evidence

No one is presumed to act against nature.

Nemo praesumitur facere contra naturam.

Source: Vinnius, 22 Vin. Abr. 154; Bouvier, Max. 142; Weisman, 74e

Courts will not presume that a party intended an act contrary to the natural order — the burden falls on whoever alleges the unnatural act.

A custom, however great its authority, should never prejudice manifest truth.

Consuetudo, licet sit magnae auctoritatis, nunquam tamen praejudicat manifestae veritati.

Source: Coke, 4 Co. 18; Weisman, 27i

No custom, however ancient or universal, can override plain truth — when custom and fact collide, fact prevails.

The reason of the law ceasing, the law itself ceases.

Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex.

Source: Co. Litt. 70b; 2 Bl. Comm. 390; Broom, Max. 159; Weisman, 14a; Weisman, 71vv

A statute enacted to address a specific evil or condition becomes void in its application when that evil or condition no longer exists.

An adjournment is to appoint a day or to give a day.

Adjournamentum est ad diem dicere seu diem dare.

Source: 4 Inst. 27; Jackson; Weisman, 65z

An adjournment is not a dismissal but a continuance — the matter remains pending and must be taken up on the appointed day.

Alienation of property is favoured by the law rather than accumulation.

Alienatio rei praefertur juri accrescendi.

Source: Co. Litt. 185a; Jackson

The law favors the free transfer of property over its indefinite accumulation in one hand — policies that restrict alienation are disfavored.

The original estate ceasing, that which is derived from it ceases.

Cessante statu primitivo, cessat derivativus.

Source: 8 Co. 34; Jackson

A derivative right cannot outlive its source — when the principal estate terminates, all lesser interests carved from it terminate as well.

Against a man denying principles there is no disputing.

Contra negantem principia non est disputandum.

Source: Co. Litt. 343; Jackson

One who refuses to accept first principles places himself beyond the reach of rational argument — debate requires shared premises. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.1.12.)

A weak foundation destroys the superstructure.

Debile fundamentum fallit opus.

Source: Noy, Max. 20; Jackson

A legal argument, proceeding, or claim built on a defective premise will inevitably fail — the soundness of the foundation determines the soundness of the whole.

A new matter always induces various events.

Eventus varios res nova semper habet.

Source: Co. Litt. 379; Jackson; Weisman, 38b

Innovation in law or commerce carries unpredictable consequences — caution is warranted when departing from established practice.

A fee-simple, so called because fee is the same as inheritance, and simple is the same as legitimate or pure; and thus fee-simple is the same as a legitimate or pure inheritance.

Feodum simplex quia feodum idem est quod hereditas, et simplex idem est quod legitimum vel purum, et sic feodum simplex idem est quod haereditas legitima vel hereditas pura.

Source: Litt. § 1; Jackson; Weisman, 58f

Fee-simple is the highest estate in land — it is an absolute and unconditional inheritance, free from any limitation as to heirs.

Women are not able to hold public offices.

Feminae non sunt capaces de publicis officiis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 237; Jackson

This maxim reflected the common law disability of women from holding public office — a rule long since superseded. The right of women to hold office came through the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee and reforms in the several state constitutions, not the Nineteenth Amendment, which secured the distinct right to vote.

The custody of the law is stronger than that of man.

Fortior est custodia legis quam hominis.

Source: 2 Rol. Rep. 325; Jackson

Property or persons in the custody of the law are more securely held than in any private custody — the protection of law is the strongest safeguard available.

Impunity always invites to greater crimes.

Impunitas semper ad deteriora invitat.

Source: 5 Co. 69; Jackson

Failure to punish wrongdoing encourages escalation — when offenders go unpunished, they and others are emboldened to commit worse offenses.

In law every definition is dangerous.

In jure omnis definitio periculosa est.

Source: Jackson

Legal definitions risk being either too broad or too narrow — a rigid definition may exclude what should be included or include what should be excluded.

Frequent interruption does not take away a prescription once acquired.

Interruptio multiplex non tollit praescriptionem semel obtentam.

Source: 2 Inst. 654; Jackson; Weisman, 95hh

Once a prescriptive right has been fully established, subsequent interruptions do not destroy it — the right, once vested, endures.

The law of England is a law of mercy.

Lex Angliae est lex misericordiae.

Source: 2 Inst. 315; Jackson

The English common law tradition, inherited by the American system, is grounded in mercy — harsh or oppressive constructions are disfavored whenever a merciful reading is available.

The law suffers no fractions and divisions of statutes.

Lex non patitur fractiones et divisiones statutorum.

Source: 1 Co. 87; Jackson

Statutes must be read as a whole, not cherry-picked in fragments — isolating one clause from its context to defeat the purpose of the act is impermissible.

Mortmain (dead hand) because it is an immortal possession; “manus” stands for possession, and “mortua” for immortal.

Manus mortua, quia possessio est immortalis, manus pro possessione et mortua pro immortali.

