property

A custom must be certain, for an uncertain custom is held as nothing.

Consuetudo debet esse certa; nam incerta pro nulla habetur.

Source: Davies 33; Black's 255; Bouvier, Max. 121; Weisman, 27c

A custom too vague to be stated with precision cannot bind — the party asserting custom must prove its definite content and consistent application.

A custom grounded on a certain and reasonable cause supersedes the common law.

Consuetudo certa et rationabili causa superinducta vincit legem communem.

Source: Litt. s. 169; Co. Litt. 113; Broom, Max. 919; Weisman, 27h

Where a local custom rests on solid reason and has been consistently observed, it displaces the general common law rule for that locality.

Custom can neither arise from nor be destroyed by a wrong.

Consuetudo neque injuria oriri neque tolli potest.

Source: Lofft 340; Jackson 157; Weisman, 27m

An unlawful practice, no matter how long continued, never ripens into a binding custom — illegality at the root destroys the claim.

A prescriptive and lawful custom overcomes the law.

Consuetudo praescripta et legitima vincit legem.

Source: Co. Litt. 113; 4 Co. 21; Weisman, 27r

A custom that has been exercised from time immemorial and rests on lawful grounds carries the force of law and overrides general rules to the contrary.

Custom and common usage overcome the unwritten law if the custom is special; and they interpret the written law if the law is general.

Consuetudo et communis assuetudo vincit legem non scriptam, si sit specialis; et interpretatur legem scriptam, si lex sit generalis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 273; Weisman, 17f

Custom operates differently depending on its object — a special local custom displaces general unwritten law outright, while against a written statute custom serves as the interpreter rather than the overrider.

The custom of a manor and place is to be observed.

Consuetudo manerii et loci observanda est.

Source: 4 Co. 21; Weisman, 27k

Each manor and locality may have its own established customs that bind the inhabitants and the courts — these local customs are not extinguished by the general law but coexist with it.

Things which are done contrary to the custom and usage of our ancestors neither please nor appear right.

Source: 4 Coke, 78; Weisman, 27j

(English-origin maxim.) Innovations that contradict established ancestral practice are presumptively disfavored — cite this to challenge novel government procedures that depart from long-standing customary due process of law.

In the court of chancery ( equity) a man shall not be prejudiced by his mispleading, or defect of form, but according to the truth of the matter; for the decision should be made according to conscience and not according to the rigor of law.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 36f

(English-origin maxim.) Equity looks to substance, not form — a party's right to be heard on the merits cannot be defeated by a technical pleading defect, because the court of conscience is bound to reach the truth of the matter rather than punish imperfect procedure.

Laws derived from the pure source of equity and justice must be founded on the consent of those whose obedience they require.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 36s

(English-origin maxim.) No law is legitimate unless it rests on the consent of the governed — invoke this maxim to challenge any regulation, ordinance, or statute imposed upon the People without their genuine consent, as all just authority flows upward from the sovereign People, not downward from government.

No one is compelled to accuse himself, except before God.

Accusare nemo se debet, nisi coram Deo.

Source: Jackson

The privilege against self-incrimination is a natural right — no tribunal of man may compel a person to bear witness against himself.

He who alleges contrary things is not to be heard.

Allegans contraria non est audiendus.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 16; Jackson

A party who makes contradictory claims destroys his own credibility — the court will not entertain assertions that are irreconcilable with each other.

A tree is so called whilst growing, but wood when it ceases to grow.

Arbor dum crescit; lignum cum crescere nescit.

Source: 2 Bul. 82; Jackson

The character of a thing changes when its nature changes — a standing tree is real property, but once felled it becomes personal property.

Debts follow the person of the debtor.

Debita sequuntur personam debitoris.

Source: Halk. Max. 18; Jackson; Weisman, 28k

A debtor cannot escape his obligations by changing location or residence — his debts attach to his person and may be pursued wherever he goes.

A thing is said to be given when it is yielded otherwise than by virtue of a right.

Donari videtur, quod nullo jure cogente conceditur.

Source: D. 50, 17, 82; Jackson; Weisman, 48l

What is yielded without legal compulsion is treated as a gift — the distinction between what is owed by right and what is given freely determines the nature of the transfer.

A new matter always induces various events.

Eventus varios res nova semper habet.

Source: Co. Litt. 379; Jackson; Weisman, 38b

Innovation in law or commerce carries unpredictable consequences — caution is warranted when departing from established practice.

Excess in law is reprehended. Excess in any matter is reprehended at common law.

Excessivum in jure reprobatur. Excessus in re qualibet jure reprobatur communi.

Source: Co. 44; Jackson; Weisman, 41a

The law disfavors excess in all things — whether in pleading, punishment, or the exercise of authority, going beyond what is necessary is condemned.

From lapse of time, all things are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly.

Ex diuturnitate temporis omnia praesumuntur esse rite et solenniter acta.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 185; Jackson; Weisman, 100e

Long-standing acts and proceedings enjoy a presumption of regularity — the passage of time cures minor defects in form and shifts the burden to him who alleges irregularity.

Deeds contain many things which are prohibited to be done.

Facta tenent multa quae fieri prohibentur.

Source: 12 Co. 125; Jackson; Weisman, 30b

Acts already done may stand even though similar acts are now forbidden — the prohibition operates prospectively, and completed transactions are not automatically undone.

Executions are more preferred than all other processes whatever.

Favorabiliores sunt executiones aliis processibus quibuscunque.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; Jackson; Weisman, 42d

The law favors the enforcement of judgments over further proceedings — once a judgment is rendered, the priority shifts to carrying it into effect.

Felony is implied in every treason.

Felonia implicatur in qualibet proditione.

Source: 3 Inst. 15; Jackson; Weisman, 26i

Treason necessarily includes felony as a lesser offense — the greater crime comprehends the lesser.

Affiliation cannot be proved.

Filiatio non potest probari.

Source: Co. Litt. 126; Jackson

At common law, paternity could not be directly proved by physical evidence — the law therefore relied on the presumption that a child born in wedlock is the child of the husband.

Navigable rivers and ports are public; therefore the right of fishing there is common to all.

Flumina et portus publica sunt, ideoque jus piscandi omnibus commune est.

Source: Jackson

Navigable waters are held in common for the benefit of all the People — no private party may monopolize what belongs by nature to the public.

Women are not able to hold public offices.

Feminae non sunt capaces de publicis officiis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 237; Jackson

This maxim reflected the common law disability of women from holding public office — a rule long since superseded. The right of women to hold office came through the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee and reforms in the several state constitutions, not the Nineteenth Amendment, which secured the distinct right to vote.

It is useless to prove that which, being proved, would not avail.

Frustra probatur quod probatum non relevat.

Source: Halk. Max. 50; Jackson; Weisman, 39u

Evidence that has no bearing on the issue should not be admitted — the court's time is not to be consumed by proof of immaterial facts.

A general expression implies nothing certain.

Generale nihil certi implicat.

Source: 2 Co. 33; Jackson; Weisman, 43f

Broad and general language in a grant, statute, or contract conveys no specific right or obligation — certainty requires specificity.

It is the same thing to say nothing and not to say sufficient.

Idem est nihil dicere et insufficienter dicere.

Source: 2 Inst. 178; Jackson

An insufficient pleading or allegation is treated as no pleading at all — the law requires that claims be stated with enough particularity to inform the opposing party. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.34.)

That is perfect which is complete in all its parts; and nothing is perfect whilst anything remains to be done.

Id perfectum est quod ex omnibus suis partibus constat; et nihil perfectum est dum aliquid restat agendum.

Source: 9 Co. 9; Jackson

A legal proceeding, instrument, or obligation must be complete in every essential element — an incomplete act is imperfect and may be challenged until it is perfected.

In the presence of the greater, the power of the inferior ceases.

In praesentia majoris cessat potentia minoris.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 214; Jackson; Weisman, 11w

When a superior authority is present and acting, the jurisdiction of the subordinate is suspended — the higher power controls.

A hidden intention is bad.

Intentio caeca mala.

Source: 2 Bulst. 179; Jackson; Weisman, 60j

Concealed purposes are disfavored in law — parties dealing with each other are bound to act with transparency, and secret reservations may vitiate a transaction.

Frequent interruption does not take away a prescription once acquired.

Interruptio multiplex non tollit praescriptionem semel obtentam.

Source: 2 Inst. 654; Jackson; Weisman, 95hh

Once a prescriptive right has been fully established, subsequent interruptions do not destroy it — the right, once vested, endures.

Judgments frequently mature by deliberation, never by hurried process.

Judicia in deliberationibus crebro maturescunt, in accelerato processu nunquam.

Source: 3 Inst. 210; Jackson

Sound judicial decision-making requires careful deliberation — hasty proceedings produce unreliable results and risk injustice.

The right of survivorship is preferred to encumbrances.

Jus accrescendi praefertur oneribus.

Source: Co. Litt. 185; Jackson; Weisman, 103n

The surviving joint tenant takes the property free of encumbrances created by the deceased tenant alone — the right of survivorship prevails.

The right descends, and not the land.

Jus descendit, et non terra.

Source: Co. Litt. 345; Jackson

What passes by inheritance is the legal right to the land, not the physical soil itself — the heir succeeds to the title, and the title carries with it dominion over the land.

Evil deeds ought not to remain unpunished; and impunity affords continual incitement to the delinquent.

Maleficia non debent remanere impunita; et impunitas continuum affectum tribuit delinquenti.

Source: 4 Co. 45; Jackson; Weisman, 78a

Failure to punish wrongdoing encourages further wrongdoing — justice requires that offences be addressed, lest impunity embolden the offender.

A mandatory cannot exceed the bounds placed upon himself.

Mandatarius terminos sibi positos transgredi non potest.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 53; Jackson

An agent or officer acts only within the limits of his mandate — any act beyond those bounds is unauthorized and void as to the principal. (Duplicate maxim — see also 4.4.16.)

The multitude of those who err gives no excuse to error.

Multitudo errantium non parit errori patrocinium.

Source: 11 Co. 75; Jackson; Weisman, 37n

The popularity of a mistake does not make it right — no matter how many follow a wrong course, the error remains an error and the law does not bend to accommodate it.

Nothing in law is more intolerable than to rule a similar case by a diverse law.

Nihil in lege intolerabilius est, eandem rem diverso jure censeri.

Source: 4 Co. 93; Jackson

Equal cases must receive equal treatment — applying different rules to materially identical facts destroys public confidence in the impartiality of the courts.

A person may not be punished otherwise than according to what the sentence enjoins.

Non alio modo puniatur aliquis, quam secundum quod se habet condemnatio.

Source: 3 Inst. 217; Jackson

Punishment must conform exactly to the sentence imposed — no officer may inflict a penalty beyond what the judgment prescribes.

Surplusage is not wont to vitiate writings.

Non solent quae abundant vitiare scripturas.

Source: D. 50, 17, 94; Jackson

Unnecessary words in a legal instrument do not invalidate it — the excess is simply disregarded, and the operative provisions stand.

No iniquity is to be presumed in law.

Nullum iniquum est praesumendum in jure.

Source: 7 Co. 71; Jackson

The law presumes itself to be just — an interpretation that would make the law work an injustice is to be rejected in favor of one that produces an equitable result.

The estimation of a past offence is never increased by a later fact.

Nunquam crescit ex post facto praeteriti delicti aestimatio.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 8; Jackson

The gravity of an offense is fixed at the time it is committed — subsequent events cannot retroactively enlarge the penalty or change the character of the act.

Every interpretation, if it can be done, is to be so made in instruments as that all contradictions may be removed.

Omnis interpretatio si fieri potest ita fienda est in instrumentis, ut omnes contrarietates amoveantur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 96; Jackson; Weisman, 22dd

When construing a legal instrument, the interpreter must harmonize apparently conflicting provisions rather than declare them irreconcilable — every clause should be given effect if possible.

It is manifest that no one is able, of his own will, to get rid of his proper origin.

Origine propria neminem posse voluntate sua eximi manifestum est.

Source: Cod. 10, 38, 4; Jackson

A person's natural allegiance and place of origin are fixed by birth and cannot be unilaterally disclaimed — expatriation requires a lawful process, not merely a declaration of will.

Agreements founded upon a base consideration are not to be observed.

Pacta quae turpem causam continent non sunt observanda.

Source: D. 2, 14, 27; Jackson

When the consideration for an agreement is immoral or illegal, the entire agreement is unenforceable — the law will not lend its aid to an unconscionable bargain.

Many partners are as one body, inasmuch as they have one right, and it is necessary that the body be perfect, and that there be defect in no part.

Participes plures sunt quasi unum corpus, in eo quod unum jus habent, et oportet quod corpus sit integrum et quod in nulla parte sit defectus.

Source: Co. Litt. 164; Jackson

Joint owners or partners must act as a single body with respect to their shared right — a defect affecting any one partner may defeat the interest of all.

Politics are to be adapted to the laws, and not the laws to politics.

Politiae legibus non leges politiis adaptandae.

Source: Hob. 154; Jackson

Government policy must conform to the law, not the reverse — bending the law to fit political convenience is a subversion of the rule of law.

That which was a useless institution at the commencement cannot gain strength from an after-fact.

Quae ab initio inutilis fuit institutio, ex post facto convalescere non potest.

