by which all other things are measured — damages are assessed in monetary terms because money provides the common denominator for compensation.

Where the number of witnesses is equal on both sides, the more worthy are to be believed.

Testibus deponentibus in pari numero dignioribus est credendum.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson

When conflicting testimony is evenly balanced, the credibility and character of the witnesses determine which side prevails — quality of testimony outweighs quantity.

Where a common remedy ceases, there recourse must be had to an extraordinary one.

Ubi cessat remedium ordinarium ibi decurritur ad extraordinarium.

Source: 4 Co. 93; Jackson; Weisman, 94n

When ordinary legal processes are inadequate, the court may grant extraordinary relief such as writs of mandamus, prohibition, or habeas corpus to prevent a failure of justice.

The law gives no more than is demanded.

Droit ne done pluis que soit demande.

Source: 2 Inst. 286; Wharton

A court cannot award relief beyond what the plaintiff has asked for — the scope of the remedy is limited by the scope of the demand.

A strong presumption avails in law.

Praesumptio violenta valet in lege.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 56; Wharton; Weisman, 89b

A violent or compelling presumption has the force of proof — when the circumstances point overwhelmingly in one direction, the law treats the presumption as equivalent to direct evidence. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.3.3.)

When anything is prohibited, everything by which it is reached is prohibited.

Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur omne per quod devenitur ad illud.

Source: 2 Inst. 48; Wharton; Weisman, 90b

A prohibition extends to every means of accomplishing the forbidden act — one cannot evade the law by achieving the same result through a different method.

Reason and authority are the two brightest lights of the world.

Ratio et auctoritas duo clarissima mundi lumina.

Source: 4 Inst. 320; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 11u

Law is sustained by two pillars: the rational principle that justifies it and the legitimate authority that enforces it — neither alone is sufficient. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.1.13.)

Whatever is against the rule of right is a wrong.

Quicquid est contra normam recti est injuria.

Source: 3 Bulstr. 313; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 105h

Right and wrong are measured against an objective standard — any act that departs from that standard is an injury, regardless of whether a statute authorizes it.

There is no fiction without law.

Nunquam fictio sine lege.

Source: Bouvier, Max.

Legal fictions exist only because the law creates and sanctions them for a specific purpose — no court may invent a fiction without lawful authority.

What ought not to be done, when done, is valid.

Quod fieri non debet, factum valet.

Source: 5 Coke, 38, 39; Nichols v. Ketchan, 19 Johns. (N.Y.) 84, 92; Weisman, 62e

An irregular but not void act remains effective — a deed delivered on Sunday or a marriage performed by an unauthorized person may be merely voidable, not void, and courts will not undo what is already accomplished if no jurisdictional defect exists.

Legal form is essential form.

Forma legalis forma essentialis.

Source: Coke, 10 Co. 100; Weisman, 46b

The forms prescribed by law are not optional niceties — they are essential to the validity of the act, and their omission destroys the proceeding. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.11.)

Form gives being.

Forma dat esse.

Source: Black's 514 (called "the old physical maxim"); Weisman, 46a

A thing has legal existence only when it has assumed its proper form — without the prescribed form, it is a nullity regardless of intent.

Where form is not observed, a nullity of the act is inferred.

Ubi forma non observatur, infertur adnullatio actus.

Source: Coke, 12 Co. 7; Weisman, 46c

An act performed without the required legal form has no legal effect — it cannot create rights, impose duties, or bind any party.

Where the law prescribes a form, the nonobservance of it is fatal to the proceeding.

Ubi lex aliquam formam praescribit, non observatio formae est fatalis.

Source: Best, Ev. Introd. s. 59; Weisman, 46d

A warrant without a signature, an indictment without a charge, a deed without a seal (where seal is required) — all are void for want of form.

The law regards the substance of a thing more than its form.

Lex respicit substantiam rei magis quam formam.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 382, max. 101; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3

Where the essential form has been observed, minor defects in form do not vitiate the act — the law looks through form to substance, punishing sham and rewarding reality.

Simplicity is favorable to the laws, and too much subtlety in law is to be rejected.

Simplicitas est legibus amica; et nimia subtilitas in jure reprobatur.

Source: Coke, 4 Co. 8; Weisman, 44k; Weisman, 71cc

Legal proceedings should be simple and direct — complexity for its own sake obscures justice and serves only those who profit from confusion.

A beneficial law affords a remedy in a similar case.

Lex beneficialis rei consimili remedium praestat.

Source: 2 Inst. 689

When a law provides a remedy for one class of injury, equity extends that remedy to similar injuries — the law does not leave a man without recourse merely because his case is not identical to the one expressly provided for.

The law provides for the future; the judge for the past.

Lex de futuro, judex de praeterito.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 63i

The legislature speaks to future conduct; the judge resolves past disputes. Neither should trespass upon the other's domain.

The law cannot fail in dispensing justice.

Lex deficere non potest in justitia exhibenda.

Source: Co. Litt. 197

If the law appears to fail a party seeking justice, the fault lies in the application, not in the law itself. A court must find a way to do justice within the law.

The law always abhors delay.

Lex dilationes semper exhorret.

Source: 2 Inst. 240

Prompt administration of justice is a fundamental principle — delay is the enemy of right, and procedural devices used to obstruct justice are looked upon with disfavor.

The law creates a fiction where equity subsists.

Lex fingit ubi subsistit aequitas.

Source: 11 Co. 90; Weisman, 45e

Legal fictions are permitted only to serve the ends of equity and justice — the law feigns what it must in order to produce a just result, but never to produce an unjust one.

The law judges of things which must necessarily be done as if actually done.

Lex judicat de rebus necessario faciendis quasi re ipsa factis.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 64w

When the law requires an act, and the act must inevitably follow, the law treats it as already accomplished — formalism yields to substance.

The law never works an injury, nor does any man a wrong.

Lex nemini operatur iniquum, nemini facit injuriam.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 22

The law, correctly applied, is incapable of producing injustice — when an unjust result appears, it is the application that has erred, not the law itself.

The law commands no useless things, because useless labor is foolish.

Lex non praecipit inutilia, quia inutilis labor stultus.

Source: Co. Litt. 197

The law does not require men to perform acts that serve no legal purpose — compliance with meaningless formalities is not demanded.

The law intends nothing impossible.

Lex non intendit aliquid impossibile.

Source: 12 Co. 89

The law does not command what cannot be done. Where compliance is genuinely impossible, the obligation is excused.

The law does not require that to be proved which is apparent to the court.

Lex non requirit verificare quod apparet curiae.

Source: 9 Co. 54

What is already manifest to the court needs no formal proof — judicial notice dispenses with the necessity of proving the obvious.

The law sometimes follows equity.

Lex aliquando sequitur aequitatem.

Source: 3 Wils. 119

Where strict law and equity diverge, the law bends toward the equitable result — rigidity in the law is tempered by the demands of justice.

The custom of making and remaking laws is most dangerous.

Legis figendi et refigendi consuetudo periculosissima est.

Source: 4 Co. Ad Lect.

Frequent legislative change undermines stability and predictability — the People cannot order their affairs when the rules shift constantly beneath them.

One who commands lawfully must be obeyed.

Legitime imperanti parere necesse est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 120; Weisman, 11s

Lawful authority commands obedience — but the emphasis falls on "lawfully." An unlawful command binds no one.

Although alienation be prohibited, yet by the consent of all those in whose favour it is prohibited it may take place; for it is in the power of every man to renounce a law made in his own favour.

Alienatio licet prohibeatur, consensu tamen omnium in quorum favorem prohibita est potest fieri.

Source: Co. Litt. 98; Jackson

A restriction on alienation may be waived by the unanimous consent of those the restriction was designed to protect — every person has the right to renounce a benefit conferred for his own advantage.

A law is not obligatory unless it has been promulgated.

Non obligat lex nisi promulgata.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 72b

A law that has not been published and made known to the People cannot bind them — no one is obliged to obey what he has no means of knowing.

That which is or lawful in the less shall be lawful in the greater; and that which is not lawful in the greater shall neither be lawful in the less.

Source: Co. Litt. 260a; 8 Coke, 48; Weisman, 73h

(English-origin maxim.) What is lawful in the lesser case is also lawful in the greater, and what is unlawful in the greater is also unlawful in the lesser — use this to argue by analogy from established precedent to a stronger or weaker case.

No free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.

Nullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur, aut disseisiatur, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur; nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terrae.

Source: Magna Carta, c. 29 (1215); 2 Inst. 45; Broom, Max. 76

The foundational restraint on all government power over the person. Due process of law — not legislative will — is the only lawful mechanism.

The law is not to be violated by those in government.

Lex non a rege est violanda.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 7; Weisman, 51k

The government officer who violates the law he is sworn to uphold commits a breach of trust.

Silence in the senate is a fault.

Silentium in senatu est vitium.

Source: 12 Co. 94

Legislators who remain silent when they should speak — when rights are being infringed, when unconstitutional measures are proposed — are guilty of a dereliction of duty. The office demands active fidelity, not passive acquiescence.

Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation.

Source: U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652; Weisman, 51n

(English-origin maxim.) Accepting a benefit or privilege from government subjects the recipient to greater regulatory oversight — licensees and grant recipients face conditions that ordinary citizens do not. Government often creates privileges where rights already exist, so that it may regulate what it otherwise cannot. Where the People know and assert their rights, no privilege — and no regulation attached to it — is necessary.

Liberty is more favored than all things.

Libertas omnibus rebus favorabilior est.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 122; Weisman, 47e

In any conflict between government power and individual liberty, liberty is the favored position. The burden is on the government to justify the restriction.

Where there is a right, there is a remedy.

Ubi jus, ibi remedium.

Source: Broom, Max. 191; 1 Term R. 512; Co. Litt. 197b; Weisman, 94a

A right without a remedy is no right at all. If government infringes a right, the law must provide recourse.

Jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good, on account of the necessity of dispensing justice.

Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate juris dicundi.

Source: 10 Co. 73a; Weisman, 66e

Jurisdiction exists to serve the public — not to expand government power. When jurisdiction is used against the public interest, it is perverted from its purpose.

One who exercises jurisdiction out of his territory is not obeyed with impunity.

Extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur.

Source: Dig. 2, 1, 20; 10 Co. 77; Story, Confl. Laws §539; Weisman, 66m

An officer acting outside his jurisdictional bounds acts without authority. Obedience to such ultra vires commands is not required and may be dangerous.

Every jurisdiction has its own bounds.

Quaelibet jurisdictio cancelos suos habet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 137; Weisman, 66g

No jurisdiction is unlimited. The limits of jurisdiction are as important as the grant of jurisdiction. What is outside the boundary is beyond the power.

A judgment given by one who is not the proper judge is of no force.

Judicium a non suo judice datum nullius est momenti.

Source: Lofft 458; 10 Co. 76; Weisman, 64a

A court acting without subject-matter or personal jurisdiction renders a void judgment, no matter how formally correct the proceedings.

The order of things is confounded if every one preserves not his jurisdiction.

Ordo judiciorum confunditur si unusquisque jurisdictionem suam non servet.

Source: 4 Inst. Proem.; Weisman, 66j

When courts or officers exceed their jurisdiction, the entire legal order breaks down. Jurisdictional limits protect the People by ensuring that no single authority becomes unchecked.

Statutes are confined to their own territory, and have no extraterritorial effect.

Statuta suo clauduntur territorio, nec ultra territorium disponunt.

Source: Story, Confl. Laws §20; Broom, Max.; Weisman, 66d

A state's statutes have no force beyond its borders. A statute of one jurisdiction cannot bind the citizens of another.

The appointment of justices is by the sovereign; but ordinary jurisdiction is from the law.

Designatio justiciariorum est a rege; jurisdictio vero ordinaria a lege.

Source: 4 Inst. 74

While the executive may appoint judges, the jurisdiction those judges exercise comes from the law itself, not from the appointing authority — the judge's power is defined by law, not by the will of whoever placed him on the bench.

Status is the legal condition of a person.

Status est conditio legalis personae.

Source: Black's Law Dict. (2d) 1107; Dig. 1, 5, 1; Weisman, 76c

Legal status — such as infancy, outlawry, citizenship, or marriage — determines what acts a person may perform and what rights he may exercise.

A status once established is presumed by law to continue until the contrary appears.

Status semel constitutus praesumitur manere donec contrarium appareat.

Source: Kidder v. Stevens, 60 Cal. 414, 419; Broom, Max. 944; Weisman, 76f

One who was proved competent at one time is presumed competent until evidence to the contrary is produced. The burden lies on him who asserts the change.

Impersonality neither concludes nor binds.

Impersonalitas non concludit nec ligat.

Source: Co. Litt. 352b; Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims no. 808; Weisman, 61g

A vague or impersonal charge or claim binds no one. The law requires that parties be specifically named and identified.

A personal connection equals, in law, a man’s own proper interest.

Persona conjuncta aequiparatur interesse proprio.

Source: Bac. Max. 18; Jackson

A party closely connected by blood or legal relationship is treated as having the same interest as one’s own — this applies when determining standing, interest in litigation, or the right to act on behalf of a connected party.

An error in the name is nothing when there is certainty as to the body or person.

Nil facit error nominis cum de corpore vel persona constat.

Source: 11 Co. 21; Broom, Max. 634; 2 Kent, Comm. 292; Weisman, 81b

A misspelling or mistake in a name does not defeat a proceeding when the true identity of the party is clear from the circumstances.

The presence of the body cures an error in the name; the truth of the name cures an error in the description.

Praesentia corporis tollit errorem nominis; et veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis.

Source: Broom, Max. 637, 639, 640; Bacon, Max. reg. 25; 6 T.R. 675; Weisman, 81j

When the person or thing is physically present and identified, no mistake in the written name can defeat jurisdiction or process.