Source: Co. Litt. 2; Jackson

Lands held in mortmain (by corporations or religious houses) are effectively removed from commerce because the holder never dies — statutes of mortmain exist to prevent perpetual accumulation by immortal entities.

No one is presumed to have preferred another’s posterity to his own.

Nemo presumitur alienam posteritatem suae pretulisse.

Source: Wing. 285; Jackson; Weisman, 58mm

The law presumes that a man provides for his own descendants before strangers — in construing wills and grants, preference for one’s own issue is the default assumption.

A reason cannot be given for all the laws that have been established by our ancestors.

Non omnium quae a majoribus nostris constituta sunt ratio reddi potest.

Source: D. 1, 3, 20; Jackson; Weisman, 60o

Some laws rest on grounds that time has obscured — the inability to articulate their reason does not invalidate them, but neither does their antiquity alone justify their perpetuation.

Not what the testator wished, but what he said, is considered in construing a will.

Non quod voluit testator, sed quod dixit in testamento inspicitur.

Source: Jackson

Courts construe wills by the words actually used, not by speculation about unexpressed intent — the written text governs over any alleged secret purpose.

All crimes done openly are lighter.

Omnia delicta in aperto leviora sunt.

Source: 8 Co. 127; Jackson

Offenses committed openly are treated less severely than those done in secret — concealment implies a consciousness of guilt that aggravates the offense.

Every interpretation, if it can be done, is to be so made in instruments as that all contradictions may be removed.

Omnis interpretatio si fieri potest ita fienda est in instrumentis, ut omnes contrarietates amoveantur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 96; Jackson; Weisman, 22dd

When construing a legal instrument, the interpreter must harmonize apparently conflicting provisions rather than declare them irreconcilable — every clause should be given effect if possible.

What is inconvenient, or contrary to reason, is not permitted in law.

Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem, non permissum est in lege.

Source: Co. Litt. 178; Jackson

An interpretation or application of law that produces absurd or unreasonable results is presumptively wrong — the law never intends what reason condemns.

What is not read is not believed.

Quod non legitur non creditur.

Source: 4 Inst. 304; Jackson; Weisman, 69t

A document not produced and read before the tribunal has no evidentiary weight — the court believes only what has been properly placed before it.

Where the number of witnesses is equal on both sides, the more worthy are to be believed.

Testibus deponentibus in pari numero dignioribus est credendum.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson

When conflicting testimony is evenly balanced, the credibility and character of the witnesses determine which side prevails — quality of testimony outweighs quantity.

Witnesses cannot prove a negative, but an affirmative.

Tesmoignes ne poent testifier le negative, mes l’affirmative.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson; Weisman, 39m

A witness can attest to what he saw or heard, but proving that something did not happen is inherently unreliable — the burden of proving a positive fact falls on the party asserting it.

Charters are called "muniments" from "muniendo," because they fortify and defend the inheritance.

Charters sont appelle "muniments" a "muniendo" quia muniunt et defendunt haereditatem.

Source: 4 Co. 153; Wharton

Title deeds and charters serve as the documentary armor of property rights — their preservation is essential because they are the evidence by which ownership is proved and defended.

Of things relating to each other, one being known, the other is also known.

Relativorum, cognito uno, cognoscitur et alterum.

Source: Cro. Jac. 539; Wharton; Weisman, 93d

Correlative legal concepts are understood together — knowing the right reveals the duty, knowing the grant reveals the obligation, and understanding one side of a legal relationship necessarily illuminates the other. (Duplicate maxim — see also 3.4.12.)

Reason is a ray of divine light.

Ratio est radius divini luminis.

Source: Co. Litt. 232; Bouvier, Max.

The capacity for reason is God-given, and the law, being founded on reason, partakes of a divine character — an unreasonable law is no law at all. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.11.6.)

Nothing should be rashly changed.

Nil temere novandum.

Source: Bouvier, Max.

The law favors stability — innovation without necessity risks destroying the settled expectations upon which the People have ordered their lives.

The law presumes that a neighbor knows the acts of his neighbor.

Lex intendit vicinum vicini facta scire.

Source: Co. Litt. 78

One cannot claim ignorance of what is open and notorious in his own vicinity — the law charges a man with knowledge of what reasonable diligence would reveal.

The law does not require that to be proved which is apparent to the court.

Lex non requirit verificare quod apparet curiae.

Source: 9 Co. 54

What is already manifest to the court needs no formal proof — judicial notice dispenses with the necessity of proving the obvious.

A status once established is presumed by law to continue until the contrary appears.

Status semel constitutus praesumitur manere donec contrarium appareat.

Source: Kidder v. Stevens, 60 Cal. 414, 419; Broom, Max. 944; Weisman, 76f

One who was proved competent at one time is presumed competent until evidence to the contrary is produced. The burden lies on him who asserts the change.

From a great number of signs, true identity is ascertained.

Ex multitudine signorum colligitur identitas vera.

Source: Bacon, Max. 103, reg. 25, 29; Broom, Max. (3d Lond. ed.) 569; Weisman, 56a

Identity is established not by a single mark but by the convergence of multiple distinguishing characteristics — the same principle that governs identification of persons, things, and legal instruments.