Source: D. 50, 17, 210; Jackson

A void act cannot be validated retroactively by subsequent events — if the foundation was defective from the start, no later development can cure it.

Those things which are spoken to one end, ought not to be perverted to another.

Quae ad unum finem loquuta sunt, non debent ad alium detorqueri.

Source: 4 Co. 14; Jackson; Weisman, 104dd

Words in a statute or instrument must be applied to the purpose for which they were intended — twisting language to serve a purpose foreign to its original design is a perversion of the law. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.33.)

When a noble woman marries a man not noble, she ceases to be noble, unless her nobility was born with her.

Quando mulier nobilis nupserit ignobili desinit esse nobilis nisi nobilitas nata fuit.

Source: 4 Co. 118; Jackson

Under the common law, a woman’s legal status was altered by marriage — this maxim has been superseded by constitutional amendments recognizing the inherent equality of all persons before the law. The Fourteenth Amendment did not create equality; it recognized and secured what already existed in natural law.

Those fears are to be esteemed vain which do not affect a firm man.

Qui non cadunt in constantem virum vani timores sunt aestimandi.

Source: 7 Co. 27; Jackson; Weisman, 95ff

Duress is measured by an objective standard — only threats that would overcome the will of a person of ordinary firmness are legally cognizable.

They who search for reason in all things subvert reason.

Qui rationem in omnibus quaerunt rationem subvertunt.

Source: 2 Co. Rep. 75a; Jackson

Not every legal rule can be reduced to a demonstrable reason — some principles rest on long experience and policy, and demanding a logical proof for every rule undermines the stability of the law.

What ought to be done is easily presumed.

Quod fieri debet facile praesumitur.

Source: Halk. Max. 153; Jackson; Weisman, 89i

The law presumes that persons have performed their legal obligations — the burden falls on the party alleging non-performance to prove it.

The grant of a right comes to an end on the termination of the right of the grantor.

Resoluto jure concedentis resolvitur jus concessum.

Source: Mackeld. 179; Jackson

A grant cannot outlive the grantor’s own interest — when the grantor’s right expires, the grantee’s derivative right expires with it.

No one can have a servitude over his own property.

Res sua nemini servit.

Source: Jackson

A servitude requires two distinct parties — an owner cannot hold an easement or other servitude against himself, because the dominant and servient estates must be in different hands.

It is according to nature that the advantages of anything should attach to him to whom the disadvantages attach.

Secundum naturam est, commoda cujusque rei eum sequi, quem sequuntur incommoda.

Source: D. 50, 17, 10; Jackson

He who bears the burdens of ownership is entitled to its benefits — risk and reward travel together, and the law does not separate them.

A term of years ought to be certain and determinate.

Terminus annorum certus debet esse et determinatus.

Source: Co. Litt. 45; Jackson; Weisman, 100i

A lease for years must specify a definite beginning and end — an estate of uncertain duration cannot exist as a valid term of years.

The term and the fee cannot both be in one and the same person at the same time.

Terminus et feodum non possunt constare simul in una eademque persona.

Source: Plow. Com. 29; Jackson

When a lessee acquires the fee, the lesser estate merges into the greater — two inconsistent estates cannot coexist in one person, and the lesser is absorbed.

That guardianship is secure which trusts to itself alone.

Tuta est custodia quae sibimet creditur.

Source: Hob. 340; Jackson; Weisman, 53d

The safest custody is self-reliance — a party who depends on his own vigilance rather than the good faith of others is best protected.

Charters are called "muniments" from "muniendo," because they fortify and defend the inheritance.

Charters sont appelle "muniments" a "muniendo" quia muniunt et defendunt haereditatem.

Source: 4 Co. 153; Wharton

Title deeds and charters serve as the documentary armor of property rights — their preservation is essential because they are the evidence by which ownership is proved and defended.

In an exchange it is necessary that the estates be equal.

En eschange il covient que les estates soient egales.

Source: Co. Litt. 60; Wharton

A valid exchange of property requires that both estates be of the same nature and quality — a fee cannot be exchanged for a term of years, nor freehold for leasehold.

Where the law gives a right, it gives a remedy to recover.

Lou le ley done chose, la ceo done remedie a vener a ceo.

Source: 2 Rol. R. 17; Wharton

Every legal right carries with it a corresponding remedy — a right without a means of enforcement is no right at all.

Every general principle [or maxim of law] is its own pledge or warrant; and things that are clearly true are not to be proved.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Co. Litt. 11; Weisman, 95b

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A maxim of law requires no external proof — it is self-authenticating authority that a court may take judicial notice of without supporting evidence, and an opponent cannot demand that a party "prove" a fundamental legal axiom.

A thing void ab initio is one that never went into effect.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 62i

(English-origin maxim.) An act, contract, or proceeding that was void from its inception has no legal force at any point — it cannot be ratified, cured, or given effect by lapse of time.

The indefinite equals the universal.

Indefinitum equipollet universali.

Source: Wharton, II-258

A grant, statute, or declaration that uses indefinite language without limitation is construed as applying universally — an unrestricted term covers all persons, things, or cases within its class.

The court has nothing to do with what is not before it.

Nihil habet forum ex scena.

Source: Wharton, II-507

A court may only adjudicate matters properly brought before it in the case at bar — it has no authority to reach out and decide questions not raised by the parties or presented in the pleadings.

Laws are imposed, not upon words, but upon things.

Source: 10 Coke, 101; Branch, Princ.; Code 6, 43, 2; Weisman, 71n

(English-origin maxim.) Law governs substance, not labels — the legal effect of an act depends on what it actually is, not on what the parties choose to call it.

The law presumes that a neighbor knows the acts of his neighbor.

Lex intendit vicinum vicini facta scire.

Source: Co. Litt. 78

One cannot claim ignorance of what is open and notorious in his own vicinity — the law charges a man with knowledge of what reasonable diligence would reveal.

An argument follows necessarily in the negative from the not possible to the not being, though not in the affirmative.

A non posse ad non esse sequitur argumentum necessarie negative, licet non affirmative.

Source: Hob. 336; Jackson

If a thing is impossible, it necessarily does not exist — but the reverse does not hold, because the mere absence of a thing does not prove its impossibility.

What the people have last enacted, let that be the established law.

Quod populus postremum jussit, id jus ratum esto.

Source: Bouvier, Max.

The will of the People, expressed through their most recent lawful act, supersedes all prior enactments — the sovereign People always retain the power to alter their law.

It concerns the State that judgments be not rescinded.

Interest reipublicae res judicatas non rescindi.

Source: 2 Inst. 359; Jackson

The finality of judgments serves the public interest by preventing endless relitigation — settled matters should remain settled unless fundamental error of jurisdiction is shown.

No one should hold two offices at the same time.

Source: 4 Inst. 100; Weisman, 51e

(English-origin maxim.) Dual office-holding creates conflicts of interest and concentrates power — challenge an official who holds incompatible offices on the ground that the offices cannot lawfully be united in one person.

Obedience makes government, not the name by which it is called.

Source: Weisman, 51c; C.L.M.

(English-origin maxim.) The legitimacy of government rests on the voluntary obedience of the People, not on titles or labels — invoke this to argue that a body calling itself "government" has no authority if the People have not consented to obey it, and that any institution demanding obedience must demonstrate its lawful basis for that claim.

All subjects are the king’s servants.

Omnes subditi sunt regis servi.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 126; Jackson

The relationship between sovereign and subject is reciprocal — protection in exchange for allegiance, allegiance in exchange for protection.

The king is both legal and politic.

Rex est legalis et politicus.

Source: Lane, 27; Jackson

The sovereign possesses both a legal capacity (bound by law) and a political capacity (exercising discretion within legal bounds) — neither is unlimited.

The king is always presumed to attend to the business of the realm, for the public good of all.

Rex semper praesumitur attendere ardua regni pro bono publico omnium.

Source: 4 Co. 56; Jackson

Government officers are presumed to act in the public interest — but this presumption is rebuttable when their acts demonstrably serve private interests instead.

Private loss is compensated by public good.

Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 85; 7 C. B. 266; Jackson

Individual inconvenience may be tolerated when a legitimate public purpose is served — but the public good must be genuine, not a pretext for private benefit.

Whatever one does in defense of his person, that he is considered to have done legally.

Quod quisque ob tutelam corporis sui fecerit, jure id fecisse videtur.

Source: 2 Inst. 590

Self-defense is the first law of nature. The right to defend one's own body and life requires no government permission.

The right of blood and kindred cannot be destroyed by any civil law.

Jura sanguinis nullo jure civili dirimi possunt.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 9; Bacon, Max. reg. 11; Broom, Max. 533; Weisman, 86j

The natural bond between parent and child is antecedent to government and cannot be severed by statute. The parental right is a natural right, not a civil privilege.

The law favors common right.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 547, max. 144; Weisman, 82r; Weisman, 82f

(English-origin maxim.) When a statute or grant is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the common right of all the people rather than in favor of a private or exclusive privilege.

A thing is private which is not common.

Source: Le Breton v. Miles, 8 Paige, Ch. (N.Y.) 261, 270; Weisman, 86e

(English-origin maxim.) Private property or right is defined by exclusion from common use — cite this to establish that a thing claimed as private cannot simultaneously be treated as public or common.

No one is considered to act with guile, or to be a wrong-doer, who uses his own right.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 55; Broom, Max. 130; Amer. Ins. Co. v. Griswold, 14 Wend. (N.Y.) 399, 492; Weisman, 86k

(English-origin maxim.) No one is considered to act in bad faith or commit a wrong merely by exercising his own legal right — cite this to defeat claims of malice or tortious conduct where the defendant was simply using a right he lawfully possessed.

If a person neglect to insist on his right, he is deemed to have abandoned it.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 86c

(English-origin maxim.) Rights recognized by the common law must be actively asserted — a man who knows of a trespass upon his rights and remains silent is presumed to have waived them. This maxim underscores why timely notice and demand are essential to the preservation of every natural and constitutional right.

It is a liberty of free citizens to retain arms for their protection and according to their condition.

Source: People v. Horton, 264 N.Y.S. 84, 88; Weisman, 9c

(English-origin maxim.) Free citizens have a liberty to keep and bear arms suitable to their condition for their personal protection — this is a right of free status, not a government-granted privilege.

Arms used in the committing an offense include only that which is recognized as a dangerous weapon.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 9e

(English-origin maxim.) The term "arms" in the context of criminal offenses is limited to instruments recognized at common law as dangerous weapons — ordinary tools, household implements, or objects not inherently dangerous cannot be classified as "arms" merely because they were present during an offense, and any statute that expands this definition beyond its common law meaning encroaches upon the right of the People to keep and bear arms.

Though a testator may have made a mistake in the proper name or in the surname of the legatee, when it is certain who is the person meant, the legacy is nevertheless valid.

Si quidem in nomine, cognomine, praenomine, legatarii testator erraverit, cum de persona constat, nihilominus valet legatum.

Source: Inst. 2, 20, 29; Jackson

A misnomer in a will does not defeat the bequest when the intended recipient can be identified with certainty from the surrounding circumstances.

No one can claim another's status as his own merely because he wishes it.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 76k

(English-origin maxim.) Legal status — whether sui juris, citizen, officer, or any other recognized standing — is determined by law and fact, not by mere assertion or desire. Invoke this to challenge a party who claims an authority, privilege, or standing to which the law has not entitled him.

The crime carries the person.

Crimen trahit personam.

Source: Wharton, III-60; Weisman, 26w

Invoke this maxim to establish that criminal jurisdiction attaches to the person of the offender — wherever the accused is found, the court with jurisdiction over the crime may reach him.

Human nature does not change with time or environment.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 55a

(English-origin maxim.) The foundational principles of law are rooted in unchanging human nature — invoke this maxim to rebut arguments that constitutional rights or common law principles are "outdated" and must yield to modern conditions. The Founders secured rights against the same tendencies toward tyranny that exist in every age.

It is necessary that given persons, lands and estates should be comprehended in a declaration of uses.

Source: 9 Coke, 9; Weisman, 69w

(English-origin maxim.) A declaration of uses must specify the persons, lands, and estates affected with particularity — a vague or general declaration that fails to identify the beneficiaries and the property is void for uncertainty.

Ignorance of one's own right does not prejudice the right.

Ignorantia juris sui non praejudicat juri.

Source: Lofft. 552; Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 130, 19 Am. Dec. 353; Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims no. 805; Weisman, 57j

A right exists whether or not the holder knows he possesses it. Ignorance of the right delays its exercise but does not destroy it.

A man may obey the law and yet be neither honest nor a good neighbor.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 34b

(English-origin maxim.) Mere legal compliance does not satisfy the demands of natural law or equity — a man may shelter behind the letter of the statute while violating every principle of good conscience. This maxim reinforces why equity looks beyond technical legality to the substance of a party's conduct and the dictates of natural justice.

A minor before coming of age cannot act in a case of property.

Minor ante tempus agere non potest in casu proprietatis.

Source: 2 Inst. 291; Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims no. 1256; Weisman, 80d

Transactions involving real property require full legal capacity. A minor's deed of conveyance is voidable at his election upon reaching majority.

All things which belong to the wife belong to the husband; the wife has no power of her own, the husband has it all.