From a great number of signs, true identity is ascertained.

Ex multitudine signorum colligitur identitas vera.

Source: Bacon, Max. 103, reg. 25, 29; Broom, Max. (3d Lond. ed.) 569; Weisman, 56a

Identity is established not by a single mark but by the convergence of multiple distinguishing characteristics — the same principle that governs identification of persons, things, and legal instruments.

A name is called from the word "to know," because it makes recognition.

Nomen dicitur a noscendo, quia notitiam facit.

Source: 6 Co. 65; Jackson

The purpose of a name is identification — it exists to make a person or thing knowable and distinguishable, so that legal rights and obligations can attach to the correct party.

He acts with guile who demands that which he will have to return.

Dolo facit qui petit quod restituere oportet.

Source: Broom, Max. 346; Dig. 50, 17, 173, 3; Weisman, 55f

One who brings a claim knowing he has no right to retain the remedy sought acts fraudulently and will be met with an equitable defense.

Discretion is to know through the law what is just.

Discretio est scire per legem quid sit justum.

Source: 10 Co. 140; Weisman, 69a

True discretion is not personal preference — it is the informed application of settled legal principles to the facts at hand.

By reasoning we arrive at lawful reason.

Ratione pervenitur ad legitimam rationem.

Source: Litt. s. 386; Co. Litt. 232b

Legal conclusions must be reached through a chain of reasoning traceable to established principles — not by decree or arbitrary assertion.

To know and to be bound to know are regarded in law as equivalent.

Scire et scire debere aequiparantur in jure.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 551; Bouvier, Law Dict. 129; Weisman, 69l

Constructive knowledge is as potent as actual knowledge. One who should have known the law or the facts is treated as if he did know them.

No one is compelled to sell his own property, even at a just price.

Nemo cogitur rem suam vendere, etiam justo pretio.

Source: Lofft, 569; Weisman, 91ee

A man's property is his own and cannot be taken from him by compulsion, even upon the offer of fair market value — the right of the owner to refuse to sell is absolute, and no government or private party may force a sale against the owner's will without his consent.

It profits little to know what ought to be done, if you do not know how it is to be done.

Parum est scire quid fieri debet, si non cognoscas quomodo sit facturum.

Source: 2 Inst. 503; Weisman, 69x

Knowledge of a right is worthless without knowledge of the remedy — the common law provides both the right and the procedure to enforce it.

Many men know many things; no man knows everything.

Multi multa, nemo omnia novit.

Source: 4 Inst. 348; Weisman, 69s

The law does not demand omniscience. It requires reasonable diligence — not perfection of knowledge.

Plain truths need not be proved.

Perspicua vera non sunt probanda.

Source: Co. Litt. 16; Bouvier, Max.

What is self-evident requires no proof — the law does not demand that a party prove what every reasonable man already knows to be true. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.4.8.)

Ignorance of the law does not excuse.

Ignorantia juris non excusat.

Source: 4 Bouv. Inst. no. 3828; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 111; 2 Co. 36; 4 Bl. Comm. 27; Broom, Max. 253

Every man is presumed to know the law. This presumption is necessary to the functioning of any legal system — without it, the most brazen violator would have the readiest defense.

Ignorance of the law excuses no one, for all are presumed to know the law.

Ignorantia legis neminem excusat; omnes enim praesumuntur legem scire.

Source: 1 Co. 177; Broom, Max. 253; Rankin v. Mortimere, 7 Watts (Pa.) 374

The presumption of legal knowledge is universal and cannot be rebutted by a claim of personal unfamiliarity with the law.

That which is first in intention is last in operation.

Source: Bacon, Max; Weisman, 60b

(English-origin maxim.) The ultimate purpose of an act is conceived first but accomplished last — in construing a statute or trust, look to the end the maker intended, understanding that the final result is the true measure of the design.

No one is bound to do what is impossible.

Nemo ad impossibile tenetur.

Source: Black's Law Dict. (2d); Jenk. Cent. 7; Co. Litt. 231b; Weisman, 34g

An obligation that cannot be performed is void. This applies to contractual duties, statutory commands, and court orders alike.

If the form is not observed, the annulment of the act follows.

Non observata forma, infertur adnullatio actus.

Source: 12 Co. 7; Broom, Max. 64

An officer who fails to follow the required procedure has not performed his duty — his act is void, not merely voidable.

A minor is not bound to answer during his minority, except as a matter of favor in a cause of dower.

Minor non tenetur respondere durante minori aetate, nisi in causa dotis.

Source: 3 Bulstr. 143; Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims no. 1261; Weisman, 80h

The law shields infants from the burden of litigation. They are not compelled to defend or plead until they reach the age at which they can do so with full understanding.

A sentence against marriage never becomes a thing finally adjudged.

Sententia contra matrimonium nunquam transit in rem judicatam.

Source: 7 Co. Rep. 43, 48; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 969; Weisman, 79e

A decree annulling or denying a marriage is never absolutely conclusive — the question of marital status may always be revisited on new evidence.

That which does not produce any effect in law does not constitute an impediment.

Non praestat impedimentum quod de jure non sortitur effectum.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 4

A thing that has no legal force cannot serve as a bar or obstacle — what is void in law cannot impede a valid right or act.

When the principal does not hold, the incidents thereof ought not to obtain.

Quum principalis causa non consistit, ne ea quidem quae sequuntur locum habent.

Source: D. 50, 17, 129; Jackson

When the principal cause or right fails, all subsidiary rights and incidents that depend upon it also fail — the accessory cannot survive the principal.

No one should intermeddle with a thing that in no way concerns him.

Nemo debet se immiscere rei ad se nihil pertinenti.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 18, case 32; Weisman, 61d

A stranger to a matter has no standing to interfere — the law forbids officious intermeddling in the affairs of others.

Personal things follow the person.

Personalia personam sequuntur.

Source: Flanders v. Cross, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 516; Weisman, 61p

Rights and obligations that are personal in nature are attached to the individual and cannot be separated from him.

A personal action dies with the person.

Actio personalis moritur cum persona.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 16; Noy, Max. 6; Weisman, 86q

Claims arising from purely personal wrongs perish with the death of the party injured — they do not pass to heirs or representatives.

No man ought to be burdened in consequence of another's act.

Nemo ex alterius facto praegravari debet.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 2k

Each man answers for his own acts — the consequences of one person's conduct cannot be shifted onto an innocent party who had no part in it.

It is not incumbent on the possessor to prove that the possessions belong to him.

Non possessori incumbit necessitas probandi possessiones ad se pertinere.

Source: Cod. 4.9.2; Broom, Max. 639, 714; Weisman, 91cc

The burden of proof lies on the challenger, not the possessor — quiet possession is its own evidence of right.

No one gives what he does not have.

Nemo dat quod non habet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 250; Broom, Max. 499n; Shep. Touch. 243; Fleta, lib. 3, c. 15, s. 8

A man cannot transfer a greater right than he possesses — this applies equally to private conveyance and to government grants of authority.

Long possession begets right.

Longa possessio jus parit.

Source: Co. Litt. 110b, 115a; Fleta, lib. 3, c. 15, s. 6

Continuous, quiet possession over time ripens into a right that the law will defend, even against a prior claimant who slept on his rights.

Movable things follow the person; immovable things follow their locality.

Mobilia personam sequuntur, immobilia situm.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

Personal property is governed by the law of the owner's domicile; real property is governed by the law of the place where it is situated — a fundamental rule of private international law.

No citizen may be dragged from his house to be conducted before a judge or to prison.

Nemo de domo sua extrahi debet.

Source: Dig. 50.17.103; Weisman, 54e

The home is so protected that the person within it may not be seized by force — process must be served, not executed by violence at the threshold.

A man shall not be punished for suing out writs in the king’s court, whether he be right or wrong.

Home ne serra puny pur suer des briefes en court le roy, soit il a droit ou a tort.

Source: 2 Inst. 228; Jackson

The right of access to the courts is fundamental — no man may be penalized for seeking judicial remedy, even if his cause ultimately fails.

It concerns the state that men's last wills be held valid.

Interest reipublicae ne hominum testamenta rata habeantur.

Source: Co. Litt. 236b; Black's, 1010; Weisman, 103p

Public policy favors the validity of wills — the law strains to uphold, not defeat, a testamentary disposition, because the right of disposal is fundamental to property itself.

It is the duty of a judge to inquire as well into the time of things as into things themselves; by inquiring into the time you will be safe.

Judicis officium est ut res ita tempora rerum quaerere; quaesito tempore tutus eris.

Source: Co. Litt. 171; Jackson; Weisman, 63w; Weisman, 63bb

Timing is essential to legal rights — a judge must examine not only what was done but when it was done, for the sequence of events often determines validity.

You will perceive many things more easily by experience than by rules.

Multa exercitatione facilius quam regulis percipies.

Source: 4 Inst. 50; Jackson; Weisman, 69e; Weisman, 95dd

Practical experience is often a better teacher than abstract rules — the law is learned as much by its application as by its study.

He who does anything by command of a judge will not be supposed to have acted from an improper motive, because it was necessary to obey.

Qui jussu judicis aliquod fecerit non videtur dolo malo fecisse quia parere necesse est.

Source: 10 Co. 76; Jackson

Obedience to a judicial command excuses the actor from imputation of wrongful intent — the necessity of compliance negates the presumption of malice.

What avails in the lesser will avail in the greater; and what does not avail in the greater will not avail in the lesser.

Quod in minori valet valebit in majori; et quod in majori non valet nec valebit in minori.

Source: Co. Litt. 260; Jackson; Weisman, 95k

The argument from lesser to greater (and vice versa) is a fundamental rule of legal reasoning — what holds for a smaller matter holds a fortiori for a larger one.

Debt and contract are of no place.

Debitum et contractus sunt nullius loci.

Source: 7 Co. 3; Jackson

Debts and contractual obligations are transitory in nature — they follow the person and may be enforced wherever the debtor is found, regardless of where the agreement was made.

A condition precedent must be fulfilled before the effect can follow.

Conditio praecendens adimpleri debet priusquam sequatur effectus.

Source: Co. Litt. 201; Jackson 121; Weisman, 19d

No obligation arises under a conditional agreement until the condition is satisfied — government cannot demand performance while its own conditions remain unfulfilled.

The condition of the defendant is the better one.

Potior est conditio defendentis.

Source: Jackson; Weisman, 65r; Weisman, 99i

In cases of doubt, the defendant holds the stronger position — the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove his case, and the defendant is presumed innocent until overcome by evidence.

Where damages are given, the losing party ought to be condemned to pay the costs of the victor.

Ubi damna dantur, victus victori in expensis condemnari debet.

Source: 2 Inst. 289; Jackson

The prevailing party is entitled to recover his costs — the loser bears the expense of litigation he wrongfully compelled.

There are two instruments for confirming or impugning all things: reason and authority.

Duo sunt instrumenta ad omnes res confirmandas aut impugnandas — ratio et auctoritas.

Source: 8 Co. 16; Weisman, 20e

Every legal proposition must withstand the test of both reason and authority — neither alone is sufficient, and what fails both is law in name only.

When the required form is not observed, the act is inferred to be annulled.

Cum forma non observatur, infertur nullatio actus.

Source: 12 Co. 7; Weisman, 7a

Substance requires form — a contract, grant, or government act that fails to observe the prescribed form is void, not merely voidable.

What was done without due consideration, upon better consideration we should revoke.

Quod inconsulto fecimus, consultius revocemus.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 116; Weisman, 7f; Weisman, 24f

Hasty or improvident acts carry their own remedy — reflection and revocation are always available to cure what recklessness created.

No right of action arises from fraud.

Ex dolo malo non oritur actio.

Source: Cowp. 341; Broom, Max. 729; Phelps v. Decker, 10 Mass. 276

A party who has himself engaged in fraud cannot invoke the courts to enforce an advantage gained by that fraud — the law will not assist the fraudulent.

What is otherwise good and just, if sought by force or fraud, becomes bad and unjust.

Quod alias bonum et justum est, si per vim vel fraudem petatur, malum et injustum efficitur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. 78; Weisman, 29j

Even a rightful claim is corrupted when pursued through unlawful means — the manner of seeking justice must itself be just.

The act of law does injury to no one.

Actus legis nemini facit injuriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 287; 5 Coke, 116; 2 Bl. Comm. 123

The lawful operation of established legal process is not an injury, even when it produces an adverse result — but this protection extends only to acts truly authorized by law. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.1, 1.5.280.)

An action should not be given to one who has suffered no injury.

Non debet actio dari ei qui non est injuria passus.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 69

Standing in law requires actual injury to a cognizable right — no man may invoke the courts over a wrong he has not personally suffered.

Abundant caution does no injury.

Abundans cautela non nocet.

Source: 11 Co. 6; Jackson; Wharton

Taking extra precautions in legal proceedings or transactions does no harm and cannot be held against the party who exercises them.

Something is conceded, which otherwise would not be conceded, lest an injury should remain unpunished.

Aliquid conceditur ne injuria remaneat impunita, quod alias non concederetur.

Source: Co. Litt. 197; Jackson

The law will stretch its ordinary rules to ensure that no wrong goes without remedy — procedural or technical barriers yield when their enforcement would leave an injury entirely unredressed.

It is the rule, that everyone is prejudiced by his ignorance of law, but is not prejudiced by his ignorance of a material fact.

Regula est, juris quidem ignorantiam cuique nocere, facti vero ignorantiam non nocere.

Source: D. 22, 6, 9; Jackson; Weisman, 57b

Ignorance of the law is no excuse, but ignorance of a material fact may be — the law presumes every man knows his legal obligations, while excusing honest ignorance of circumstances.

