constitutional

Natural law is that which holds the same force among all mankind.

Jus naturale est quod apud omnes homines eandem habet potentiam.

Source: Coke, 7 Co. 12; Jackson 473; Weisman, 82e

Natural law is universal — it binds every nation and every court, and no legislature can override it.

Natural law has its foundation in the will of God.

Jus naturale, sive lex naturalis, fundamentum habet in voluntate Dei.

Source: Blackstone, 1 Bl. Comm. 39; Kent, 1 Comm. 2; Weisman, 74f

The authority of natural law rests not on human enactment but on the will of the Creator — it precedes and supersedes all positive law. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

The laws of nature are most perfect and unchangeable.

Leges naturae perfectissimae sunt et immutabiles.

Source: Coke, 7 Co. 25; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 74d

Human laws rise and fall, but the laws of nature admit neither amendment nor repeal — any statute contradicting them is void from the beginning.

Things forbidden by the nature of things are confirmed by no law.

Quae rerum natura prohibentur, nulla lege confirmantur.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Finch, Law 74; Weisman, 74j; Weisman, 90c

A legislature may pass any words it pleases, but no enactment can make valid what nature itself forbids.

The force of nature is the greatest.

Natura vis maxima est.

Source: Noy, Max. 26; Coke, 2 Inst. 564; Weisman, 74h

When natural law and positive law conflict, natural law prevails — no human enactment can overcome the force of nature.

The highest reason is that which acts in favor of religion.

Summa ratio est quae pro religione facit.

Source: Co. Litt. 341; Jackson 998

Where competing interpretations of law exist, the one that best accords with divine principle and the moral law is to be preferred.

That which natural reason has established among all men is called the law of nations.

Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, vocatur jus gentium.

Source: Dig. 1.1.9; Inst. 1.2.1; 1 Bl. Comm. 43; Weisman, 74l

The law of nations is derived from natural law — it represents those principles so fundamental that all civilized peoples recognize them.

Nature takes little heed.

Parum cavet natura.

Source: Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 127, 166; Weisman, 74g; Wharton, III-248

Nature operates by fixed principles indifferent to human convenience — courts invoke this maxim to explain why legal fictions cannot override natural facts such as birth, death, or biological parentage.

So far as natural law is concerned, all men are equal.

Quod ad jus naturale attinet, omnes homines aequales sunt.

Source: Dig. 50.17.32; Co. Litt. 122b

The common law, rooted in natural law, recognizes no natural hierarchy among free men — all stand equal before the law.

The general custom of the whole country is the common law of the country.

Communis consuetudo totius patriae est lex communis patriae.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 119; Jackson 147; Weisman, 18e

The common law is not made by judges or legislators — it is the accumulated custom of the People, recognized and declared by the courts. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

The laws of England are threefold: common law, customs, and decrees of Parliament.

Leges Angliae sunt tripartitae: jus commune, consuetudines, ac decreta comitiorum.

Source: Jackson 486; 1 Bl. Comm. 63; Wharton

Statute is only one of three sources of law — common law and custom operate with equal force, and statutes that derogate from them are strictly construed.

Things introduced contrary to the reason of the law are not to be drawn into consequence.

Quae contra rationem juris introducta sunt, non debent trahi in consequentiam.

Source: Coke; Branch, Princ.; Jenk. Cent. 29

Exceptions carved out of the common law remain exceptions — they must not be expanded by analogy or used to justify further erosion of common law rights.

An affirmative statute does not derogate from the common law.

Statutum affirmativum non derogat communi legi.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 24; Black's 2nd 1910; Weisman, 18g

A statute that creates a new right or procedure does not, by that creation, abolish the existing common law remedy — both stand unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.

The jurisprudence of the common law is a social and comprehensive science.

Scientia juris communis est scientia socialis et comprehensiva.

Source: Coke, 7 Co. 28a; Weisman, 18b

The common law is not a narrow technical system — it comprehends the whole of social life and adapts to the needs of the People it governs.

A dispensation is a wound that injures the common law.

Dispensatio est vulnus, quod vulnerat jus commune.

Source: Davies, Ir. K.B. 69; Weisman, 18f; Weisman, 82c

Every special exemption from the common law weakens the law itself — dispensations must be granted sparingly and never presumed.

In England there is no interregnum.

In Anglia non est interregnum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 205; Jackson

The continuity of sovereign authority is never broken — upon the death of one king, the next succeeds instantly, ensuring that the People are never without the protection of law.

From unwritten sources comes that law which use has sanctioned.

Ex non scripto jus venit quod usus comprobavit.

Source: Inst. 1.2.9; Dig. 1.3.35; Jackson 245

The unwritten law — proved by long and uniform practice — is as binding as any statute, and in the common law tradition it is the more ancient authority.

The custom of England is the law of England.

Consuetudo regni Angliae est lex Angliae.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 119; Jackson

The common law of England is nothing more and nothing less than the general custom of the realm — what the People have long practiced is what the law declares.

That which is equitable and good is the law of laws.

Aequum et bonum est lex legum.

Source: Hobart 224; Jackson 39; Weisman, 68b

The ultimate test of any legal rule is whether it produces what is equitable and good — a rule that consistently fails this test has lost its claim to authority.

The civil law is what a people establishes for itself.

Source: Inst. 1, 2, 1; Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 424, 426; Weisman, 36h

(English-origin maxim.) The civil law derives its authority from the consent of the people who adopt it — a statute imposed without the people's consent lacks the character of true law.

Law is the highest reason, which commands what is useful and necessary, and forbids what is contrary thereto.

Lex est ratio summa, quae jubet quae sunt utilia et necessaria, et contraria prohibet.

Source: Co. Litt. 319b; Jenk. Cent. p. 117; 2 Inst. 587; Jackson 504

True law is grounded in reason — it commands what is beneficial and forbids what is harmful. An enactment that commands what is harmful or forbids what is useful has departed from law.

The same is always referred to its next antecedent.

Idem semper antecedenti proximo refertur.

Source: Co. Litt. 20; Jackson; Weisman, 97c

In construing a document, a relative pronoun or phrase is applied to the nearest preceding subject — this rule of grammatical construction prevents ambiguity in legal instruments.

What is mine cannot be lost or transferred to another without my act or my default.

Quod meum est sine facto meo vel defectu meo amitti vel in alium transferri non potest.

Source: Prest. Abs. 147; Jackson; Weisman, 91z

Property cannot be taken from its owner without his voluntary act or his legal fault — involuntary transfers without consent or due process of law are void.

Law is the science of what is good and just.

Jus est ars boni et aequi.

Source: Dig. 1.1.1; Bracton, fol. 2b; Weisman, 71e

Law is not mere command — it is the art of discerning what is good and equitable, and applying that discernment to human affairs.

Law is a rule of right.

Lex est norma recti.

Source: Bouvier, Max. 136; Weisman, 12d; Weisman, 59o; Weisman, 71f

Every law must be measured against the standard of right — an enactment that violates right is not true law but mere force.

The law always intends what is agreeable to reason.

Lex semper intendit quod convenit rationi.

Source: Co. Litt. 78b; Jackson 532; Weisman, 71jj

When a statute or rule admits of two readings, adopt the one that accords with reason — the law never intends an absurd result.

Laws are made to no purpose except for those who are subject and obedient.

Leges in vanum conficiuntur, nisi iis subjicientibus et obedientibus.

Source: Branch, Princ.; 7 Co. 13; Weisman, 72m

A law that binds no one accomplishes nothing — law derives its force from the obedience of the governed. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

An integral part being removed, the whole is taken away.

Parte quacumque integrante sublata, tollitur totum.

Source: 8 Co. 41; Black's 2nd 1910; Weisman, 95s

When an essential element of a statute, contract, or proceeding is struck down, the remainder cannot stand — the parts depend on the whole.

Nothing is invented and perfected at the same moment.

Nihil simul inventum est et perfectum.

Source: Co. Litt. 230; 2 Bl. Comm. 298 n.; Weisman, 95u

Law develops over time through experience and application — new doctrines must be tested before they can be trusted.

It is better to seek the source than to follow the streamlets.

Melius est petere fontes quam sectari rivulos.

Source: Lofft 606

Always go to the original source — Coke, Bracton, the Digest, the constitution — rather than relying on secondary commentary or modern restatement.

The law does not concern itself with trifles.

Lex non curat de minimis.

Source: Hobart 88; Jackson 514

Immaterial errors, trivial losses, and negligible deviations will not sustain a legal action — the law reserves its machinery for matters of substance.

Execution is the end and fruit of the law.

Executio est finis et fructus legis.

Source: Co. Litt. 289b

A law that is not executed is as if it did not exist — the entire purpose of law is fulfilled only when its commands are carried into effect. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.13, 8.9.2.)

The meeting of minds — i.e. mutual consent.

Assensio mentium.

Source: Jackson

No binding agreement exists without a genuine meeting of minds — both parties must understand and agree to the same terms for a contract to form.

Commerce, by the law of nations, ought to be common, and not converted to monopoly and the private gain of a few.

Commercium jure gentium commune esse debet, et non in monopolium et privatum paucorum quaestum convertendum.

Source: 3 Inst. 56; Jackson

Trade is a natural right of all men — government-granted monopolies that restrict commerce for the benefit of a privileged few violate the law of nations.

The end of one day is the beginning of another.

Finis unius diei est principium alterius.

Source: 2 Buls. 305; Jackson

For purposes of legal computation, the expiration of one period marks the commencement of the next — time is continuous and admits no gaps.

A new remedy is to be applied to a new case.

In novo casu, novum remedium apponendum est.

Source: 2 Inst. 8; Jackson; Weisman, 94s

When existing remedies are insufficient to address a novel wrong, the law must fashion new remedies — justice is not defeated by the absence of precedent.

Law ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most frequently, and not to those which are unexpected.

Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt, non quae ex inopinato.

Source: D. 1, 3, 8; Jackson; Weisman, 71s

Legislation should address the ordinary course of events, not rare exceptions — laws tailored to unusual cases often produce unjust results in common ones.

It is not safe to obey him who has no right.

Jus non habenti tute non paretur.

Source: Hob. 146; Jackson; Weisman, 99c

Obedience to an authority acting without lawful right may expose the obedient party to liability — one must first satisfy himself that the command comes from legitimate authority.

A right growing to a possessor accrues to the successor.

Jus superveniens auctori accrescit successori.

Source: Halk. 76; Jackson; Weisman, 58l; Weisman, 103s

A right that attaches to property after its transfer vests in the successor, not in the original holder — the successor takes the benefit of any improvement in title.

The law rejects superfluous, contradictory, and incongruous things.

Lex rejicit superflua, pugnantia, incongrua.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 133; Jackson; Weisman, 71rr

Courts will disregard surplusage, resolve contradictions, and reject absurdities in the construction of legal instruments — clarity and consistency are demanded.

Things permitted are properly united unless the form of law oppose.

Licita bene miscentur, formula nisi juris obstet.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 24; Jackson

Lawful acts may be freely combined unless a specific legal formality prevents it — the law does not prohibit the joining of permissible actions without express cause.

The more worthy draws with it the less worthy.

Majus dignum trahit ad se minus dignum.

Source: 1 Inst. 48; Jackson; Weisman, 95gg

When two things of unequal dignity are joined, the lesser follows the greater — the principal thing governs the accessory.

The promises of women are prompter than those of men.

Maturiora sunt vota mulierum quam virorum.

Source: 6 Co. 71; Jackson; Weisman, 104n

This maxim historically justified earlier ages of legal capacity for women in certain contexts — it reflects the common law’s recognition that maturity of judgment may differ between individuals.

To lie is to go against the mind.

Mentiri est contra mentem ire.

Source: 3 Buls. 260; Jackson

A lie is a deliberate contradiction of what the speaker knows to be true — it is an act against one’s own conscience, and the law punishes it because it corrupts the foundations of justice. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.5.16.)

The smallest bodily punishment is greater than any pecuniary one.

Minima pena corporalis est major qualibet pecuniaria.

Source: 2 Inst. 220; Jackson; Weisman, 92y

Liberty of the person is more precious than property — the law treats even the slightest restraint on bodily freedom as more serious than any monetary penalty.

Death is denominated the extreme penalty.

Mors dicitur ultimum supplicium.

Source: 3 Inst. 212; Jackson

Capital punishment stands at the summit of legal penalties — its severity demands the highest degree of procedural safeguard and certainty of guilt.

Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.

Negligentia semper habet infortuniam comitem.

Source: Co. Litt. 246; Jackson

He who neglects his duty or his property invites harm — negligence is the mother of loss, and the law does not relieve those who fail to exercise ordinary care.

No one is born an artificer.

Nemo nascitur artifex.

Source: Co. Litt. 97; Jackson

Skill and knowledge are acquired, not innate — the law recognizes that competence comes through training, and does not presume expertise without evidence of it.

No one is restrained from using several defences.

Nemo prohibetur pluribus defensionibus uti.

Source: Co. Litt. 304; Jackson

A defendant may plead as many defenses as he has available — the law does not force a party to rely on a single ground when multiple grounds exist.

Nothing is prescribed except what is possessed.

Nihil prescribitur nisi quod possidetur.

Source: 5 B. & A. 277; Jackson

A prescriptive right can only be claimed over property one actually possesses — mere assertion of a right, without actual enjoyment, cannot ripen into prescription.

There are two sorts of nobility, the higher and the lower.

Nobilitas est duplex, superior et inferior.

Source: 2 Inst. 583; Jackson

The distinction between grades of nobility determined the order of precedence and the incidents of tenure — in American law, all titles of nobility are prohibited by the Constitution.

Names ought to be regarded not by the opinions of individuals, but by common use.

Non ex opinionibus singulorum sed ex communi usu nomina exaudiri debent.

Source: D. 38, 10, 7; Jackson

Legal terms are to be understood according to their ordinary and customary meaning, not according to any private or idiosyncratic definition a party may assign to them.

No one is considered entitled to recover that which he must give up to another.

Non videtur quisquam id capere, quod ei necesse est alii restituere.

Source: D. 50, 17, 51; Jackson; Weisman, 94l

The law does not permit a futile recovery — if a party must immediately surrender what he obtains, he has no real interest worth pursuing.

That which is given for all is restored by the contribution of all.

Omnium contributione sarciatur quod pro omnibus datum est.

Source: 4 Bing. 121; Jackson

When one party bears a loss that benefits all, the cost must be shared proportionally — this is the foundation of general average in maritime law and analogous principles elsewhere.