Omnia quae sunt uxoris sunt ipsius viri; non habet uxor potestatem sui, sed vir.

Source: Co. Litt. 112; Jackson; Weisman, 79o

At common law, the doctrine of coverture merged the wife's legal identity into her husband's — her property and legal capacity were subsumed under his authority during marriage.

Divorce is called from divertendo, because a man is diverted from his wife.

Source: Co. Litt. 234; Weisman, 79b

(English-origin maxim.) The word 'divorce' signifies the legal turning away of one spouse from another — cite this when tracing the etymology and common-law meaning of divorce in jurisdictional or pleading disputes.

The male sex always includes the female.

Source: Dig. 32, 62; Weisman, 79c

(English-origin maxim.) In the construction of statutes, the masculine gender includes the feminine unless the context requires otherwise — invoke this rule of interpretation when a statute uses only masculine pronouns.

Insanity prevents marriage from being contracted, because consent is needed.

Source: 1 Bl. Comm. 439; Weisman, 79g

(English-origin maxim.) A marriage contracted by a person of unsound mind is void ab initio, because the essential element of consent is absent — cite this to annul a marriage where one party lacked mental capacity at the time of the ceremony.

A wife follows the domicile of her husband.

Source: Tray. Lat. Max. 606; Weisman, 79h

(English-origin maxim.) A married woman's legal domicile follows that of her husband — this common-law rule determined jurisdiction, venue, and voting rights, and is still cited in domicile disputes under traditional choice-of-law analysis.

Wife and son are names of nature.

Source: 4 Bacon's Works, 350; Weisman, 79k

(English-origin maxim.) The relationships of wife and son are created by nature, not by legal artifice — invoke this to argue that the natural family bond is prior to and independent of any civil regulation.

Madness does not allow marriage to be contracted, because consent is required.

Furor contrahi matrimonium non sinit, quia consensu opus est.

Source: Wharton, III-121

Consent is the essence of marriage, and insanity destroys the capacity to consent — cite this to annul a marriage entered into by a person who, at the time of the ceremony, was incapable of understanding the nature of the contract.

Whatever is acquired by the servant is acquired for the master.

Quicquid acquiritur servo acquiritur domino.

Source: Dig. 41, 1, 10, 1; Co. Litt. 117; Weisman, 96g

The acquisitions of a servant acting in that capacity belong to the master — the servant's hand is the master's hand.

The lord (owner) suffers the loss.

Damnum sentit dominus.

Source: Jackson

The risk of loss falls on the owner — the master who holds dominion over property bears the burden when it is damaged or destroyed.

It is not theft where the commencement of the detention arises through the will of the owner of the thing detained.

Furtum non est ubi initium habet detentionis per dominum rei.

Source: 3 Inst. 107; Jackson

Where possession originated with the owner's consent, the subsequent retention does not constitute theft — the initial lawful delivery negates the element of unlawful taking.

No man can be tenant and lord.

Nemo potest esse tenens et dominus.

Source: Gilb. Ten. 142; Jackson

The same person cannot simultaneously hold the position of tenant (one who holds of another) and lord (one from whom the holding derives) — the two statuses are incompatible in the same subject.

A treasure belongs to the king, and not to the lord of a liberty, unless it be through special words.

Thesaurus competit domino regi, et non domino libertatis, nisi sit per verba specialia.

Source: Fitz. Corone, 281; Jackson

Treasure trove belongs to the Crown by default — a lord of a franchise or liberty has no claim to it unless his grant contains express words conferring that right.

Treasure-trove is an ancient hiding of money, &c., of which no recollection exists, so that it now has no owner.

Thesaurus inventus est vetus dispositio pecuniae, &c., cujus non extat modo memoria, adeo ut jam dominum non habeat.

Source: 3 Inst. 132; Jackson

Treasure trove is defined by its antiquity and the absence of any known owner — money or valuables hidden so long ago that no living person can claim them belong to the sovereign by prerogative.

Free servants are in general all free persons who let, hire, or engage their services to another.

Source: Black's, 2d. 1075; Weisman, 96c

(English-origin maxim.) Any free person who voluntarily hires out his services to another is classified as a servant for purposes of the master-servant relationship — cite this to establish the employment relationship and the duties flowing from it.

The accessory right does not lead, but follows its principal.

Accessorium non ducit, sed sequitur suum principale.

Source: Finch, Law, 128; Jackson; Weisman, 26x

An accessory right has no independent existence — it follows the fate of the principal right to which it is attached, and cannot be enforced or maintained without it.

The principal being taken away, its adjunct is also taken away.

Sublato principali tollitur adjunctum.

Source: Co. Litt. 389; Jackson

When the principal thing is removed or destroyed, everything attached to or dependent upon it is likewise extinguished — the adjunct has no separate existence.

An agent, as such, does not have title to the principal's property, although he may be intrusted with possession, and although he may have power to pass title.

Source: Rogers v. U.S. Rubber Co., 20 A.2d 626, 627, 91 N.H. 398; Weisman, 4h

(English-origin maxim.) Mere possession by an agent does not vest title in him — cite this to defeat a claim of ownership by an agent who holds the principal's property, even where the agent has apparent authority to transfer it.

An assigner is clothed with the rights of his principal.

Source: Halk. Max. 14; Broom, Max. 3d Land. ed. 415; Wing. Max. 56; Weisman, 4i

(English-origin maxim.) An assignee steps into the shoes of his assignor and holds the same rights the assignor possessed — cite this to establish that an assignee may enforce every right the principal could have enforced.

In a common matter the condition of the one forbidding is the stronger.

In re communi potior est conditio prohibentis.

Source: Dig. 10, 3, 28; 3 Kent, Comm. 45

Where partners disagree about the use of common property, the one who says no prevails over the one who says yes — in co-ownership, the veto rules.

One co-proprietor can exercise no authority over the common property against the will of the other.

Source: Dig. 10, 3, 28; Weisman, 85d

(English-origin maxim.) No co-owner may exercise dominion over common property against the will of another co-owner — cite this to enjoin a partner or joint tenant from unilateral use, alteration, or disposition of shared property.

A thing done between others ought not to injure a person who is a stranger to it.

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.

Source: Co. Litt. 132, 182; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874), pp. 954, 967; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 932

Transactions between strangers may benefit but cannot bind or injure those who are not parties — no man's rights are diminished by the acts of others done without his consent.

When suspicion between men is suggested, it is easily entertained.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 61f

(English-origin maxim.) Once suspicion is planted between parties, human nature readily embraces it — courts must therefore demand proof rather than innuendo, because mere suggestion of wrongdoing, without evidence, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence or good faith that the law recognizes in every man.

The law favors mutual recompense.

Source: Wing. Max. 100; Weisman, 61h

(English-origin maxim.) The law prefers that obligations flow both ways — where one party has conferred a benefit, the other ought to render an equivalent return. This principle undergirds the common-law doctrine of consideration and prevents one-sided exactions by ensuring that every enforceable agreement rests on mutual exchange.

The law favors dower; it is the reward of chastity, therefore let it be preserved.

Doti lex favet; praemium pudoris est, ideo parcatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 31, 81; Jenk. Cent. 50; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 208; Weisman, 33a

Dower holds a favored position in the law — once it attaches, it can be defeated only by the wife's own consent or by divorce.

Where there is no marriage, there is no dower.

Ubi nullum matrimonium, ibi nulla dos est.

Source: Co. Litt. 32; 2 Bl. Comm. 130; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 1031b; Weisman, 33b

Dower is an incident of lawful marriage — without the marriage, the right to dower does not arise.

A woman who voluntarily leaves her husband and commits adultery loses her dower, unless her husband takes her back of his own accord.

Sponte virum fugiens mulier et adultera facta, dote sua careat, nisi sponsi sponte retracta.

Source: Co. Litt. 37; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 991; Weisman, 33d

Dower is the reward of fidelity — voluntary desertion and adultery forfeit the right, but the husband's reconciliation restores it.

Dower ought not to be sought from dower.

Dos de dote peti non debet.

Source: 4 Co. 122b; Weisman, 33f

A widow cannot claim dower out of lands already assigned as dower to another — the right extends only to the husband's own estate, not to the dower of a prior wife.

In law, a dower is a provision for a widow; upon her husband's death, out of his lands or tenements for her support and the nurture of her children.

Source: Co. Litt. 30a; 2 Bl. Comm. 130; 4 Kent, Comm. 35; Chaplin v. Hill, 1 R.I. 452; Hoy v. Varner, 100 Va. 600, 42 S.E. 690; Weisman, 33e

(English-origin maxim.) Dower is the widow's common-law entitlement to a life estate in one-third of her husband's lands — cite this when establishing a surviving spouse's right to a share of the deceased's real property.

A legitimate dower belongs to every woman of all lands and tenements of which her husband possessed in his own right, as of fee, etc.

Dos rationabilis vel legitima est cujuslibet mulieris de quocunque tenemento tertia pars omnium terrarum et tenementorum.

Source: Co. Litt. 336; Weisman, 33c

At common law, every widow was entitled to a life estate in one-third of all lands her husband held in fee during the marriage — this right attached by operation of law and could not be defeated by the husband's conveyance.

The right of property is that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual.

Jus proprietatis est jus illud solum et despoticum dominium quod unus homo exercet in rebus externis mundi.

Source: Blackstone, 2 Bl. Comm. 2, 5; 1 Bl. Comm. 138; Weisman, 91bb

Ownership is exclusive dominion — the owner's right excludes all others, including the government, except by due process of law.

Chattels justly possessed cannot be lost.

Catalla juste possessa amitti non possunt.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 28; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

Goods held by lawful right cannot be forfeited without due process of law — just possession is its own defense against all claims of loss or seizure.

Property is the proper right by which a man uses his own thing.

Proprietas est jus proprium, quo quis re sua utitur.

Source: Blackstone, 2 Bl. Comm. 2; 1 Bl. Comm. 138

Property is not a privilege granted by government — it is an inherent right of use and dominion over what belongs to a man.

It is unjust that freemen should not have the free disposal of their own property.

Injustum est, nisi tota lege inspecta, liberos homines non habere liberam potestatem rerum suarum.

Source: Co. Litt. 223a; 4 Kent, Comm. 131; Hob. 87; Weisman, 91e

A free man's control over his own property is a fundamental attribute of liberty — any restraint on disposal is a restraint on freedom itself.

That which is mine cannot be taken away without my act, consent, or forfeiture.

Quod meum est sine me auferri non potest.

Source: Broom, Max. 465; Jenk. Cent. p. 251, case 41; 8 Co. 92; Dig. 50.17.11

No man loses his property except by his own act, his own negligence, or lawful forfeiture — never by the bare will of another.

It is not incumbent on the possessor to prove that the possessions belong to him.

Non possessori incumbit necessitas probandi possessiones ad se pertinere.

Source: Cod. 4.9.2; Broom, Max. 639, 714; Weisman, 91cc

The burden of proof lies on the challenger, not the possessor — quiet possession is its own evidence of right.

When the parties are equal in right, the condition of the possessor is the better.

In pari causa possessor potior haberi debet.

Source: Plowd. 296; Broom, Max. 71; Dig. 50.17.126; 4 Bouv. Inst. n. 3724

Where competing claims are in equipoise, the law favors the party already in possession.

Possession is the best title where no better title appears.

Possessio est optimus titulus ubi alius non apparet.

Source: 20 Vin. Abr. 278; Bouvier, Max. 148; Weisman, 91w

Actual possession establishes a presumptive right that prevails against all the world except a claimant with superior title.

No one gives what he does not have.

Nemo dat quod non habet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 250; Broom, Max. 499n; Shep. Touch. 243; Fleta, lib. 3, c. 15, s. 8

A man cannot transfer a greater right than he possesses — this applies equally to private conveyance and to government grants of authority.

He who is first in time is stronger in right.

Qui prior est tempore potior est jure.

Source: Co. Litt. 14a; Broom, Max. 354; Weisman, 100l

Priority of claim establishes superiority of right — the earlier right prevails over the later, absent fraud or forfeiture.

A thing belonging to no one naturally belongs to the first taker.

Res nullius naturaliter fit primi occupantis.

Source: Dig. 41.1.3; 2 Bl. Comm. 258; Taylor v. The Cato, 1 Pet. Adm. 53

Abandoned or ownerless things become the property of whoever first takes possession of them.

Every man is the manager and disposer of his own property.

Unusquisque est rei suae moderator et arbiter.

Source: Co. Litt. 223a; Weisman, 91r

The owner alone decides how his property is used, managed, and disposed of — no other party may direct its use without his consent.

Long possession begets right.

Longa possessio jus parit.

Source: Co. Litt. 110b, 115a; Fleta, lib. 3, c. 15, s. 6

Continuous, quiet possession over time ripens into a right that the law will defend, even against a prior claimant who slept on his rights.

Chattels are considered in law among the minor things.

Catalla reputantur inter minima in lege.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 28; Jackson; Weisman, 91p

The law regards chattels (movable personal property) as lesser things compared to land — disputes over chattels receive less elaborate procedure than disputes over freehold estates.

Lordship cannot be in suspense.

Dominium non potest esse in pendenti.

Source: Halk. 39; Jackson

Ownership must be vested in a determinate person at all times — the law does not permit dominion to hang in abeyance without a present holder.