Surplusage hurts not.

Surplusagium non nocet.

Source: 9 H. 6, 26; Jackson

Unnecessary or redundant matter in a pleading or instrument does not vitiate what is otherwise sufficient — superfluous words are disregarded rather than treated as fatal defects.

An error of a clerk ought not to hurt.

Vitium clerici nocere non debet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 23; Jackson

A clerical or ministerial error in recording or transcribing does not defeat the substance of a proceeding — the law will not allow a scrivener's mistake to destroy a party's rights.

One's own wrong shall not benefit the person doing it.

Injuria propria non cadet in beneficium facientis.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

No man may convert his own wrongful act into an advantage — the law refuses to let the wrongdoer profit from the very injury he inflicts.

When both parties are in fault the plaintiff must always fail, and the cause of the person in possession be preferred.

Cum par delictum est duorum, semper oneratur petitor.

Source: D. 50, 17, 154; Jackson; Weisman, 44p; Weisman, 99w

Where both parties are equally culpable, the court will not disturb the existing state of affairs — the plaintiff who comes with unclean hands loses to the defendant in possession.

The force of a word is to be first examined, lest by a fault of expression the discourse or the law be obstructed without arguments.

Primo excutienda est verbi vis, ne sermonis vitio obstruatur oratio, sive lex sine argumentis.

Source: Co. Litt. 68; Jackson; Weisman, 104aa

The precise meaning of every word must be established before argument begins, lest imprecise language obstruct the entire proceeding.

That which is without remedy avails of itself if there be no fault in the party seeking to enforce it.

Quod remedio destituitur ipsa re valet si culpa absit.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 9; Jackson; Weisman, 94b

Where no formal remedy exists, the right itself still has force provided the claimant is free from fault — the absence of a prescribed procedure does not extinguish the underlying right.

The act of law does wrong to no one.

Actus legis nulli facit injuriam.

Source: 5 Coke, 116; 2 Bl. Comm. 123; Weisman, 105q

Where the law itself operates, the resulting consequence is deemed just — but this maxim protects only acts truly authorized by law, not acts merely performed under its color.

It is better to turn back than to proceed wrongly.

Melius est recurrere quam male currere.

Source: 4 Inst. 176; Weisman, 95aa; Weisman, 105m

When a course of action is discovered to be unlawful, the duty is to stop and reverse — not to press on and hope the wrong corrects itself.

A wrong, in capital cases, is excused or palliated, which would not be so treated in civil cases.

Excusat aut extenuat delictum in capitalibus quod non operatur idem in civilibus.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 15; Jackson

Because life is at stake in capital matters, the law extends defenses and mitigating circumstances that would not avail in civil proceedings — the higher the penalty, the more liberal the construction in favor of the accused.

No Court which has not a record can impose a fine, or commit any person to prison; because those powers belong only to Courts of record.

Nulla curia quae recordum non habet potest imponere finem, neque aliquem mandare carceri; quia ista spectant tantummodo ad curias de recordo.

Source: 8 Co. 60; Jackson; Weisman, 65h

The power to fine and imprison is reserved exclusively to courts of record — inferior tribunals lacking a formal record have no authority to deprive a man of his property or liberty.

A person may not be punished differently than according to what the sentence enjoins.

Non alio modo puniatur aliquis, quam secundum quod se habet condemnatio.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 217; Weisman, 92ii

The punishment must conform strictly to the judgment — no officer may impose penalties beyond or different from those ordered by the court.

Positive rules of law will be receded from, rather than crimes and wrongs should remain unpunished.

Receditur a placitis juris, potius quam injuriae et delicta maneant impunita.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Bacon's Max. Reg. 12

Technical legal rules yield when their strict application would allow wrongdoing to escape all consequence, because the public safety is the supreme law.

Remedies are the life of rights.

Remedia sunt vitae jurium.

Source: Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 631; Weisman, 94w

A right that cannot be enforced is a dead letter — the vitality of every right depends on the availability and efficacy of its remedy.

Take away the remedy and you take away the right.

Tolle remedium et tollis jus.

Source: Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 270, 303

Any legislative or administrative action that eliminates the means of enforcing a constitutional right effectively destroys the right — the remedy and the right are inseparable.

Extraordinary remedies are never to be resorted to until ordinary ones fail.

Nunquam ad extraordinaria recurrendum est nisi ubi ordinaria deficiunt.

Source: 4 Inst. 84

The law favors regular process and reserves extraordinary writs, injunctions, and special proceedings for cases where the normal channels have proven inadequate.

If the old remedies can provide relief, new ones should not be tried.

Si veteribus remediis subveniri potest, nova non sunt tentanda.

Source: 10 Coke, 142b

The proven remedies of the common law should be exhausted before inventing novel procedures — established forms carry the weight of precedent and the assurance of tested process.

Not a new but a customary remedy is to be used.

Non novo sed consueto remedio utendum.

Source: 2 Inst. 3

The law favors established and proven remedies over novel inventions — parties should resort to the known forms of action rather than seeking untested procedures.

Resist beginnings; the remedy comes too late when the evil has gathered strength through long delay.

Principiis obsta; sero medicina paratur cum mala per longas convaluere moras.

Source: 2 Inst. 299; Ovid, Remedia Amoris, 91

Prevention is superior to cure — a wrong resisted at its inception is far easier to overcome than one allowed to entrench itself through indifference or delay.

Trial should always be held where the jurors can have better knowledge.

Ibi semper debet fieri triatio ubi juratores meliorem possunt habere notitiam.

Source: Co. Litt. 112

Venue should be fixed where the jury can be best informed of the facts — the right to trial by a jury of the vicinage ensures that those who decide the case have local knowledge of the circumstances.

He who cannot pay with his purse must answer with his person, lest any offend with impunity.

Qui non potest solvere in aere, luat in corpore, ne quis peccetur impune.

Source: 2 Inst. 173; 4 Bl. Comm. 20; Weisman, 94i

The inability to pay a judgment does not extinguish the obligation — the law ensures that no wrong goes entirely unremedied, even when the wrongdoer lacks the means for monetary satisfaction.

In similar cases, the remedy should be similar.

In consimili casu consimile debet esse remedium.

Source: Hardr. 65; Statute of Westminster II (13 Edw. I, c. 24); Weisman, 94p

Like wrongs demand like remedies — the law applies consistent treatment to comparable injuries, ensuring that justice is not arbitrary.

The despoiled party ought to be restored before all else.

Spoliatus debet ante omnia restitui.

Source: 2 Inst. 714

Before any other question is heard — before defenses, counterclaims, or procedural objections — the party wrongfully deprived of his property must first be restored to possession. Restoration comes before adjudication.

No one is obliged to restore that which has been exacted by way of penalty.

Quod a quoquo poenae nomine exactum est id eidem restituere nemo cogitur.

Source: D. 50, 17, 46; Jackson

A penalty lawfully imposed and collected need not be refunded to the offender — what was taken as punishment is taken permanently.

Remedies ought to be reciprocal.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

(English-origin maxim.) Where the law grants a remedy to one party, the opposing party must have a corresponding remedy available — justice requires mutuality of recourse.

Remedies for rights are ever favorably extended.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 18 Vin. Ab. 521; Weisman, 94o

(English-origin maxim.) Courts construe remedial provisions liberally to ensure that rights are made effective, not theoretical.

The process of the law is a grievous vexation; the execution of the law crowns the work.

Processus legis est gravis vexatio, executio legis coronat opus.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 289

Legal process is burdensome by nature, but its justification lies in the final execution of judgment — without execution, all the vexation of process serves no purpose.

No man ought to be a judge in his own cause.

Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa.

Source: 12 Co. 13; Branch, Princ.; Broom, Max. 117; Weisman, 63d

A judge who has a personal interest in the matter before him is disqualified — any judgment rendered under such a conflict is void for want of impartiality.

A man ought not to be judge in his own cause, because he cannot act as both judge and party.

Aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa, quia non potest esse judex et pars.

Source: Co. Litt. 141a; Broom, Max. 117

The prohibition is not merely ethical but structural — the roles of judge and litigant are incompatible and cannot coexist in one person.

A good judge decides according to what is just and right, and prefers equity to strict law.

Bonus judex secundum aequum et bonum judicat, et aequitatem stricto juri praefert.

Source: Co. Litt. 24; Jenk. Cent. 45, case 85; Broom, Max. 77; Weisman, 63c

A judge who mechanically applies the letter while ignoring the substance of justice has failed his office.

A judge must decide according to the facts alleged and proved.

Judex debet judicare secundum allegata et probata.

Source: Dyer 12; Halk. Max. 73; Broom, Max. 102

A judge may not rely on private knowledge or personal investigation — he is bound to what the parties have placed before him through proper procedure.

It is the duty of a judge to declare the law, not to make it.

Judicis est jus dicere, non dare.

Source: Lofft 42; Tray. Leg. Max. 283; Weisman, 63y

Legislation belongs to the legislature; the judicial office is to interpret and apply existing law, never to invent new law from the bench.

A judge does not award more than the claimant himself demands.

Judex non reddit plus quam quod petens ipse requirit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 585; Dig. 10, 3, 18; Weisman, 94v

The court's power is circumscribed by the relief actually requested; a judgment that exceeds the prayer of the complaint is irregular.

A judge cannot be a witness in his own case.

Judex non potest esse testis in propria causa.

Source: 4 Inst. 272; Co. Litt. 6b

One who sits in judgment may not also testify as a fact witness — the dual role destroys the safeguard of impartiality.

It is the duty of a good judge to extend justice.

Boni judicis est ampliare justitiam.

Source: Chan. Prac. 329; 1 Burr. 304; Broom, Max. 79; Weisman, 63k; Weisman, 66b; Weisman, 68p

Where justice requires it, a judge should apply his remedial authority liberally — not to usurp jurisdiction, but to ensure that no wrong goes unremedied for want of procedure.

It is the duty of a good judge to put an end to litigation.

Boni judicis est lites dirimere.

Source: 4 Co. 15; 5 Co. 31a; Broom, Max. 331; Weisman, 65e

A judge who allows suits to multiply and disputes to fester has abdicated his primary function — the resolution of controversies.

It is the duty of a good judge to order judgment executed without delay.

Boni judicis est judicium sine dilatione mandare executioni.

Source: Co. Litt. 289b; Weisman, 63l

Justice delayed is justice denied — a judgment that sits unenforced is an empty formality, not a remedy.

A judge who exceeds his office is not to be obeyed.

Judex qui excedit officium suum non obeditur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 139, case 84; Weisman, 63z

Obedience to judicial authority depends on the judge acting within the bounds of his lawful commission — beyond those bounds, his commands carry no force of law.

The ignorance of the judge is the calamity of the innocent.

Ignorantia judicis est calamitas innocentis.

Source: 2 Inst. 591; Weisman, 63p

The people's liberty depends upon judges who know the law; an ignorant judge is a danger to every man who comes before him.

That law is best which leaves least to the discretion of the judge; that judge is best who leaves least to his own will.

Optima est lex quae minimum relinquit arbitrio judicis; optimus judex qui minimum sibi.

Source: Bacon, Aph. 8, 46; Broom, Max. 84; 1 Kent, Comm. 478; Weisman, 63q

Arbitrary discretion is the enemy of liberty — the more a judge's decision is bound by fixed principles of law, the safer the rights of the people.

The judge is condemned when a guilty person escapes punishment.

Judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur.

Source: Dig. 1, 1, 13; Pub. Syr. Sent.; Weisman, 63g

The public holds the judge accountable for the faithful discharge of his duty — failure to administer justice implicates the judge himself.

Verbal quibbles are unworthy of a judge.

Aucupia verborum sunt judice indigna.

Source: Hob. 348

A judge who seizes upon technicalities of language to defeat the substance of a claim dishonors the bench. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.29.)

A judge must take care that nothing be imposed either more harshly or more leniently than the cause demands; for the reputation of neither severity nor clemency should be pursued.

Respiciendum est judicanti, ne quid aut durius aut remissius constituatur quam causa deposcit; nec enim aut severitatis aut clementiae gloria affectanda est.

Source: 3 Inst. 220

The judge who sentences to make an example, or who pardons to win popularity, has abandoned justice for vanity — the punishment must fit the offense, no more and no less.

A good judge should do nothing from his own judgment or from private inclination, but should pronounce according to law and justice.

Judex bonus nihil ex arbitrio suo faciat, nec propositione domesticae voluntatis, sed juxta leges et jura pronunciet.

Source: 7 Co. 27; Weisman, 63f

Personal opinion has no place on the bench — the judge's duty is to declare the law, not to impose his will.

The judge is the law speaking.

Judex est lex loquens.

Source: 7 Co. 4; Weisman, 63o

The judge is not the master of the law but its voice — he speaks what the law says, not what he wishes it said.

A judge cannot punish a wrong done to himself.

Judex non potest injuriam sibi datam punire.

Source: 12 Co. 113; Weisman, 63u

When the judge is the aggrieved party, he must recuse — self-interest disqualifies him from adjudicating a wrong suffered by himself.

It is punishment enough for a judge that he has God as his avenger.

Judici satis poena est quod Deum habet ultorem.

Source: 1 Leon. 295; Weisman, 63v

The judge who abuses his office may escape human censure, but he answers to a higher tribunal — the weight of divine accountability restrains the conscience of the just.

The judge in his decision ought to follow the rule when the exception is not proved.

Judicis est in pronunciando sequi regulam, exceptione non probata.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 64f

The general rule governs unless the party claiming an exception demonstrates its applicability — the burden of proving the exception falls on the party who invokes it.

Arbitrators are judges.