There may be an abuse of everything of which there is a use, virtue alone excepted.

Omnium rerum quarum usus est, potest esse abusus, virtute solo excepta.

Source: Dav. 79; Jackson; Weisman, 25e

Every right and power is susceptible of misuse — the law therefore imposes limits on the exercise of rights to prevent their perversion into instruments of harm.

The risk of a thing sold, and not yet delivered, is the purchaser’s.

Periculum rei venditae, nondum traditae, est emptoris.

Source: Jackson

Once a sale is complete, risk of loss passes to the buyer even before physical delivery — the buyer bears the loss if the goods are destroyed in transit.

Of principles there is no rule.

Principiorum non est ratio.

Source: 2 Buls. 239; Jackson

First principles are self-evident and require no further justification — they are the axioms from which all legal reasoning proceeds and cannot themselves be proved by prior rules.

When provision of party is wanting, provision of law is present.

Quando abest provisio partis, adest provisio legis.

Source: cited 18 C. B. 960; Jackson

Where the parties to a contract have failed to address a particular matter, the law supplies the missing term — default rules fill the gaps that private agreement leaves open.

When anything is prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly.

Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo prohibetur et per obliquum.

Source: Co. Litt. 223; Jackson; Weisman, 90a

The law cannot be evaded by doing indirectly what it forbids doing directly — a prohibition extends to every method of accomplishing the forbidden result.

What ought to be done is easily presumed.

Quod fieri debet facile praesumitur.

Source: Halk. Max. 153; Jackson; Weisman, 89i

The law presumes that persons have performed their legal obligations — the burden falls on the party alleging non-performance to prove it.

What I cannot do in person, I cannot do by proxy.

Quod per me non possum, nec per alium.

Source: 4 Co. 24; Jackson

A person cannot circumvent legal restrictions on his own authority by acting through an agent — the agent’s power can never exceed the principal’s.

The kingdom is not divisible.

Regnum non est divisibile.

Source: Co. Litt. 165-166; Jackson; Wharton

Sovereign authority cannot be fractured into independent competing jurisdictions within a single realm — the unity of the sovereign power is essential to the rule of law.

If the suggestion be not true, the letters patent are void.

Si suggestio non sit vera, literae patentes vacuae sunt.

Source: 10 Co. 118; Jackson

A patent or royal grant obtained upon false representations is void — the sovereign’s grant is conditional upon the truth of the facts stated in the petition.

Where a common remedy ceases, there recourse must be had to an extraordinary one.

Ubi cessat remedium ordinarium ibi decurritur ad extraordinarium.

Source: 4 Co. 93; Jackson; Weisman, 94n

When ordinary legal processes are inadequate, the court may grant extraordinary relief such as writs of mandamus, prohibition, or habeas corpus to prevent a failure of justice.

An outlaw is, as it were, put out of the protection of the law: he carries the head of a wolf.

Utlagatus est quasi extra legem positus: caput gerit lupinum.

Source: 7 Co. 14; Jackson; Weisman, 26cc

One declared outlaw forfeits the protection of the law — the severity of this maxim historically meant that any man might treat the outlaw as he would a wolf, though modern law has replaced outlawry with less drastic measures.

We can do nothing against truth.

Nihil possumus contra veritatem.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 101h

Truth is the foundation on which all law rests; no act, statute, or judgment can prevail against it — what is true remains true regardless of what any tribunal declares. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.5.17.)

Reason is a ray of divine light.

Ratio est radius divini luminis.

Source: Co. Litt. 232; Bouvier, Max.

The capacity for reason is God-given, and the law, being founded on reason, partakes of a divine character — an unreasonable law is no law at all. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.11.6.)

By various acts experience frames the law.

Per varios actus legem experientia facit.

Source: 4 Inst. 50; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 2h

The common law is not the product of abstract theorizing but of accumulated human experience — repeated acts, tested by time, harden into binding rule.

Records are vestiges of antiquity and truth.

Recorda sunt vestigia vetustatis et veritatis.

Source: 2 Roll. R. 296; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 101a

The written record preserves what memory cannot — it is the evidence of what was actually done and said, and stands as proof against later contradiction.

Things which are not valid from the beginning cannot be made valid by a subsequent act.

Quae ab initio non valent, ex post facto convalescere non possunt.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 482; Weisman, 62c

An act void from inception cannot be cured by any subsequent event — cite this to challenge government actions taken without jurisdiction, which remain void regardless of later ratification attempts.

That which is valid in law has legal strength, force, and effect, or incapable of being rightfully overthrown or set aside.

Source: Emerson v. Knapp, 75 Mo.App. 92, 97; Weisman, 62g

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A valid instrument carries the full force of law and cannot be collaterally attacked; opposing parties must show a jurisdictional or constitutional defect to overcome it.

Voidable imports a valid act which may be avoided, rather than an invalid act which may be confirmed as such.

Source: Rothberg v. Schmiedeskamp, 134 N.E.2d 544, 546, 334 Mass. 172; Weisman, 62j

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) A voidable contract or conveyance stands until the injured party elects to rescind — unlike a void act, it confers rights and imposes duties unless and until affirmatively set aside.

The wisdom of the law cannot be valued by money.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 168; Weisman, 71k

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) The principles of justice embedded in the common law transcend monetary valuation — a court cannot put a price on the rule of law itself, nor can damages adequately compensate for the destruction of legal principle.

Things which are found within the reason of a law are supposed to be within the law itself.

Source: 2 Inst. 689; Weisman, 71qq

(English-origin maxim — no Latin equivalent; the English title is the original form.) Whatever falls within the spirit and purpose of a law is governed by it, even if not expressly named — a statute prohibiting fraud covers schemes not specifically enumerated if they fall within the mischief the law was enacted to remedy.

A party may waive the benefit of any condition or provision made in his behalf, no matter in what manner it may have been made or secured.

Source: Wharton, III-25

(English-origin maxim.) A right or protection established for an individual's benefit may be voluntarily relinquished by that individual, but the waiver must be knowing and intentional — no one else can waive it on his behalf without authority.

The offspring follows the condition of the father.

Proles sequitur sortem paternam.

Source: Wharton, III-258

In questions of status, descent, and inheritance, the child's condition follows the father's — applied in determining legitimacy, citizenship, and rights of inheritance.

When laws imposed by the state fail, we must act by the law of nature.

Legibus sumptis desinentibus, lege naturae utendum est.

Source: 2 Roll. R. 298; Weisman, 74a

The law of nature is the ultimate fallback — when positive law is silent, absent, or has broken down, men are governed by natural law, which never fails.

Nothing that is inconvenient is lawful.

Nihil quod inconveniens est licitum est.

Source: Co. Litt. 66a, 97b; Jackson 669; Weisman, 73g

"Inconvenient" here means inconsistent or absurd — a legal outcome that produces absurd or self-contradictory results cannot be lawful.

Under pretext of legality, what is illegal ought not to be admitted.

Sub praetextu legalitatis, non debet admitti illicitum.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 728, max. 196; Weisman, 73a

A lawful label on an unlawful act does not sanitize it — the law strips away pretense and judges the substance of the act.

We are able to do only that which we can do lawfully.

Id possumus quod de jure possumus.

Source: Bouvier, Max. 129; Weisman, 73c

Power without lawful authority is no power at all — an officer who exceeds his lawful commission acts as a private person, not as an agent of the law.

It is lawful to repel force by force, provided it is done with the moderation of blameless defense, not for the purpose of taking revenge, but to ward off injury.

Vim vi repellere licet, modo fiat moderamine inculpatae tutelae, non ad sumendam vindictam, sed ad propulsandam injuriam.

Source: Co. Litt. 162a; Weisman, 73d

Self-defense is a natural right — but it must be proportionate and defensive, not retaliatory. The force used must match the threat, not exceed it.

To investigate is the way to know what things are truly lawful.

Investigare est modus sciendi quae res sint vere licita.

Source: Litt. s. 443; Bouvier, Max. 150; Weisman, 73b

Lawfulness is not assumed — it is proved by inquiry. The party asserting lawful authority bears the burden of showing the lawful basis for the act. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

Necessity makes lawful what is otherwise not lawful.

Quod alias non est licitum, necessitas licitum facit.

Source: 10 Co. 61; Noy, Max.

In cases of true necessity — where the preservation of life or the prevention of greater harm demands immediate action — acts otherwise unlawful are excused. But the necessity must be genuine, not manufactured.

He vainly invokes the aid of the law who transgresses the law.

Frustra legis auxilium quaerit qui in legem committit.

Source: Fleta, lib. 4, c. 2, s. 3; Broom, Max. 279, 297; Weisman, 72n

A party who has acted unlawfully cannot turn to the law for relief arising from that very unlawfulness — the courts will not aid one whose own hands are unclean.

Where there is no law, there is no transgression.

Ubi non est lex, ibi non est transgressio.

Source: Coke, 4 Co. 16b; Romans 4:15; Weisman, 72h

No one can be punished for an act that was not prohibited by law at the time it was committed — this is the foundation of the prohibition against ex post facto legislation.

The law looks forward, not backward.

Lex prospicit, non respicit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 284; Jackson 524; Weisman, 71pp

Laws operate prospectively — they govern future conduct, not past acts. A new law cannot punish what was lawful when done.

What is done contrary to law is deemed not to have been done.

Quod contra legem fit, pro infecto habetur.

Source: 4 Co. 31

An act performed in violation of law is treated as a nullity — it creates no rights, imposes no obligations, and is regarded as though it never occurred.

The laws are silent amid arms.

Silent leges inter arma.

Source: 4 Inst. 70; Cicero, Pro Milone 4.11; Weisman, 9d

In times of open conflict or armed tumult, the ordinary processes of law are necessarily suspended — but this maxim is a description of fact, not a license for tyranny; the moment arms are laid down, the law resumes its full authority.

Law is the dictate of reason.

Lex est dictamen rationis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 117; Co. Litt. 319; Weisman, 71nn; Weisman, 77o

Law is not the arbitrary will of the legislator but the product of right reason applied to the governance of human affairs — an enactment contrary to reason is no law at all.

The law delights in equity; it covets perfection; it is a rule of right.

Lex aequitate gaudet; appetit perfectum; est norma recti.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 36

The three attributes of law — equity, perfection, rightness — express its highest aspiration. Where a construction of law defeats any of these, the construction is wrong.

The law would rather tolerate a private loss than a public evil.

Lex citius tolerare vult privatum damnum quam publicum malum.

Source: Co. Litt. 152

Between private hardship and public harm, the law accepts the former to prevent the latter — but this is a principle of last resort, not a license to sacrifice individual rights at will. In the American system, this principle is bounded by the Bill of Rights — no public interest can destroy a secured right.

The law provides for the future; the judge for the past.

Lex de futuro, judex de praeterito.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 63i

The legislature speaks to future conduct; the judge resolves past disputes. Neither should trespass upon the other's domain.

The law of necessity is the law of time — that is, of the present instant.

Lex necessitatis est lex temporis, id est instantis.

Source: Hob. 159; 8 Co. 69; Weisman, 83i

Necessity justifies only what the immediate moment demands — once the emergency passes, the ordinary law resumes. No permanent rule can be built on temporary necessity.

The law intends nothing impossible.

Lex non intendit aliquid impossibile.

Source: 12 Co. 89

The law does not command what cannot be done. Where compliance is genuinely impossible, the obligation is excused.

The law speaks to all with one mouth.

Lex uno ore omnes alloquitur.

Source: 2 Inst. 184

The law applies equally to all — there is no separate law for the powerful and another for the weak. Uniform application is the essence of the rule of law.

Human laws are born, live, and die.

Leges humanae nascuntur, vivunt et moriuntur.

Source: 7 Co. 25; Weisman, 71p

Unlike the natural law, positive laws are temporal — they arise from necessity, serve their purpose, and are superseded when conditions change.

The construction of law obtains the force of law.

Legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bouvier, Max.

An authoritative interpretation of a law has the same binding effect as the law itself — courts are bound not only by the text but by its received meaning. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.1.19.)

The voice of legislators is a living voice, to impose laws on things, not on words.

Legislatorum est viva vox, rebus et non verbis, legem imponere.

Source: 10 Co. 101

Legislation addresses realities, not verbal abstractions — the law binds conduct, not language, and its force attaches to substance, not to form.

A law is not obligatory unless it has been promulgated.

Non obligat lex nisi promulgata.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 72b

A law that has not been published and made known to the People cannot bind them — no one is obliged to obey what he has no means of knowing.

Not everything that is permitted is honorable.

Non omne quod licet honestum est.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 144; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 52e

The law tolerates many things it does not approve — legality is the floor, not the ceiling, of right conduct.

There are some things which are not proper though lawful; but certainly those things are not proper which are not lawful.

Source: Hob. 159; Weisman, 73f

(English-origin maxim.) Something may be technically lawful yet still improper — but what is unlawful can never be proper, and courts will not enforce an act that is both unlawful and improper.

That which is or lawful in the less shall be lawful in the greater; and that which is not lawful in the greater shall neither be lawful in the less.

Source: Co. Litt. 260a; 8 Coke, 48; Weisman, 73h

(English-origin maxim.) What is lawful in the lesser case is also lawful in the greater, and what is unlawful in the greater is also unlawful in the lesser — use this to argue by analogy from established precedent to a stronger or weaker case.

That which is lawful is constituted or authorized by law; rightful; conformable to law; allowed by law; legitimate; competent.

Source: Ohio Auto. Spr. Co. v. Fender, 141 N.E. 269, 275; Weisman, 73j

(English-origin maxim.) "Lawful" means authorized by law, conformable to law, and legitimate — cite this definition to distinguish lawful authority from mere power exercised without legal sanction.

The principle distinction between the terms 'lawful' and 'legal' is that the former contemplates the substance of law, the latter the form of law.

Source: Black's, 703; Weisman, 73k

(English-origin maxim.) "Lawful" refers to the substance of law (conformity with right and justice) while "legal" refers merely to the form of law (compliance with procedural requirements) — an act may be legal in form yet unlawful in substance.

If the object is to regulate a thing it cannot be prohibited, for the power to regulate is not the power to prohibit.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 90f

(English-origin maxim.) When the People delegate a power to regulate, that delegation does not include the power to destroy through prohibition — a regulatory scheme that operates as a de facto ban exceeds the delegated authority and is void as an act beyond the scope of the trust.

The government must be under the law, because the law makes the government.

Rex debet esse sub lege, quia lex facit regem.