To know and to be bound to know are regarded in law as equivalent.

Scire et scire debere aequiparantur in jure.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 551; Bouvier, Law Dict. 129; Weisman, 69l

Constructive knowledge is as potent as actual knowledge. One who should have known the law or the facts is treated as if he did know them.

No one is compelled to sell his own property, even at a just price.

Nemo cogitur rem suam vendere, etiam justo pretio.

Source: Lofft, 569; Weisman, 91ee

A man's property is his own and cannot be taken from him by compulsion, even upon the offer of fair market value — the right of the owner to refuse to sell is absolute, and no government or private party may force a sale against the owner's will without his consent.

Not to believe rashly is the sinew of wisdom.

Non temere credere est nervus sapientiae.

Source: 5 Co. 114; Weisman, 69r

The law distrusts credulity. A party who acts on unverified assertions bears the risk of their falsity.

Plain truths need not be proved.

Perspicua vera non sunt probanda.

Source: Co. Litt. 16; Bouvier, Max.

What is self-evident requires no proof — the law does not demand that a party prove what every reasonable man already knows to be true. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.4.8.)

By reasoning we come to true reason.

Source: Litt. s. 386; Weisman, 69b

(English-origin maxim.) Sound legal reasoning, carefully applied, leads to correct conclusions. Courts and advocates must reason from established principles rather than from assumptions or speculation.

The knowledge of smatterers is mixed ignorance.

Source: 8 Coke, 159; Weisman, 69f

(English-origin maxim.) Superficial knowledge of the law is worse than none at all, because it breeds false confidence — courts distrust arguments built on half-understood authorities, and counsel must master principles before invoking them.

Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things Divine and human; the science of the just and the unjust.

Source: Dig. 1, 1, 10, 2; Inst. 1, 1, 1; Bract. 3; People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 290, 295; Weisman, 69g

(English-origin maxim.) True jurisprudence encompasses both divine and human law and demands the ability to distinguish the just from the unjust — invoke this definition to remind a tribunal that law is a moral science, not mere procedure.

He who questions well learns well.

Source: 3 Bulst. 227; Weisman, 69b; Weisman, 69h

(English-origin maxim.) Effective cross-examination and forensic inquiry are the engines of truth — a lawyer who asks the right questions will uncover what no amount of passive observation reveals.

To know properly is to know a thing in its reason, and by its cause. We are truly said to know anything, where we know the true cause thereof.

Source: Co. Litt. 183b; Weisman, 69i

(English-origin maxim.) True understanding of a legal rule requires knowing its reason and cause — cite this to challenge a party who invokes a rule mechanically without understanding the principle that animates it.

We are ignorant of many things which would not be hidden from us if the reading of old authors was familiar to us.

Source: 10 Coke, 73; Weisman, 69j

(English-origin maxim.) Many modern legal errors arise from neglect of the old authorities — counsel should study Coke, Blackstone, and the ancient reports, because the principles established there remain the foundation of the common law.

Things universal are better known than things particular.

Source: 2 Rolle, 294; Weisman, 69k

(English-origin maxim.) General principles of law are more universally understood than the particular rules derived from them — begin any argument from the broad maxim before descending to the specific application.

No man is bound to have foreknowledge of a Divine or a future event.

Source: 10 Coke, 55a; Weisman, 69u

(English-origin maxim.) No person can be held liable for failing to foresee an act of God or an unforeseeable future event — invoke this to defeat a negligence claim premised on the expectation of superhuman foresight.

It is necessary that given persons, lands and estates should be comprehended in a declaration of uses.

Source: 9 Coke, 9; Weisman, 69w

(English-origin maxim.) A declaration of uses must specify the persons, lands, and estates affected with particularity — a vague or general declaration that fails to identify the beneficiaries and the property is void for uncertainty.

Notice is named from a knowledge being had; and notice ought not to halt, [i.e., be imperfect.].

Source: 6 Coke, 29; Weisman, 69y

(English-origin maxim.) Legal notice must be complete and definite — a notice that is partial, ambiguous, or otherwise imperfect fails to accomplish its purpose and does not bind the party to whom it is directed.

It is sometimes expedient to forget what you know.

Etiam oblivisci quod scis interdum expedit.

Source: Weisman, 69v

Discretion and prudence sometimes require setting aside what one knows — applied to situations where strict enforcement of knowledge would produce unjust or impractical results.

An error which is not resisted is approved.

Error qui non resistitur, approbatur.

Source: Doct. and Stud. c. 70; Jackson; Weisman, 37d

A party who has knowledge of an error and fails to object or correct it in a timely manner is deemed to have accepted it — silence in the face of a known mistake operates as ratification.

Outward acts reveal the inner secrets.

Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta.

Source: Broom, Max. (3d ed.) 270; 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 115; 8 Co. 291

When direct proof of intent is unavailable, the law infers intent from conduct. A man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his deliberate acts.

Without knowledge, intent cannot exist.

Sine scientia intentio esse non potest.