Compromissarii sunt judices.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 128; Jackson

Persons chosen by the parties to resolve their dispute exercise a judicial function and are bound by the same principles of impartiality and fairness as judges of the court.

The Court of Parliament is governed by its own peculiar laws.

Curia Parliamenti suis propriis legibus subsistit.

Source: 4 Inst. 50; Jackson

Legislative bodies operate under their own rules of procedure, distinct from the rules governing ordinary courts — each branch maintains its own internal governance.

The practice of the Court is the law of the Court.

Cursus curiae est lex curiae.

Source: 3 Buls. 53; Jackson; Weisman, 65j

The established practice and procedure of a court constitutes its governing rule — parties must conform to the court's customary course of proceeding.

Of the good faith and intention of a judge a question cannot be entertained; but it is otherwise as to his knowledge, whether the error be one of law or fact.

De fide et officio judicis non recipitur quaestio; sed de scientia, sive error sit juris sive facti.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 17; Jackson

A judge's motives and good faith are not open to question, but his knowledge of law and fact may be challenged on appeal — the law presumes integrity but not infallibility.

It is unjust to judge of any part unless the whole sentence is examined.

Incivile est nisi tota sententia perspecta de aliqua parte judicare.

Source: Hob. 171; Jackson

No portion of a judgment, instrument, or statute may be construed in isolation — the whole must be read together before any part can be properly understood.

A judge ought always to regard equity.

Judex aequitatem semper spectare debet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 45; Jackson; Weisman, 63s

A judge must look beyond the bare letter of the law to the equitable substance of the case — rigid literalism that produces injustice is a failure of the judicial office.

A judge should have two salts: the salt of wisdom, lest he be insipid; and the salt of conscience, lest he be devilish.

Judex habere debet duos sales: salem sapientiae, ne sit insipidus, et salem conscientiae, ne sit diabolus.

Source: 3 Inst. 147; Jackson; Weisman, 63t

A judge requires both learning and moral integrity — wisdom without conscience produces tyranny, and conscience without wisdom produces disorder.

Judges are not bound to explain the reason of their sentence.

Judices non tenentur exprimere causam sententiae suae.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 75; Jackson; Weisman, 63aa

While it is good practice for judges to state their reasons, the law does not require it — the judgment itself is the authoritative act, not the explanation accompanying it.

It is the duty of a judge to finish the work of each day within that day.

Judicis officium est opus diei in die suo perficere.

Source: 2 Inst. 256; Jackson

Judicial business must not be delayed or carried over indefinitely — a diligent judge disposes of the matters before him promptly.

The law is the safest leader of the army of judges.

Lex est exercitus judicum tutissimus ductor.

Source: 2 Inst. 526; Jackson

Judges who follow the law faithfully are never led astray — the law, not personal judgment, is the surest guide to right decision.

No man ought to be twice vexed, if it be proved to the Court that it be for one and the same cause.

Nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa.

Source: 5 Co. 61; Jackson

Once a cause has been determined, the same matter may not be relitigated between the same parties — double vexation for one cause is prohibited.

No one ought to be his own judge, or the tribunal in his own affairs.

Nemo sibi esse judex vel suis jus dicere debet.

Source: Jackson

Self-judgment is inherently partial — no man can be trusted to adjudicate his own cause impartially, which is why all disputes require an independent tribunal.

It belongs not to the secular Judge to take cognisance of things which are merely spiritual.

Non pertinet ad judicem secularem cognoscere de iis quae sunt mere spiritualia annexa.

Source: 2 Inst. 488; Jackson

Civil courts have no jurisdiction over purely spiritual matters — the temporal and spiritual jurisdictions are separate, and each must respect the bounds of the other.

Let no one depart from the Court of Chancery without a remedy.

Nullus recedat e curia cancellaria sine remedio.

Source: 4 H. 7, 4; Jackson

The equity court exists to provide relief where the common law cannot — no suitor who presents a just cause should leave Chancery without a remedy for his grievance.

The practice of the judges is the interpreter of the laws.

Praxis judicum est interpres legum.

Source: Hob. 96; Jackson; Weisman, 63e

How judges have consistently applied the law in practice is the most reliable guide to its meaning — judicial usage is the living interpretation of enacted text.

How long reasonable time ought to be is not defined by law, but depends upon the discretion of the judges.

Quam longum debet esse rationabile tempus, non definitur in lege, sed pendet ex discretione justiciariorum.

Source: Co. Litt. 56; Jackson; Weisman, 100g

What constitutes "reasonable time" is a question of fact and judicial discretion determined by the circumstances of each case, not by rigid statutory prescription.

Everyone is the manager and judge of his own affairs.

Rerum suarum quilibet est moderator et arbiter.

Source: Co. Litt. 223; Jackson

Every person has the right to manage his own property and private affairs without interference — the law presumes competence and self-governance in one's own domain.

A multitude of ignorant persons destroys a court.

Multitudo imperitorum perdit curiam.

Source: 2 Inst. 219; Wharton

The quality of justice depends on the competence of those who administer it — filling courts with unqualified persons undermines the entire judicial system.

An act of a judge which does not relate to his office is of no force.

Factum a judice quod ad ejus officium non spectat, non ratum est.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 10 Co. 76; Weisman, 65c

A judge acts with authority only within the scope of his judicial office; anything done outside that scope is void and without legal effect. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.6.)

The offices of magistrates ought not to be sold.

Officia magistratus non debent esse venalia.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 234

The sale of judicial or magisterial office corrupts the administration of justice at its source and is absolutely prohibited.

Judicial offices ought not to be granted before they are vacant.

Officia judicialia non concedantur antequam vacent.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 11 Co. 4

Granting a judicial office before it falls vacant creates a successor-in-waiting with perverse incentives and undermines the independence of the sitting officer.

An equal has no power over an equal.

Par in parem imperium non habet.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Jenk. Cent. 174

No judge may exercise authority over another judge of the same court, for peers in jurisdiction possess no superiority one over another.

An office ought to be injurious to no one.

Officium nemini debet esse damnosum.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

The holding of public office must not become a vehicle for harming the officeholder or the people he serves — office is a trust, not a weapon.

A judge's order is an order made by a judge at chambers, or out of court.

Source: Black's, 664; Weisman, 63b

(English-origin maxim.) A judge's order made in chambers or outside open court carries the same judicial authority as one made in formal session, so long as it is within the judge's jurisdiction.

To questions of fact judges do not answer; to questions of law the jury does not answer.

Ad quaestionem facti non respondent judices; ad quaestionem juris non respondent juratores.

Source: Co. Litt. 295b; Broom, Max. 938; Wharton, Leg. Max. 265

The division between judge and jury is fundamental — the jury finds what happened; the judge declares what the law requires. Neither may usurp the province of the other.

A verdict is, as it were, the utterance of truth; as a judgment is the utterance of law.

Veredictum quasi dictum veritatis; ut judicium quasi dictum juris.

Source: Co. Litt. 226; Weisman, 64n

The jury's verdict carries the authority of truth in fact, just as the court's judgment carries the authority of truth in law — each is final in its own sphere.

Jurors are the judges of fact.

Juratores sunt judices facti.

Source: State of Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall. 1, 4 (1794); Co. Litt. 155b; Weisman, 67b

No judge, however learned, may substitute his opinion of the facts for that of the jury — the jury is the sole and sovereign tribunal on all questions of fact.

Jurors ought to be neighbors, of sufficient estate, and above all suspicion.

Juratores debent esse vicini, sufficientis status, et ab omni suspicione majores.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 141; Weisman, 67a

The jury must be drawn from the community where the dispute arose — strangers without local knowledge and persons of doubtful character undermine the very purpose of trial by peers.

The verdict of twelve good and lawful men is held by the common law to be the declaration of truth.

Duodecim proborum et legalium hominum dictum, per legem communem, veritatis dictum habetur.

Source: Halk. Max. 73; Co. Litt. 155b; Weisman, 67c

The unanimous verdict of a proper jury of twelve is the highest form of factual determination known to the common law — no lesser body may supplant it.

Jurors ought not to be harassed by labors and expenses.

Juratores non debent fatigari laboribus et expensis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 6; Weisman, 67d

The duty of jury service must not be made so burdensome that it deters good men from serving — efficiency in trial procedure protects the institution itself.

The verdict of a jury is a bar in equity.

Veredictum juratorum obstat in aequitate.

Source: Branch, Max. 155; Weisman, 67f; Weisman, 67h

Once a jury has determined the facts, a court of equity may not retry them — the verdict settles the matter.

The witnesses being dead, it must be referred, as to the truth of charters, out of necessity, to the country — i.e. a jury.

Chartarum super fidem, mortuis testibus, ad patriam, de necessitudine, recurrendum est.

Source: Co. Litt. 386; Jackson

When the original witnesses to a document are deceased, the authenticity of the instrument must be determined by a jury drawn from the community where the facts are known.

Ecclesiastical laws are limited within separate bounds.

Jura ecclesiastica limitata sunt infra limites separatos.

Source: 3 Buls. 53; Jackson

Church law operates within its own defined sphere and may not extend beyond those bounds into the temporal jurisdiction of the civil courts.

When two rights concur in one person it is the same as if they were in different persons.

Quando duo jura in una persona concurrunt, aequum est ac si essent in diversis.

Source: 2 Preston Abs. 430; Jackson; Weisman, 86o

Where one person holds two distinct legal rights, they are treated as separate and independent — merger of rights in one person does not extinguish either.

The vigilant, and not the sleepy, are assisted by the laws.

Vigilantibus, et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt.

Source: Wing. 692; Jackson

The law rewards diligence and punishes delay — a party who sleeps on his rights forfeits the assistance of the courts.

No one can verify by jury against a record.

Nemo potest contra recordum verificare per patriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 380; Wharton

A court record cannot be contradicted or overturned by jury verdict — the record speaks for itself and is conclusive as to what it contains.

Justice is the steady and unceasing disposition to render to every man his due.

Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi.

Source: Inst. 1, 1, pr.; Dig. 1, 1, 10; Weisman, 68g

Justice is not occasional or discretionary — it is a permanent obligation owed equally to every person, without respect of station.

Justice is neither to be denied nor delayed.

Justitia non est neganda, non differenda.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 76, 93; 2 Inst. 56; Weisman, 68f

Every refusal to hear a case and every unnecessary delay in its resolution is a species of injustice.

Justice ought to be free, because nothing is more iniquitous than venal justice; full, because justice ought not to halt; and speedy, because delay is a kind of denial.

Justitia debet esse libera, quia nihil iniquius venali justitia; plena, quia justitia non debet claudicare; et celeris, quia dilatio est quaedam negatio.

Source: 2 Inst. 56; Weisman, 68e

The three pillars of justice — accessibility, completeness, and speed — must all be present; the absence of any one corrupts the whole.

Let justice be done, though the heavens fall.

Fiat justitia, ruat coelum.

Source: 1 Lord Mansfield in R. v. Wilkes (1770); Wing. Max. 668; Weisman, 68o

The administration of justice may never be subordinated to convenience, politics, or fear of consequences.

Justice knows neither father nor mother; justice looks to truth alone.

Justitia non novit patrem nec matrem; solam veritatem spectat justitia.

Source: 1 Bulstr. 199; Weisman, 68m

Partiality, favoritism, and respect of persons are the death of justice — the court must be blind to everything except the merits of the cause.

Those matters which are properly transacted in court ought to be committed to due execution.

Ea quae in curia nostra rite acta sunt debitae executioni demandari debent.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; Weisman, 65n

A proceeding duly completed creates a right to enforcement — a court that refuses to execute its own lawful judgments nullifies its own authority.

The law does not fail in dispensing justice.

Lex non deficit in justitia exhibenda.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 31, case 61; Co. Litt. 197; Weisman, 68n

For every wrong the law provides a remedy — where no remedy appears, the deficiency is in the practitioner's knowledge, not in the law itself.

Justice that prevents a wrong is better than justice that punishes it.

Praevalet justitia praeventioni.

Source: 3 Inst. Epil.; Weisman, 68h

Courts and officers should act to prevent injuries where possible, rather than waiting to assess damages after the harm is done.

Hasty justice is the stepmother of misfortune.

Festinatio justitiae est noverca infortunii.

Source: Hob. 97; Weisman, 68d

Speed must never come at the cost of accuracy — a judgment rushed to conclusion without due deliberation is worse than one delayed.

Favor ought not to bend justice, power ought not to break it, nor money to corrupt it.

Favor non debet flectere justitiam, potestas non frangere, pecunia non corrumpere.

Source: Cicero, Fragmenta de Republica; Halk. Max.; Weisman, 68k

The three mortal enemies of justice are influence, force, and bribery — any court susceptible to any of these has ceased to be a court.

It is the duty of justices to administer justice to everyone seeking it from them.

Ad officium justiciariorum spectat, unicuique coram eis placitanti justitiam exhibere.

Source: 2 Inst. 451; Jackson; Weisman, 63j

No suitor who appears before the court may be turned away without a hearing — the judicial duty to administer justice is universal and non-discretionary.

It is not consonant to justice that any accessory should be convicted in the king’s court before some one has been attainted of the fact.

Juri non est consonum quod aliquis accessorius in curia regis convincatur antequam aliquis de facto fuerit attinctus.

Source: 2 Inst. 183; Jackson

An accessory cannot be convicted before the principal — unless the underlying crime is first established against the primary offender, there is no foundation for charging one who merely assisted.

It is always safer to err in acquitting than in punishing: on the side of mercy, than of strict justice.

Tutius semper est errare acquietando quam in puniendo, ex parte misericordiae quam ex parte justitiae.

Source: H. H. P.C. 290; Jackson; Weisman, 64o

When the court is uncertain, it is better to let a guilty man go free than to punish an innocent one — mercy in doubt is the safer course for the preservation of justice.