Source: Bl. Comm. I (1765) (citing Bracton); Tucker's Bl. Comm. I (1803); Wharton, Max. (1878); Morgan, Eng. Legal Max. (1878); Jackson, Latin for Lawyers 947 (1915); Bract., lib. 1, f. 5b; cf. Weisman, 51b

Government derives its existence from law — it cannot place itself above the law that created it. (The Latin reads *rex* / king; rendered "government" in both clauses for the American constitutional order, per Weisman, 51b.)

All political power is inherent in the People by decree of God; none can exist except it be derived from them.

Source: American constitutional maxim; cf. Romans 13:1; Va. Declaration of Rights §2 (1776); Weisman, 51o

(English-origin maxim.) Sovereignty resides in the People, not in the government. Every exercise of government power must trace back to a grant from the People.

The welfare of the People is the supreme law.

Salus populi est suprema lex.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 12; 13 Co. 139; Broom, Max. 1; Weisman, 71j

The object of government is the protection and preservation of the rights of the People — not its own power or convenience.

No free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.

Nullus liber homo capiatur vel imprisonetur, aut disseisiatur, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur; nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terrae.

Source: Magna Carta, c. 29 (1215); 2 Inst. 45; Broom, Max. 76

The foundational restraint on all government power over the person. Due process of law — not legislative will — is the only lawful mechanism.

The king ought not to be under any man, but under God and under the law, for the law makes the king.

Rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub Deo et lege, quia lex facit regem.

Source: Bracton, lib. 1, c. 5; 12 Co. 65

Government authority is bounded above by God and below by law — it is never above either. This is the constitutional bedrock: government officers are servants of the law, not masters of the People.

Power ought to follow justice, not precede it.

Potentia debet sequi justitiam, non antecedere.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 11n

Justice determines the rule; power enforces it — when power acts first and seeks justification after, the result is tyranny, not government.

What the people have last enacted, let that be the established law.

Quod populus postremum jussit, id jus ratum esto.

Source: Bouvier, Max.

The will of the People, expressed through their most recent lawful act, supersedes all prior enactments — the sovereign People always retain the power to alter their law.

Laws are imposed on things, not on words.

Leges non verbis sed rebus sunt impositae.

Source: Coke, 10 Co. 101; Weisman, 71n

Government action is judged by its substance and effect, not by the label given to it. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.2.32.)

The law does not compel the impossible.

Lex non cogit ad impossibilia.

Source: Co. Litt. 231b; Broom, Max. 242; Hob. 96

No government may require of its citizens what is impossible to perform.

The end of a thing is to be attended to.

Finis rei attendendus est.

Source: 3 Co. Inst. 51

The end for which government was instituted — protection of rights — determines the measure of its lawful action.

The law is not to be violated by those in government.

Lex non a rege est violanda.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 7; Weisman, 51k

The government officer who violates the law he is sworn to uphold commits a breach of trust.

Public necessity is greater than private.

Necessitas publica major est quam privata.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 12; Noy, Max.

When genuine public necessity exists, it takes precedence — but the necessity must be real, not manufactured, and the remedy proportionate. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.6.9.)

The king ought to judge only according to law.

Rex non debet judicare sed secundum legem.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 9

No government officer may exercise discretion contrary to law — all judgments, decisions, and exercises of authority must conform to the law as established, not to the officer's personal will.

The king can do nothing other than what he can do by law.

Nihil aliud potest rex quam quod de jure potest.

Source: 11 Co. Rep. 74; Jackson

The sovereign's power is bounded by law — any act beyond what the law authorizes is ultra vires and void.

The government cannot load a citizen with imposition against his will or consent.

Source: 2 Coke, 61; Weisman, 51a; Weisman, 59g

(English-origin maxim.) The government cannot burden a citizen with obligations, taxes, or conditions without lawful authority derived from the consent of the governed — an imposition that exceeds the powers delegated by the People is ultra vires and void.

The laws themselves desire that they should be governed by right.

Source: Co. Litt. 174b; Weisman, 51d; Weisman, 71ee

(English-origin maxim.) The laws themselves demand that they be administered according to right and justice — an officer who administers the law contrary to right acts against the very nature of law.

The absence of him who is employed in the service of the state, should not be prejudicial to him nor to others.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 140; Weisman, 51g

(English-origin maxim.) A person absent on public service shall not be prejudiced thereby — his rights, deadlines, and legal standing are preserved as though he were present, and third parties cannot take advantage of his service-related absence.

Men must turn square corners when they deal with the government.

Source: Rock Island R.R. v. U.S., 254 U.S. 141, 143; Weisman, 51m

(English-origin maxim.) Those who deal with the government must comply strictly with all conditions and requirements — equitable excuses for non-compliance that might work between private parties will not avail against the sovereign.

Were the executive power not to have a right of restraining the encroachments of the legislative body, the latter would become despotic.

Source: Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws; Weisman, 51j

(English-origin maxim.) The executive power must have the ability to check legislative overreach — without this restraint, the legislature becomes despotic, which is the foundation for the executive veto and separation of powers.

The main object of government is the protection and preservation of personal rights, private property, and public liberties, and upholding the law of God.

Source: Weisman, 51p

(English-origin maxim.) Government exists to protect personal rights, private property, and public liberties — any government action that undermines these objects is contrary to the very purpose for which government was established.

A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, virtue, and original law, are indispensably necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty and good government.

Source: Weisman, 51q

(English-origin maxim.) The People must regularly return to first principles of justice and original law to preserve liberty — cite this constitutional maxim (found in many state constitutions) to justify challenging government drift from foundational limits.

As usurpation is the exercise of power, which another has a right to; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body can have a right to.

Source: Locke, Treat. 2, 18, 199; Weisman, 51r

(English-origin maxim.) Usurpation is exercising power that belongs to another; tyranny is exercising power beyond any lawful right — both are unlawful, but tyranny is the graver offense because no one can ever have a right to it.

The king can do no wrong.

Rex non potest peccare.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 9; 2 Roll. R. 304; Broom, Max. 52

Under the monarchy, this meant the Crown was presumed to act lawfully. There is no king in America — the People are sovereign. When a government officer acts outside his delegated authority, the presumption of lawful action vanishes, and the act is void as ultra vires. The People, as sovereign, can do no wrong because it is from them that all lawful authority flows.

A foreigner is one who is born out of the territory—that is, the government—of the king.

Extraneus est subditus qui extra terram, i.e. potestatem regis, natus est.

Source: 7 Co. 16; Jackson

Citizenship and allegiance attach to the place of birth and the sovereignty under which one is born — a person born outside the jurisdiction owes no natural allegiance to it.

An ambassador fills the place of the king by whom he is sent, and is to be honoured as he is whose place he fills.

Legatus regis vice fungitur a quo destinatur et honorandus est sicut ille cujus vicem gerit.

Source: 12 Co. 17; Jackson; Weisman, 51f

An ambassador or delegate acts in the name and with the authority of the one who sent him — an affront to the delegate is an affront to the principal.

Royal prerogatives pertaining to the Crown depart from the Crown by the consent of the kings.

Libertates regales ad coronam spectantes ex concessione regum a corona exierunt.

Source: 2 Inst. 496; Jackson

Royal prerogatives are not inherent but derived from law; they may be relinquished or limited by the sovereign's own consent or by constitutional constraint.

All subjects are the king’s servants.

Omnes subditi sunt regis servi.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 126; Jackson

The relationship between sovereign and subject is reciprocal — protection in exchange for allegiance, allegiance in exchange for protection.

That which is the property of nobody, belongs to our lord the king.

Quod nullius est, est domini regis.

Source: Fleta, 1. 8; Jackson

Property that belongs to no one reverts to the sovereign — in the American system, to the People collectively through the state.

The king is both legal and politic.

Rex est legalis et politicus.

Source: Lane, 27; Jackson

The sovereign possesses both a legal capacity (bound by law) and a political capacity (exercising discretion within legal bounds) — neither is unlimited.

The king never dies.

Rex nunquam moritur.

Source: Branch, Max. 5th ed. 197; Jackson

The office of sovereign is perpetual even though the holder changes — governmental continuity survives the death of any individual officer.

The king is always presumed to attend to the business of the realm, for the public good of all.

Rex semper praesumitur attendere ardua regni pro bono publico omnium.

Source: 4 Co. 56; Jackson

Government officers are presumed to act in the public interest — but this presumption is rebuttable when their acts demonstrably serve private interests instead.

No summonses or citations are permitted to be served within the king’s palace.

Summonitiones aut citationes nullae liceant fieri infra palatium regis.

Source: 3 Inst. 141; Jackson

The sovereign's residence is immune from service of process, preserving the dignity and uninterrupted function of the sovereign office.

Treasure does not belong to the king, unless no one knows who hid it.

Thesaurus non competit regi, nisi quando nemo scit qui abscondit thesaurum.

Source: 3 Inst. 132; Jackson

Found treasure belongs to the finder unless no owner can be identified, in which case it reverts to the sovereign — the state's claim is secondary to that of any known owner.

A delegated authority cannot be again delegated.

Delegata potestas non potest delegari.

Source: 2 Inst. 597; Broom, Max. 840; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1300; Weisman, 11a

Government power delegated by the People cannot be sub-delegated to private actors, corporations, or agencies without express constitutional authorization.

The derivative power cannot be greater than the original from which it is derived.

Derivativa potestas non potest esse major primitiva.

Source: Noy, Max. 16; Wing. Max. 66; Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3; Weisman, 11b

Government cannot exercise a power greater than what the People delegated to it. What the People reserved, the government never possessed.

Nothing is so becoming to authority as to live in accordance with the laws.

Nihil tam proprium imperio quam legibus vivere.

Source: Fleta, lib. 1, c. 17, s. 11; Weisman, 11c

Authority is legitimate only when exercised within the bounds of law. An officer who acts outside the law acts without authority.

No one can do indirectly what he cannot do directly.

Nemo potest facere per obliquum quod non potest facere per directum.

Source: 1 Inst. 56; Broom, Max. 347; Weisman, 2y

A government that lacks authority to regulate a right directly cannot use licensing, taxation, or contract to achieve the same result by indirection. The foundation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.

When anything is commanded, everything by which it can be accomplished is also commanded.

Quando aliquid mandatur, mandatur et omne per quod pervenitur ad illud.

Source: 5 Co. 116; Weisman, 11g

A grant of authority includes the means necessary to exercise it — but no more. The grant must exist before the means can be implied.

A power is strictly interpreted.

Potestas stricte interpretatur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 17, case 29; Weisman, 11p

Government power is construed narrowly. What is not granted is withheld. Ambiguity in a grant of power is resolved against the government and in favor of the People's retained rights.

In the greatest power there is the least freedom [license].

In maxima potentia minima licentia.

Source: Hob. 159; Weisman, 11d

The more powerful the government office, the more tightly bound it is by law. Supreme power carries supreme obligation.

An equal has no power over an equal.

Par in parem non habet imperium.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 174; Broom, Max. 111; Weisman, 11k

One citizen has no inherent authority over another. Government authority exists only by delegation from the People as a whole, not from any individual over another.

The edict of the sovereign contrary to right is of no force.

Rescriptum principis contra jus non valet.

Source: Reg. Civ. Jur.

No executive order, proclamation, or governmental directive that contravenes established right has any validity — the form of authority does not overcome the substance of right.

The supreme power may loose, but cannot bind, itself.

Potestas suprema seipsam dissolvere potest, ligare non potest.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 19; Jackson

The highest power can release itself from its own constraints but cannot permanently bind its successors — no legislature can enact an irrepealable statute.

A delegate cannot have a delegate.

Vicarius non habet vicarium.

Source: Jackson

A deputy or delegate has no power to appoint a sub-deputy — delegated authority rests with the person to whom it was entrusted and cannot be passed further.

That power is to no purpose which never comes into act, or which is never exercised.

Source: 2 Coke, 51; Weisman, 11e; Weisman, 11o

(English-origin maxim.) A delegated power that is never actually exercised is as if it did not exist — cite this to argue that an authority claimed but never used has been effectively abandoned or waived.

Power can never be delegated which the authority said to delegate never possessed itself.

Source: N.J. Steam Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. (47 U.S.) 344, 407; Weisman, 11f

(English-origin maxim.) An agent or officer cannot delegate authority that was never granted to the principal in the first place — cite this to challenge subdelegations of power where the original delegating body lacked the authority itself.

Supreme power can dissolve itself.

Source: Bacon, Max. VI; Black's, 2d. 1181; Dav. Ir. KB. 69; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 11h

(English-origin maxim.) The supreme sovereign power has the inherent ability to dissolve itself — this principle underlies the People's right to alter or abolish their form of government when it no longer serves them.

Liberty is the natural power of doing whatever one pleases, except that which is restrained by law or force.

Libertas est naturalis facultas ejus quod cuique facere libet, nisi quod de jure aut vi prohibetur.

Source: Co. Litt. 116; Dig. 1, 5, 4; Inst. 1, 3, 1; Weisman, 47b

The default state of every person is liberty. Restriction is the exception, requiring lawful authority.

All laws cry out in favor of liberty.

In favorem libertatis, omnia jura clamant.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 122

When a law is ambiguous as to whether it restricts liberty, it must be construed as not restricting it. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

He is to be judged impious and cruel who does not favor liberty.

Impius et crudelis judicandus est qui libertati non favet.

Source: Co. Litt. 124; Weisman, 47f

A judge, officer, or legislator who construes law against liberty acts against the very purpose of his office.

Liberty is a thing beyond all price.

Libertas inaestimabilis res est.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 106; Weisman, 47c

Liberty cannot be bargained away, taxed, or valued in money. It is not a commodity subject to exchange.

The body of a freeman does not admit of valuation.

Liberum corpus aestimationem non recipit.

Source: Dig. 9, 3, 7; Hob. 59; Bract. fol. 14; Weisman, 35n; Weisman, 47d

A free person's body and liberty cannot be reduced to a monetary value — the basis for the rule against involuntary servitude.

Whenever the interpretation of liberty is doubtful, the answer should be on the side of liberty.

Quotiens dubia interpretatio libertatis est, secundum libertatem respondendum erit.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 20; Co. Litt. 116; Weisman, 47a

Doubt is resolved in favor of the individual's liberty, never in favor of the government's power. The presumption is always freedom.

It is a wretched state of slavery which subsists where the law is vague or uncertain.

Misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut incertum.