Two persons cannot possess one thing in entirety.

Duo non possunt in solido unam rem possidere.

Source: Co. Litt. 368; Jackson

Two persons cannot each have sole and exclusive possession of the same thing at the same time — co-possession is possible, but not two independent claims of total possession.

Long possession produces the right of possession, and takes away an action from the true owner.

Longa possessio parit jus possidendi et tollit actionem vero domino.

Source: Co. Litt. 110; Jackson; Weisman, 91u

Continuous undisturbed possession over time creates a prescriptive right in the possessor and extinguishes the original owner’s right of action — the law rewards vigilance and punishes the sleeping claimant.

Nothing is so consonant to natural equity as to regard the intention of the owner in transferring his own property to another.

Nihil tam conveniens est naturali aequitati, quam voluntatem domini rem suam in alium transferre, ratam habere.

Source: 1 Co. 100; Jackson; Weisman, 91o

Natural equity demands that the owner's intent govern the transfer of his property — the law respects and gives effect to the will of the proprietor in all conveyances.

The loss falls on the owner.

Res perit suo domino.

Source: Bell Dict. 857; Jackson; Weisman, 91ff

The risk of accidental loss or destruction of property lies with the owner — unless another has assumed that risk by contract or wrongful act.

No one should lose his property without his act or negligence.

Nemo debet rem suam sine facto aut defectu suo amittere.

Source: Co. Litt. 263; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 91s

Property is lost only by the owner's own doing or his own fault — never by the bare act of another or by operation of government without cause.

What belongs to us cannot be transferred to another without our consent.

Id quod nostrum est sine facto nostro ad alium transferri non potest.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 11; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

The right of property includes the exclusive power of disposition — no transfer is lawful without the owner's act or agreement.

Movable things follow the person; immovable things follow their locality.

Mobilia personam sequuntur, immobilia situm.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

Personal property is governed by the law of the owner's domicile; real property is governed by the law of the place where it is situated — a fundamental rule of private international law.

No one can have a servitude over his own property.

Nulli enim res sua servit jure servitutis.

Source: Dig. 8, 2, 26; 17 Mass. 443; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1600; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

A man cannot create an easement or servitude burdening his own land in his own favor — the full ownership already includes every lesser right of use.

He cannot be considered as having ceased to have a thing, who never had it.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 208; Weisman, 91b; Weisman, 91n

(English-origin maxim.) A party cannot claim to have lost what he never possessed — the defense of prior possession fails when the claimant never held the thing in the first place.

When the question is as to the gain of two persons, the cause or title of the party in possession is the better one.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 126; Weisman, 91d

(English-origin maxim.) Where two parties each claim gain from a disputed thing, the party already in possession holds the stronger position and need not yield absent proof of superior title.

A deprivation presupposes a possession.

Source: 2 Rolle, 419; Weisman, 91f

(English-origin maxim.) Before claiming deprivation, the claimant must first prove he possessed the thing — a man who never had possession cannot be deprived of it.

A destruction of the thing is the loss of its owner.

Source: Inst. nn. 1456, 1466; Story, Bailm. 426; 2 Kent, Comm, 591; 2 Bouv; Weisman, 91g

(English-origin maxim.) When a thing is destroyed, the owner bears the loss — the destruction of the subject matter extinguishes the owner's rights in it.

There is no prescription for that which is not possessed.

Source: Cycl. Diet. 693; Weisman, 91j

(English-origin maxim.) No prescriptive right can ripen over property that is not actually possessed — adverse possession requires actual, continuous occupation.

Things abandoned [or which belong to no one] become the property of the first occupant.

Source: Taylor v. The Cato, 1 Pet. Adm. 53, Fed. Case. No. 13, 786; Dig. 41, 1, 3; 2 Bl. Comm. 258; Weisman, 91l

(English-origin maxim.) Property that has been abandoned or that belongs to no one may be claimed by the first person to take possession of it. This principle governs salvage, derelict property, and unowned natural resources.

That does not truly belong to one which can be taken from him upon occasion.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 159, 1; Weisman, 91m

(English-origin maxim.) Property that may be seized upon occasion is not truly owned — secure ownership means the thing cannot be taken at the pleasure of another.

When a man has the possession as well as the right of property, he is said to have jus duplicatum-a double right, forming a complete title.

Source: Bract. lib. 4, tr. 4, c. 4; 2 Bl. Comm. 199, 311; Weisman, 91x

(English-origin maxim.) When a claimant holds both the right of possession and the right of property, he holds an unassailable title that prevails over all challengers.

Rights of dominion are transferred without title or delivery, by prescription, to-wit, long and quiet possession.

Source: Co. Litt. 113; Weisman, 91y

(English-origin maxim.) Long and quiet possession, undisturbed by any adverse claim, transfers dominion without deed or delivery — time perfects title.

No one can grant or convey what he does not own.

Source: Seymour v. Canandaigua & N.F.R. Co., 25 Barb. (N.Y.) 284, 301; Fassett v. Smith, 23 N.Y. 252; Weisman, 91aa

(English-origin maxim.) A conveyance is void if the grantor does not hold title to the thing conveyed — the purchaser takes nothing from one who has nothing to give.

Two cannot possess or own one thing in entirety.

Source: Co. Litt. 368; Dig. 13, 6, 5, 15; Bract. fol. 28b; Weisman, 91dd

(English-origin maxim.) Sole and exclusive possession cannot vest simultaneously in two separate persons — co-ownership is possible, but two claims of total dominion over the same thing are mutually exclusive.

The legal conception of property is of right.

Source: Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 350; Weisman, 91hh

(English-origin maxim.) Property is a right, not merely a physical thing — the constitutional protection extends to the right itself, not just to the tangible object.

Things taken or captured by pirates and robbers do not change their ownership.

Source: 1 Kent, Comm. 108, 184; Weisman, 91ii

(English-origin maxim.) Stolen goods retain their original ownership — pirates and robbers cannot pass title, and the true owner's right survives the taking.

It is one thing to possess; it is another to be in possession.

Source: Hob. 163; Bract. 206; Co. Litt. 14a; Weisman, 91kk

(English-origin maxim.) Possessing a thing in fact and having legal possession are distinct — one may physically hold a thing without having the legal right of possession, and vice versa.

Neither disease, indigence, nor any evil of the same kind is more contrary to nature than appropriating or desiring to appropriate the property of another to our own use.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 91q

(English-origin maxim.) The natural law recognizes the right of property as so fundamental that its violation is worse than any natural misfortune — no condition of want or hardship justifies the taking of another's property, and government is no exception: the power of eminent domain, taxation, or regulatory seizure without the owner's consent and just compensation is a trespass upon a right that precedes all civil institutions.

Things which are taken from enemies immediately become the property of the captors.

Quae ab hostibus capiuntur, statim capientium fiunt.

Source: Weisman, 91lj; Weisman, 91jj

Property seized from an enemy in war vests immediately in the captor by the law of nations — no further judicial proceeding is required to transfer title.

He who has fraudulently dispossessed himself of a thing may be treated as if he still had possession.

Qui dolo desierit possidere, pro possidente damnatur.

Source: Wharton, III-B-9

A person who fraudulently divests himself of possession of property may still be treated as if he retained it. This prevents a wrongdoer from evading an action for recovery by voluntarily parting with possession before suit is brought.

The law of God and the law of the land are all one, and both preserve and favor the common and public good of the land.

Le ley de Dieu et le ley de terre sont tout un, et l'un et l'autre preferre et savour le common et publique bien del terre.

Source: Keilw. 191; Wharton; Weisman, 70q

Divine law and the law of the land share a common purpose — the protection of the public good and the common rights of the people. Neither contradicts the other when rightly understood.

Whose is the soil, his it is even to the sky above and to the depths below.

Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos.

Source: Co. Litt. 4a; Wharton, Legal Maxims, Max. 24; Broom, Max. 395; 2 Bl. Comm. 18; 9 Co. 54; C.L.M.; Weisman, 70f

The owner of land owns everything above and below it to an indefinite extent — the surface is merely the midpoint of his dominion.

Land comprehends every ground, soil, or earth whatsoever — meadows, pastures, woods, moors, waters, and marshes.

Terra comprehendit omnem rem, solum, seu fundamentum quodcunque.

Source: Co. Litt. 4a; Weisman, 70w

"Land" in law is the broadest term — it encompasses not merely dry soil but every type of ground and the water that covers it.

Land lying unoccupied is given to the first occupant.

Terra manens vacua occupanti conceditur.

Source: C.L.M.; Dig. 41.1.3; 2 Bl. Comm. 258; Weisman, 70e

Where land has no owner, the first man to take actual possession establishes the original right.

Whatever is planted in the soil belongs to the soil.

Quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit.

Source: Inst. 2.1.32; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1572; Dig. 41.1.7.10

Whatever takes root in the soil becomes the property of the landowner, regardless of who planted it — a trespasser who plants crops on another's land loses them, and a tenant's plantings revert to the landlord absent a contrary agreement. Cite this in disputes over ownership of timber, orchards, or improvements affixed to land.

Whatever is built upon the soil belongs to the soil.

Quicquid inaedificatur solo, solo cedit.

Source: Broom, Max. 401-431; Inst. 2.1.29; Co. Litt. 4a; Fleta, lib. 3, c. 2, s. 12

Buildings, fences, walls, and all permanent structures affixed to land become part of the land — they pass with a grant of the soil.

Water follows the land.

Aqua cedit solo.

Source: 2 Bl. Comm. 18; Co. Litt. 4; Weisman, 70k

A sale of land passes the water covering it — the owner of the bank owns the stream.

Water runs and ought to run as it has been accustomed to run.

Aqua currit et debet currere, ut currere solebat.

Source: Bouvier, Max. 118; 3 Kent, Comm. 439; Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. St. 407, 413; Weisman, 70l

No landowner may divert the natural flow of water to the injury of his neighbor — the watercourse belongs to the land through which it naturally runs.

Prescription is a title derived from use and time, having the force of law.

Praescriptio est titulus ex usu et tempore.

Source: Co. Litt. 113

Rights of dominion may be acquired by long and uninterrupted use — time, combined with quiet possession, creates title.

Use your own property so as not to injure another's.

Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.

Source: Broom, Max. 364; 9 Co. 59; Wharton, Legal Maxims, Max. 80; 3 Bl. Comm. 217; Weisman, 59r

Ownership is not license for abuse — every man must exercise his property rights with due regard to his neighbor's equal rights.

Every innovation disturbs more by its novelty than it benefits by its utility.

Omnis innovatio plus novitate perturbat quam utilitate prodest.

Source: 2 Co. 36; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874)

The law disfavors unnecessary change — established customs and settled property rights should not be lightly overturned for the sake of novelty.

Allodial land is that possessed by a man in his own right, free and absolute, owing no rent or service to any superior.

Allodium est praedium liberum ab omni servitio.

Source: 2 Bl. Comm. 104; 3 Kent, Comm. 495; 4 Kent, Comm. 2; Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis. 367, 377; Weisman, 70p

In America, all land is held in allodium — the citizen owns in his own right, free of feudal obligation, and no government officer is his landlord.

Hanging fruits are considered part of the land.

Fructus pendentes pars fundi videntur.

Source: Dig. 6.1.44; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1578; Weisman, 70t

Ungathered crops growing upon the land belong to the landowner — once severed, they become personal property.

Not right, but seisin, makes the stock of descent. (But see now 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 106.).

Non jus, sed seisina, facit stipitem.

Source: Fleta, 6, c. 14; Jackson

At common law, the line of descent is traced from the person last seized (in actual possession), not from the person who held the mere right — actual seisin, not bare title, determines inheritance.

A reversion of land is as it were the return of the land to the possession of the donor or his heirs after the termination of the estate granted.

Reversio terrae est tanquam terra revertens in possessione donatori sive heredibus suis post donum finitum.

Source: Co. Litt. 142; Jackson

When a lesser estate (life estate, term of years) expires, the land reverts automatically to the grantor or his heirs — the reversion is a present interest, vested from the moment the grant is made.

Tenure is a compact contrary to the common nature of the fee, put into a contract.

Tenor est pactio contra communem feudi naturam ac rationem in contractu interposita.

Source: Wright, Ten. 21; Jackson

Tenure modifies the natural freedom of the fee by imposing conditions of service or obligation — it is an artificial arrangement that restricts what would otherwise be absolute ownership.

Rivers and ports are public, therefore the right of fishing there is common to all.

Flumina et portus publica sunt, ideoque jus piscandi omnibus commune est.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 86n

Navigable rivers and public ports belong to no private owner — the right to use them, including the right of fishing, is a common right of the People.

Gathered fruits do not make a part of the house.

Fructus perceptos villae non esse constat.

Source: Dig. 19, 1, 17, 1; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1578; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 70u; Weisman, 83j

Once crops are harvested and severed from the soil, they cease to be part of the realty and become personal property — the distinction between fructus pendentes and fructus percepti governs whether they pass with the land.

An estate in free and pure allodium, and an estate in fee simple absolute, refer to essentially the same thing.

Source: 4 Kent, Comm. 2; Weisman, 70a

(English-origin maxim.) Allodial title and fee simple absolute describe the same thing: absolute ownership of land free from any superior lord or rent, the highest estate known to law.