Justice is an excellent virtue and pleasing to the Most High.

Justitia est virtus excellens et altissimo complacens.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 4 Inst. 58; Weisman, 68l

The administration of justice is not merely a civic function but a duty that accords with divine order — the judge who dispenses true justice serves both man and God.

A judicial act performed before one who is not the proper judge is void; but a ministerial act, from whomsoever it proceeds, may be ratified.

Actus judiciarius coram non judice irritus habetur, de ministeriali autem a quocunque provenit ratum esto.

Source: Lofft 458; Broom, Max. 92

The distinction between judicial and ministerial acts is critical — only ministerial defects may be cured after the fact; a void judgment for want of jurisdiction cannot be made valid by ratification.

He who exercises jurisdiction beyond his proper limits cannot be obeyed with safety.

Qui extra jurisdictionem suam judicat, tuto non paretur.

Source: Dig. 2, 1, 20; 10 Co. 77; Story, Confl. Laws §539

Obedience to a court acting outside its jurisdiction is not merely optional — it is affirmatively dangerous, because the proceedings are void and any act taken in reliance on them is without legal protection.

Where jurisdiction is given, those powers also are deemed granted without which the jurisdiction cannot be exercised.

Ubi jurisdictio data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potest.

Source: Dig. 2, 1, 2; 1 Kent, Comm. 339

The grant of jurisdiction carries with it every power necessary to its effective exercise — but no more; implied powers cannot exceed the original grant.

Every jurisdiction has its own bounds.

Unaquaeque jurisdictio suos fines habet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 137

No court's authority is unlimited — every tribunal is confined to the territory, subject matter, and persons within its lawful commission.

The order of things is thrown into confusion if each person does not preserve his own jurisdiction.

Rerum ordo confunditur si unicuique jurisdictio non servetur.

Source: 4 Inst. Proem.

When courts overstep their jurisdictional boundaries — or fail to exercise the jurisdiction properly vested in them — the entire system of ordered justice breaks down.

Jurisdiction over the principal matter draws to itself jurisdiction over the accessory.

Jurisdictio principalis trahit ad se accessoriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 493; Bract. 481; Weisman, 66c

A court with jurisdiction over the main controversy may also determine incidental and subsidiary questions arising from it.

He who has jurisdiction to acquit has jurisdiction to bind.

Qui habet jurisdictionem absolvendi habet jurisdictionem ligandi.

Source: 12 Co. 59; Weisman, 66i

The power to release necessarily implies the power to restrain — jurisdiction cannot be exercised in only one direction.

Where a man offends, there shall he be punished.

Ubi quis delinquit, ibi punietur.

Source: 3 Inst. 24; Bract. fol. 154b

Jurisdiction in criminal matters belongs to the place where the offense was committed — transporting a cause to a distant forum deprives the accused of his right to be tried by jurors of the vicinage.

The plaintiff follows the forum of the defendant.

Actor sequitur forum rei.

Source: Branch, Max. 4; Jackson; Weisman, 99t

The plaintiff must bring his action in the court that has jurisdiction over the defendant — a man is entitled to be sued in his own forum, not dragged to a distant tribunal.

A judgment given by an improper judge is of no moment.

Judicium a non suo judice datum nullius est momenti.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 11 Co. 76

A judgment rendered by a court or judge lacking jurisdiction over the matter is void from the beginning and imposes no obligation on any party.

An action is not given to one who has not been injured.

Actio non datur non damnificato.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 69; Broom, Max. 768; Weisman, 59w; Weisman, 75e

Standing requires actual injury — a man who has suffered no wrong has no cause of action, no matter how objectionable the conduct of another may be.

Every action proceeds in its own course.

Actio quaelibet it sua via.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 77; Weisman, 2c; Weisman, 75f

Each form of action has its own established procedure — a party must choose the correct form or his action fails.

The correct forms of action are to be carefully preserved.

Actionum genera maxime sunt servanda.

Source: Lofft 460

The forms of action are not mere technicalities but safeguards — they define the nature of the controversy and the relief available.

No one acquires a right of action from his own wrongdoing.

Nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur actionem.

Source: Broom, Max. 297; Wing. Max. 131

The law will not reward misconduct — a party who engineers the very situation he complains of has no standing to seek relief.

No one is bound to arm his adversary against himself.

Nemo tenetur armare adversarium contra se.

Source: Wing. Max. 665; Weisman, 75x; Weisman, 77j; Weisman, 99l

A party is not required to disclose his strategy, theory of the case, or evidence that would aid his opponent — the adversarial system presupposes that each side prepares its own case.

Every action is a complaint.

Omnis actio est loquela.

Source: Co. Litt. 292a; Weisman, 75k

The essence of every legal action is the plaintiff's grievance — without a grievance properly stated, there is no action.

The action has not accrued within six years.

Actio non accrevit infra sex annos.

Source: Jackson

Actions must be brought within the prescribed limitation period — a claim not pursued within six years is barred, because the law favors repose and finality.

The defrauding of one person does not afford an action to another.

Alterius circumventio alii non praebet actionem.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 49; Jackson

Only the person actually defrauded has standing to bring an action — a third party cannot claim a right of action arising from a fraud committed against someone else.

A judicial writ fails not through defect of form.

Breve judiciale non cadit pro defectu formae.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 43; Jackson; Weisman, 65g

A writ issued by the court is not voided by a mere formal defect — substance prevails over form in judicial process.

No prescription runs against a person unable to bring an action.

Contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio.

Source: Jackson; Weisman, 75z; Weisman, 99d

The statute of limitations does not run against one who is legally incapable of suing — minority, imprisonment, insanity, or other disability tolls the prescriptive period.

There is no exception against an action which entirely destroys an exception.

Exceptio nulla est versus actionem quae exceptionem perimit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 106; Jackson

A defense cannot be raised against an action that itself extinguishes the very ground of that defense — a plea that would destroy the foundation of the exception it invokes is self-defeating.

An action does not arise from a base cause.

Ex turpi causa non oritur actio.

Source: Cowp. 843; Jackson

No court will lend its aid to a party whose claim is founded upon his own immoral or illegal conduct — the law will not enforce a right arising from turpitude.

Every plaint and every action for injuries is limited within certain times.

Omnis querela et omnis actio injuriarum limitata est infra certa tempora.

Source: Co. Litt. 114; Jackson; Weisman, 75l

All legal actions are subject to limitation periods — the law requires claims to be brought within a reasonable time to prevent stale demands and preserve certainty.

An impediment being removed, an action emerges.

Remoto impedimento, emergit actio.

Source: Wing. 20; Jackson

When a legal disability or obstruction that prevented suit is removed, the right of action revives — the impediment suspended the remedy but did not destroy the underlying right.

No one who may condemn is unable to acquit.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 37; Weisman, 65d

(English-origin maxim.) The power to condemn necessarily includes the lesser power to acquit — a court with jurisdiction to punish also has jurisdiction to absolve.

A lawsuit signifies every action, whether it be in rem or in personam.

Lis mota litem significat omnem actionem, sive sit in rem sive in personam.

Source: Co. Litt. 292

The term "suit" encompasses all forms of legal proceeding — the distinction between actions against the thing and actions against the person does not alter the fundamental nature of litigation.

When the plaintiff does not prove his case, the defendant is acquitted.

Actore non probante, reus absolvitur.

Source: Hob. 103; Weisman, 99cc

The burden of proof rests on the party who asserts — if the plaintiff fails to establish his claim, judgment goes for the defendant as a matter of course.

No man can be at once suitor and judge.

Nemo potest esse simul actor et judex.

Source: Broom, Max. 117; Weisman, 99f

The integrity of the judicial process depends on the absolute separation of the roles of advocate and adjudicator.

The condition of the possessor is better, and that of the defendant better than the plaintiff's.

Melior est conditio possidentis, et rei quam actoris.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 126; Broom, Max. 715, 740

When the equities are equal, the law favors the party in possession and the party defending — the plaintiff who would disturb the status quo bears the heavier burden.

No man ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause.

Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.

Source: 5 Co. 61; Broom, Max. 327; Dig. 50, 17, 57

The prohibition against double jeopardy and duplicative litigation is fundamental — once a matter has been properly determined, it may not be relitigated between the same parties.

No one is heard who advances his own disgrace.

Nemo auditur qui suam allegat turpitudinem.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 16; Broom, Max. 160; 4 Inst. 279

A party who makes contradictory allegations — or who confesses his own wrongdoing in the course of his pleading — destroys his own case.

During the pendency of a suit, nothing should be changed.

Lite pendente nihil innovetur.

Source: Co. Litt. 344; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §406

Once litigation is underway, neither party may unilaterally alter the subject matter — alienation, destruction, or material change pending suit is void as against the litigation.

It is in the interest of the state that there be an end to litigation.

Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.

Source: Co. Litt. 303b; Broom, Max. 331, 343; Jenk. Cent. 61; Weisman, 59p; Weisman, 99y

Perpetual litigation is a public evil — the law provides limitations, res judicata, and finality doctrines precisely because disputes must end.

A trial should always be had where the jurors can be best informed.

Judicium semper fieri debet ubi juratores melius scire possunt.

Source: 7 Co. 1b; Weisman, 99z

Venue serves the search for truth — the trial belongs in the community where the facts are known and witnesses are available.

The burden of proof lies on the plaintiff.

Actori incumbit onus probandi.

Source: Hob. 103; Jackson; Weisman, 39n; Weisman, 39dd; Weisman, 99j

The party who asserts a claim bears the obligation of proving it — the defendant need prove nothing until the plaintiff has established a prima facie case.

In things preceding judgment the plaintiff is favoured.

In preparatoriis ad judicium favetur actori.

Source: 2 Inst. 57; Jackson; Weisman, 64cc

In the pre-trial and preparatory stages of litigation, the law gives the plaintiff a favorable construction to ensure his case reaches a hearing on the merits.

Words make the plea.

Verba faciunt placitum.

Source: 5 Mod. 458; Weisman, 87e

A plea is defined by what is actually stated — the court will not supply allegations the pleader failed to make.

He who does not deny, admits.

Qui non negat, fatetur.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 503; Dig. 50, 17, 142; Weisman, 26a; Weisman, 87h; Weisman, 99dd

Silence in the face of a properly served allegation operates as an admission — what is not specifically denied is taken as conceded.

Two negatives do not make an issue.

Duae negationes non faciunt placitum.

Source: Lofft 415

An issue requires affirmation on one side and denial on the other — mutual negation produces no question for the court to decide.

Nothing can be demanded before the time when, by the nature of things, it can be performed.

Nihil peti potest ante id tempus quo per rerum naturam persolvi possit.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 186

A premature demand is no demand at all — the cause of action must be ripe before the court will entertain it. (Duplicate maxim — see also 6.5.4.)

The issue proves the act.

Exitus acta probat.

Source: Co. Litt. 232b; Broom, Max. 259

An allegation stands or falls by its outcome at trial — the result of the proceeding is the ultimate test of whether the claim was well-founded.

An ambiguous plea ought to be construed against the party who pleads it.

Ambiguum placitum interpretari debet contra proferentem.

Source: Co. Litt. 303b; Bacon, Max. reg. 3; Weisman, 87o

The burden of clarity falls on the pleader — obscurity in a plea is resolved against the party who had the opportunity to speak plainly and chose not to.

A plea denying the facts is the last resort.

Exceptio falsi est omnium ultima.

Source: Dig. 44, 1, 22; Broom, Max. 457; Weisman, 87b

Before resorting to a flat denial, a defendant should exhaust every other defense — demurrer, confession and avoidance, justification — because a denial puts the entire matter at issue.

Every plea is a complaint.

Omne placitum est querela.

Source: Co. Litt. 292a

Every act of pleading, whether by plaintiff or defendant, is in substance an appeal to the court for relief.

When the order of pleading is observed, the law is observed.

Quando ordo placitandi servatur, lex servatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 303a; Broom, Max. 188; Weisman, 87n

Procedural regularity is not a formality but a safeguard — when the prescribed sequence of pleading is followed, each party's rights are preserved.

It is not permitted to adduce a plea of the matter in issue as a bar thereto.

Non potest adduci exceptio ejusdem rei cujus petitur dissolutio.

Source: Bac. Max. 22; Jackson

A party cannot use the very matter under dispute as a defense against the action seeking to resolve it — the subject of the suit cannot simultaneously be its own bar.

Hear the other side.

Audi alteram partem.

Source: Broom, Max. 113; 6 Co. 52a; 4 Bl. Comm. 283

No judgment may be rendered against any person without giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard — this is the irreducible minimum of due process of law.

The antecedent has relation to that which next follows unless thereby the meaning of the sentence would be impaired.

Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio, nisi impediatur sententia.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 180; Jackson

A relative word or clause refers to the nearest antecedent unless that construction would produce an absurd or unintelligible result. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.1.)

A thing adjudged is received as truth.

Res judicata pro veritate accipitur.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 207; 2 Kent, Comm. 120; Broom, Max. 328

Once a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered final judgment, the matters determined therein are conclusive between the parties — they may not be relitigated, even if the judgment was wrong.

A judgment is, as it were, a declaration of law.

Judicium est quasi juris dictum.

Source: Co. Litt. 39a, 168a; 2 Inst. 537; Weisman, 64aa

Every judgment carries the force of law for the parties — it is not merely the judge's opinion but the law's own pronouncement applied to the facts found.

A thing adjudged makes white black, black white, crooked straight, and straight crooked.

Res judicata facit ex albo nigrum, ex nigro album, ex curvo rectum, ex recto curvum.