Source: Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711; Weisman, 60m

Intent presupposes knowledge of the relevant facts. One who is genuinely ignorant of a material circumstance cannot have formed the specific intent the law requires.

A minor cannot take an oath.

Minor jurare non potest.

Source: Co. Litt. 172b; Litt. 289; Weisman, 80b

Because an oath binds the conscience and carries legal penalties for its breach, the law does not permit a minor — who cannot fully appreciate these consequences — to swear one.

The presumption is always in favor of the legitimacy of children.

Semper praesumatur pro legitimatione puerorum.

Source: Co. Litt. 126; 5 Co. Rep. 98b; Weisman, 79l

Children born during wedlock are presumed legitimate — the law favors the protection of the innocent over suspicion of the parents.

The father is he whom the marriage indicates.

Pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant.

Source: Co. Litt. 123; Dig. 2, 4, 5; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874), p. 516; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 792; Weisman, 79n

A child born in lawful wedlock is presumed to be the child of the husband — the marriage itself establishes paternity.

That which is mine cannot be taken away without my act, consent, or forfeiture.

Quod meum est sine me auferri non potest.

Source: Broom, Max. 465; Jenk. Cent. p. 251, case 41; 8 Co. 92; Dig. 50.17.11

No man loses his property except by his own act, his own negligence, or lawful forfeiture — never by the bare will of another.

In no tenement which is held for a term of years is there an avail of homage; but there is the oath of fealty (loyalty).

Source: Co. Litt. 67b; Weisman, 70i

(English-origin maxim.) A tenant for years owes fealty but not homage — the oath of loyalty is required of all tenants, but the ceremony of homage is reserved for freehold estates.

Some gifts are perfect, others incipient and not perfect; as if a gift were read and granted, but delivery had not yet followed.

Donationum alia perfecta, alia incepta et non perfecta; ut si donatio lecta fuit et concessa, ac traditio nondum fuerit subsecuta.

Source: Co. Litt. 56; Jackson

A gift is imperfect until delivery is complete — a declared intent to give, even formally recorded, does not transfer ownership without actual or constructive delivery to the donee.

The presumption is in favor of legitimacy.

Source: 1 Bl. Comm. 457; 5 Coke, 98b; Co. Litt. 126a; Weisman, 58bb

(English-origin maxim.) The law presumes that a child born in wedlock is legitimate — the burden of proving illegitimacy falls on the party asserting it, and the standard is exacting.

No one is presumed to trifle at the point of death.

Nemo praesumitur ludere in extremis.

Source: Cycl. Dict. 689; 6 Co. 76; Weisman, 103m

A dying man's declarations are presumed to be earnest and sincere — the law gives the greatest weight to words spoken in contemplation of death.

It is the duty of a judge to inquire as well into the time of things as into things themselves; by inquiring into the time you will be safe.

Judicis officium est ut res ita tempora rerum quaerere; quaesito tempore tutus eris.

Source: Co. Litt. 171; Jackson; Weisman, 63w; Weisman, 63bb

Timing is essential to legal rights — a judge must examine not only what was done but when it was done, for the sequence of events often determines validity.

A testament is the witnessing of one's intention, made under no present fear of danger, but in expectancy of death.

Testamentum, i.e., testatio mentis, facta nullo praesente metu periculi, sed cogitatione mortalitatis.

Source: Weisman, 103j

A valid will must be made freely, without duress or imminent peril clouding judgment — it is a deliberate declaration of intent made in contemplation of mortality, not in the panic of danger.

Written words remain — a written contract cannot be varied by parol proof.

Verba scripta manent.

Source: Broom, Max. 594

Once parties reduce their agreement to writing, the writing is the contract — prior oral negotiations merge into the instrument and cannot contradict it.

An instrument of debt found in the debtor's possession is presumed paid.

Chirographum apud debitorem repertum praesumitur solutum.

Source: Halk. Max. 20; BL4 "Chirographum"; Jackson 107

Possession of the evidence of debt by the debtor raises a presumption of satisfaction — the creditor who surrenders the instrument is taken to have been paid. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.2.12.)

An instrument of debt not in existence is presumed discharged.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 73; BL4 "Debt"; Weisman, 28b

(English-origin maxim.) When the evidence of a debt cannot be produced, the law presumes satisfaction — the burden shifts to the alleged creditor.

A debtor is not presumed to make a gift.

Debitor non praesumitur donare.

Source: 1 Kames, Eq. 212; Dig. 50, 16, 108; Ersk. Inst. 3, 3, 93; Weisman, 28y

When a debtor transfers money or goods to his creditor, the natural presumption is that he intends to discharge his debt, not to confer a gratuity.

A delegated debtor is hateful in law.

Source: 3 Bulstr. 148; Weisman, 28e

(English-origin maxim.) The law disfavors the delegation of debts — substituting a new debtor in place of the original is viewed with suspicion and requires clear proof of the creditor's consent.

Crime vitiates everything that springs from it.

Crimen omnia ex se nata vitiat.