What the original estate determines, the derivative estate determines also.

Source: 8 Coke, 34; Broom, Max. 495; Weisman, 70b

(English-origin maxim.) A derivative estate cannot outlast the estate from which it was carved — when the original grant expires or is defeated, every lesser estate carved out of it falls with it.

An alien holds no lands.

Source: Tray. Lat. Max. 203; Weisman, 70g

(English-origin maxim.) At common law, an alien could not hold freehold land — the capacity to own real property was tied to allegiance, and one who owed no allegiance could acquire no estate.

The shore is where the highest wave from the sea has reached.

Source: Dig. 50, 16, 96; Weisman, 70h

(English-origin maxim.) The boundary between sea and land is fixed at the line of the highest tide — everything below that line belongs to the public. In the American system, the sovereign is the People, and public trust lands below the high-water mark are held for their benefit, not for the government's exclusive use.

In no tenement which is held for a term of years is there an avail of homage; but there is the oath of fealty (loyalty).

Source: Co. Litt. 67b; Weisman, 70i

(English-origin maxim.) A tenant for years owes fealty but not homage — the oath of loyalty is required of all tenants, but the ceremony of homage is reserved for freehold estates.

The situation and productiveness of the soil constitutes the value of the land.

Source: West River Bridge v. Dix, 6 Howard (47 U.S.) 507, 537; Weisman, 70m

(English-origin maxim.) In assessing the value of land for any legal purpose — condemnation, taxation, or damages — the court must consider both the quality of the soil and its productive capacity.

Whichever of two parties has the division of an estate, the choice of the shares is the other's.

Source: Co. Litt. 166b; Weisman, 70s

(English-origin maxim.) When one co-owner divides the estate, the other has the right to choose which share he will take — the power of partition and the power of election are separated to ensure fairness.

Every entry on lands without the owner's leave, or authority of law, is a trespass.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 70c

(English-origin maxim.) The right to exclude others from one's land is among the most ancient rights secured by the common law — any unauthorized entry, whether by a private party or a government agent acting without lawful warrant or the owner's consent, constitutes a trespass actionable at law regardless of whether actual damage is shown.

A fee cannot in any way be constituted without investiture.

Feudum sine investitura nullo modo constitui potest.

Source: Wharton, III-114

A feudal estate cannot be created without investiture — actual delivery of possession (livery of seisin) is essential to the creation of a freehold interest in land.

That which ought to have been done, is to be regarded as done, in favor of him to whom, and against him from whom, performance is due.

Source: Story Eq. Jur. § 64; Adams' Equity, 74; Burch v. Newberry, 1 Barb. 648, 664; Hasbrouck v. Paddock, 1 Id. 635; Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563; Roosevelt v. Bank of Niagara, Hopk. 583; Wharton, III-B-20

(English-origin maxim.) Equity treats as done what ought to have been done. An agreement for valuable consideration is treated as executed from the date performance was due. Money agreed to be laid out in land is treated as real estate; land contracted to be sold is treated as money.

Buildings pass by a grant of the land.

Source: Fleta, lib. 3, c. 2, s. 12; Weisman, 70o

(English-origin maxim.) A conveyance of land includes all structures upon it — buildings are part of the realty and pass with the soil unless expressly excluded.

The law of God and the law of the land are one, and both preserve and favor the private rights to the land.

Lex Dei et lex terrae omnia una, et ambo conservant et praeferunt jura privata ad terram.

Source: Keilw. 191

The divine law and the common law unite in one purpose: the protection of every man's private right to his land and home.

Every man's house is his safest refuge.

Domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium.

Source: 5 Co. 91b; 3 Inst. 162; Dig. 2.4.18; Broom, Max. 432; Weisman, 54d; Weisman, 54f

The law regards the home as the ultimate sanctuary — no power may breach it without the most urgent lawful necessity.

Every man's house is his castle and fortress, not merely for his own protection, but for the protection of his family and his property therein.

Domus sua cuique est castrum et fortissimum.

Source: 5 Co. 91b; Broom, Max. 432; Curtis v. Hubbard, 4 Hill (N.Y.) 437; Weisman, 54g

The "castle doctrine" means the home is fortified by law against all intruders — the householder defends not only himself but his family and goods.

Nothing is more sacred, more inviolate, than the house of every citizen.

Nihil est magis sacrum, magis inviolatum, quam domus uniuscujusque civis.

Source: C.L.M.; Dig. 50.17.103; 5 Co. 91, 92; Weisman, 54c

The sanctity of the home is among the highest protections the law affords — even the winds of heaven may blow through it, but the government may not enter without warrant.

No citizen may be dragged from his house to be conducted before a judge or to prison.

Nemo de domo sua extrahi debet.

Source: Dig. 50.17.103; Weisman, 54e

The home is so protected that the person within it may not be seized by force — process must be served, not executed by violence at the threshold.

It is settled that that place is to be considered the home of each man where he has his habitation and has established his business.

Domus est constitutum habitaculum.

Source: Dig. 50.16.203; Arnold v. United Ins. Co., 1 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 363, 366; Weisman, 54b

Domicile is fixed by habitation and intent — where a man dwells and keeps his accounts, there the law considers him at home.

A home is a social unit formed by a family living together in one dwelling.

Domus est societas quaedam a familia cohabitante formata.

Source: Anaya v. Foundation Res. Ins. Co., 414 P.2d 848, 849; Weisman, 54h

The home is defined not by walls but by the family within — a dwelling becomes a home when a family makes it the seat of their common life.

Every person has exclusive dominion over the soil which he absolutely owns; hence such owner has the exclusive right of hunting and fishing on his land, and the waters covering it.

Omnis persona habet exclusivam dominationem super solum quod absolute possidet.

Source: L. Realty Co. v. Johnson, 92 Minn. 363, 365; Weisman, 70j

Absolute ownership carries absolute dominion over every use of the land — including every creature and watercourse upon it.

It is not permitted to build upon one’s own land what may be injurious to another.

Aedificare in tuo proprio solo non licet quod alteri noceat.

Source: 3 Inst. 201; Jackson

Ownership of land does not confer the right to erect structures that cause harm to a neighbor — the right of property is bounded by the equal rights of others.

A man shall not be punished for suing out writs in the king’s court, whether he be right or wrong.

Home ne serra puny pur suer des briefes en court le roy, soit il a droit ou a tort.

Source: 2 Inst. 228; Jackson

The right of access to the courts is fundamental — no man may be penalized for seeking judicial remedy, even if his cause ultimately fails.

Residence creates domicile.

Source: Arnold v. United Ins. Co., 1 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 363, 366; Weisman, 54a

(English-origin maxim.) The fact of dwelling in a place establishes legal domicile — actual residence, not mere intent, creates the jurisdictional tie between a person and a locality.

A gift is perfected by the possession of the receiver.

Donatio perficitur possessione accipientis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 109, case 9; 2 Kent, Comm. 438; Ewing v. Ewing, 2 Leigh (Va.) 337; Weisman, 48s

No gift is complete until the thing given passes into the hands of the recipient — intent alone does not transfer property.

The donor never ceases to possess until the donee begins to possess.

Nunquam donator desinit possidere, antequam donatarius incipiat possidere.

Source: Bract. fol. 41b; Dyer, 281; Weisman, 48u

There is no gap in ownership — the donor holds until the moment the recipient takes, and at that instant ownership transfers.

No man can transfer to another a greater right than he himself has.

Nemo plus juris ad alienum transferre potest quam ipse haberet.

Source: Dig. 50.17.54; Broom, Max. 499n; Noy, Max. 9th ed.; Weisman, 86l

This is the universal limit on all transfers — a grantor cannot convey what he does not own, whether it be property, power, or privilege.

Clandestine gifts are always suspicious.

Dona clandestina sunt semper suspiciosa.

Source: 3 Co. 81; Noy, Max. 152; Jackson, Latin for Lawyers, 1915; Weisman, 48c

Secret transfers raise the presumption of fraud — the law expects transactions in property to be open and visible.

He who gives an end gives the means to that end.

Qui dat finem, dat media ad finem.

Source: 3 Mass. 129; Weisman, 52h

A grant of a right carries with it everything necessary to exercise that right — the law will not allow a grant to be rendered futile for want of means.

When anything is granted, that also is granted without which the thing granted cannot exist.

Quando aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest.

Source: 11 Co. 52; Shep. Touch. 89; Hob. 234; 3 Kent, Comm. 421; Jenk. Cent. 32, case 63; Weisman, 52b

A grant of land carries the right of access; a grant of water carries the right to the channel — every grant includes its necessary incidents.

The manner gives law to the gift.

Modus legem dat donationi.

Source: Co. Litt. 19a; Weisman, 48f; Weisman, 48k

The terms and conditions attached to a gift by the donor govern its use — the recipient takes subject to the mode prescribed.

The will of the donor, manifestly expressed in his deed of gift, is to be observed.

Voluntas donatoris in carta doni sui manifeste expressa observetur.

Source: Co. Litt. 21; Weisman, 48h

The donor's intent, when clearly stated in the instrument of gift, binds all parties — no court may rewrite a deed of gift against the donor's expressed will.

Whatever is built upon the soil belongs to the soil; buildings belong to the soil.

Omne quod solo inaedificatur solo cedit; aedificia solo cedunt.

Source: Fleta, lib. 3, c. 2, s. 12; Broom, Max. 401; Weisman, 70r

A conveyance of land carries every structure upon it — the grantee takes the buildings without separate mention.

Every grant is to be interpreted most strongly against the grantor.

Concessio versus concedentem latam interpretationem habere debet.

Source: Co. Litt. 183a; Chelsea v. Malden, 4 Mass. 134; Weisman, 52c

Where a grant is ambiguous, the grantee is favored — the grantor who chose the words bears the burden of any uncertainty.

A gift is not presumed.

Donatio non praesumitur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 109; Jackson; Weisman, 48q

The law does not presume that a transfer of property was intended as a gift — a gift must be proven by clear evidence of donative intent and delivery.

Some gifts are perfect, others incipient and not perfect; as if a gift were read and granted, but delivery had not yet followed.

Donationum alia perfecta, alia incepta et non perfecta; ut si donatio lecta fuit et concessa, ac traditio nondum fuerit subsecuta.

Source: Co. Litt. 56; Jackson

A gift is imperfect until delivery is complete — a declared intent to give, even formally recorded, does not transfer ownership without actual or constructive delivery to the donee.

He who gives a thing by mistake has a right to recover it back; but, if he gives designedly (with knowledge of the facts), it is a gift.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 53; Weisman, 48a

(English-origin maxim.) A gift made under mistake of fact may be recovered, but a gift made deliberately and with full knowledge is irrevocable — intent and knowledge at the time of giving determine whether restitution lies.

One who gives and yet retains does not give effectually. Or, one who gives, yet retains, gives nothing.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 129; Weisman, 48b

(English-origin maxim.) A purported gift where the giver retains possession or control is no gift at all — delivery must be complete and unconditional to perfect the transfer.

No man can give that which he has not.

Source: Fleta, lib. 3, c. 15, s. 8; Jenk. Cent. 250; Broom, Max. 499n; Jackson v. Bradford, 4 Wend. (N.Y.) 619; Shep. Touch. 243; Weisman, 48d

(English-origin maxim.) No man can give away what does not belong to him — the donor must have title to the thing given, or the gift is a nullity.

That is considered to be given which is granted when no law compels.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 82; Weisman, 48e

(English-origin maxim.) A voluntary transfer made without legal compulsion is treated as a gift — the absence of obligation distinguishes a gift from a payment or a performance.

A bequest is not rendered void by an erroneous description.

Source: Inst. 2, 20, 30; Broom, Max. 645; Weisman, 48g

(English-origin maxim.) A bequest that incorrectly describes the thing given is not thereby voided — if the intended subject can be identified despite the error, the gift is upheld.

A gift is said to be pure and simple when no condition or qualification is annexed.

Source: Bract. 1; Bouv. 158; Weisman, 48i

(English-origin maxim.) A gift made without conditions or qualifications is absolute and irrevocable from the moment of delivery — no strings may be implied where none were expressed.

He gives nothing who has nothing.

Nihil dat qui non habet.

Source: Cycl. Diet. 693; Weisman, 48m

A person who owns nothing has nothing to give — the purported gift or conveyance of another's property passes no title and confers no right on the recipient.

That which one has given, knowing it not to be due, with the intention of redemanding it, he cannot recover back.

Source: Dig. 12, 6, 50; Walker v. Hill, 17 Mass. 388; Weisman, 48n

(English-origin maxim.) One who knowingly pays what is not owed, intending to demand it back later, cannot recover — the deliberate payment with knowledge forecloses the claim for restitution.

To present is no more than to give or offer on the spot.

Source: Co. Litt. 120; Weisman, 48p

(English-origin maxim.) To present a thing is to deliver it on the spot — presentment is an immediate, in-person act of giving or offering, not a future promise.

Among other methods of acquiring property, a great, much-used, and celebrated method is that of gift.

Source: Bract. fol. 11; Weisman, 48r

(English-origin maxim.) Gift is one of the principal modes of acquiring property recognized at law — voluntary transfer without consideration is as valid a conveyance as sale or exchange.