Source: 4 Inst. 245, 246; Broom, Max. 150; Weisman, 47i

Vague laws that leave the citizen guessing whether he is free to act are instruments of servitude, not liberty. A law must be definite enough that a citizen of ordinary understanding can know what is required. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.3.9.)

No man can renounce the country in which he was born, nor abjure the obligation of his allegiance.

Nemo patriam in qua natus est exuere, nec ligeantiae debitum ejurare possit.

Source: Co. Litt. 129; Broom, Max. 75

Under the monarchy, the subject owed perpetual allegiance to the Crown and could not renounce it. In the American system, allegiance flows from birthright, not from government grant — but the natural right of expatriation is recognized. The Declaration of Independence itself was an act of renouncing allegiance, establishing that the People may dissolve political bonds when government ceases to protect their rights.

The laws of England in every case give favor to liberty.

Angliae jura in omni casu libertati dant favorem.

Source: Fortescue, c. 42

In every legal dispute touching the freedom of the subject, the presumption runs in favor of liberty — the common law never construes against freedom when the question is doubtful.

The civil laws reduce an ungrateful freedman to his original slavery, but the laws of England regard a man once manumitted as ever after free.

Libertinum ingratum leges civiles in pristinam servitutem redigunt; sed leges Angliae semel manumissum semper liberum judicant.

Source: Co. Litt. 187; Jackson

Under the common law of England, once a person is freed from bondage the freedom is permanent and irrevocable — liberty, once granted, cannot be recalled for ingratitude or any other cause.

All men are freemen or slaves.

Source: Inst. 1, 3, pr.; Fleta, 1. 1, c. 1, s. 2; Bouv. 145; Weisman, 47g

(English-origin maxim.) Every person is either free or enslaved — there is no intermediate status. Cite this to resist the creation of quasi-servitudes through licensing regimes, conditions on travel, or administrative controls on liberty.

The laws of nature are immutable.

Jura naturae sunt immutabilia.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Bacon, Aph.; Weisman, 74c

Natural rights do not change with the times, with legislation, or with judicial doctrine. What was a right at the founding remains a right today.

Natural liberty is the power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature.

Libertas naturalis est potestas agendi ut quis velit, absque ullo impedimento vel coactione, nisi lege naturae.

Source: 1 Bl. Comm. 125; Weisman, 47h

The only inherent restraint on natural liberty is the law of nature itself — not legislative enactment, not executive decree, not judicial construction. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

Individual liberties are antecedent to all government.

Source: American constitutional maxim; Declaration of Independence (1776); state bills of rights; Weisman, 51i

(English-origin maxim.) Rights existed before government was instituted. Government was created to secure rights, not to grant them. What preceded government cannot be taken by government.

What is mine cannot be taken away without my consent.

Quod meum est sine me auferri non potest.

Source: Bouvier, Max.

Property is a natural right — no government, corporation, or individual may deprive a man of what is his except by his own voluntary act or by due process of law.

Everyone is the manager and disposer of his own affairs.

Rerum suarum quilibet est moderator et arbiter.

Source: Co. Litt. 223a; Bouvier, Max.

Every man has the natural right to direct his own affairs, order his own household, and dispose of his own property — no authority may usurp this right without due process of law.

It is lawful to repel force with force.

Vim vi repellere licet.

Source: Weisman, 82d

Self-defense is a natural right — a man may use proportionate force to defend his life, limb, or property against unlawful aggression without waiting for the aid of the law.

Liberty is more favored than all things.

Libertas omnibus rebus favorabilior est.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 122; Weisman, 47e

In any conflict between government power and individual liberty, liberty is the favored position. The burden is on the government to justify the restriction.

Whatever one does in defense of his person, that he is considered to have done legally.

Quod quisque ob tutelam corporis sui fecerit, jure id fecisse videtur.

Source: 2 Inst. 590

Self-defense is the first law of nature. The right to defend one's own body and life requires no government permission.

The right of blood and kindred cannot be destroyed by any civil law.

Jura sanguinis nullo jure civili dirimi possunt.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 9; Bacon, Max. reg. 11; Broom, Max. 533; Weisman, 86j

The natural bond between parent and child is antecedent to government and cannot be severed by statute. The parental right is a natural right, not a civil privilege.

Where there is a right, there is a remedy.

Ubi jus, ibi remedium.

Source: Broom, Max. 191; 1 Term R. 512; Co. Litt. 197b; Weisman, 94a

A right without a remedy is no right at all. If government infringes a right, the law must provide recourse.

Anyone may renounce a right introduced for his own benefit.

Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se inducto.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 77d

A man may waive a right that exists for his personal benefit, but only voluntarily and with knowledge — the waiver of a right cannot be compelled or presumed.

He who uses his legal rights harms no one.

Source: Carson v. Western R. Co., 8 Gray (Mass.) 424; Broom, Max. 379; Weisman, 77c; Weisman, 77i

(English-origin maxim.) A person who lawfully exercises his own rights cannot be held liable for any resulting harm to another — the exercise of a right is never a legal wrong, even if it causes inconvenience or loss to others.

Not the duration of time, but the solidity of reason, is to be considered.

Non diuturnitas temporis, sed soliditas rationis est consideranda.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 100, case 95; Weisman, 77g

What must be considered is not the duration of time but the solidity of reason — a right grounded in sound principle endures regardless of how long it has gone unexercised or been suppressed.

Mistaken notions about one's legal rights are not sufficient to bar prosecution for crime.

Source: Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 238; Weisman, 77m

(English-origin maxim.) A person's mistaken belief about his legal rights does not excuse criminal conduct — ignorance of the law is no defense, even when the defendant sincerely believed he was within his rights.

A continual usage is of great effect to establish a right.

Source: 4 Coke, 78; Wing. Max. p. 719, max. 192; Williams v. U.S., 341 US 97, 101; Weisman, 77n

(English-origin maxim.) Long and uninterrupted exercise of a right is powerful evidence of its existence — cite this to establish prescriptive rights, customary easements, or longstanding community practices as legally binding.

Any one may waive or renounce the benefit of a principle or rule of law that exists only for his protection.

Source: Black's, 304; Weisman, 77p

(English-origin maxim.) A party may voluntarily waive any legal protection that exists solely for his own benefit — but the waiver must be knowing and voluntary, and rights that protect the public generally cannot be waived by an individual.

He will not be considered as using force who exercises his rights and proceeds by forms of law.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 155, 1; Weisman, 77s

(English-origin maxim.) One who pursues his rights through proper legal channels is not considered to be using force — lawful process, even if coercive in effect, is not wrongful compulsion.

A fact does not necessarily constitute a right.

Source: Branch, Max. 15; Weisman, 77t

(English-origin maxim.) The mere existence of a state of affairs does not create a legal right — possession alone does not make ownership, and practice alone does not make law unless it meets the requirements of custom or prescription.

The right ascends collaterally.

Source: Bract. 20; Weisman, 77u

(English-origin maxim.) Rights of inheritance may pass not only downward to descendants but also upward and sideways through collateral lines — relevant in determining succession when direct heirs are absent.

The law favors common right.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 547, max. 144; Weisman, 82f; Weisman, 82f

(English-origin maxim.) When a statute or grant is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the common right of all the people rather than in favor of a private or exclusive privilege.

By natural right, anyone is entitled to summon another into court.

Source: Branch, Max. 120; Weisman, 82g

(English-origin maxim.) Every person has an inherent right to bring another before a court of justice — the right of access to the courts is a natural right, not a privilege granted by the state.

Natural rights are such as appertain to man, inherent in his nature or plainly assured by natural law, being distinguished from such as are created by law, and depend upon civilized society.

Source: Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 519, 527; 44 Am. Dec. 217; Weisman, 82h

(English-origin maxim.) Natural rights are inherent in man's nature and assured by natural law, while civil rights are created by positive law — cite this to argue that natural rights exist independently of and prior to any government grant.

It would be idle and trite to say that no right is absolute.

Source: Orient Ins. Co. v. Draggs, 172 U.S. 557, 566; Weisman, 86a

(English-origin maxim.) While every right has limits, the point of this maxim is that declaring rights non-absolute is itself a commonplace that proves nothing — the real question is always where the limit falls, not whether one exists.

Rights never die.

Jura non moritura.

Source: Bouv. 156; Weisman, 86d

Rights are immortal and cannot be extinguished by disuse, suppression, or the passage of time — a right that has lain dormant for generations may be revived and enforced at any time. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

A thing is private which is not common.

Source: Le Breton v. Miles, 8 Paige, Ch. (N.Y.) 261, 270; Weisman, 86e

(English-origin maxim.) Private property or right is defined by exclusion from common use — cite this to establish that a thing claimed as private cannot simultaneously be treated as public or common.

Right is threefold,-of property, of possession, and of possibility.

Source: Black's, 681; Weisman, 86f

(English-origin maxim.) Right exists in three forms: the right of ownership (property), the right of actual holding (possession), and the right of future claim (possibility) — correctly identifying which type of right is at issue is essential to selecting the proper remedy.

A right not vested in a person living, but merely exists in the consideration and contemplation of law, is said to be in abeyance.

Source: Co. Litt. 342; Weisman, 86h

(English-origin maxim.) A right that is not yet vested in any living person but exists in contemplation of law is said to be in abeyance — it is not destroyed but merely suspended until a person qualifies to receive it.

He is not deemed to use force who exercises his own right, and proceeds by ordinary action.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 155, 1; Weisman, 86i

(English-origin maxim.) A person who exercises his lawful right through ordinary legal action is not considered to use force — the enforcement of a valid right by lawful means cannot constitute duress or compulsion.

No one is considered to act with guile, or to be a wrong-doer, who uses his own right.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 55; Broom, Max. 130; Amer. Ins. Co. v. Griswold, 14 Wend. (N.Y.) 399, 492; Weisman, 86k

(English-origin maxim.) No one is considered to act in bad faith or commit a wrong merely by exercising his own legal right — cite this to defeat claims of malice or tortious conduct where the defendant was simply using a right he lawfully possessed.

No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear or unquestionable authority of law.

Source: Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251; Weisman, 86m

(English-origin maxim.) The right of bodily autonomy is the most sacred right at common law — no one may be restrained, searched, or compelled to submit his body without clear and unquestionable authority of law.

A chase is by common law.

Source: 2 Bl. Comm. 414-416; Weisman, 86p

(English-origin maxim.) The right of chase (hunting) exists by common law and does not depend on statutory grant — cite this to argue that hunting rights on one's own land or common land are inherent, not licensed.

It is allowable to kill a thief if he cannot otherwise be taken.

Surem, si aliter capi non posset, occidere permittunt.

Source: Weisman, 77b

At common law, deadly force was permitted against a thief who could not be apprehended by lesser means — the right to protect property extended to lethal defense when no alternative existed.

If a person neglect to insist on his right, he is deemed to have abandoned it.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 86c

(English-origin maxim.) Rights recognized by the common law must be actively asserted — a man who knows of a trespass upon his rights and remains silent is presumed to have waived them. This maxim underscores why timely notice and demand are essential to the preservation of every natural and constitutional right.

No man ought to be affected in his rights by the judgment or decree of any court, without an opportunity of being previously heard in his own defense.

Source: Wharton, III-208

(English-origin maxim.) Due process of law requires that no person's rights be taken or diminished by any judgment or decree without the opportunity to be heard in his own defense — a judgment entered without notice and hearing is void.

The right of arms is necessary where laws are deficient.

Jus armorum est necessarium ubi deficiunt leges.

Source: Common law maxim; cf. 2 Inst. 574

When the law fails to protect the citizen, the citizen retains the natural right to protect himself. The right of arms is the last safeguard of all other rights. (Latin not located in any public-domain source we hold; cited to 2 Inst. 574, which is not in the library.)

The laws permit the taking up of arms against the armed.

Arma in armatos sumere jura sinunt.

Source: 2 Inst. 574; Broom, Max. 26; Weisman, 9a

The right to bear arms includes the right to use them in defense against armed aggression — whether from private actors or tyrannical government.

Under the name of arms are included, not only shields and swords and helmets, but also clubs and stones.

Source: Co. Litt. 162; Weisman, 9b

(English-origin maxim.) The term "arms" is broadly defined to include any weapon, not merely firearms or bladed weapons — cite this to argue that the right to bear arms extends to all instruments of defense.

It is a liberty of free citizens to retain arms for their protection and according to their condition.

Source: People v. Horton, 264 N.Y.S. 84, 88; Weisman, 9c

(English-origin maxim.) Free citizens have a liberty to keep and bear arms suitable to their condition for their personal protection — this is a right of free status, not a government-granted privilege.

Arms used in the committing an offense include only that which is recognized as a dangerous weapon.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 9e

(English-origin maxim.) The term "arms" in the context of criminal offenses is limited to instruments recognized at common law as dangerous weapons — ordinary tools, household implements, or objects not inherently dangerous cannot be classified as "arms" merely because they were present during an offense, and any statute that expands this definition beyond its common law meaning encroaches upon the right of the People to keep and bear arms.

The people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state.

Source: Weisman, 9f

(English-origin maxim.) The people's right to bear arms exists for both personal defense and the defense of the state — this dual purpose cannot be legislatively reduced to only one or the other.

A person is a man considered in light of a certain status.

Persona est homo cum statu quodam consideratus.

Source: Bouvier, Law Dict. 147; Heineccius, Elem. Jur. Civ.; Weisman, 76h

The law does not deal with man in the abstract — it recognizes him through the lens of his legal standing, whether as citizen, infant, husband, guardian, or officer.

Status is the legal condition of a person.

Status est conditio legalis personae.

Source: Black's Law Dict. (2d) 1107; Dig. 1, 5, 1; Weisman, 76c

Legal status — such as infancy, outlawry, citizenship, or marriage — determines what acts a person may perform and what rights he may exercise. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

No one is bound to incapacitate himself.

Nemo tenetur seipsum inhabilitare.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 40; Weisman, 76i

The law will not require a man to destroy his own legal standing or strip himself of rights as a condition of exercising another right. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

One placed outside the law is civilly dead.

Extra legem positus est civiliter mortuus.

Source: Co. Litt. 130a; Wharton, Legal Maxims no. 172; Weisman, 36q

Outlawry — the deprivation of the protection of law — was the most severe civil penalty. It could not be imposed except by lawful judgment.

No one can claim another's status as his own merely because he wishes it.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 76k

(English-origin maxim.) Legal status — whether sui juris, citizen, officer, or any other recognized standing — is determined by law and fact, not by mere assertion or desire. Invoke this to challenge a party who claims an authority, privilege, or standing to which the law has not entitled him.