Source: Henry v. Bank of Salina, 5 Hill (N.Y.) 523, 531; Weisman, 26o

No lawful right, title, or benefit can arise from a criminal act — the taint of the original wrong infects everything built upon it.

Let him who accuses be of clear fame, and not criminal.

Qui accusat integrae famae sit et non criminosus.

Source: 3 Inst. 26; Jackson

An accuser must himself be of unblemished reputation — a criminal bringing charges against another lacks the standing and credibility the law demands.

Fraud is odious and is not to be presumed.

Fraus est odiosa et non praesumenda.

Source: Cro. Car. 550; Jackson, No. 296; Weisman, 29s

The law does not presume fraud but requires it to be proved by clear evidence — yet once proved, every presumption turns against the wrongdoer.

Once a fraud, always presumed a fraud.

Semel fraudator, semper praesumitur fraudator.

Source: 13 Vin. Abr. 539; Weisman, 29i

A proven pattern of fraud raises a continuing presumption — the law does not extend fresh credit to a demonstrated deceiver.

A deceiver deals in generalities.

Dolosus versatur in generalibus.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Co. 34

The fraudulent actor avoids specifics because particular statements can be tested and disproved, while vague assertions resist scrutiny. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.6.13, 1.5.54.)

Injury is not presumed.

Injuria non praesumitur.

Source: Co. Litt. 232; Weisman, 59c

The law presumes that men act lawfully until the contrary is shown — no man is presumed to have wronged another without proof.

Evil is not presumed.

Malum non praesumitur.

Source: 4 Coke, 72; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 78c

The law's starting presumption is innocence — no man is assumed to harbor evil intent until the evidence compels that conclusion.

He who is once shown to be bad is presumed to remain so in the same kind.

Semel malus, semper praesumitur esse malus in eodem genere.

Source: Cro. Car. 317; Best, Evid. 345; Weisman, 26j; Weisman, 78e

A demonstrated pattern of wrongdoing creates a rebuttable presumption of continued misconduct of the same character — past behavior is evidence of present disposition.

A judge must decide according to the facts alleged and proved.

Judex debet judicare secundum allegata et probata.

Source: Dyer 12; Halk. Max. 73; Broom, Max. 102

A judge may not rely on private knowledge or personal investigation — he is bound to what the parties have placed before him through proper procedure.

A judge cannot be a witness in his own case.

Judex non potest esse testis in propria causa.

Source: 4 Inst. 272; Co. Litt. 6b

One who sits in judgment may not also testify as a fact witness — the dual role destroys the safeguard of impartiality.

How long reasonable time ought to be is not defined by law, but depends upon the discretion of the judges.

Quam longum debet esse rationabile tempus, non definitur in lege, sed pendet ex discretione justiciariorum.

Source: Co. Litt. 56; Jackson; Weisman, 100g

What constitutes "reasonable time" is a question of fact and judicial discretion determined by the circumstances of each case, not by rigid statutory prescription.

A multitude of ignorant persons destroys a court.

Multitudo imperitorum perdit curiam.

Source: 2 Inst. 219; Wharton

The quality of justice depends on the competence of those who administer it — filling courts with unqualified persons undermines the entire judicial system.

The witnesses being dead, it must be referred, as to the truth of charters, out of necessity, to the country — i.e. a jury.

Chartarum super fidem, mortuis testibus, ad patriam, de necessitudine, recurrendum est.

Source: Co. Litt. 386; Jackson

When the original witnesses to a document are deceased, the authenticity of the instrument must be determined by a jury drawn from the community where the facts are known.

No one can verify by jury against a record.

Nemo potest contra recordum verificare per patriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 380; Wharton

A court record cannot be contradicted or overturned by jury verdict — the record speaks for itself and is conclusive as to what it contains.

The administration of an oath is an indispensable requisite to the formation of a legal jury.

Source: Lumsden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 485, 486; Weisman, 67e

(English-origin maxim.) Without the administration of an oath, no lawful jury is constituted — the oath is the foundation of the jury's authority and the guarantee of its fidelity.

The law favors justice and right.

Source: Wing. Max. 141; Weisman, 68i

(English-origin maxim.) In every doubtful case, the law leans toward justice and right — legal presumptions and constructions always favor the just outcome.

Faith is the sister of justice.

Source: Halk. Max. 77; Weisman, 68q

(English-origin maxim.) Good faith and justice are inseparable — without fidelity to promises and honest dealing, the administration of justice is impossible.

Justice is prior to liberty.

Source: Halk. Max. 77; Weisman, 68r

(English-origin maxim.) Justice must be established before liberty can be enjoyed — without a just legal order, liberty degenerates into license and chaos.

It is the property of a Judge to administer justice, not to give it.

Source: Lofft, 42; Weisman, 68s

(English-origin maxim.) A judge's duty is to administer the existing law, not to create new rights or grant favors — the judge declares what the law is, he does not invent what it should be.

Every presumption of the law must be in aid of justice.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 68a

(English-origin maxim.) Legal presumptions exist to advance justice, not to defeat it — a presumption that operates to deprive a man of his recognized rights or to shield wrongdoing perverts its own purpose and must yield to the truth of the matter.