He who has a right to give has the right to dispose of the gift.

Source: Wing. Max. 53; 2 Coke, 71; Broom, Max. 459, 461; Weisman, 48t

(English-origin maxim.) The power of disposition follows the power of giving — he who may give freely may also direct the terms and manner of the gift.

It is necessary that a certain thing be brought into the gift, or made the subject of the conveyance.

Source: Bract. fol. 15b; Weisman, 48v

(English-origin maxim.) Every gift or conveyance must identify a definite thing as its subject — an attempt to give or convey something uncertain or indeterminate is void for want of a subject.

Permission is a license to do a thing or an authority to do an act, without such authority, would have been unlawful.

Source: Black's, 893; Weisman, 52d

(English-origin maxim.) A license or permission authorizes what would otherwise be unlawful — absent such authority, the act remains a trespass or wrong.

He who is permitted to do the greater may with greater reason do the less.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 21; Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed. 165; Shep. Touch. 429; Weisman, 52f

(English-origin maxim.) He who is authorized to do the greater thing is by necessary implication authorized to do the lesser — a grant of broad power includes every narrower power within it.

That which is granted or reserved in a certain specified form must be taken as it is granted, and will not be permitted to be made the subject of any adjustment or compensation on the part of the grantee.

Source: Ex parte Miller, 2 Hill (NY) 423; Bacon, Max. 26, reg. 4; Weisman, 52i

(English-origin maxim.) A grant made in a specific form must be taken exactly as stated — the grantee may not adjust, compensate, or substitute terms that were fixed by the grantor.

That which is permitted only at a loss is not permitted to be done.

Source: Co. Litt. 127; Weisman, 52j

(English-origin maxim.) An act that can only be performed at a loss is not truly permitted — the law does not grant permission that would destroy the very right it purports to allow.

To permit is to allow by passive consent or not hindering; or to grant leave to by express consent or authorization.

Source: Hill v. Montgomery, 176 S.W.2d 284, 287, 352 Mo. 147; Weisman, 52k

(English-origin maxim.) Permission may be given either expressly by words of authorization or impliedly by passive acquiescence — silence in the face of another's act may constitute permission.

If a man grant that which is not his, the grant is void.

Source: Shep. Touch. 243; Watk. Conv. 191; Weisman, 52l

(English-origin maxim.) A grant of what the grantor does not own is void ab initio — no interest passes, and the grantee acquires nothing regardless of the form of the conveyance.

Measure gives validity to the grant.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 52a

(English-origin maxim.) A grant must specify with certainty the quantity, bounds, or measure of what is conveyed — without definite measure, the grant is void for uncertainty. This applies equally to delegations of governmental power: authority not defined in scope and measure by the People's constitutions is authority never granted.

The wrong-doer shall never be heard in court to claim that his felony, or other wrong, gives him any advantage as a defense.

Source: Wharton, III-346

(English-origin maxim.) A wrongdoer cannot invoke his own crime or tort as a shield in court — no man profits from his own wrong, and the law will not hear a defense built on the defender's own misconduct.

A grant must be construed with certainty as to the thing granted.

Concessio per regem fieri debet de certitudine.

Source: Bract. fol. 15b; 9 Co. 46; Bacon, Max.

No grant is valid unless the subject of the grant can be identified with certainty — vagueness defeats a conveyance.

Let the buyer beware; the buyer ought not to be ignorant that he is purchasing the rights of another.

Caveat emptor; qui ignorare non debuit quod jus alienum emit.

Source: Hob. 99; Co. Litt. 102a; Broom, Max. 690; 1 Bouv. Inst. 383; Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. (77 U.S.) 388; Weisman, 13b

The buyer purchases at his own risk — he is bound to examine the title and quality of what he buys, and ignorance is no defense.

Let the seller beware.

Caveat venditor.

Source: Lofft. 328; Hargous v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 73, 82; Weisman, 13p

The seller is equally bound to deal honestly — misrepresentation or concealment of defects lies at the seller's door.

To sell is one thing; to consent to a sale is another.

Aliud est vendere, aliud vendenti consentire.

Source: Dig. 50.17.160; Weisman, 13a

The owner's consent is the foundation of every lawful sale — a sale without consent is no sale at all.

He who has the right of giving also has the right of selling and granting.

Qui habet jus donandi habet jus vendendi et concedendi.

Source: Dig. 50.17.163; Weisman, 13c; Weisman, 77r

The right to sell flows from the right to own — if a man may give his property away, he may certainly sell it.

He is fraudulent who sells the same thing twice.

Fraudulentus est qui rem bis vendit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 107; Weisman, 13i

Double-dealing in sales is fraud on its face — a man who sells what he has already sold defrauds the second buyer.

No rule of law protects a buyer who willfully closes his ears to information, or refuses to make inquiry when circumstances of grave suspicion imperatively demand it.

Nulla juris regula protegit emptorem qui voluntarie aures claudit.

Source: Lytly v. Lansing, 147 U.S. 59, 72; Weisman, 13s

The buyer who refuses to investigate what a reasonable man would suspect forfeits the law's protection — willful blindness is no better than knowledge.

No one is bound to sell his property, even for a just price.

Nemo cogitur rem suam vendere, etiam justo pretio.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

The right of property includes the absolute right to refuse to sell — no compulsion, not even the offer of fair value, can force a man to part with what is his.

The purchaser runs the risk of the loss of a thing sold, though not yet delivered.

Periculum rei venditae, nondum traditae, est emptoris.

Source: 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 939; 4 B. & C. 941; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 13e

Once the sale is agreed upon, the risk of loss passes to the buyer even before physical delivery — the buyer's title is complete upon agreement, and the loss falls where the title rests.

In the price of buying and selling, it is naturally allowed to the contracting parties to overreach each other.

Source: 1 Story, Cont. 606; Weisman, 13g

(English-origin maxim.) In arm's-length bargaining over price, each party is naturally permitted to seek the best deal — the law does not police hard bargaining absent fraud or duress.

Purchaser without notice is not obliged to discover his own hurt.

Source: Inst. n. 4336; 4 Bouv; Weisman, 13l

(English-origin maxim.) A bona fide purchaser without notice of a defect in title is not required to investigate beyond what appears on the face of the transaction — the law protects innocent buyers.

Mere recommendation of an article does not bind the vendor of it.

Source: Dig. 4, 3, 37; 2 Kent, Comm. 485; Broom, Max. 781; Weisman, 13m

(English-origin maxim.) Mere praise or recommendation of goods by the seller does not create a warranty — the buyer must distinguish between puffery and a binding representation.

A trustee can never be a purchaser.

Source: Wharton, III-33

(English-origin maxim.) A trustee is absolutely prohibited from purchasing the trust property — the fiduciary duty to the beneficiary is incompatible with the self-interest of a buyer.

Be careful, purchaser.

Source: Wharton, III-38

(English-origin maxim.) The buyer must exercise caution and diligence before purchasing — the law places the burden of investigation on the purchaser.

The buyer buys for the least he can; the seller sells for the most he can.

Emptor emit quam minimo potest ; venditor vendit quam maximo potest.

Source: 2 Kent, Comm. 486; Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 252, 256; Weisman, 13r; Wharton, III-79

Each party to a sale lawfully pursues his own economic advantage — the buyer aims low and the seller aims high, and no wrong lies in driving a hard bargain absent fraud.

A guardian cannot act in the capacity of both buyer and seller.

Item ipse tutor et emptoris et venditoris officio fungi non potest.

Source: Wharton, III-154

A guardian cannot act as both buyer and seller in the same transaction — the duty of undivided loyalty to the ward forbids the trustee from occupying both sides of a dealing.

Inheritance is the succession to every right which the deceased had.

Haereditas est successio in universum jus quod defunctus habuerit.

Source: Co. Litt. 237; Dig. 50.17.62

The heir steps into the shoes of the dead — he takes all rights, all obligations, and all property that the ancestor lawfully held.

Inheritance is not to be understood as comprehending only the lands and tenements which a man has by descent; but also every fee simple or fee tail which he has by purchase is also called inheritance, because his heirs can inherit it from him.

Haereditas n'est pas tant solement entendue lou home ad terres ou tenements per discent d'enheritage, mes auxi chescun fee simple ou tail que home ad per son purchase puit estre dit enheritance, pur ceo que ses heirs luy purront enheriter.

Source: Co. Litt. 26; Wharton

The term "inheritance" extends beyond lands received by descent to include any estate of freehold acquired by purchase — if heirs can succeed to it, it is an inheritance regardless of how the ancestor obtained it.

A right descends, not the land.

Jus descendit et non terra.

Source: Co. Litt. 345; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 70d

What passes by descent is the legal right to the land, not the land itself — the heir inherits a title, not the physical soil.

Not right, but seisin (legal possession), makes a stock from which the inheritance must descend.

Source: Fleta, 1.6, cc. 14, 2, s. 2; Noy, Max. 9th ed. 72, n. (b); Broom, Max. 466; 2 Bl. Comm. 388, 389; Weisman, 58d; Weisman, 91gg

(English-origin maxim.) Inheritance descends from the person who was actually seised (in legal possession), not merely from one who had a right of entry or a bare right — seisin, not abstract right, is the root of descent.

Fee-tail, an inheritance limited in a definite descent.

Source: Litt. s. 13; Black's, 2d. 491; Weisman, 58g

(English-origin maxim.) A fee tail is an estate of inheritance limited to a particular line of heirs — it descends only to the issue of the body of the grantee, and upon failure of such issue, it reverts.

No one can at the same time be the heir and the owner of the same tenement.

Source: Hale, Com. Law, c. 7; Bouv. 141; Weisman, 58q

(English-origin maxim.) A person cannot simultaneously be both heir and owner of the same tenement — the two capacities are incompatible because the heir's right exists only in expectation of the owner's death.

A penal action is not given against an heir, unless such heir is benefited by the wrong.

Source: Black's, 2d. 25; 2 Inst. 442; Weisman, 58t

(English-origin maxim.) An heir is not liable for the penal consequences of his ancestor's wrongs unless the heir has personally benefited from those wrongs — punishment does not pass by descent.

He who provides for himself provides for his heirs.

Source: Black's, 2d. 980; Weisman, 58u; Weisman, 58p

(English-origin maxim.) The prudent man who secures his own affairs thereby secures his heirs — what the ancestor builds lawfully, the heir inherits.

The presumption is in favor of legitimacy.

Source: 1 Bl. Comm. 457; 5 Coke, 98b; Co. Litt. 126a; Weisman, 58bb

(English-origin maxim.) The law presumes that a child born in wedlock is legitimate — the burden of proving illegitimacy falls on the party asserting it, and the standard is exacting.

Possession of the brother in fee-simple makes the sister to be heir.

Source: 3 Coke, 42; 2 Bl. Comm. 227; Weisman, 58cc

(English-origin maxim.) Where a brother dies seised in fee simple, his sister becomes his heir — seisin in the brother at death is what vests the right of inheritance in the sister.

An heir is a part of his ancestor.

Source: Co. Litt. 22; Branch, Princ.; Schoonmaker v. Sheely, 3 Hill. (N.Y.) 165, 167; C.L.M; Co. Litt. 8a; Broom, Max. 519; Weisman, 58ee

(English-origin maxim.) The heir is treated as a continuation of the ancestor's legal person — the rights, obligations, and seisin of the ancestor flow through to the heir without interruption.

A yearly increase goes to enhance the inheritance.

Source: Dig. 5, 3, 20, 3; Weisman, 58hh

(English-origin maxim.) Annual profits and increase of the estate augment the inheritance — rents, crops, and natural increase of livestock all pass to the heir as part of the inherited estate.

The law favors the inheritance of a man.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 58h

(English-origin maxim.) The common law strongly favors the descent of property to a man's heirs — ambiguities in deeds, wills, or statutes are construed so as to preserve the inheritance rather than defeat it, because the right to transmit the fruits of one's labor to one's posterity is a natural right that the law merely recognizes and secures.

Give your things while they are yours; after death they are not yours.

Da tua dum tua sunt; post mortem tunc tua non sunt.

Source: 3 Bulst. 18; Weisman, 103f

A man who would dispose of his property does well to act in life — after death, the will speaks, but the testator no longer commands.

An act already begun, the completion of which depends on the will of the parties, may be recalled; but if it depend on the consent of a third person, or on a contingency, it cannot.

Actus inceptus cujus perfectio pendet ex voluntate partium revocari potest; si autem pendet ex voluntate tertiae personae vel ex contingenti, revocari non potest.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 20; Jackson; Weisman, 7d

A revocable act is one that rests entirely in the hands of the parties — once a third party's rights or an external contingency intervene, the power of revocation is lost.

Although the grant of a future interest is inoperative, yet it may become a declaration precedent, which will take effect on the intervention of some new act.

Licet dispositio de interesse futuro sit inutilis, tamen fieri potest declaratio praecedens quae sortiatur effectum, interveniente novo actu.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 14; Jackson

A grant of a future interest, though void as a present conveyance, may operate as a declaration of intent that takes effect when a subsequent act completes it.

Simony is the will or desire of buying or selling spiritualities, or things pertaining thereto.

Simonia est voluntas sive desiderium emendi vel vendendi spiritualia vel spiritualibus adhaerentia.