Source: 1 Bouv. Inst. no. 840; Weisman, 64z

The power of final judgment is absolute — however unjust the result may appear, once finally determined it becomes the legal truth and alters all rights accordingly.

He who determines any matter without hearing both sides, though he may have decided rightly, has not done justice.

Qui aliquid statuerit, parte inaudita altera, aequum licet dixerit, haud aequum fecerit.

Source: 6 Co. 52a; 4 Bl. Comm. 283; Seneca, Medea 199; Weisman, 64bb

The rightness of the result does not cure a defective process — justice requires that both sides be heard, regardless of whether the outcome would have been the same.

Judgment is not to be pronounced on a matter that is not clear.

Non sententia de re non liquida proferenda est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 7, case 9

A court should never rush to judgment on doubtful facts — where the evidence is ambiguous or incomplete, the court must withhold decision until the matter is properly illuminated.

A judgment ought not to be illusory; it ought to have its proper effect.

Judicium non debet esse illusorium; suum effectum habere debet.

Source: 2 Inst. 341; Weisman, 64l

A judgment that cannot be enforced is a mockery of justice — every judgment must be capable of producing a real result.

That which is to be resolved once for all should be long deliberated upon.

Deliberandum est diu quod statuendum est semel.

Source: 12 Co. 74; Weisman, 65o; Weisman, 75o

Final determinations demand thorough consideration — haste in matters of permanent consequence is the enemy of sound judgment.

Matters adjudged between other parties create no prejudice to those who were not parties.

Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt.

Source: Dig. 44, 2, 1; Dig. 42, 1, 63

A judgment binds only the parties to the proceeding — strangers to the suit are not affected by it, because they had no opportunity to be heard.

In doubt, always prefer the safer course.

In dubio, semper id quod tutius est praeferendum.

Source: Branch, Princ.; 2 Hale, P.C. 290; Broom, Max. 326

When the court is uncertain, it is always safer to err on the side of mercy and acquittal than on the side of punishment — doubt favors the accused.

Where the opinions are equal, the defendant is acquitted.

Ubi sententiae concordant, reus absolvitur.

Source: 4 Inst. 64; Weisman, 64g

A divided court cannot condemn — when the tribunal is evenly split, the result is the same as if no judgment had been entered, and the defendant goes free.

A new judgment does not create new law, but declares the old.

Novum judicium non dat novum jus, sed declarat antiquum.

Source: 10 Co. 42; Jackson

Adjudication reveals existing law — it does not invent it. Every judgment is retroactive in the sense that it declares what the law always was.

An interlocutory judgment may be recalled, but a final judgment may not.

Sententia interlocutoria revocari potest, definitiva non potest.

Source: Bac. Max.; Weisman, 64j

Preliminary rulings remain open to correction throughout the proceeding, but once the court renders its definitive judgment, the matter is settled — finality is the seal of justice.

An absolute sentence requires no exposition.

Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget.

Source: 2 Inst. 533; Jackson

A clear and unambiguous judgment needs no interpretation — where the court has spoken plainly, no gloss or commentary may alter its meaning. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.1.16.)

An award is a judgment.

Arbitrium est judicium.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 137; Jackson; Weisman, 64c

An arbitral award carries the same force as a court judgment — it is binding on the parties and enforceable as law.

The intention, the count, and the foundation, ought to be certain, and so ought the thing to be which is brought for judgment.

Certa debet esse intentio, et narratio, et certum fundamentum, et certa res quae deducitur in judicium.

Source: Co. Litt. 303a; Jackson; Weisman, 64p

Every element of a legal proceeding must be stated with certainty — vague or indefinite claims deprive the opposing party of fair notice and prevent the court from rendering a proper judgment.

A person confessing a judgment is deemed as adjudged, and in a manner is condemned by his own sentence.

Confessus in judicio pro judicato habetur, et quodammodo sua sententia damnatur.

Source: 11 Co. 30; Jackson

A confession of judgment is equivalent to a verdict — the party who admits the claim against him is bound by his own admission as firmly as if a jury had found against him.

Execution is the execution of the law according to the judgment.

Executio est executio juris secundum judicium.

Source: 3 Inst. 212; Jackson; Weisman, 42a

Execution must conform strictly to the terms of the judgment — an officer who departs from the judgment in carrying it out acts without authority.

He who flees judgment confesses his guilt.

Fatetur facinus qui judicium fugit.

Source: 3 Inst. 14; Jackson; Weisman, 64m

Flight from justice is treated as an admission of guilt — a man who evades the court's process demonstrates consciousness of his own wrongdoing.

Judgment in presumption of law is given contrary to inclination.

Judicium redditur in invitum, in praesumptione legis.

Source: Co. Litt. 248; Jackson; Weisman, 64d

Default judgments and judgments based on legal presumption are entered against the unwilling party — the law acts upon those who refuse to participate in the process.

Every conclusion of a good and true judgment arises from good and true premises, and sayings of juries.

Omnis conclusio boni et veri judicii sequitur ex bonis et veris praemissis et dictis juratorum.

Source: Co. Litt. 226; Jackson; Weisman, 64gg

Sound judgments rest on sound foundations — a just conclusion can only follow from truthful premises established by the jury's findings of fact.

A thing certain must be brought to judgment.

Oportet quod certa res deducatur in judicium.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 84; Jackson

The subject matter of a lawsuit must be definite and identifiable — the court cannot adjudicate a claim that is vague, indefinite, or uncertain in its object.

Judgments frequently become matured by deliberation, never by hurried process.

Judicia in deliberationibus crebro maturescunt, in accelerato processu nunquam.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 210; Weisman, 64ee

Sound judgment requires careful deliberation — haste in judicial proceedings produces error, not justice.

A compromise is brought into affinity with judgments.

Source: Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 571; Weisman, 64b

(English-origin maxim.) A settlement or compromise between parties is treated with the same finality as a judgment — once agreed, it binds the parties and cannot be reopened absent fraud or mistake.

The execution of law does no injury.

Executio juris non habet injuriam.

Source: 2 Rolle 301; Co. Litt. 289b; Weisman, 42e

When the law is properly applied and its judgments duly executed, no one can complain of injury — the enforcement of a lawful judgment is itself a lawful act.

Execution is the end and the fruit of the law.

Executio est finis et fructus legis.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; Bank of U.S. v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 51, 64; Weisman, 42b

The entire judicial process — pleading, trial, judgment — exists for one purpose: execution. A system that pronounces judgments but cannot enforce them is a system of words, not of law. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.13, 1.5.31.)

The effect of law consists in its execution.

Effectus legis in executione consistit.

Source: Co. Litt. 289b; Weisman, 42c; Weisman, 71ss

Law that is not enforced is law in name only — the real measure of any legal system is whether its judgments and decrees are carried into effect.

Executions are preferred to all other processes.

Executiones omni processu praeferuntur.

Source: Co. Litt. 287, 289

Once a judgment has been obtained, the writ of execution takes priority over other legal processes — the party who has prevailed is entitled to the fruits of his victory without further delay.

Where the prescribed form is not observed, the act is annulled.

Non observata forma, infertur adnullatio actus.

Source: 12 Co. 7; Co. Litt. 303a

Execution must follow the form prescribed by law — an execution conducted in violation of established procedure is void and conveys no rights.

Not only what is lawful, but what is fitting, must be considered; because nothing that is unfitting is lawful.

Non solum quid liceat, sed quid sit conveniens est considerandum; quia nihil quod est inconveniens est licitum.

Source: Co. Litt. 66a

In the execution of law, the manner matters as much as the authority — lawful power exercised in an oppressive or unreasonable fashion ceases to be lawful.

Non-enforcement does not abolish the law.

Desuetudo non tollit legem.

Source: Louisville & N. R.R. v. U.S., 282 U.S. 740, 759; Weisman, 42f

The failure to enforce a law does not repeal it — the law remains in force and may be invoked at any time, regardless of how long it has gone unenforced.

It is not enough that a sentence has been given unless it is committed to execution.

Parum est latam esse sententiam nisi mandetur executioni.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 289

A judgment without execution is an empty pronouncement — the law's work is not complete until its decrees are carried into effect.

Stand by decisions and do not disturb settled matters.

Stare decisis et non quieta movere.

Source: Johnson v. Western Union Tele. Co. (N.C.) 57 S.E. 122, 124; Co. Litt.; Broom, Max.

Stability in the law is essential to liberty — when courts reverse settled principles on every new occasion, no man can know his rights and no contract is secure.

We are to judge by laws, not by examples.

Non exemplis sed legibus judicandum est.

Source: 4 Co. 33b; 4 Bl. Comm. 405

Precedent is a guide, not a master — when a prior decision conflicts with the law itself, the law prevails and the precedent must yield.

Things introduced contrary to the reason of the law ought not to be drawn into precedent.

Quae contra rationem juris introducta sunt, non debent trahi in consequentiam.

Source: 12 Co. 75; Dig. 1, 3, 14; Dig. 50, 17; Weisman, 88e

An aberrant decision — one that contradicts established legal principles — should be confined to its facts and never extended to new cases.

Things accepted on account of necessity ought not to be drawn into precedent.

Quae propter necessitatem recepta sunt, non debent in argumentum trahi.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 162; Weisman, 83k; Weisman, 88g

Emergency measures are exceptions, not rules — what the law tolerates under extraordinary circumstances must not become the standard for ordinary times.

One absurdity being established, an infinity follows.

Uno absurdo dato, infinita sequuntur.

Source: 1 Co. 102; Weisman, 88i

A single bad precedent opens the door to endless subsequent errors — the first departure from sound principle must be corrected before it spawns a chain of injustice.

The old way is the safe way.

Via antiqua via est tuta.

Source: Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 223; 10 Co. 142; Weisman, 88j

Established practice, tested by time and experience, is more trustworthy than novel theory — innovation in the law should be approached with caution.

Let it be done as it has been accustomed to be done.

Fiat ut fieri consuevit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 116, case 39; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 88m

Established usage carries the force of law — courts should follow customary practice unless it has been shown to conflict with a higher principle.

It is perilous to introduce new and untried things.

Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas inducere.

Source: Co. Litt. 379a; Weisman, 88o

Legal innovation should be incremental and cautious — sweeping changes untested by experience risk undermining the settled expectations upon which all men have ordered their affairs.

A case omitted and forgotten is left to the disposal of the common law.

Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur.

Source: 5 Co. 87; Weisman, 99h

Where the legislature has failed to address a matter, the gap is not a void — the common law fills every silence. No court may supply what the statute omits; the common law already governs.

The latter decisions are stronger in law.

Judicia posteriora sunt in lege fortiora.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 8 Co. 97

In matters of procedure and statutory construction, the latest decision is presumed to carry greater weight, as it reflects the most deliberate consideration. This procedural presumption, however, does not license courts to depart from the original meaning of a constitution or statute — a later decision is not stronger merely for being later.

Faith or credit is to be given to the last decisions.

Judiciis posterioribus fides est adhibenda.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 13 Co. 14

Where prior and later decisions conflict on the same point, the later decision is given credit as the more considered statement of the law. This maxim does not validate judicial drift — a recent opinion that departs from original constitutional meaning is not thereby superior to an older one that faithfully applied it.

Precedents that pass sub silentio are of little or no authority.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 16 Vin. 499

(English-origin maxim.) A prior decision that did not actually consider or address the point in question carries no weight as precedent on that point — authority requires deliberate adjudication.

The power of adducing proof is not to be narrowed.

Facultas probationum non est angustanda.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson, No. 262

Courts must not restrict a party's opportunity to present evidence; the right to prove one's case is fundamental to due process of law.

The burden of proof falls upon the one who asserts, not the one who denies.

Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat.

Source: Dig. 22, 3, 2; Halk. Max. 9; Steph. Pl. 84

He who brings a claim must prove it; a party denying an allegation is not required to produce evidence of the negative.

The proof rests upon the one who affirms, not upon the one who denies.

Affirmanti, non neganti, incumbit probatio.

Source: Halk. Max. 9; Dig. 22, 3, 2

A restatement of the fundamental rule: the affirmative party bears the burden because a negative, by its nature, does not admit of direct proof.

A confession made in court is stronger than any proof.

Confessio facta in judicio omni probatione major est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 102; 11 Co. 30; Weisman, 39b

A voluntary admission before the tribunal supersedes the need for extrinsic evidence on the admitted point.

No one ought to be a witness in his own cause.

Testis nemo in sua causa esse debet.

Source: 3 Bl. Comm. 371; Dig. 22, 5, 10

A man's testimony in his own cause is inherently suspect because self-interest taints credibility — cite this to challenge the weight given to interested-party testimony, or to argue that a party's uncorroborated self-serving declarations should not carry the day.

The thing speaks for itself.

Res ipsa loquitur.

Source: Broom, Max.; per Pollock, C.B. in Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 2 H. & C. 722

Where an event is of such a character that it could not ordinarily occur without negligence or wrongful act, the occurrence itself is evidence sufficient to raise a presumption of fault without further proof.

In criminal cases, the proofs ought to be clearer than light.

In criminalibus, probationes debent esse luce clariores.

Source: 3 Inst. 210; Jackson, No. 371

Because the criminal proceeding puts life and liberty at hazard, the proof required is of the highest degree — clear, certain, and beyond reasonable doubt.

No one alleging his own wrongdoing is to be heard as a witness.

Nemo turpitudinem suam allegans audiendus est.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Best, Ev. §385; Weisman, 39ii

A person who would profit from his own wrong is not a credible witness; the law does not receive testimony grounded in the witness's own turpitude.

Proofs ought to be evident — that is, clear and easily understood.

Probationes debent esse evidentes, id est, perspicuae et faciles intellectu.

Source: Co. Litt. 283; Weisman, 39r

Evidence must be presented plainly and intelligibly; obscure or convoluted proofs fail to satisfy the standard the law requires.