What has been agreed to be done, and what ought to be done, shall, for the advancement of justice, be regarded as done.

Source: Wharton, III-377

(English-origin maxim.) Equity treats as done that which ought to have been done — when parties have agreed to perform an act, or justice requires it, the law regards the act as already accomplished.

When the plaintiff does not prove his case, the defendant is acquitted.

Actore non probante, reus absolvitur.

Source: Hob. 103; Weisman, 99cc

The burden of proof rests on the party who asserts — if the plaintiff fails to establish his claim, judgment goes for the defendant as a matter of course.

No one is heard who advances his own disgrace.

Nemo auditur qui suam allegat turpitudinem.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 16; Broom, Max. 160; 4 Inst. 279

A party who makes contradictory allegations — or who confesses his own wrongdoing in the course of his pleading — destroys his own case.

The burden of proof lies on the plaintiff.

Actori incumbit onus probandi.

Source: Hob. 103; Jackson; Weisman, 39n; Weisman, 39dd; Weisman, 99j

The party who asserts a claim bears the obligation of proving it — the defendant need prove nothing until the plaintiff has established a prima facie case.

The issue proves the act.

Exitus acta probat.

Source: Co. Litt. 232b; Broom, Max. 259

An allegation stands or falls by its outcome at trial — the result of the proceeding is the ultimate test of whether the claim was well-founded.

Whatever is offered by the defendant as sufficient to defeat the cause of action stated in the plaintiffs declaration, either by way of denial, justification, or confession, is a plea.

Source: Jewett Car Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 107 Fed. 622, 624; Weisman, 87j

(English-origin maxim.) Any matter the defendant raises to defeat the plaintiff's claim — whether denial, justification, or confession and avoidance — constitutes a plea and must conform to the rules of pleading.

A thing certain must be brought to judgment.

Oportet quod certa res deducatur in judicium.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 84; Jackson

The subject matter of a lawsuit must be definite and identifiable — the court cannot adjudicate a claim that is vague, indefinite, or uncertain in its object.

That which appears not is not; and nothing appears judicially before judgment.

Quod non apparet non est ; et non apparet judicialiter ante judicium.

Source: 2 Inst; Weisman, 64t

What does not appear in the record does not exist for judicial purposes — nothing is judicially cognizable until it is properly presented and entered before the court.

The power of adducing proof is not to be narrowed.

Facultas probationum non est angustanda.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson, No. 262

Courts must not restrict a party's opportunity to present evidence; the right to prove one's case is fundamental to due process of law.

The burden of proof falls upon the one who asserts, not the one who denies.

Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat.

Source: Dig. 22, 3, 2; Halk. Max. 9; Steph. Pl. 84

He who brings a claim must prove it; a party denying an allegation is not required to produce evidence of the negative.

The proof rests upon the one who affirms, not upon the one who denies.

Affirmanti, non neganti, incumbit probatio.

Source: Halk. Max. 9; Dig. 22, 3, 2

A restatement of the fundamental rule: the affirmative party bears the burden because a negative, by its nature, does not admit of direct proof.

A confession made in court is stronger than any proof.

Confessio facta in judicio omni probatione major est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 102; 11 Co. 30; Weisman, 39b

A voluntary admission before the tribunal supersedes the need for extrinsic evidence on the admitted point.

No one ought to be a witness in his own cause.

Testis nemo in sua causa esse debet.

Source: 3 Bl. Comm. 371; Dig. 22, 5, 10

A man's testimony in his own cause is inherently suspect because self-interest taints credibility — cite this to challenge the weight given to interested-party testimony, or to argue that a party's uncorroborated self-serving declarations should not carry the day.

Negatives cannot be proved.

Negativa probari non possunt.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Code. 4, 19, 23

It is in the nature of things that a party cannot prove what did not happen; therefore the law places the burden of proof on the affirmative.

The thing speaks for itself.

Res ipsa loquitur.

Source: Broom, Max.; per Pollock, C.B. in Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 2 H. & C. 722

Where an event is of such a character that it could not ordinarily occur without negligence or wrongful act, the occurrence itself is evidence sufficient to raise a presumption of fault without further proof.

False in one thing, false in all things.

Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Broom, Max.; Jackson, Lat. for Lawyers, No. 266; Weisman, 26bb; Weisman, 37f

Where a witness is shown to have testified falsely on a material point — one on which he could not be presumed to be mistaken — the tribunal may reject the whole of his testimony.

In criminal cases, the proofs ought to be clearer than light.

In criminalibus, probationes debent esse luce clariores.

Source: 3 Inst. 210; Jackson, No. 371

Because the criminal proceeding puts life and liberty at hazard, the proof required is of the highest degree — clear, certain, and beyond reasonable doubt.

No one alleging his own wrongdoing is to be heard as a witness.

Nemo turpitudinem suam allegans audiendus est.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Best, Ev. §385; Weisman, 39ii

A person who would profit from his own wrong is not a credible witness; the law does not receive testimony grounded in the witness's own turpitude.