Source: Hob. 167; Jackson

The law forbids the buying and selling of sacred offices, sacraments, and spiritual benefits — such traffic is void as contrary to good morals and the law of the Church.

Things are worth what they will sell for.

Tantum bona valent, quantum vendi possunt.

Source: 3 Inst. 305; Jackson

The true value of goods is their market value — what a willing buyer will pay a willing seller, not any abstract or sentimental valuation.

In testaments, the will of the testator should be liberally construed.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 12; Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed. 507; Weisman, 103g

(English-origin maxim.) Courts should give the broadest and most liberal reading to a testator's will, favoring validity over technicality, so that the testator's true wishes are carried out.

Old age does not alone and of itself vitiate a will or a gift.

Source: Jackson v. VanDusen, 5 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 148, 158; Weisman, 103i

(English-origin maxim.) Advanced age alone does not invalidate a will or gift — the question is always whether the testator had mental capacity, not how many years he had lived.

A person dies intestate who either has made no testament at all or has made one not legally valid; or if the testament he has made be revoked, or made useless; or if no one becomes heir under it.

Source: Inst. 3, 1, pr; Dig. 38, 16, 1; Dig. 50, 16, 64; Weisman, 103k

(English-origin maxim.) A person dies intestate if he made no will, made an invalid will, had his will revoked, or if no one qualifies as heir under its terms — any of these failures triggers the rules of intestate succession.

A testament is the witnessing of one's intention, made under no present fear of danger, but in expectancy of death.

Testamentum, i.e., testatio mentis, facta nullo praesente metu periculi, sed cogitatione mortalitatis.

Source: Weisman, 103j

A valid will must be made freely, without duress or imminent peril clouding judgment — it is a deliberate declaration of intent made in contemplation of mortality, not in the panic of danger.

The right of testaments belongs to the ordinary.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 103t

(English-origin maxim.) Jurisdiction over the probate and administration of wills belongs to the ordinary (the ecclesiastical or probate court) — this maxim establishes that testamentary matters are heard in a specialized forum with original jurisdiction, and no other court may usurp that authority absent express constitutional provision.

It must be shown by the most evident proofs that the testator intended to multiply the legacy.

Evidentissimis probationibus ostendatur testatorem multiplicasse legatum voluisse.

Source: Wharton, III-95

It must be shown by the clearest evidence that a testator intended to multiply a legacy — the law does not presume duplicate bequests, and ambiguity is resolved in favor of a single gift.

Silence implies consent where the interest of the silent party is at stake.

Qui tacet consentire videtur, ubi tractatur de ejus commodo.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 32, case 64; Broom, Max. 138, 787; 9 Mod. 38

When a man's rights are being dealt with and he has knowledge and opportunity to object, his silence operates as acquiescence.

There is no doubt that the rights of others cannot be impaired by private agreements.

Privatis pactionibus non dubium est non laedi jus caeterorum.

Source: Dig. 2, 15, 3, pr.; Broom, Max. 623; Jackson 819; Weisman, 5h; Weisman, 86g

Two parties cannot agree between themselves to destroy the rights of a third — private agreements bind only the parties to them.

The part which does not agree with its whole is entitled to small or no consideration.

Source: Plowd. 101; Shep. Touch. 87; Weisman, 5f

(English-origin maxim.) A clause or provision that is inconsistent with the whole agreement is given little or no weight — the parts must conform to the whole, and an outlier term yields to the dominant intent.

That which bars those who have made a contract will bar their successors.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 143; Weisman, 24y

(English-origin maxim.) Defenses that bar the original contracting parties also bar their successors and assigns — the successor steps into the shoes of his predecessor and takes subject to the same limitations.

An unlawful condition is deemed as not annexed.

Conditio illicita habetur pro non adjecta.

Source: BL4 "Conditio"; cf. Co. Litt. 206; Weisman, 19c

A condition that requires something unlawful is struck from the grant without destroying the grant itself — the grantor cannot poison his own gift.

All conditions are odious, but especially those which restrain marriage and commerce.

Conditiones quaelibet odiosae; maxime autem contra matrimonium et commercium.

Source: Lofft, App. 644; Jackson 122; Weisman, 19e

The law disfavors conditions that restrict natural liberty — conditions restraining the fundamental rights of the People are construed most strictly against the one imposing them.

A repugnant condition in a grant does not destroy the grant; the condition is rejected, and the gift stands.

Repugnans conditio in testamento non vitiatur; rejicitur autem conditio, et stat donatio.

Source: Co. Litt. 206; Broom, Max. 535

Where a condition contradicts the very nature of what is granted, the condition falls and the grant survives — the grantor cannot give and take away in the same breath.

The church can make its condition better, but not worse.

Ecclesia meliorari non deteriorari potest.

Source: 2 Eden, 313; Jackson; Weisman, 80a

Those who hold ecclesiastical property in trust may improve it but cannot alienate or diminish it — the same principle applies to any trustee who holds for the benefit of others.

The thing passes with its burden.

Res transit cum suo onere.

Source: Bracton, fols. 47b, 48; Weisman, 28r

An encumbrance follows the property wherever it goes — the purchaser takes subject to existing obligations, and cannot claim ignorance as a defense.

Let him who has nothing in his purse pay in his person, lest he who offends should go unpunished.

Source: C.L.M.; 2 Inst. 173; 4 Bl. Comm. 20; Weisman, 28g

(English-origin maxim.) Where a wrongdoer cannot make monetary restitution, the law requires satisfaction in his person — historically through imprisonment or corporal punishment — so that no offense goes without remedy. The principle secures the injured party's right to redress: inability to pay does not extinguish the obligation, and the law will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.

Private good yields to public.

Privatum commodum publico cedit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 223; Jackson

Under the monarchy, private advantage yielded to the Crown's public interest without limit. In the American system, this principle still applies — but it is bounded by the reserved rights of the People. No claim of public necessity can override a constitutionally secured right, and the government bears the burden of proving genuine public necessity rather than mere administrative convenience.

To confirm is to make firm that which was before infirm.

Confirmare est id quod prius infirmum fuit firmare.

Source: Co. Litt. 295; Jackson 125; Weisman, 20a

Confirmation gives strength to what was previously weak or defective — but it cannot create a right where none existed.

No one can confirm a right before the right accrues to him.

Confirmare nemo potest priusquam jus ei acciderit.

Source: 10 Co. 48; Jackson 126; Weisman, 20b

A man cannot ratify or confirm what he has no authority over — premature confirmation is a nullity.

He who does not disapprove when he can, approves.

Qui non reprobat, approbat.

Source: 3 Inst. 27; Weisman, 21q

Silence in the face of a known wrong, where one has the power and duty to object, operates as ratification — the People's silence on constitutional violations confirms them.

Confirmation supplies all defects, even though what was done may not have been valid from the beginning.

Confirmatio omnes supplet defectus, licet id quod actum est ab initio non valuit.

Source: Co. Litt. 295b; Jackson 128; Weisman, 20i

This maxim applies only to voidable acts (defective but not void) — true nullities remain beyond the reach of confirmation (see 6.7.4).

He who confirms gives nothing.

Qui confirmat nihil dat.

Source: 2 Bouv. Inst. no. 2069

Confirmation is not a new grant — it strengthens what already existed. The confirmer creates no new right; he merely removes doubt about an existing one.

Confirmation is valid only where the confirmer is in possession of the thing itself or of the right to be confirmed.

Confirmatio is tantum firma est ubi possessor aut rei aut juris sit.

Source: Co. Litt. 295

Only the holder of a right can confirm it — a stranger's ratification is without effect.

By the same mode by which a thing is bound, by that it is also released or dissolved.

Source: 2 Rolle, 21, 39; Jenk. Cent. 74; Broom, Max. 884, 891; 6 Coke, 53; Weisman, 7g

(English-origin maxim.) An obligation must be dissolved by the same form or authority by which it was created — what is bound by deed is released by deed; what is bound by consent is released by consent.

The touching of property not one’s own, with an intention to steal, is theft.

Contrectatio rei alienae, animo furandi, est furtum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 132; Jackson; Weisman, 91c

The mere handling of another’s property with intent to steal constitutes theft, even if the property is not carried away — the crime is complete upon the wrongful touching.

The fraud of a predecessor does not prejudice the successor.

Dolus auctoris non nocet successori.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Weisman, 29e

A successor in title or office is not tainted by the fraud of his predecessor — each person answers for his own deceit, and no innocent party inherits another's guilt.

It is not the rigor but the inexpediency of laws and acts of authority which make them tyrannical.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 25a

(English-origin maxim.) A law does not become tyrannical merely because it is strict; tyranny arises when law serves no just purpose or exceeds the scope of the authority delegated by the People. Legislation that bears no rational connection to the security of natural rights is an act of arbitrary power, not of lawful governance.

The act of God does injury to no one.

Actus Dei nemini facit injuriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 287; 1 Coke, 97b; Co. Litt. 206a; 5 Co. 87; Weisman, 59d

No man is held liable for losses caused by forces beyond human control — where God acts, man is excused.

No one causes damage except he who does what he has no right to do.

Nemo damnum facit nisi qui id fecit quod facere jus non habet.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 151

Lawful exercise of one's own rights cannot constitute an actionable injury to another, even if the other suffers loss thereby.

A right cannot arise from a wrong.

Jus ex injuria non oritur.

Source: Broom, Max. 738 n.; 4 Bing. 639; Weisman, 77h

No lawful claim can be founded on an unlawful act — a right purportedly created by wrongdoing is no right at all.

No one can take advantage of his own wrong.

Nul prendra advantage de son tort demesne.

Source: 2 Inst. 713; Wharton

A man may not profit from or found a claim upon his own wrongful act — the law denies every benefit flowing from self-created injury.

Where the crime is, there the punishment should be also.

Ubi culpa est, ibi poena subesse debet.

Source: 6 Coke, 47; Weisman, 92t

Punishment must follow the offender and attach to him personally — it cannot be imposed on an innocent party, and it must be inflicted where the guilt actually lies.

Let not jailers torture or augment the punishment of those intrusted to their keeping; but let the sentence of the law be duly yet mercifully executed.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 92u

(English-origin maxim.) A jailer's authority extends only to the lawful execution of the sentence imposed by the court — any cruelty, deprivation, or punishment beyond the judgment is an unauthorized trespass upon the prisoner's natural rights. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments recognizes this ancient common-law limitation on custodial power.

The despoiled party ought to be restored before all else.

Spoliatus debet ante omnia restitui.

Source: 2 Inst. 714

Before any other question is heard — before defenses, counterclaims, or procedural objections — the party wrongfully deprived of his property must first be restored to possession. Restoration comes before adjudication.

It is just that every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or character.

Source: Weisman, 94h

(English-origin maxim.) Every person is entitled to a remedy at law for injuries to his person, property, or reputation — the right to redress is itself a fundamental right.

An oath has in it three component parts — truth, justice, and judgment: truth is requisite in the party swearing, justice and judgment in the judge administering the oath.

Sacramentum habet in se tres comites, veritatem, justitiam et judicium: veritas habenda est in jurato, justitia et judicium in judice.

Source: 3 Inst. 160; Jackson; Weisman, 84e

The oath binds both the swearer and the officer — the swearer must speak truth, and the judge must administer the oath justly and with sound judgment.

Public rights are to be preferred to private.

Jura publica anteferenda privatis.

Source: Co. Litt. 130; Jackson

Where a private claim conflicts with a recognized public right — such as navigation on public waters, passage on public highways, or access to common lands — the public right prevails. This maxim does not authorize government to override individual natural rights in the name of collective benefit.

When two rights concur in one person it is the same as if they were in different persons.

Quando duo jura in una persona concurrunt, aequum est ac si essent in diversis.

Source: 2 Preston Abs. 430; Jackson; Weisman, 86o

Where one person holds two distinct legal rights, they are treated as separate and independent — merger of rights in one person does not extinguish either.

It is the property of a Judge to administer justice, not to give it.

Source: Lofft, 42; Weisman, 68s

(English-origin maxim.) A judge's duty is to administer the existing law, not to create new rights or grant favors — the judge declares what the law is, he does not invent what it should be.

Every presumption of the law must be in aid of justice.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 68a

(English-origin maxim.) Legal presumptions exist to advance justice, not to defeat it — a presumption that operates to deprive a man of his recognized rights or to shield wrongdoing perverts its own purpose and must yield to the truth of the matter.

It is not just and right that he who exposes the faults of a guilty person should be condemned on that account; for it is proper and expedient that the offense of the guilty should be known.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 68c

(English-origin maxim.) The People's right to expose malfeasance by public officers or private wrongdoers is essential to self-governance — one who brings the guilty to light serves justice and cannot be punished for doing so. This principle undergirds the right of remonstrance, petition, and the freedom of speech secured by the First Amendment.

No one goes to law without an action, and no one can bring an action without a writ or bill.

Source: Bract. fol. 112; Fleta, 1.2, c. 13, s. 4; Weisman, 75c

(English-origin maxim.) Access to the courts requires a formal writ or bill — no action can be commenced without the proper originating process.

Two negative pleas do not form an issue.

Source: Lofft, 415; Weisman, 87i

(English-origin maxim.) In pleading, two negative assertions cannot create a triable issue. An issue requires an affirmative on one side and a negative on the other — two denials leave nothing for the court to determine.