Names are changeable, but things remain the same.

Nomina sunt mutabilia, res autem immobiles.

Source: 6 Co. 66

A thing retains its identity regardless of the label placed upon it. Renaming a tax a "fee" does not change its nature.

The same thing, called by different names, does not change the difference between things.

Source: Cincinnati R.R. v. Kentucky, 115 U.S. 321, 337

(English-origin maxim.) Renaming a tax a "fee," or a penalty a "regulation," does not change its true nature — the law looks to the substance, not the label applied to it.

Identity of a thing means the sameness in all that constitutes the objective reality of a thing.

Source: State v. Evjue, 33 N.W.2d 305, 309; Weisman, 56c

(English-origin maxim.) To establish identity in law, one must show complete sameness in every material characteristic — a partial resemblance is insufficient where the question is whether two things are truly one and the same.

The nature of man is changeable; the law, however, is always the same.

Natura hominis est mutabilis; lex autem semper eadem.

Source: Branch, Princ.; cf. Co. Litt. 379b

Law is founded on fixed principles, not on the shifting inclinations of those who happen to hold power. The fickleness of human nature is precisely why law must be stable. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things Divine and human; the science of the just and the unjust.

Source: Dig. 1, 1, 10, 2; Inst. 1, 1, 1; Bract. 3; People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 290, 295; Weisman, 69g

(English-origin maxim.) True jurisprudence encompasses both divine and human law and demands the ability to distinguish the just from the unjust — invoke this definition to remind a tribunal that law is a moral science, not mere procedure.

It is necessary that given persons, lands and estates should be comprehended in a declaration of uses.

Source: 9 Coke, 9; Weisman, 69w

(English-origin maxim.) A declaration of uses must specify the persons, lands, and estates affected with particularity — a vague or general declaration that fails to identify the beneficiaries and the property is void for uncertainty.

Ignorance of one's own right does not prejudice the right.

Ignorantia juris sui non praejudicat juri.

Source: Lofft. 552; Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 130, 19 Am. Dec. 353; Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims no. 805; Weisman, 57j

A right exists whether or not the holder knows he possesses it. Ignorance of the right delays its exercise but does not destroy it.

It is ignorance when we do not know our own rights.

Juris ignorantia est cum jus nostrum ignoramus.

Source: Black's 2nd 1910; Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 130; Weisman, 57e

The most dangerous form of ignorance is not ignorance of the law in general, but ignorance of one's own particular rights — for a man who does not know his rights cannot defend them.

Intentions ought to be subordinate to the laws, not the laws to intentions.

Intentio inservire debet legibus, non leges intentioni.

Source: Co. Litt. 314a, 314b; Weisman, 66l

No man's private purpose can override the settled law. This applies with equal force to legislators who attempt to bend the law to their desired ends.

Right and obligation are correlative terms.

Source: Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 281; cf. Blackstone, 1 Comm. 123

(English-origin maxim.) Every right held by one person implies a corresponding duty in another to respect it. Where there is no duty, there is no right — and where there is a right, there must be a remedy for its violation.

It is safe not to obey him who has no right.

Jus non habenti tute non paretur.

Source: Hob. 146; Trayner, Latin Maxims (1883); Weisman, 34a

Obedience is owed only to lawful authority. An officer who commands without jurisdiction may be lawfully refused — and the refusal is not contempt but right. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.116.)

A neglected duty often injures as much as a duty wrongfully performed.

Source: Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 295; Weisman, 34h

(English-origin maxim.) The officer who fails to act when duty demands it is as liable as the officer who acts unlawfully. Maladministration includes both commission and omission.

That which concerns all ought to be borne by all.

Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus supportari debet.

Source: 2 Inst. 14; Bracton; Broom, Max. 745; Wingate, Max. 106; Weisman, 34e

Public burdens — taxes, defense, and civic obligation — must be shared equally. No class of persons may be singled out to bear a disproportionate weight.

He who betrays his country is like the insane sailor who bores a hole in the ship that carries him.

Qui molitur insidias in patriam id facit quod insanus nauta perforans navem in qua vehitur.

Source: 3 Inst. 36; Black's 2nd 1910; Weisman, 34f

The officer who undermines the very system of law that gives him authority destroys his own foundation. Treason against the constitution is self-destruction.

No one is bound to criminate himself.

Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare.

Source: Wing. Max. 486; Wharton

The privilege against self-incrimination is a natural right — no tribunal, officer, or proceeding may compel a man to furnish evidence against himself.

An office ought to be injurious to no one.

Officium nemini debet esse damnosum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 101; Bouvier, Max.

Public office is a trust, not a weapon — the power of office must never be turned against the officer's own constituents or used to harm those it was created to serve.

Husband and wife are regarded in law as one person.

Vir et uxor censentur in lege una persona.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 27; Co. Litt. 112; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 1065; Weisman, 79i

At common law, husband and wife form a legal unity — the acts, acquisitions, and obligations of one are attributable to both.

Marriages ought to be free.

Matrimonia debent esse libera.

Source: Halk. Max. 86; 2 Kent, Comm. 102; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 568; Weisman, 61l; Weisman, 79d

No external compulsion or unreasonable restraint should be placed upon the right to marry — it is a matter of free choice.

Consent, and not coition, constitutes marriage; and the parties are not able to consent before marriageable years.

Consensus non concubitus facit matrimonium; et consentire non possunt ante annos nubiles.

Source: 6 Co. 22; Jackson; Weisman, 79q

Consent is the foundation of marriage, and consent requires capacity — those below the age of lawful marriage cannot give it, rendering any purported union void.

A wife has no power of her own, but is under the government of her husband.

Uxor non est sui juris sed sub potestate viri.

Source: 3 Inst. 108; Jackson; Weisman, 79j

Under the common law doctrine of coverture, the wife's legal capacity was absorbed into her husband's — she could not sue, contract, or hold property independently during the marriage.

An assigner is clothed with the rights of his principal.

Source: Halk. Max. 14; Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed. 415; Wing. Max. 56; Weisman, 4i

(English-origin maxim.) An assignee steps into the shoes of his assignor and holds the same rights the assignor possessed — cite this to establish that an assignee may enforce every right the principal could have enforced.

Causes of dower, life, liberty, and revenue are among the things favored in law.

Causae dotis, vitae, libertatis, fisci, sunt inter favorabilia in lege.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 284; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 96

The law extends special solicitude to dower, life, and liberty — these causes receive every favorable presumption and every benefit of doubt.

It is unjust that freemen should not have the free disposal of their own property.

Injustum est, nisi tota lege inspecta, liberos homines non habere liberam potestatem rerum suarum.

Source: Co. Litt. 223a; 4 Kent, Comm. 131; Hob. 87; Weisman, 91e

A free man's control over his own property is a fundamental attribute of liberty — any restraint on disposal is a restraint on freedom itself.

The loss falls on the owner.

Res perit suo domino.

Source: Bell Dict. 857; Jackson; Weisman, 91ff

The risk of accidental loss or destruction of property lies with the owner — unless another has assumed that risk by contract or wrongful act.

No one should lose his property without his act or negligence.

Nemo debet rem suam sine facto aut defectu suo amittere.

Source: Co. Litt. 263; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 91s

Property is lost only by the owner's own doing or his own fault — never by the bare act of another or by operation of government without cause.

Rights of dominion are transferred without title or delivery, by prescription, to-wit, long and quiet possession.

Source: Co. Litt. 113; Weisman, 91y

(English-origin maxim.) Long and quiet possession, undisturbed by any adverse claim, transfers dominion without deed or delivery — time perfects title.

Every innovation disturbs more by its novelty than it benefits by its utility.

Omnis innovatio plus novitate perturbat quam utilitate prodest.

Source: 2 Co. 36; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874)

The law disfavors unnecessary change — established customs and settled property rights should not be lightly overturned for the sake of novelty.

Tenure is a compact contrary to the common nature of the fee, put into a contract.

Tenor est pactio contra communem feudi naturam ac rationem in contractu interposita.

Source: Wright, Ten. 21; Jackson

Tenure modifies the natural freedom of the fee by imposing conditions of service or obligation — it is an artificial arrangement that restricts what would otherwise be absolute ownership.

Rivers and ports are public, therefore the right of fishing there is common to all.

Flumina et portus publica sunt, ideoque jus piscandi omnibus commune est.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 86n

Navigable rivers and public ports belong to no private owner — the right to use them, including the right of fishing, is a common right of the People. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.77.)

An estate in free and pure allodium, and an estate in fee simple absolute, refer to essentially the same thing.

Source: 4 Kent, Comm. 2; Weisman, 70a

(English-origin maxim.) Allodial title and fee simple absolute describe the same thing: absolute ownership of land free from any superior lord or rent, the highest estate known to law.

What the original estate determines, the derivative estate determines also.

Source: 8 Coke, 34; Broom, Max. 495; Weisman, 70b

(English-origin maxim.) A derivative estate cannot outlast the estate from which it was carved — when the original grant expires or is defeated, every lesser estate carved out of it falls with it.

Whichever of two parties has the division of an estate, the choice of the shares is the other's.

Source: Co. Litt. 166b; Weisman, 70s

(English-origin maxim.) When one co-owner divides the estate, the other has the right to choose which share he will take — the power of partition and the power of election are separated to ensure fairness.

Buildings pass by a grant of the land.

Source: Fleta, lib. 3, c. 2, s. 12; Weisman, 70o

(English-origin maxim.) A conveyance of land includes all structures upon it — buildings are part of the realty and pass with the soil unless expressly excluded.

The law of God and the law of the land are one, and both preserve and favor the private rights to the land.

Lex Dei et lex terrae omnia una, et ambo conservant et praeferunt jura privata ad terram.

Source: Keilw. 191

The divine law and the common law unite in one purpose: the protection of every man's private right to his land and home. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

Every man's house is his safest refuge.

Domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium.

Source: 5 Co. 91b; 3 Inst. 162; Dig. 2.4.18; Broom, Max. 432; Weisman, 54d; Weisman, 54f

The law regards the home as the ultimate sanctuary — no power may breach it without the most urgent lawful necessity.

Nothing is more sacred, more inviolate, than the house of every citizen.

Nihil est magis sacrum, magis inviolatum, quam domus uniuscujusque civis.

Source: C.L.M.; Dig. 50.17.103; 5 Co. 91, 92; Weisman, 54c

The sanctity of the home is among the highest protections the law affords — even the winds of heaven may blow through it, but the government may not enter without warrant. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

A home is a social unit formed by a family living together in one dwelling.

Source: Anaya v. Foundation Res. Ins. Co., 414 P.2d 848, 849; Weisman, 54h

(English-origin maxim.) The home is defined not by walls but by the family within — a dwelling becomes a home when a family makes it the seat of their common life.

A man shall not be punished for suing out writs in the king’s court, whether he be right or wrong.

Home ne serra puny pur suer des briefes en court le roy, soit il a droit ou a tort.

Source: 2 Inst. 228; Jackson

The right of access to the courts is fundamental — no man may be penalized for seeking judicial remedy, even if his cause ultimately fails.

Residence creates domicile.

Source: Arnold v. United Ins. Co., 1 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 363, 366; Weisman, 54a

(English-origin maxim.) The fact of dwelling in a place establishes legal domicile — actual residence, not mere intent, creates the jurisdictional tie between a person and a locality.

The law favors public commerce.

Lex favet commercium publicum.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 738, max. 198; Weisman, 13k

Free exchange among men is favored by the law — restrictions on trade are disfavored and narrowly construed. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

No one is bound to sell his property, even for a just price.

Nemo cogitur rem suam vendere, etiam justo pretio.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

The right of property includes the absolute right to refuse to sell — no compulsion, not even the offer of fair value, can force a man to part with what is his. (Duplicate maxim — see also 3.4.7.)

A greater inheritance comes to every one of us from right and the laws than from parents.

Major haereditas venit unicuique nostrum a jure et legibus quam a parentibus.

Source: 2 Inst. 56; Weisman, 58kk

The rights and liberties secured by law are a greater patrimony than any estate of land or goods — every man inherits the common law itself.

A person dies intestate who either has made no testament at all or has made one not legally valid; or if the testament he has made be revoked, or made useless; or if no one becomes heir under it.

Source: Inst. 3, 1, pr; Dig. 38, 16, 1; Dig. 50, 16, 64; Weisman, 103k

(English-origin maxim.) A person dies intestate if he made no will, made an invalid will, had his will revoked, or if no one qualifies as heir under its terms — any of these failures triggers the rules of intestate succession.

Consent makes the law.

Consensus facit legem.

Source: Branch, Princ.; BL4 "Consent"; Weisman, 21b

No law, contract, or obligation binds a man without his consent — the foundation of every lawful agreement.

He who can exercise his will has the right to refuse to consent.

Ejus est nolle qui potest velle.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 3; Taylor, Civil Law; Black's 2nd 1910

The power to consent necessarily includes the power to withhold consent — no man can be compelled to agree, and any purported consent obtained through coercion, deception, or duress is void. Cite this to challenge government programs or corporate terms that treat silence or participation as consent when no genuine choice was offered.

Those who act and those who consent to the act are visited with equal punishment.

Agentes et consentientes pari poena plectentur.

Source: 5 Co. 80; Jackson 43

An officer who consents to a trespass on the rights of the People is equally liable with the officer who executes it.

Public right cannot be diminished by private agreements.

Pactis privatorum juri publico derogari non potest.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 45, 1; 7 Co. 23; Broom, Max. 695; Wing. Max. 201

No contract between private parties — or between private parties and government officers — can take away rights belonging to the People at large.

Private contracts cannot derogate from public right.

Conventio privatorum non potest publico juri derogare.

Source: Wing. Max. 201; 7 Co. 23; Co. Litt. 166a; Dig. 50, 17, 45, 1; Broom, Max. 695; Jackson 149; Weisman, 24i

This is the master rule of contract law in the constitutional order. No contract — whether between private parties or between a citizen and the government — can bargain away the rights of the People. Government cannot contract away the constitution.

An unjust condition ought not to be imposed upon one by another.

Non debet alteri per alterum iniqua conditio inferri.

Source: D. 50, 17, 74; Jackson; Weisman, 61s

No man has the right to impose inequitable terms upon another — conditions that are inherently unjust are void, whether imposed by private party or government officer.

A privilege is a personal benefit and dies with the person.