Violent presumption is sometimes full proof.

Violenta praesumptio aliquando est plena probatio.

Source: Co. Litt. 6; Jackson

A presumption so strong that it admits of no reasonable alternative explanation may stand as complete proof of the fact presumed, shifting the burden entirely to the opposing party.

To swear is to call God as witness, and is an act of divine worship.

Jurare est Deum in testem vocare, et est actus divini cultus.

Source: 3 Inst. 165; Jackson, No. 459; Weisman, 84j

The oath invokes the highest authority — the Almighty — as surety of truth, making perjury not only a civil offense but a transgression against the divine order.

There is no stronger bond between men than an oath.

Nullum vinculum majus inter homines quam jusjurandum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. Cas. 126, case 54; Weisman, 84a

The oath is the highest form of human undertaking; its binding force exceeds that of any contract or promise because it appeals to conscience and to God.

An oath is indivisible; it cannot be held partly true and partly false.

Juramentum est indivisibile, et non est admittendum in parte verum et in parte falsum.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson, No. 456; Weisman, 84d

Sworn testimony must be taken whole — a tribunal may not selectively accept portions of an oath while rejecting others, because the oath stands or falls as one.

Every oath ought to be founded upon certain knowledge.

Omne sacramentum debet esse de certa scientia.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Weisman, 84f

No person may swear to what he does not know; an oath grounded on conjecture, supposition, or hearsay is void.

In court, no one is believed unless under oath.

In judicio non creditur nisi juratis.

Source: Cro. Car. 64; 3 Inst. 79

All facts presented in a legal proceeding must be established by sworn testimony or affirmation; unsworn statements carry no evidentiary weight.

The divine punishment for perjury is destruction; the human punishment is disgrace.

Perjurii poena divina exitium, humana dedecus.

Source: 3 Inst. 163; Co. Litt. 158

Perjury strikes at the foundation of the legal system; the law regards it with the utmost severity because the oath is the pillar upon which all judicial proceedings rest.

An oath made between others ought neither to hurt nor to benefit a stranger.

Jusjurandum inter alios factum nec nocere nec prodesse debet.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson, No. 472; Weisman, 84l

The binding force of an oath extends only to the parties involved; third parties are neither bound by, nor entitled to rely upon, sworn statements made in proceedings to which they were not privy.

An oath has three companions — truth, justice, and judgment.

Juramentum habet in se tres comites — veritatem, justitiam, et judicium.

Source: 3 Inst. 160

Truth inheres in the party swearing; justice and judgment inhere in the officer administering the oath. All three must be present for the oath to be lawful.

The oath of an infamous person is not to be received.

Repellitur a sacramento infamis.

Source: Co. Litt. 158; Jackson; Wharton

A person of proven infamy is excluded from giving sworn testimony because his oath carries no credibility — the law will not receive sworn evidence from one whose character is wholly discredited.

The form of taking an oath, though it differs in words, agrees in meaning; for it ought to have this sense, that the Deity be invoked.

Jusjurandi forma verbis differt, re convenit; hunc enim sensum habere debet, ut Deus invocetur.

Source: Grotius, l. 2, c. 13, §10; Wharton; Weisman, 84m

The particular words of an oath may vary by custom or jurisdiction, but the substance is universal — every lawful oath must invoke the Almighty as witness to the truth of what is sworn.

Punishment is due if the words of an oath be false.

Source: Black's, 840; Weisman, 84c

(English-origin maxim.) Perjury — the willful utterance of false words under oath — merits punishment because the oath is the foundation of judicial truth-finding, and its violation undermines the entire system of justice.

All things are presumed to have been done rightly and in due form.

Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta.

Source: Co. Litt. 232b; Broom, Max. 847; Best, Ev. §300; Weisman, 89f

Until contrary proof is adduced, the law presumes that official acts were performed lawfully and that regular procedures were followed.

A presumption of law and from the law — a conclusive presumption.

Praesumptio juris et de jure.

Source: Co. Litt. 6b; Broom, Max.; Best, Ev.

Certain presumptions are so firmly established in law that no contrary evidence is permitted to rebut them; the law treats the presumed fact as conclusively established.

A strong presumption has great weight in law.

Praesumptio violenta valet in lege.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 56, case 3; Co. Litt. 6b; Weisman, 89c

Where the circumstances raise a violent presumption — one so strong as to amount to full proof — it operates with the force of direct evidence and shifts the burden to the opposing party. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.253.)

A presumption stands until the contrary is proved.

Praesumptio donec probetur in contrarium.

Source: Hob. 297; 3 Bl. Comm. 371; Weisman, 89e

Rebuttable presumptions have the force of proof until overcome by competent evidence to the contrary; the party challenging the presumption bears the burden.

The presumption always favors the one who denies.

Praesumptio semper est pro negante.

Source: 10 Clark & F. 534; Weisman, 89j

Because proof lies on the affirmative party, the law presumes in favor of the one who denies until the affirmative proposition is established.

All things are presumed against a despoiler.

Omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem.

Source: Broom, Max. 938; Best, Ev. §303

Where a party destroys or suppresses evidence, the law raises every presumption against him — he who silences the proof is presumed to fear its voice.

Nothing unjust is to be presumed in law.

Nihil iniquum est praesumendum in jure.

Source: 4 Co. 72; Co. Litt. 78; Weisman, 89h

The law will not presume that any party acted unjustly, dishonorably, or unlawfully; wrongdoing must be affirmatively proved.

What is clearly apparent needs no proof.

Quod constat clare non debet verificari.

Source: 10 Mod. 150; 9 Co. 54

When a fact is manifest to the court, requiring formal proof of it wastes the tribunal's time and insults its intelligence.

The extremes being proved, the intermediate things are presumed.

Probatis extremis, praesumuntur media.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 207; 1 Greenl. Ev. §20; Weisman, 39s

Where the beginning and end of a transaction are proved, the law presumes the intervening steps occurred in regular order.

From length of time, all things are presumed to have been done in due form.

Ex diuturnitate temporis, omnia praesumuntur solemniter esse acta.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 6; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 20

Where an act has stood unchallenged for a great length of time, the law presumes that all necessary formalities were observed in its execution.

When doubts arise, the most generous and benign presumptions are to be preferred.

Nobiliores et benigniores praesumptiones in dubiis sunt praeferendae.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

In cases of doubt, the law favors the presumption that is most favorable and least injurious, rather than the harsher interpretation. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.4.8.)

Things manifest do not require proof.

Manifesta probatione non indigent.

Source: 7 Co. 40b; Co. Litt. 16

Plain and obvious facts need not be proved; to require formal evidence of what everyone can see would burden the proceeding without advancing truth.

That which appears to the court does not need the aid of witnesses.

Quod constat curiae opere testium non indiget.

Source: 2 Inst. 662; Weisman, 39i

Where a fact is within the court's own knowledge — from its records, its observation, or matters of which it takes judicial notice — witness testimony is unnecessary.

Judicial notice is a form of evidence.

Source: Mann v. Mann, 172 P.2d 369, 375, 76 Cal. App. 2d 32; Weisman, 39gg

(English-origin maxim.) Courts take judicial notice of facts so universally known or so readily verifiable from authoritative sources that they require no formal proof; such notice operates as evidence in the proceeding.

Of things which do not appear and things which do not exist, the rule is the same.

De non apparentibus, et non existentibus, eadem est ratio.

Source: 5 Co. 6; Jenk. Cent. 207; Jackson, No. 185

What is not brought before the court is treated as though it does not exist at all; a party who fails to produce evidence of a fact may not rely upon it.

First principles prove; they are not proved.

Principia probant, non probantur.

Source: 3 Co. 40a, 50a

Fundamental axioms of law — like the rules of evidence themselves — are self-evident foundations; they are to be approved and applied, not themselves subjected to proof.

Plain truths need not be proved.

Perspicua vera non sunt probanda.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 16

What is obvious and undeniable requires no formal evidence — the law does not demand proof of what no reasonable person would dispute. (Duplicate maxim — see also 3.4.13.)

It matters not what is known to the judge, if it is not known to him judicially.

Non refert quid notum sit judici, si notum non sit in forma judicii.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Buls. 115

A judge's private knowledge cannot substitute for evidence properly before the court — what the judge knows as a man is irrelevant unless established through the formal record. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.165.)

Truth is the mother of justice.

Veritas est justitiae mater.

Source: Halk. Max. 185; Weisman, 101m

Justice cannot exist apart from truth; every legal proceeding is, at its foundation, a search for truth, and any process that obscures truth undermines justice.

Truth is lost by too much disputation.

Veritas nimium altercando amittitur.

Source: Hob. 344

Excessive argument and procedural wrangling obscure the truth rather than illuminating it; simplicity and directness serve justice better than prolixity.

The law suffers nothing contrary to truth.

Lex non patitur aliquid contra veritatem.

Source: 2 Inst. 252; Weisman, 101c

No fiction, no presumption, and no procedural rule may be carried so far as to contradict established truth; where truth is known, it must prevail.

Truth not sufficiently defended is overcome; and he who does not disapprove, approves.

Veritas, quae non sufficienter defenditur, opprimitur; et qui non improbat, approbat.

Source: 3 Inst. 27; Weisman, 101l

Silence in the face of falsehood operates as consent; he who knows the truth and fails to defend it bears responsibility for the falsehood that prevails.

Painted error appears in many things more probable than naked truth; and again and again conquers truth by reasoning.

Error fucatus nuda veritate in multis est probabilior; et saepenumero rationibus vincit veritatem error.

Source: 2 Co. 78; Jackson

A well-dressed falsehood often appears more plausible than plain truth — advocates and tribunals must guard against sophisticated arguments that obscure simple facts.

Judgments are as it were the dicta of the law, and are received as truth.

Judicia sunt tanquam juris dicta, et pro veritate accipiuntur.

Source: 2 Inst. 587; Jackson; Weisman, 64e

A final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is presumed to state the law correctly and is treated as conclusive truth until reversed on appeal or vacated for jurisdictional defect.

Monuments which we call records are the vestiges of truth and antiquity.

Monumenta quae nos recorda vocamus sunt veritatis et vetustatis vestigia.

Source: Co. Litt. 118; Jackson

Official records carry the weight of established truth and historical fact — they are the permanent evidence of what was done and decided, and are presumed accurate until rebutted.

Impossibilities or dishonesty are not to be presumed; but honesty, and truth, and possibility.

Nulla impossibilia aut inhonesta sunt praesumenda; vera autem et honesta et possibilia.

Source: Co. Litt. 78; Jackson

The law always presumes in favor of what is honest, true, and possible — dishonesty and impossibility must be proved, never assumed.

To lie is to go against the mind.

Mentiri est contra mentem ire.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 8 Buls. 260

A lie is a deliberate contradiction of what the speaker knows to be true — it is an offense against the faculty of reason itself, not merely against the hearer. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.137.)

The construction of law obtains the force of law.

Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet.

Source: Bouvier

An authoritative construction of a statute carries the same binding effect as the statute itself; the interpretation, once settled, governs as law. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.7.34.)

Words to which reference is made in an instrument have the same effect and operation as if they were inserted in the instrument referring to them.

Verba relata hoc maxime operantur per referentiam, ut in eis inesse videntur.

Source: Co. Litt. 359; Jackson; Weisman, 16c

Incorporation by reference gives the referenced words the same force as if they had been copied into the instrument verbatim.

Words spoken to one end ought not to be perverted to another.

Quae ad unum finem loquuta sunt, non debent ad alium detorqueri.

Source: 4 Co. 14; Bouvier

Language drafted for a specific purpose must not be wrested from that purpose and applied to a different end — every provision has its proper office and must not be conscripted into foreign service. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.200.)

Discretion is to discern through law what is just.

Discretio est discernere per legem quid sit justum.

Source: 5 Co. 99, 100; 4 Inst. 41; 1 Bl. Comm. 152; Weisman, 31g

Judicial discretion is not arbitrary choice — it is the disciplined application of law to fact, discerning what justice requires in the particular case.

It is the same thing not to exist and not to appear.

Idem non esse et non apparere.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 207; Co. Litt. 6b

A right, condition, or fact that is not made to appear in the record or instrument is treated as if it did not exist; what cannot be shown cannot be relied upon.

Things which do not appear are treated as though they do not exist; and not appearing judicially is the same as not being.

Quae non apparent non sunt; et non apparent judicialiter idem est ac si non essent.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 207; Co. Litt. 6b

What is not expressed in a record, instrument, or pleading cannot be relied upon; the law takes no notice of what is not brought before it.

Fiction yields to truth; there is no fiction of law where truth is.

Fictio cedit veritati; fictio juris non est ubi veritas.

Source: 11 Co. 51; Wharton, Max. no. 189; Jackson, Lat. for Lawyers 3146

A legal fiction may stand only where the truth is absent; the moment truth is established, the fiction falls and reality governs.

A fiction is contrary to truth, but is held for truth.

Fictio est contra veritatem, sed pro veritate habetur.

Source: Co. Litt.; Hibberd v. Smith, 67 Cal. 547, 4 Pac. 473

A fiction is a deliberate assumption of something known to be false, adopted by the law for the sake of justice; it operates as truth only within the boundaries set by that purpose.

Relation back is a fiction of law.

Relatio est fictio juris.

Source: Wharton, Max.; Jackson v. Davenport, 30 Johns. 537, 551; Weisman, 93a

The doctrine of relation back — by which a later act is deemed to have taken effect from an earlier date — is a fiction and therefore subject to all the limits of fictions: it must serve equity and may injure no one.

Of things similar, the judgment is the same.

De similibus idem est judicium.