Proofs ought to be evident — that is, clear and easily understood.

Probationes debent esse evidentes, id est, perspicuae et faciles intellectu.

Source: Co. Litt. 283; Weisman, 39r

Evidence must be presented plainly and intelligibly; obscure or convoluted proofs fail to satisfy the standard the law requires.

One eye-witness is worth more than ten ear-witnesses.

Pluris est oculatus testis unus quam auriti decem.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; 3 Bouv. Inst. n. 3154; Weisman, 39w

Direct observation outweighs hearsay; testimony from one who saw the event firsthand carries greater weight than any number of those who merely heard of it.

Witnesses are weighed, not counted.

Testes ponderantur, non numerantur.

Source: 1 Starkie, Ev. 554; Best, Ev. §389; Weisman, 39x

The credibility and quality of witnesses determines the force of their testimony, not the mere number of them.

We have the best witness in an accused who confesses the charge.

Habemus optimum testem confitentem reum.

Source: Fost. Cr. L. 243; Jackson

A voluntary confession by the accused is the strongest evidence of guilt — no testimony from any other witness can surpass the defendant's own admission.

Women ought not to be admitted to proof of the estate of a man.

Mulieres ad probationem status hominis admitti non debent.

Source: Co. Litt. 6; Jackson

This historical common law rule restricted certain categories of witness testimony regarding status; modern practice has broadly abandoned such categorical exclusions.

A strumpet is a sufficient witness to a happening in a brothel.

Testis lupanaris sufficit ad factum in lupanari.

Source: Moor, 817; Jackson

A witness is competent to testify about events occurring in a place she frequents, regardless of her character — the law takes testimony where it can find it.

Violent presumption is sometimes full proof.

Violenta praesumptio aliquando est plena probatio.

Source: Co. Litt. 6; Jackson

A presumption so strong that it admits of no reasonable alternative explanation may stand as complete proof of the fact presumed, shifting the burden entirely to the opposing party.

Facts are more powerful than words.

Facta sunt potentiora verbis.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Weisman, 101d

Deeds and circumstances carry greater evidentiary weight than mere declarations — the law looks to what was done, not merely what was said. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.2.1.)

When the proofs of facts are present, what need is there of words.

Cum adsunt testimonia rerum, quid opus est verbis.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Buls. 53; Weisman, 39bb

Where the evidence itself speaks clearly, verbal testimony becomes superfluous — tangible proof supersedes oral assertion.

Things done in one action cannot be taken as evidence in another, unless it be between the same parties.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 11; Weisman, 39a

(English-origin maxim.) Proceedings and findings in one action cannot serve as evidence in a different action unless both actions involve the same parties, because strangers to the first case had no opportunity to test the evidence.

Proof is the effect of evidence; the establishment of a fact by evidence.

Source: Tift v. Jones, 77 Ga. 181; 3 S.E. 399; Weisman, 39d

(English-origin maxim.) Proof is not the evidence itself but the conclusion the evidence establishes; counsel should distinguish between offering evidence and actually proving the fact at issue.

Nothing can be treated as evidence which is not introduced as such.

Source: Harvey v. Waitt, 44 N.E.2d 629, 633, 312 Mass. 333; Weisman, 39f

(English-origin maxim.) Matter not formally introduced into evidence cannot be considered by the tribunal — a party who fails to offer material into the record may not rely upon it, however relevant it may be.

The law arises out of the fact.

Source: 2 Inst. 479; 2 Bl. Comm. 329; Weisman, 39g

(English-origin maxim.) Law does not exist in the abstract — it must be applied to actual facts. A court cannot declare the law until the facts giving rise to the legal question are established. The facts are the foundation; the law follows from them.

It is in the nature of things that a negative is no proof.

Source: Black's, 2d. 890; Bouv. 147; Code. 4, 19, 23; Weisman, 39j

(English-origin maxim.) A negative proposition cannot be proved directly; therefore the party who asserts the affirmative bears the entire burden and must produce positive proof.

He who affirms must prove.

Source: Porter v. Stevens, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 535; Weisman, 39k

(English-origin maxim.) The party who makes an affirmative claim must sustain it with evidence; the opposing party is not required to disprove what has not first been proved.

The answer of one witness shall not be heard at all; the testimony of a single witness shall not be admitted under any circumstances (for civil cases).

Source: 1 Greenl. Ev. s. 260; Code. 4, 20, 9; 3 Bl. Comm. 370; Best, Ev. p. 426, s. 390, and note; Weisman, 39l

(English-origin maxim.) In civil cases, the testimony of a single uncorroborated witness was historically insufficient to establish a fact; this rule enforces the principle that important matters require more than one source of proof.

What is not proved and what does not exist are the same; it is not a defect of the law, but of proof.

Source: Black's, 587; Jenk. Cent. 207; Weisman, 39z; Weisman, 95h

(English-origin maxim.) A fact not established by evidence is treated as nonexistent — this is not a flaw in the law but in the party's failure to prove; the court cannot act on what is not before it.