Privilegium est beneficium personale, et moritur cum persona.

Source: 3 Bulstr. 8; Weisman, 12a

Unlike rights, which are inherent and perpetual, privileges are grants that attach to the individual — they do not pass to heirs or successors.

A benefit is not conferred upon one who is unwilling to receive it.

Invito beneficium non datur.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 69; Broom, Max. 699n; Weisman, 12b

No man can be compelled to accept a benefit against his will — and acceptance of an unrequested benefit cannot be used to impose conditions retroactively.

A privilege avails not against the commonwealth.

Privilegium non valet contra rempublicam.

Source: Bacon, Max. 25; Broom, Max. 17; Noy Max. 34; Weisman, 12c

No private privilege can override the public interest — the rights of the People as a body always prevail over grants to individuals.

Every man has liberty to renounce those privileges which have been conferred for his benefit.

Cuilibet licet renuntiare juri pro se introducto.

Source: Code 1, 3, 51; Code 2, 3, 29

A man may freely waive a personal privilege — but he cannot waive a right that belongs to the People, because it is not his alone to surrender.

He who receives the benefit should also bear the burden.

Qui sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus.

Source: 1 Co. 99; Broom, Max. 706-713; 1 Kames, Eq. 289; 1 Story, Const. 78

Benefit and burden are inseparable — a government that claims the benefit of authority must also bear the burden of its fiduciary duties.

He who bears the burden should also enjoy the benefit.

Qui sentit onus, sentire debet et commodum.

Source: 1 Co. 99a; Broom, Max. 638; Weisman, 12g

The People who bear the burden of taxation, obedience, and civic duty are entitled to the benefit of protection and liberty — the equation must balance.

A privilege is, as it were, a private law.

Privilegium est quasi privata lex.

Source: 2 Bulstr. 189; Weisman, 12h

Privileges create exceptions to general law for specific persons — and because they are exceptions, they are to be construed strictly, never expanded beyond their terms.

He who uses his own right injures no one.

Qui jure suo utitur nemini facit injuriam.

Source: Broom, Max. 379; Jackson

A man exercising a right that belongs to him by nature or by law does no legal injury to another — cite this to defend against claims that the lawful exercise of a recognized right (property, speech, arms, travel) constitutes harm to a third party.

He justly loses the benefit of the law who purposes to overturn the law itself.

Merito beneficium legis amittit, qui legem ipsam subvertere intendit.

Source: 2 Inst. 58; Jackson

One who seeks to destroy the legal order forfeits its protections — the law does not shield those who would undermine the very system that grants them standing.

Private good yields to public.

Privatum commodum publico cedit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 223; Jackson

Under the monarchy, private advantage yielded to the Crown's public interest without limit. In the American system, this principle still applies — but it is bounded by the reserved rights of the People. No claim of public necessity can override a constitutionally secured right, and the government bears the burden of proving genuine public necessity rather than mere administrative convenience.

He who does not disapprove when he can, approves.

Qui non reprobat, approbat.

Source: 3 Inst. 27; Weisman, 21q

Silence in the face of a known wrong, where one has the power and duty to object, operates as ratification — the People's silence on constitutional violations confirms them. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

Confirmation is null where the preceding gift is invalid.

Confirmatio est nulla ubi donum praecedens est invalidum.

Source: Co. Litt. 295; Moore 764; Jackson 127; Weisman, 20h

A void act cannot be made valid by subsequent ratification — if the original grant was beyond the power of the grantor, no amount of confirmation can cure it.

A clause which excludes the power of abrogation is void from the beginning.

Clausula quae abrogationem excludit ab initio non valet.

Source: Broom, Max. 27; Bacon, Max. reg. 19; Jackson 111

No law or contract can make itself perpetual and irrevocable — the People always retain the sovereign power to alter or abolish what they have created. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.3.1.)

Whose it is to institute, his it is also to abrogate.

Cujus est instituere, ejus est abrogare.

Source: Broom, Max. 785; Wing. Max.; Weisman, 7k; Weisman, 77e

The power to create includes the power to destroy. The People who established the constitution and government retain the exclusive power to alter or abolish both — no creature of the constitution can claim that power for itself.

To derogate from a law is to take away part of it; to abrogate a law is to abolish it entirely.

Derogatur legi, cum pars detrahitur; abrogatur legi, cum prorsus tollitur.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 102; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 91; Weisman, 7h

The distinction matters: partial repeal preserves the remainder; total abrogation eliminates the whole — government officers who exceed their authority abrogate the trust that created their office.

All have liberty to renounce those things which have been established in their favor.

Omnes licentiam habere renuntiare his quae pro se introducta sunt.

Source: Code 2, 3, 29; Broom, Max. 625; Weisman, 7i

A man may renounce a personal privilege — but this maxim does not extend to the renunciation of inalienable rights, which are not his alone to surrender.

That which is null produces no effect.

Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 519; Weisman, 7j; Weisman, 14q

A void act is as though it never occurred — it needs no revocation because it never had force. Ultra vires contracts, unconstitutional statutes, and acts without authority fall under this maxim.

The cause being removed, the effect ceases.

Sublata causa tollitur effectus.

Source: 2 Bl. Comm. 203; Broom, Max. 160

When the foundation of an obligation is destroyed — by repeal, by breach, by withdrawal of consent — the obligation itself falls. No effect survives its cause.

Laws may be abrogated by the same authority by which they are made.

Leges eodem modo abrogari possunt quo constituuntur.

Source: Broom, Max. 785; Weisman, 7e

What the legislature enacted, the legislature may repeal. What the People established by constitution, only the People may alter — no lesser authority suffices. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

An amendment [to the original instrument] is not a repeal. [Fundamental principles are not annulled by amendment.].

Source: Mass. Bond & Ins. Co. v. U.S., 352 U.S. 128, 139; Weisman, 7l

(English-origin maxim.) An amendment modifies but does not repeal — the fundamental principles of the original instrument survive amendment unless expressly abrogated.

Implied repeals are not favored in Law.

Source: United States v. Noce, 268 U.S. 613, 619; Weisman, 7m

(English-origin maxim.) The law disfavors implied repeals — a later statute is not presumed to repeal an earlier one unless the two are irreconcilably in conflict, and every effort is made to harmonize them.

The crime of treason exceeds all other crimes as to its punishment.

Crimen laesae majestatis omnia alia crimina excedit quoad poenam.

Source: 3 Inst. 210; Weisman, 26c

Treason — the betrayal of sovereign trust — stands apart from all other offenses in severity, because it strikes at the foundation of the entire legal order.

No crime is greater than disobedience.

Nullum crimen majus est inobedientia.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 77; Jackson

Disobedience to lawful authority strikes at the foundation of order itself — every other crime is a particular wrong, but disobedience is a rejection of the rule of law as such.

He who betrays his country is like the insane sailor who bores a hole in the ship which carries him.

Qui molitur insidias in patriam, id facit quod insanus nauta perforans navem in qua vehitur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 36

Treason is self-destructive folly — the traitor undermines the very order upon which his own safety depends. (Duplicate maxim — see also 3.7.8.)

Capital crimes are punished by death.

Source: Walker v. State, 13 S.W. 860; Weisman, 26v

(English-origin maxim.) The defining characteristic of a capital crime is that it carries the death penalty — no lesser punishment qualifies an offense as capital.

That which is bad in its beginning does not improve by lapse of time.

Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescet.

Source: Broom, Max. 178; 4 Coke, 2

An act founded in corruption cannot ripen into legitimacy merely because no one challenged it promptly — illegality at the root is permanent.

The corruption of the best is the worst.

Corruptio optimi pessima.

Source: Black's, 2d. 277; Weisman, 25d

When those entrusted with the highest offices and duties become corrupt, the resulting injury to the public trust is the most severe.

A poisonous gloss is one which corrupts the substance of the text.

Glossa viperina est quae corrodit viscera textus.

Source: 11 Co. 34; Black's 2nd 1910; Weisman, 25c

An interpretation that twists a law's plain meaning to serve corrupt purposes destroys the law itself — the corruption of the text is worse than ignoring it entirely.

Corruption is always the forerunner of despotism.

Source: Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U.S. 108, 111-12; Weisman, 25f

(English-origin maxim.) Where public officers engage in corrupt practices, tyranny inevitably follows — corruption in government is not an isolated vice but the gateway to the loss of all liberty.

Abuse does not take away use.

Abusus non tollit usum.

Source: Dav. Ir. K.B. 79

The fact that a right or power has been abused does not justify abolishing it — the remedy for abuse is correction, not extinction. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

An evil custom is to be abolished.

Malus usus abolendus est.

Source: Co. Litt. 141; Weisman, 78h

No custom or practice, however long-standing, can survive once shown to be contrary to right — duration does not convert wrong into right.

Extortion is a crime when, under color of office, one takes what is not due, or more than is due, or before the time when it is due.

Extortio est crimen quando quis colore officii extorquet quod non est debitum, vel supra debitum, vel ante tempus quod est debitum.

Source: 10 Coke, 102; Weisman, 26q

A public officer who uses his position to exact anything beyond what is lawfully owed commits the specific crime of extortion — color of office magnifies, not excuses, the wrong.

It is not the rigor but the inexpediency of laws and acts of authority which make them tyrannical.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 25a

(English-origin maxim.) A law does not become tyrannical merely because it is strict; tyranny arises when law serves no just purpose or exceeds the scope of the authority delegated by the People. Legislation that bears no rational connection to the security of natural rights is an act of arbitrary power, not of lawful governance.

He who does not repel an injury when he can, invites it.

Qui non repellit injuriam quando potest, inducit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 271; Weisman, 59f

A man who has the power to resist a wrong and does nothing makes himself partly responsible for the harm that follows — rights must be defended or they will be lost. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

The act of law does injury to no one.

Actus legis nemini facit injuriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 287; 5 Coke, 116; 2 Bl. Comm. 123

The lawful operation of established legal process is not an injury, even when it produces an adverse result — but this protection extends only to acts truly authorized by law. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.1, 1.5.280.)

No one can change his purpose to the injury of another.

Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam.

Source: D. 50, 17, 75; Jackson; Weisman, 59i

A man may not reverse his course of action when doing so would injure another who has relied upon his original undertaking — change of mind does not excuse the harm it causes.

What right is, and in what consists injury, is the business of the law to declare.

Quid sit jus et in quo consistit injuria, legis est definire.

Source: Co. Litt. 158; Jackson; Weisman, 59t

The definition of rights and wrongs belongs to the law, not to private opinion — no man may unilaterally declare what constitutes his right or another's injury.

To commit and not prohibit, when in your power, is the same thing; and he who does not, when he can prohibit, is in fault.

Idem est facere et non prohibere cum possis; et qui non prohibet cum prohibere possit in culpa est.

Source: 3 Inst. 158; Jackson; Weisman, 44n

He who has the power to prevent a wrong and fails to act is as culpable as the one who commits it — the duty to prevent evil is as binding as the duty not to commit it.

It is not lawful to do evil that good may come of it.

Non licet ex malo bonum facere.

Source: 11 Coke, 74a; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 378; Weisman, 78n

No desired outcome, however beneficial, can justify the use of unlawful means to achieve it — the end never justifies the means. (Latin not located in any public-domain source we hold; cited to 11 Coke, 74a, which is not in the library.)

The more common the evil, the worse.

Malum quo communius eo pejus.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Weisman, 78d

A wrong that spreads widely through society is more dangerous than an isolated offense, because it corrupts the general order and threatens the peace of all.

Force, fraud, and wrong are the greatest enemies of peace.

Vis, fraus, et injuria, maximi sunt hostes pacis.

Source: Co. Litt. 161

The three great destroyers of civil order are violence, deceit, and injustice — the law's first object is to suppress all three. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

The act of law does wrong to no one.

Actus legis nulli facit injuriam.

Source: 5 Coke, 116; 2 Bl. Comm. 123; Weisman, 105q

Where the law itself operates, the resulting consequence is deemed just — but this maxim protects only acts truly authorized by law, not acts merely performed under its color.

Whatever is done in excess is prohibited by law.

Quicquid in excessu actum est, lege prohibetur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Co. Inst. 107; Weisman, 41b

The law sets bounds to every right and every power; action that exceeds those bounds is itself a wrong, regardless of whether the underlying authority was legitimate. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.5.1.)

Although a thing may not be bad in itself, yet, if it is of bad example, it is not to be done.

Source: 2 Inst. 564; Weisman, 105p

(English-origin maxim.) Even lawful acts should be avoided when they set a dangerous precedent — the law considers not only the immediate effect but the example set for others.

No one should be punished twice for the same offense.

Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.

Source: 4 Coke, 43; 11 Coke, 59b; Jackson, No. 632; Weisman, 77a; Weisman, 92e

Double punishment for a single wrong is itself a wrong — once a man has answered for his crime by the sentence of a competent tribunal, that matter is concluded forever.

No one is punished for the crime of another.

Nemo punitur pro alieno delicto.

Source: Wing. Max. 336; Weisman, 92hh

Criminal responsibility is individual — no man can be made to suffer punishment for wrongs committed by another without his knowledge, direction, or participation.

No one is punished unless for some wrong, act, or default.

Nemo punitur sine injuria, facto, seu defalta.

Source: 2 Inst. 287; Weisman, 92n

Punishment presupposes an offense actually committed — the law cannot punish status, condition, or mere association without a wrongful act or culpable omission.

No one suffers punishment for his thoughts.

Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur.

Source: Dig. 48, 19, 18; Broom, Max. 279; Weisman, 92i

The law punishes acts, not ideas — a man's innermost thoughts, however wicked, are beyond the reach of earthly tribunals until they manifest in conduct.

It concerns the state that crimes do not remain unpunished.

Interest reipublicae ne maleficia remaneant impunita.

Source: Jenk. Cent. pp. 30-31, case 59; Wing. Max. 501; Weisman, 92z

The public has an interest in the enforcement of criminal law that transcends the private interest of the victim — unpunished crime undermines the order upon which all rights depend.

Punishment ought not to precede the crime.

Poena non debet antecedere crimen.

Source: Halk. Max. 126; Weisman, 92cc

No person may be subjected to punitive measures in anticipation of wrongdoing — the law punishes what has been done, never what might be done. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

The estimation of a crime committed never increases from a subsequent fact.

Aestimatio praeteriti delicti ex postremo facto nunquam crescit.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Bac. Max. Reg. 8

A past offense cannot be retroactively aggravated by later events — the gravity of a crime is fixed at the time of its commission.