Source: 7 Co. 18; Co. Litt. 191

Where two cases rest on the same reason, the same rule governs both; the law does not produce different results from identical principles.

Where the same reason exists, there the same law prevails; and of things similar, the judgment is similar.

Ubi eadem ratio, ibi idem jus; et de similibus idem est judicium.

Source: 7 Co. 18; Co. Litt. 191; Weisman, 97g

The law is governed by reason, not by accident; when two facts present the same rationale, neither party may claim a different rule.

From similars to similars, we are to proceed by the same rule.

A similibus ad similia eadem ratione procedendum est.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 8e; Weisman, 97m

Reasoning by analogy is lawful and necessary: where a case falls within the reason of an established rule, the rule extends to it by operation of logic, even if the case was not specifically contemplated.

What is effectual in one of two like things shall be effectual in the other.

Quod in uno simili valet, valebit in altero.

Source: Co. Litt. 191a; Weisman, 97k

A rule that operates in one case extends to every case that stands on the same footing; consistency is the life of the law.

No example is the same for all purposes.

Nullum exemplum est idem omnibus.

Source: Co. Litt. 212a; Weisman, 97n

Every precedent carries implicit limitations; an example illuminates a principle but does not govern every case to which a superficial resemblance might be drawn.

An act of the law does injury to no one.

Actus legis nemini facit injuriam.

Source: 5 Co. 116; Broom, Max. 122; Jenk. Cent. 252; Weisman, 59q

Where the law itself operates to produce a result, no party can claim to be injured by that operation — the law is presumed to work justice. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.280, 7.4.6.)

An act of the law is harmful to no one.

Actus legis nemini est damnosus.

Source: 5 Co. 81; Wing. Max. 614

A legal consequence that flows from the operation of law — as distinct from the act of a party — carries no actionable injury.

Not what is said, but what is done, is to be regarded.

Non quod dictum est, sed quod factum est, inspicitur.

Source: Co. Litt. 36; 6 Bing. 310; Osborn v. Cook, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 536; Weisman, 2d

In the delivery of instruments, the substance of what was performed controls — not the oral declarations accompanying it.

An act of a judge which does not pertain to his office is of no force.

Factum a judice quod ad ejus officium non spectat, non ratum est.

Source: 10 Co. 76; Dig. 50, 17, 170

A judicial act performed beyond the judge's jurisdiction is a nullity — it binds no one and conveys no authority. (Duplicate maxim — see also 8.1.41.)

If the written law be silent, that which is drawn from manners and custom ought to be observed; and if in that anything is defective, then that which is next and analogous to it.

Lex scripta si cesset, id custodiri oportet quod moribus et consuetudine inductum est; et si qua in re hoc defecerit, tunc id quod proximum et consequens ei est.

Source: 7 Co. 19; Jackson

Where the written law fails to address a matter, custom fills the gap; where custom also fails, the nearest analogous principle governs.

Legal form is essential form.

Forma legalis forma essentialis.

Source: 10 Co. 100; Bouvier

The prescribed form of an instrument is not a mere technicality but the very substance of its validity; an act performed without the form required by law is a nullity. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.6.1.)

When form is not observed, a nullity of the act is inferred.

Forma non observata, infertur adnullatio actus.

Source: 12 Co. 7; Bouvier

Failure to comply with mandatory legal form is fatal to the act — the law infers from the defective form that no valid act was performed.

Execution is the end and the fruit of the law.

Executio est finis et fructus legis.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; Bouvier

The purpose of the law is achieved only through execution; a judgment without enforcement is a tree without fruit. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.31, 8.9.2.)

Where the provision of the party is wanting, the provision of the law is at hand.

Ubi defecit remedium partis, ibi adest remedium legis.

Source: 6 Vin. Abr. 49; Weisman, 16g

Where the parties to an instrument have failed to address a contingency, the common law supplies the default rule — silence in a contract is not a void, but an invitation for law to govern.

To discontinue is to intermit, to disuse, to interrupt.

Discontinuare est intermittere, desuescere, interrumpere.

Source: Co. Litt. 325

Discontinuance is the failure to maintain or prosecute — a right or action left dormant may be treated as abandoned.

Custom is sustained by its own force through continuance.

Consuetudo robore suo sustinetur.

Source: Cf. Mann v. Mann's Ex'rs, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 231, 237; 2 Bl. Comm. 263

A practice that persists without interruption gathers legal force — continuity itself is evidence of right.

That which is so persistently repeated as to constitute virtually an unbroken series is continuous.

Quod perseveranter repetitur, ut seriem ininterruptam constituat, continuum est.

Source: Ingraham v. Hough, 46 N.C. 43; Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 260; Weisman, 23c

Continuous use is proven not by absolute permanence, but by a pattern of repetition so consistent that it admits no meaningful break.

Time is a means of destroying obligations and actions.

Tempus enim modus tollendi obligationes et actiones.

Source: Bract. fols. 100b, 101; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 4, s. 5, §12; Weisman, 100a

Where an instrument or right is not enforced within the time allowed, the law may extinguish the obligation — continuity of claim is the antidote to the running of time.

An argument drawn from authority is the strongest in law.

Argumentum ab auctoritate est fortissimum in lege.

Source: Co. Litt. 254a; Broom, Max. 68; Weisman, 8i

Precedent and authoritative texts are the firmest ground for legal argument — the reported cases are the best proof of what the law is.

An argument from division of the subject is of the greatest force in law.

Argumentum a divisione est fortissimum in jure.

Source: Co. Litt. 213b; 6 Co. 60; Weisman, 8a

A question dissected into its constituent parts is most readily answered — division clarifies where generality obscures.

An argument from a similar case, or from analogy, is valid in law.

Argumentum a simili valet in lege.

Source: Co. Litt. 191; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 8d

Where no direct authority exists, the law permits reasoning from like cases to like — analogy bridges the gap between settled principle and new facts.

An argument drawn from things commonly happening is frequent in law.

Argumentum a communiter accidentibus in jure frequens est.

Source: Broom, Max. 44; Co. Litt. 191; Weisman, 8j

The law reasons from ordinary experience — what usually happens is the baseline for legal presumption.

The negation of a conclusion is error in law.

Negatio conclusionis est error in lege.

Source: Wing. 268; Jackson; Weisman, 37k

To deny a conclusion that follows necessarily from established premises is itself a legal error; the law demands that reasoning be carried to its logical end.

Principles prove; they are not proved.

Principia probant, non probantur.

Source: 3 Co. 40; Bouvier; Weisman, 39y

First principles are the axioms of the law — they are the starting points of reasoning, not the conclusions; they are accepted as self-evident and used to prove other propositions.

There is no disputing against one who denies principles.

Contra negantem principia non est disputandum.

Source: Co. Litt. 43; Bouvier; Weisman, 95qq

Rational discourse requires agreed premises; he who denies the foundational principles of law places himself beyond the reach of argument. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.47.)

Reason and authority are the two brightest lights in the world.

Ratio et auctoritas duo clarissima mundi lumina.

Source: 4 Co. Inst. 320; Bouvier

The law rests on two pillars — rational principle and established precedent; where both converge, the law speaks with its greatest force. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.260.)

Novelty benefits not so much by its utility as it disturbs by its novelty.

Novitas non tam utilitate prodest quam novitate perturbat.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 167; Bouvier

Innovation in the law is to be approached with caution — a new rule may offer some advantage, but the disruption of settled expectations often outweighs the gain.

Inquire into doubtful points, for by reasoning we arrive at legal truth.

Quaere de dubiis, quia per rationes pervenitur ad legitimam rationem.

Source: Litt. s. 443; Co. Litt. 264b

Doubt is not a destination but a point of departure — the law commands inquiry, not paralysis.

When you doubt about a thing, do not do it.

Quod dubitas, ne feceris.

Source: 1 Hale P.C. 310; cf. Dig. 50, 17, 12; Weisman, 32g

Doubt is a counsel against action — where the lawfulness of a course is uncertain, abstention is the safer path.

In cases of doubt, the more generous and more favorable presumptions are to be preferred.

Nobiliores et benigniores praesumptiones in dubiis sunt praeferendae.

Source: Reg. Jur. Civ.; Jackson

Where the facts permit more than one inference, the law prefers the presumption that is more generous and more favorable to the party, rather than the harsher one. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.3.12.)

Whatever is done in excess is prohibited by law.

Quicquid in excessu actum est, lege prohibetur.

Source: 2 Inst. 107; Co. Litt. 44

Excess in the exercise of any power or right is itself unlawful — the law permits the proper use of authority but condemns its overreach. (Duplicate maxim — see also 7.7.12.)

All excess is reprehended in law.

Omne nimium in lege reprobatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 44; 2 Inst. 107

Moderation is a first principle — every exercise of power, every pleading, every remedy must be proportionate to its purpose.

When more is done than ought to be done, that which ought to have been done is considered to have been done.

Quando plus fit quam fieri debet, videtur etiam illud fieri quod faciendum est.

Source: 8 Co. 85; Jackson

Where an act exceeds what was required, the law treats the required portion as validly performed; the excess does not vitiate the lawful part.

The law would rather suffer a mischief than an inconvenience.

Le ley voit plus tost suffer un mischiefe que un inconvenience.

Source: Litt. s. 321; Wharton; Weisman, 71bb

The law tolerates a particular injury to one party sooner than it will permit a general inconvenience affecting the whole system of law. In the American system, however, the rights of the individual are themselves part of systemic integrity — the Bill of Rights exists precisely because the Founders understood that sacrificing individual liberty for systemic convenience without due process of law is itself the greater inconvenience.

Time is the devourer of things; for time is a means of destroying obligations and actions, because time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their own rights.

Tempus est edax rerum; tempus enim modus tollendi obligationes et actiones, quia tempus currit contra desides et sui juris contemptores.

Source: Bract. fols. 100b, 101; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 4, s. 5, §12

He who sleeps on his rights may lose them — the passage of time is the law's penalty for inaction.

A day begun is held as complete.

Dies inceptus pro completo habetur.

Source: Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 367; 2 Bulstr. 305; Weisman, 100c

For legal purposes, a day is indivisible — once begun, it is reckoned as if fully elapsed.

An uncertain day is held as a condition.

Dies incertus pro conditione habetur.

Source: Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 367; cf. Dig. 36, 2, 5; Weisman, 100d

Where an obligation is fixed to a day that may or may not arrive, the day is treated as a condition precedent — the obligation does not mature until the uncertain event occurs.

The law does not take notice of fractions of a day.

Lex non curat de minimis; de fractionibus diei non curat lex.

Source: Lofft 572; Co. Litt. 135a; Weisman, 100k

The law deals in whole days — hours and minutes are beneath its notice unless a statute specifically requires finer measurement.

Delays in law are odious.

Dilationes in lege sunt odiosae.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier; Weisman, 71h

The law abhors delay because delay is the enemy of justice — a right deferred is a right diminished, and the courts will not tolerate dilatory tactics that prolong the resolution of disputes.

Delay is disapproved of in law.

Mora reprobatur in lege.

Source: Bouvier

The law censures unreasonable delay in the assertion of rights and the prosecution of remedies — he who delays without cause forfeits the law's sympathy and may forfeit the right itself.

An accuser is not to be heard after a reasonable time unless he can account satisfactorily for the delay.

Accusator post rationabile tempus non est audiendus, nisi se bene de omissione excusaverit.

Source: Moor. 817; Jackson; Weisman, 99x

Stale accusations are disfavored; he who delays bringing a charge must explain the delay or forfeit the right to prosecute.

The Lord’s Day (Sunday) is not juridical, or a day for legal proceedings.

Dies Dominicus non est juridicus.

Source: Co. Litt. 185; Jackson

Sunday is excluded from the reckoning of legal days; judicial acts performed on the Lord’s Day are void by ancient common law tradition.

A man may be capable and incapable at different times.

Homo potest esse habilis et inhabilis diversis temporibus.

Source: 5 Co. 98; Jackson

Legal capacity is not fixed; a person's competence to act may vary with age, condition, or circumstance, and the law judges capacity at the time the act was performed.

In customs, not the length of time but the strength of the reason should be considered.

In consuetudinibus, non diuturnitas temporis sed soliditas rationis est consideranda.

Source: Co. Litt. 141; Jackson

A custom is validated not merely by its age but by the soundness of its underlying reason; an unreasonable custom, however ancient, is no law.

The law dislikes delay.

Lex reprobat moram.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 35; Jackson

Delay in the administration of justice is condemned; the law demands promptness in the assertion of rights and the dispatch of proceedings.

Long time and long use, which exceeds the memory of man, suffices in law.

Longum tempus et longus usus, qui excedit memoriam hominum, sufficit pro jure.

Source: Co. Litt. 115; Jackson

Immemorial usage — practice so old that no one remembers its origin — is presumed lawful and establishes right as effectively as a grant or statute.

Neither time nor place affects the king.

Nec tempus nec locus occurrit regi.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 190; Jackson

Statutes of limitation and rules of venue do not run against the sovereign; the Crown is not barred by lapse of time or confined by locality in asserting its rights.

What is first is truer; and what is first in time is better in law.

Quod prius est verius est; et quod prius est tempore potius est jure.

Source: Co. Litt. 347; Jackson

Priority in time confers priority in right; the first in time has the superior claim, and later interests must yield to earlier ones.

A wise man does everything advisedly.

Sapiens omnia agit cum consilio.

Source: 4 Inst. 4; Weisman, 3g

Deliberation is the mark of wisdom — the law rewards the prudent and penalizes the rash.

The advice of many is requisite in great affairs.

Multorum consilio opus est in rebus magnis.

Source: 4 Inst. 1; Weisman, 3f

Weighty decisions demand broad counsel — the law recognizes that complex matters require collective wisdom, not solitary judgment.