Where the prescribed form is not observed, the act is annulled.

Non observata forma, infertur adnullatio actus.

Source: 12 Co. 7; Co. Litt. 303a

Execution must follow the form prescribed by law — an execution conducted in violation of established procedure is void and conveys no rights.

Precedents are principles of law which are also conclusions, or decision in a cause; and not a process of reasoning or illustration or analogy.

Source: Rodwell v. Rowland, (N.C.) 50 S.E. 319, 327; Weisman, 88k

(English-origin maxim.) A precedent is a decision, not an argument — it establishes a principle of law by its holding, not by any reasoning, analogy, or illustration that may accompany it.

Report, which induces suspicion, ought to arise from good and grave men; not, indeed, from malevolent and malicious men, but from cautious and credible persons; not only once, but frequently; for clamor diminishes, and defamation manifests.

Source: 2 Inst. 52; Black's, 2d. 482; Weisman, 39cc

(English-origin maxim.) Rumor and report that would justify investigation must originate from credible, disinterested persons and must be persistent — isolated accusations from hostile witnesses do not constitute lawful grounds for suspicion.

From length of time, all things are presumed to have been done in due form.

Ex diuturnitate temporis, omnia praesumuntur solemniter esse acta.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 6; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 20

Where an act has stood unchallenged for a great length of time, the law presumes that all necessary formalities were observed in its execution.

The law dispenses what common use has approved.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 17g; Weisman, 71ff

(English-origin maxim.) The common law draws its authority from the customs and usages long recognized by the People — where a practice has been universally and peaceably adopted, the law confirms and enforces it as an expression of the People's sovereign will.

Truth of the name removes the error of description.

Veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 614; Co. Litt.; Weisman, 101j

Where the identity of a person or thing is established with certainty, an error in the description does not defeat the instrument — truth of substance prevails over error of form.

False spelling or false grammar does not vitiate a grant.

Falsa orthographia, sive falsa grammatica, non vitiat concessionem.

Source: 9 Co. 48; Jackson; Weisman, 30i

A grant, deed, or other instrument is not defeated by mere errors of spelling or grammar when the meaning and intent are clear — substance prevails over form. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.2.14.)

A possessor in good faith is liable only for that which has actually come to him.

Bona fide possessor, in id tantum quod ad se pervenerit, tenetur.

Source: 2 Inst. 285; Dig.; Weisman, 50f

He who holds property believing his title to be lawful is accountable only for the benefit he actually received, not for speculative or consequential gains.

A good-faith possessor makes the fruits he has gathered and consumed his own.

Bona fide possessor facit fructus perceptos et consumptos suos.

Source: Tray. Max. 57; Dig.; Weisman, 50b

Where a person holds property in genuine good faith, the profits and fruits he has consumed before notice of a superior title are his by right; the law protects innocent use.

From the words of the law there must be no departure.

A verbis legis non est recedendum.

Source: 5 Co. 119; Wing. Max. 25; Weisman, 104v

Where the words are clear, there is no room for construction; the plain text governs and may not be overridden by appeal to purpose or policy.

It is the same thing to say nothing and not to say it sufficiently.

Idem est nihil dicere et insufficienter dicere.

Source: 2 Co. Inst. 178; Bouvier

A statement so vague or incomplete that it communicates nothing is treated as no statement at all; the law demands not merely words but adequate words. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.90.)

A false description does not vitiate when the thing is sufficiently identified.

Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat.

Source: 6 Term 676; 1 Greenl. Ev. §301; Broom, Max. 562, 629; Weisman, 31a; Weisman, 31d

Mere misdescription in a deed, will, or instrument does not invalidate it if the subject matter intended can be identified with certainty from the whole instrument.

Whatever is added to describe a thing already sufficiently described is of no effect.

Quidquid demonstratae rei additur satis demonstratae, frustra est.

Source: Dig. 33, 4, 1, 8; Broom, Max. 562; Weisman, 31e

Surplus description beyond what is needed to identify the subject cannot enlarge, diminish, or defeat a grant or devise; the sufficient description controls.

Fiction is a poor ground for changing substantial rights.

Fictio est pauperum fundamentum ad mutanda jura substantialia.

Source: Bacon, Max.; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 45h

No fiction may be used to alter vested rights; it is a procedural convenience, not a substantive power, and may never serve as the basis for taking from one to give to another.

All which is dissimilar, is a difference of degree, the extent of which is ascertained by close and objective analysis.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 97i

(English-origin maxim.) When things appear different, the distinction is one of degree rather than kind, and the law requires precise, objective analysis to determine the extent of that difference — vague assertions of dissimilarity cannot justify disparate legal treatment.

A thing done cannot be undone.

Factum infectum fieri nequit.

Source: 1 Kames, Eq. 96, 259; Weisman, 2x; Weisman, 13o

Once an act is completed — a deed delivered, an instrument executed — the actor cannot recall it by his own will alone.

Certain legal consequences are attached to the voluntary act of a person.

Source: Duncan v. Landis, 106 Fed. 839; Weisman, 2e

(English-origin maxim.) A person who voluntarily performs an act is bound by the legal consequences that flow from it, regardless of whether he foresaw or intended those consequences.

Deeds are more powerful than words.

Facta sunt potentiora verbis.

Source: Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 476; Co. Litt. 36; Weisman, 30a

Where a deed and a parol declaration conflict, the deed prevails — written instruments carry greater weight than oral statements. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.1.18.)

That is not called a deed which does not continue operative.

Factum non dicitur quod non perseverat.

Source: 5 Co. 96; Weisman, 30c

An instrument that ceases to have legal effect ceases to be a deed in the eyes of the law.

Delivery makes a deed speak.

Traditio loqui facit chartam.

Source: 5 Co. 1a; Weisman, 30m

Until delivery, a deed is a silent instrument — it is the act of delivery that gives life and legal force to the writing.

It is the tenor of the deed which gives validity to the estate.

Tenor est qui legem dat feudo.

Source: Co. Litt. 36; cf. 5 Co. 96; Weisman, 30f

The operative language of an instrument — its tenor — determines the rights conveyed, not the label or title given to it.

Bad grammar does not vitiate a deed.

Mala grammatica non vitiat chartam.

Source: Shep. Touch. 55, 87; 9 Co. 48a; Wing. Max. 19

A deed or grant is not defeated by imperfect Latin, misspelling, or grammatical error — the law looks to substance, not syntax.

A deed is nothing but the vestment of a gift.

Charta non est nisi vestimentum donationis.

Source: Co. Litt. 36; Weisman, 30j

The deed is the clothing of the grant — the formal expression through which the intention to convey is made operative.

An allegation contrary to a deed is not admissible.

Allegatio contra factum non est admittenda.

Source: Jackson; Weisman, 24dd

A party may not contradict by oral allegation what he has solemnly committed to a written instrument; the deed speaks and cannot be gainsaid.

A charter concerning a thing not in existence is of no avail.

Charta de non ente non valet.

Source: Co. Litt. 36a; Jackson

A deed or grant that purports to convey something that does not exist is a nullity — the law cannot clothe with validity what has no substance.

In the delivery of writings, not what is said, but what is done, is to be considered.

In traditionibus scriptorum non quod dictum est, sed quod gestum est, inspicitur.

Source: 9 Co. 137; Bouvier; Weisman, 30d

The validity and effect of a written instrument depend on the actual delivery and acts performed, not on the oral declarations accompanying the transfer.

False spelling or false grammar does not vitiate a grant.

Falsa orthographia, sive falsa grammatica, non vitiat concessionem.

Source: 9 Co. 48; Shep. Touch. 55; Bouvier

A grant or deed is not defeated by mistakes in spelling or grammar; the law looks to the substance of what is conveyed, not to the accuracy of the penmanship. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.5.11.)

Authority to execute a deed must be given by deed.

Source: 4 Term, 313; Cooper v. Rankin, 5 Binn. (Penn.) 613; Weisman, 30e

(English-origin maxim.) The authority to execute a deed on behalf of another must itself be conferred by deed — a bare parol authorization is insufficient to support a formal conveyance.

The deed of one should not hurt another.

Source: Co. Litt. 152; Weisman, 30g

(English-origin maxim.) No person should be prejudiced by the deed of a stranger — the acts of one party cannot impose obligations or forfeitures upon another who is not privy to the instrument.

When a deed contains a general clause, and afterwards descends to special words, consistent with the general clause, the deed is to be construed according to the special words.

Source: 8 Coke, 154; Weisman, 30h

(English-origin maxim.) Where a deed opens with a general grant and then specifies particular terms consistent with it, the special words control the construction — the general yields to the specific.

The intention is to be taken for the deed.

Voluntas reputabatur pro facto.

Source: 3 Inst; Weisman, 30k; Weisman, 51b; Weisman, 104z

Where the intent to execute a deed is clearly established but formal completion is prevented by death or other cause, equity may treat the intention as equivalent to the act.

No man can contravene or contradict his own deed.

Source: 2 Inst. 66; Weisman, 30l; Weisman, 2aa

(English-origin maxim.) A party who has executed a deed is estopped from denying its terms — his solemn act binds him, and he may not contradict what he has formally declared.

The clause, "Of our special grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion," is of no avail where it may be presumed that the prince was ignorant.

De gratia speciali, certa scientia, et mero motu; talis clausula non valet in his in quibus praesumitur principem esse ignorantem.

Source: 1 Co. Rep. 53; Jackson

A royal grant claiming to be made from the sovereign’s personal knowledge is void if the facts show the sovereign could not have known the circumstances — the recital does not cure the ignorance.

Custom is sustained by its own force through continuance.

Consuetudo robore suo sustinetur.

Source: Cf. Mann v. Mann's Ex'rs, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 231, 237; 2 Bl. Comm. 263

A practice that persists without interruption gathers legal force — continuity itself is evidence of right.

That which is so persistently repeated as to constitute virtually an unbroken series is continuous.

Quod perseveranter repetitur, ut seriem ininterruptam constituat, continuum est.

Source: Ingraham v. Hough, 46 N.C. 43; Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 260; Weisman, 23c

Continuous use is proven not by absolute permanence, but by a pattern of repetition so consistent that it admits no meaningful break.

That which is certain is fixed or stated, precise or exact, free from doubt or question.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 15l

(English-origin maxim.) Legal certainty requires that rights, obligations, and commands be stated with precision sufficient to be understood and obeyed — a law or instrument so indefinite that reasonable men must guess at its meaning fails the standard of certainty and cannot bind the People.

Every worthier thing draws to it the less worthy, though the latter be more ancient.

Omne magis dignum trahit ad se minus dignum, sit antiquius.

Source: Co. Litt. 355; Bouvier

Where two rights or interests conflict, the more dignified or important prevails and absorbs the lesser — rank and worth, not mere priority in time, determine which governs.

Common custom is better than royal grant.

Plus valet vulgaris consuetudo quam regalis concessio.

Source: Co. Cop. § 31; Jackson

A right established by long and general custom of the People carries greater weight than a right conferred by royal privilege; the People's practice outranks the sovereign's gift.

In cases of extreme necessity, all things are in common.

In casu extremae necessitatis, omnia sunt communia.

Source: Hale, P.C. 54; Weisman, 83g

At the extremity of need — shipwreck, famine, imminent peril — private property gives way to the common right of survival, and the taker is excused by the emergency.

Long time and long use, which exceeds the memory of man, suffices in law.

Longum tempus et longus usus, qui excedit memoriam hominum, sufficit pro jure.

Source: Co. Litt. 115; Jackson

Immemorial usage — practice so old that no one remembers its origin — is presumed lawful and establishes right as effectively as a grant or statute.

Prescription is a title by authority of law, deriving its force from use and time.

Praescriptio est titulus ex usu et tempore substantiam capiens ab auctoritate legis.

Source: Co. Litt. 118; Jackson

Prescriptive title arises from continuous use over time and is confirmed by operation of law; it is not a grant from any person but a right born of established practice.

What is first is truer; and what is first in time is better in law.

Quod prius est verius est; et quod prius est tempore potius est jure.

Source: Co. Litt. 347; Jackson

Priority in time confers priority in right; the first in time has the superior claim, and later interests must yield to earlier ones.

What is given to the church is given to God.

Quod Ecclesiae datur, Deo datur.

Source: 2 Inst. 590; Weisman, 49k

Property dedicated to religious use is held in trust for a sacred purpose — its diversion to secular ends is a breach of that trust.

The Church does not die.

Ecclesia non moritur.

Source: 2 Inst. 8; Jackson

The Church, as a corporation sole, has perpetual legal existence; it never dies, and its property and obligations pass unbroken through time.

It is more serious to hurt Divine than temporal majesty.

Source: 11 Coke, 29; Weisman, 49e

(English-origin maxim.) Offenses against God and the moral law are regarded as more grievous than offenses against temporal authority — the common law grades culpability by the dignity of the interest injured.

Goods are worth as much as they can be sold for.

Res merx valet quantum vendi potest.

Source: Shep. Touch. 142; 3 Inst. 305; Weisman, 35g

Market value is determined by the willing buyer — the law measures worth not by sentiment, cost, or aspiration, but by what the marketplace will actually pay.