He who spares the guilty punishes the innocent.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 133; Weisman, 92q

(English-origin maxim.) Failure to punish the guilty is itself an injury to the innocent — when wrongdoers go unpunished, their future victims bear the cost of the law's leniency.

Remedies are the life of rights.

Source: Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 631; Weisman, 94w

(English-origin maxim.) A right that cannot be enforced is a dead letter — the vitality of every right depends on the availability and efficacy of its remedy.

Take away the remedy and you take away the right.

Source: Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 270, 303

(English-origin maxim.) Any legislative or administrative action that eliminates the means of enforcing a constitutional right effectively destroys the right — the remedy and the right are inseparable.

Resist beginnings; the remedy comes too late when the evil has gathered strength through long delay.

Principiis obsta; sero medicina paratur cum mala per longas convaluere moras.

Source: 2 Inst. 299; Ovid, Remedia Amoris, 91

Prevention is superior to cure — a wrong resisted at its inception is far easier to overcome than one allowed to entrench itself through indifference or delay.

Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies.

Source: Schechter v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528; Weisman, 94x

(English-origin maxim.) Where ordinary remedies are inadequate to meet an extraordinary situation, the court may fashion extraordinary relief — unusual circumstances justify unusual measures.

No man ought to be a judge in his own cause.

Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa.

Source: 12 Co. 13; Branch, Princ.; Broom, Max. 117; Weisman, 63d

A judge who has a personal interest in the matter before him is disqualified — any judgment rendered under such a conflict is void for want of impartiality.

It is the duty of a judge to declare the law, not to make it.

Judicis est jus dicere, non dare.

Source: Lofft 42; Tray. Leg. Max. 283; Weisman, 63y

Legislation belongs to the legislature; the judicial office is to interpret and apply existing law, never to invent new law from the bench.

A judge who exceeds his office is not to be obeyed.

Judex qui excedit officium suum non obeditur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 139, case 84; Weisman, 63z

Obedience to judicial authority depends on the judge acting within the bounds of his lawful commission — beyond those bounds, his commands carry no force of law. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

That law is best which leaves least to the discretion of the judge; that judge is best who leaves least to his own will.

Optima est lex quae minimum relinquit arbitrio judicis; optimus judex qui minimum sibi.

Source: Bacon, Aph. 8, 46; Broom, Max. 84; 1 Kent, Comm. 478; Weisman, 63q

Arbitrary discretion is the enemy of liberty — the more a judge's decision is bound by fixed principles of law, the safer the rights of the people.

A good judge should do nothing from his own judgment or from private inclination, but should pronounce according to law and justice.

Judex bonus nihil ex arbitrio suo faciat, nec propositione domesticae voluntatis, sed juxta leges et jura pronunciet.

Source: 7 Co. 27; Weisman, 63f

Personal opinion has no place on the bench — the judge's duty is to declare the law, not to impose his will.

The Court of Parliament is governed by its own peculiar laws.

Curia Parliamenti suis propriis legibus subsistit.

Source: 4 Inst. 50; Jackson

Legislative bodies operate under their own rules of procedure, distinct from the rules governing ordinary courts — each branch maintains its own internal governance.

No one ought to be his own judge, or the tribunal in his own affairs.

Nemo sibi esse judex vel suis jus dicere debet.

Source: Jackson

Self-judgment is inherently partial — no man can be trusted to adjudicate his own cause impartially, which is why all disputes require an independent tribunal.

It belongs not to the secular Judge to take cognisance of things which are merely spiritual.

Non pertinet ad judicem secularem cognoscere de iis quae sunt mere spiritualia annexa.

Source: 2 Inst. 488; Jackson

Civil courts have no jurisdiction over purely spiritual matters — the temporal and spiritual jurisdictions are separate, and each must respect the bounds of the other.

Judicial offices ought not to be granted before they are vacant.

Officia judicialia non concedantur antequam vacent.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 11 Co. 4

Granting a judicial office before it falls vacant creates a successor-in-waiting with perverse incentives and undermines the independence of the sitting officer.

A judge's order is an order made by a judge at chambers, or out of court.

Source: Black's, 664; Weisman, 63b

(English-origin maxim.) A judge's order made in chambers or outside open court carries the same judicial authority as one made in formal session, so long as it is within the judge's jurisdiction.

Jurors are the judges of fact.

Juratores sunt judices facti.

Source: State of Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 Dall. 1, 4 (1794); Co. Litt. 155b; Weisman, 67b

No judge, however learned, may substitute his opinion of the facts for that of the jury — the jury is the sole and sovereign tribunal on all questions of fact.

Jurors ought to be neighbors, of sufficient estate, and above all suspicion.

Juratores debent esse vicini, sufficientis status, et ab omni suspicione majores.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 141; Weisman, 67a

The jury must be drawn from the community where the dispute arose — strangers without local knowledge and persons of doubtful character undermine the very purpose of trial by peers.

The laws of war are especially to be preserved in the State.

In republica maxime conservanda sunt jura belli.

Source: 2 Inst. 58; Jackson

Even in wartime, the rules of law must be observed — the state's emergency powers do not extinguish the obligation to conduct warfare according to established legal principles.

Ecclesiastical laws are limited within separate bounds.

Jura ecclesiastica limitata sunt infra limites separatos.

Source: 3 Buls. 53; Jackson

Church law operates within its own defined sphere and may not extend beyond those bounds into the temporal jurisdiction of the civil courts.

Public rights are to be preferred to private.

Jura publica anteferenda privatis.

Source: Co. Litt. 130; Jackson

Where a private claim conflicts with a recognized public right — such as navigation on public waters, passage on public highways, or access to common lands — the public right prevails. This maxim does not authorize government to override individual natural rights in the name of collective benefit.

The special rights of the king are not yielded by general words.

Jura regis specialia non conceduntur per generalia verba.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 103; Jackson

The sovereign's prerogative rights cannot be surrendered or waived by general language — any alienation of royal authority requires explicit and specific terms.

There can be no valid trial jury of less than 12 men, and a consent even by the defendant to a trial by a less number is absolutely void.

Source: Hunt v. State, 61 Miss. 577, 580, 581; Weisman, 67g

(English-origin maxim.) The common law right to trial by jury means a jury of twelve — a trial by fewer than twelve is void, and no party's consent can validate what the law prohibits.

Justice ought to be free, because nothing is more iniquitous than venal justice; full, because justice ought not to halt; and speedy, because delay is a kind of denial.

Justitia debet esse libera, quia nihil iniquius venali justitia; plena, quia justitia non debet claudicare; et celeris, quia dilatio est quaedam negatio.

Source: 2 Inst. 56; Weisman, 68e

The three pillars of justice — accessibility, completeness, and speed — must all be present; the absence of any one corrupts the whole.

Favor ought not to bend justice, power ought not to break it, nor money to corrupt it.

Favor non debet flectere justitiam, potestas non frangere, pecunia non corrumpere.

Source: Cicero, Fragmenta de Republica; Halk. Max.; Weisman, 68k

The three mortal enemies of justice are influence, force, and bribery — any court susceptible to any of these has ceased to be a court. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

Justice strengthens the throne.

Justitia firmatur solium.

Source: 3 Inst. 140; Jackson

The authority of government is sustained by the just administration of law — a ruler who dispenses justice secures his own legitimacy, while injustice undermines it.

Justice is prior to liberty.

Source: Halk. Max. 77; Weisman, 68r

(English-origin maxim.) Justice must be established before liberty can be enjoyed — without a just legal order, liberty degenerates into license and chaos.

The order of things is thrown into confusion if each person does not preserve his own jurisdiction.

Rerum ordo confunditur si unicuique jurisdictio non servetur.

Source: 4 Inst. Proem.

When courts overstep their jurisdictional boundaries — or fail to exercise the jurisdiction properly vested in them — the entire system of ordered justice breaks down. (Duplicate maxim — see also 2.6.5.)

No one is bound to accuse himself.

Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare.

Source: Wing. Max. 486; 1 Bl. Comm. 443; Weisman, 49c; Weisman, 75r; Weisman, 77l

The privilege against self-incrimination is not a modern statutory creation but an ancient common law maxim — no man may be compelled to furnish evidence against himself. (Duplicate maxim — see also 3.7.10.)

A prison ought to be used for the keeping of men, not for their punishment.

Carcer ad homines custodiendos, non ad puniendos, dari debet.

Source: Co. Litt. 260

Imprisonment before conviction is custody, not punishment — the gaol holds the accused for trial, not to inflict suffering. Any pretrial condition that punishes before judgment perverts the purpose of confinement.

The judge is counsel for the prisoner.

Judex est consiliarius rei.

Source: Weisman, 65x

In criminal proceedings, the judge has a duty to protect the rights of the accused — particularly an unrepresented defendant — by ensuring that the trial is conducted fairly and that the prisoner understands the proceedings against him. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

No man can be at once suitor and judge.

Nemo potest esse simul actor et judex.

Source: Broom, Max. 117; Weisman, 99f

The integrity of the judicial process depends on the absolute separation of the roles of advocate and adjudicator.

No man ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause.

Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.

Source: 5 Co. 61; Broom, Max. 327; Dig. 50, 17, 57

The prohibition against double jeopardy and duplicative litigation is fundamental — once a matter has been properly determined, it may not be relitigated between the same parties.

A traitor is punished that one and not all may perish.

Reus laesae majestatis punitur, ut pereat unus ne pereant omnes.

Source: 4 Co. 124; Jackson

The severe punishment of treason serves the public good — the destruction of one who betrays the commonwealth preserves the safety of all its members.

Whatever is offered by the defendant as sufficient to defeat the cause of action stated in the plaintiffs declaration, either by way of denial, justification, or confession, is a plea.

Source: Jewett Car Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 107 Fed. 622, 624; Weisman, 87j

(English-origin maxim.) Any matter the defendant raises to defeat the plaintiff's claim — whether denial, justification, or confession and avoidance — constitutes a plea and must conform to the rules of pleading.

A judgment is, as it were, a declaration of law.

Judicium est quasi juris dictum.

Source: Co. Litt. 39a, 168a; 2 Inst. 537; Weisman, 64aa

Every judgment carries the force of law for the parties — it is not merely the judge's opinion but the law's own pronouncement applied to the facts found.

A thing adjudged makes white black, black white, crooked straight, and straight crooked.

Res judicata facit ex albo nigrum, ex nigro album, ex curvo rectum, ex recto curvum.

Source: 1 Bouv. Inst. no. 840; Weisman, 64z

The power of final judgment is absolute — however unjust the result may appear, once finally determined it becomes the legal truth and alters all rights accordingly.

Judgment in error is a judgment rendered by a court of error on a record sent up from an inferior court.

Source: Black's, 666; Weisman, 64r

(English-origin maxim.) A judgment in error is the decision of an appellate court reviewing the record of a lower court for legal mistakes — it is the mechanism by which errors of law are corrected.

Not only what is lawful, but what is fitting, must be considered; because nothing that is unfitting is lawful.

Non solum quid liceat, sed quid sit conveniens est considerandum; quia nihil quod est inconveniens est licitum.

Source: Co. Litt. 66a

In the execution of law, the manner matters as much as the authority — lawful power exercised in an oppressive or unreasonable fashion ceases to be lawful.

Things accepted on account of necessity ought not to be drawn into precedent.

Quae propter necessitatem recepta sunt, non debent in argumentum trahi.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 162; Weisman, 83k; Weisman, 88g

Emergency measures are exceptions, not rules — what the law tolerates under extraordinary circumstances must not become the standard for ordinary times.

Proofs ought to be evident — that is, clear and easily understood.

Probationes debent esse evidentes, id est, perspicuae et faciles intellectu.

Source: Co. Litt. 283; Weisman, 39r

Evidence must be presented plainly and intelligibly; obscure or convoluted proofs fail to satisfy the standard the law requires.

A witness is a person who is present at and observes a transaction.

Source: State v. Desforges, 47 La. Ann. 1167, 17 So. 811; McDonald v. Robertson, 104 F.2d 945, 948; Weisman, 39ee

(English-origin maxim.) A witness is one who was present and perceived the transaction firsthand; this definition excludes those who merely heard about the event or arrived after the fact.

The rules of evidence are of great importance, and cannot be departed without endangering private as well as public rights.

Source: Nicholls v. Webb, 8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 326, 332; Weisman, 39hh

(English-origin maxim.) The rules of evidence safeguard both private rights and public order; courts must not relax evidentiary standards for convenience, as doing so endangers the rights of all parties.

There is no stronger bond between men than an oath.

Nullum vinculum majus inter homines quam jusjurandum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. Cas. 126, case 54; Weisman, 84a

The oath is the highest form of human undertaking; its binding force exceeds that of any contract or promise because it appeals to conscience and to God.

All things are presumed to have been done rightly and in due form.

Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta.

Source: Co. Litt. 232b; Broom, Max. 847; Best, Ev. §300; Weisman, 89f

Until contrary proof is adduced, the law presumes that official acts were performed lawfully and that regular procedures were followed.

All things are presumed in favor of life, liberty, and innocence.

In favorem vitae, libertatis, et innocentiae omnia praesumuntur.

Source: Lofft, 125; Jackson, No. 379

When facts are doubtful, every presumption is made in favor of the accused and against forfeiture of life or liberty — the law will not presume guilt.

Contemporaneous exposition is the best and most powerful in law.

Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege.

Source: 2 Inst. 11; 3 Co. 7; 10 Co. 70; Broom, Max. 682; Weisman, 22z

A statute or instrument is best explained by the construction placed upon it by those who lived when it was made; later reinterpretation is suspect.

Lawful commands receive a strict interpretation, but unlawful ones a wide and broad construction.

Mandata licita recipiunt strictam interpretationem, sed illicita latam et extensam.

Source: Bacon's Max. Reg. 16; Bouvier

A lawful order is confined to its strict terms so that authority is not exceeded; an unlawful order is read broadly so that any illegality within it may be fully exposed and defeated.

It is a wretched state of things when the law is vague or uncertain.

Misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut incertum.

Source: 2 Salk. 512; Weisman, 6d; Weisman, 15i

Vague law is no law at all; it subjects the People to the arbitrary will of whoever interprets it, rather than to a fixed and knowable rule. (Duplicate maxim — see also 2.3.7.)

What is generally granted carries this exception: if it be not contrary to law and right.

Quod generaliter conceditur inest haec exceptio, si non aliquid sit contra jus fasque.

Source: Wing. Max.; 10 Co. 78

Every general grant is subject to an implied limitation: it cannot authorize what the law forbids; no general language, however broad, may be read to sanction illegality.

Fiction is a poor ground for changing substantial rights.

Fictio est pauperum fundamentum ad mutanda jura substantialia.

Source: Bacon, Max.; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 45h

No fiction may be used to alter vested rights; it is a procedural convenience, not a substantive power, and may never serve as the basis for taking from one to give to another. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

An act of a judge which does not pertain to his office is of no force.

Factum a judice quod ad ejus officium non spectat, non ratum est.

Source: 10 Co. 76; Dig. 50, 17, 170

A judicial act performed beyond the judge's jurisdiction is a nullity — it binds no one and conveys no authority. (Duplicate maxim — see also 8.1.41.)

In things that are favorable to the spirit, though injurious to things, an extension of a statute should sometimes be made.

In rebus quae sunt favorabilia animae, quamvis sunt damnosa rebus, fiat aliquando extensio statuti.

Source: 10 Co. 101; Jackson

Statutes may be extended beyond their strict letter when the soul's welfare is at stake, even at the cost of temporal property — the law favors the spiritual over the material.

The king is not bound by any statute if he be not expressly named therein.

Roy n'est lie per ascun statute si il ne soit expressement nosme.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 307; Wharton

The sovereign is not presumed to be included in the operation of a statute unless the statute expressly names him — a principle of construction, not of immunity.

Environment illuminates the meaning of acts, as context does that of words.

Source: Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 33; Weisman, 2g

(English-origin maxim.) The circumstances surrounding an act — its time, place, and setting — are essential to determining its legal character, just as context gives meaning to language.

Public and private law is that which is collected from natural principles, either of nations or in states; and what in written law is called *jus*, by the law of England is said to be right.

Jus publicum et privatum est quod ex naturalibus praeceptis, aut gentium, aut civilibus est collectum; et quod in jure scripto jus appellatur, id in lege Angliae rectum esse dicitur.

Source: Co. Litt. 158; Jackson

All law — public and private — derives from natural principles; the English common law term "right" corresponds to the civil law term *jus*, both rooted in the law of nature.

A clause in a law which precludes its own repeal is void from the beginning.

Clausula quae abrogationem excludit ab initio non valet.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 19; Broom, Max. (3d Lond. ed.) 27; Weisman, 16b

No legislature can bind its successors — a statute that declares itself unrepealable attempts to exceed the legislative power and is a nullity. (Duplicate maxim — see also 6.8.3.)

A proviso is to provide for the present and future, not the past.

Provisio est providere praesentia et futura, non praeterita.

Source: 2 Co. 72; Broom, Max. (3d Lond. ed.) 275; Weisman, 16e

A proviso in an instrument operates prospectively — it cannot retroactively alter obligations already performed or rights already vested.

The clause, "Of our special grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion," is of no avail where it may be presumed that the prince was ignorant.

De gratia speciali, certa scientia, et mero motu; talis clausula non valet in his in quibus praesumitur principem esse ignorantem.

Source: 1 Co. Rep. 53; Jackson

A royal grant claiming to be made from the sovereign’s personal knowledge is void if the facts show the sovereign could not have known the circumstances — the recital does not cure the ignorance.

A derogatory clause does not prevent things from being dissolved by the same power which created them.

Non impedit clausula derogatoria quo minus ab eadem potestate res dissolvantur a qua constituuntur.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 19; Jackson

No clause can bind the power that created it; the same authority that establishes a law or instrument may unmake it, regardless of any self-protecting language.

It is an everlasting law that no positive and human law shall be perpetual, and a clause which excludes abrogation is void from its commencement.

Perpetua lex est, nullam legem humanam ac positivam perpetuam esse, et clausula quae abrogationem excludit, ab initio non valet.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 19; Wharton

No human law can make itself eternal; a statute purporting to prevent its own future repeal exceeds the legislative power and is void ab initio.

An argument from the greater to the less does not hold in the negative; conversely it does.

Argumentum a majori ad minus negativum non valet; converso valet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 281; Weisman, 8b

That a greater power is denied does not prove a lesser one is also denied; but that a greater power is granted proves the lesser is included.

No argument can be drawn against the use of a thing from its abuse.

Ab abusu ad usum non valet consequentia.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Broom, Max. 17; Weisman, 8h

The misuse of a right or power does not prove the right or power itself is defective — abuse is an argument for correction, not abolition.

When the cause ceases, the effect ceases.

Cessante causa, cessat effectus.

Source: Co. Litt. 70; Jackson

When the reason for a rule or obligation no longer exists, the rule or obligation itself expires; the law does not perpetuate effects whose cause has been removed.

Where the law is uncertain, there is no law.

Ubi jus incertum, ibi jus nullum.

Source: Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 1181; Bouv. 160; 2 Salk. 512; Weisman, 15e

A statute so vague that no citizen can know its command is a nullity — the law must speak clearly enough to be obeyed.

An act of legislature to have force of law must be intelligibly expressed and when too vague is a nullity.

Source: Larkin v. Consolidated Telegraph, 85 N.Y.S. (2d) 631; Weisman, 15g

(English-origin maxim.) A statute so vague that a reasonable person cannot determine its meaning violates due process of law and is void — the legislature must express its commands with sufficient intelligibility to be obeyed.

That which is certain is fixed or stated, precise or exact, free from doubt or question.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 15l

(English-origin maxim.) Legal certainty requires that rights, obligations, and commands be stated with precision sufficient to be understood and obeyed — a law or instrument so indefinite that reasonable men must guess at its meaning fails the standard of certainty and cannot bind the People.

In a doubtful matter, the negative is to be understood rather than the affirmative.

In re dubia, magis inficiatio quam affirmatio intelligenda.

Source: Godb. 37; Cycl. Dict. 518; Weisman, 32e

Where doubt exists as to whether a power has been granted, the presumption is that it has not been — the negative protects against the expansion of authority beyond what was intended.

Whatever is done in excess is prohibited by law.

Quicquid in excessu actum est, lege prohibetur.

Source: 2 Inst. 107; Co. Litt. 44

Excess in the exercise of any power or right is itself unlawful — the law permits the proper use of authority but condemns its overreach. (Duplicate maxim — see also 7.7.12.)

All excess is reprehended in law.

Omne nimium in lege reprobatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 44; 2 Inst. 107

Moderation is a first principle — every exercise of power, every pleading, every remedy must be proportionate to its purpose. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

The greater always includes the less.

In eo quod plus sit, semper inest et minus.

Source: D. 50, 17, 110; Jackson

He who is granted the greater power possesses by implication every lesser power necessary to its exercise.

Common custom is better than royal grant.

Plus valet vulgaris consuetudo quam regalis concessio.

Source: Co. Cop. § 31; Jackson

A right established by long and general custom of the People carries greater weight than a right conferred by royal privilege; the People's practice outranks the sovereign's gift.

The law is the highest inheritance that the king possesses, for by the law both he and all his subjects are ruled; and if there were no law, there would be neither king nor inheritance.

Le ley est le plus haut enheritance que le roy ad, car per le ley il mesme et touts ses sujets sont rules, et si le ley ne fuit, nul roy ne nul enheritance serra.

Source: 1 J. H. 6, 63; Wharton

The law is supreme over both sovereign and subject; without it, neither authority nor property can exist — the law is the foundation of all order.

Necessity has no law.

Necessitas non habet legem.

Source: Plowd. 18a; Broom, Max. 17; Hob. 144

Where genuine necessity compels, the strict letter of the law yields — but the necessity must be real and present, not speculative or manufactured.

A good thing required by necessity is not good beyond the limits of the necessity.

Bonum necessarium extra terminos necessitatis non est bonum.

Source: Hob. 144; Weisman, 83a

The exception carved by necessity extends only as far as the necessity itself — once the emergency passes, the ordinary law resumes its full authority.

Necessity overrules the law.

Necessitas vincit legem.

Source: Hob. 144; Cooley, Const. Lim. (4th ed.) 747; Plowd. 18a; Weisman, 83h

Necessity is the supreme exception — but it is the narrowest one, and the party invoking it must demonstrate that no lawful alternative existed.

Necessity is the law of the time and of the place.

Necessitas est lex temporis et loci.

Source: Hob. 159; 1 Hale P.C. 54

Necessity is always measured against the particular moment and circumstances — what is necessary today may not be tomorrow, and what is necessary here may not be elsewhere.

Public necessity is greater than private.

Necessitas publica major est quam privata.

Source: Bacon, Max. in Reg. 5; Bouvier

Under the monarchy, the Crown's public necessity overrode private claims without limit. In the American system, public necessity may temporarily subordinate private convenience, but it cannot destroy the reserved rights of the People without due process of law — and the government bears the burden of proving genuine necessity, not merely invoking it. (Duplicate maxim — see also 2.1.13.)

What is introduced of necessity is never introduced except when necessary.

Quod est ex necessitate nunquam introducitur, nisi quando necessarium.

Source: 2 Rol. Rep. 512; Jackson; Weisman, 83l

The exception of necessity is self-limiting; it arises only when the necessity is present and ceases the moment it is no longer required.

Lapse of time does not bar the commonwealth.

Source: The State v. Purcell, 16 Tex. 305; Weisman, 100f

(English-origin maxim.) Statutes of limitation do not run against the sovereign — the state's claims are not barred by delay, because public rights belong to the whole people and cannot be forfeited by the negligence of officers. (Duplicate maxim — see also 2.1.23.)

The law of nations is that which regulates the intercourse of nations.

Jus gentium est quod inter gentes regit commercium.

Source: 1 Kent, Comm. 1, 4

International law governs the relations between sovereign nations — it is the framework within which treaties, commerce, and war are conducted. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

An aggressor who puts himself into a state of war with another and unjustly invades another's right can never, by such unjust war, come to have a right over the conquered.

Aggressor qui se in statum belli cum altero ponit, et injuste jus alterius invadit, nunquam per tale bellum injustum jus super victum acquirere potest.

Source: Locke, Two Treatises of Government, bk. 2, c. 16, §176; Weisman, 102j

Conquest by unjust aggression conveys no legitimate sovereignty — right cannot spring from wrong, and a people subjected by force retain their natural rights. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

The People have given their governors no power to wage unjust war, for they never had such power themselves.

Populus gubernatoribus suis nullam potestatem dedit bellum injustum gerendi, quia ipsi talem potestatem nunquam habuerunt.

Source: Locke, Two Treatises of Government, bk. 2, c. 16, §179; Weisman, 102l

The government's war power is delegated by the People — since no individual has the natural right to wage unjust war, the People could not delegate that right to their government. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

The laws are silent amid arms.

Silent leges inter arma.

Source: 4 Inst. 70; Cicero, Pro Milone 4.11; Black's 2nd 1910; Weisman, 102g

This maxim describes a practical reality of armed conflict: during active hostilities, the ordinary machinery of courts and civil process cannot function. It does not, however, authorize the suspension of fundamental rights — natural rights persist even when courts are silenced, and the return of peace demands the immediate restoration of legal process. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.7.14.)

Human things never prosper where divine things are neglected.

Nunquam res humanae prospere succedunt ubi negliguntur divinae.

Source: Co. Litt. 15; Wing. Max. 2; Weisman, 49b

The common law rests on the premise that temporal order depends on reverence for the divine — a society that abandons its moral foundations invites its own destruction.

The Christian religion is a part of the common law of England.

Religio Christiana pars est legis Angliae communis.

Source: Halkerston, Latin Maxims (1823); Lofft 327; Taylor's Case, 1 Vent. 293; Weisman, 49i

The common law historically recognized Christianity as part of its moral foundation — not as an established church, but as the source of the moral principles upon which the law was built.

No man warring for God should be troubled by secular business.

Nemo militans Deo implicetur negotiis secularibus.

Source: Co. Litt. 70; 2 Tim. 2:4; Weisman, 49j

Those devoted to religious ministry are, by ancient custom, exempt from certain temporal obligations — the law honors the separation between the sacred calling and worldly affairs.

That is the highest law which favors religion.

Ea est summa lex quae pro religione facit.

Source: 10 Mod. 117, 119; Broom, Max. 19; 5 Co. 14b; Weisman, 49f

Where competing interpretations exist, the one that honors religious liberty and the moral order is preferred — the law favors the sacred over the profane.

That which is against divine law is repugnant to society and is void.

Quod contra Legem Divinam est, repugnat societati et vanum est.

Source: Co. Litt.; cf. 4 Co. Inst. 37; Broom, Max. 19; Weisman, 49l

No human law that contradicts the law of God can bind in conscience or in right — the divine law is the ultimate standard against which all human legislation is measured. (Latin not located in any public-domain source in the library as of 2026-08-08; retained pending further sources.)

The cause of the Church is equal to public causes; and for the best of reasons — it is the cause of religion.

Causa ecclesiae publicis causis aequiparatur; et summa est ratio quae pro religione facit.

Source: Co. Litt. 341; Jackson

Matters concerning the Church are treated with the same gravity as matters of public interest; the law accords religious causes the highest dignity.

The clergy should not be placed in temporal offices.

Clerici non ponentur in officiis.

Source: Co. Litt. 96; Jackson

Those ordained to sacred ministry are exempt from secular office; the separation of spiritual and temporal callings is a settled principle of the common law.

A parish is a place in which the population of a certain church resides.

Parochia est locus quo degit populus alicujus ecclesiae.

Source: 5 Co. 67; Jackson

A parish is defined by its territorial boundaries and the congregation dwelling within them; it is both a geographic and an ecclesiastical unit of the common law.

Where the Divinity is insulted the case is unpardonable.

Nec veniam, laeso numine, casus habet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 167; Weisman, 49a

An offense against the Divine Majesty admits of no pardon through accident or mistake — where sacred things are violated, no plea of inadvertence will serve as defense.

Commerce ought to be common, and not to be converted into a monopoly and the private gain of a few.

Commercia debent esse communia, non in monopolium et privatum paucorum quaestum convertenda.

Source: 3 Inst. 181, in marg.; Weisman, 35a

The right to trade is a common right — its restriction to favored parties for their private enrichment is contrary to the public good and the common law.

It is inequitable to permit some to trade, and to prohibit others.

Iniquum est alios permittere, alios inhibere mercaturam.

Source: 3 Co. Inst. 181; Bouvier; Weisman, 35o

The right to engage in commerce belongs equally to all — selective enforcement that allows some to trade while barring others from the same market is a species of injustice the law will not countenance.