Report, which induces suspicion, ought to arise from good and grave men; not, indeed, from malevolent and malicious men, but from cautious and credible persons; not only once, but frequently; for clamor diminishes, and defamation manifests.

Source: 2 Inst. 52; Black's, 2d. 482; Weisman, 39cc

(English-origin maxim.) Rumor and report that would justify investigation must originate from credible, disinterested persons and must be persistent — isolated accusations from hostile witnesses do not constitute lawful grounds for suspicion.

A witness is a person who is present at and observes a transaction.

Source: State v. Desforges, 47 La. Ann. 1167, 17 So. 811; McDonald v. Robertson, 104 F.2d 945, 948; Weisman, 39ee

(English-origin maxim.) A witness is one who was present and perceived the transaction firsthand; this definition excludes those who merely heard about the event or arrived after the fact.

The rules of evidence are of great importance, and cannot be departed without endangering private as well as public rights.

Source: Nicholls v. Webb, 8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 326, 332; Weisman, 39hh

(English-origin maxim.) The rules of evidence safeguard both private rights and public order; courts must not relax evidentiary standards for convenience, as doing so endangers the rights of all parties.

To swear is to call God as witness, and is an act of divine worship.

Jurare est Deum in testem vocare, et est actus divini cultus.

Source: 3 Inst. 165; Jackson, No. 459; Weisman, 84j

The oath invokes the highest authority — the Almighty — as surety of truth, making perjury not only a civil offense but a transgression against the divine order.

There is no stronger bond between men than an oath.

Nullum vinculum majus inter homines quam jusjurandum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. Cas. 126, case 54; Weisman, 84a

The oath is the highest form of human undertaking; its binding force exceeds that of any contract or promise because it appeals to conscience and to God.

An oath is indivisible; it cannot be held partly true and partly false.

Juramentum est indivisibile, et non est admittendum in parte verum et in parte falsum.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson, No. 456; Weisman, 84d

Sworn testimony must be taken whole — a tribunal may not selectively accept portions of an oath while rejecting others, because the oath stands or falls as one.

Every oath ought to be founded upon certain knowledge.

Omne sacramentum debet esse de certa scientia.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Weisman, 84f

No person may swear to what he does not know; an oath grounded on conjecture, supposition, or hearsay is void.

In court, no one is believed unless under oath.

In judicio non creditur nisi juratis.

Source: Cro. Car. 64; 3 Inst. 79

All facts presented in a legal proceeding must be established by sworn testimony or affirmation; unsworn statements carry no evidentiary weight.

The divine punishment for perjury is destruction; the human punishment is disgrace.

Perjurii poena divina exitium, humana dedecus.

Source: 3 Inst. 163; Co. Litt. 158

Perjury strikes at the foundation of the legal system; the law regards it with the utmost severity because the oath is the pillar upon which all judicial proceedings rest.

A foolish oath, though false, does not amount to perjury.

Stultum juramentum, licet falsum, tamen non committit perjurium.

Source: 2 Inst. 167; Weisman, 84g

Where an oath is so vague, absurd, or impossible that it cannot affect the matter at issue, its falsity does not constitute the crime of perjury — the substance, not the form, determines the offense.

An oath made between others ought neither to hurt nor to benefit a stranger.

Jusjurandum inter alios factum nec nocere nec prodesse debet.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Jackson, No. 472; Weisman, 84l

The binding force of an oath extends only to the parties involved; third parties are neither bound by, nor entitled to rely upon, sworn statements made in proceedings to which they were not privy.

An oath has three companions — truth, justice, and judgment.

Juramentum habet in se tres comites — veritatem, justitiam, et judicium.

Source: 3 Inst. 160

Truth inheres in the party swearing; justice and judgment inhere in the officer administering the oath. All three must be present for the oath to be lawful.

The oath of an infamous person is not to be received.

Repellitur a sacramento infamis.

Source: Co. Litt. 158; Jackson; Wharton

A person of proven infamy is excluded from giving sworn testimony because his oath carries no credibility — the law will not receive sworn evidence from one whose character is wholly discredited.

The form of taking an oath, though it differs in words, agrees in meaning; for it ought to have this sense, that the Deity be invoked.

Jusjurandi forma verbis differt, re convenit; hunc enim sensum habere debet, ut Deus invocetur.

Source: Grotius, l. 2, c. 13, §10; Wharton; Weisman, 84m

The particular words of an oath may vary by custom or jurisdiction, but the substance is universal — every lawful oath must invoke the Almighty as witness to the truth of what is sworn.

Punishment is due if the words of an oath be false.

Source: Black's, 840; Weisman, 84c

(English-origin maxim.) Perjury — the willful utterance of false words under oath — merits punishment because the oath is the foundation of judicial truth-finding, and its violation undermines the entire system of justice.

In law, none is credited unless he is sworn. All facts must, when established by witnesses, be under oath or affirmation.

Source: Cro. Car. 64; Bouv. 130; Weisman, 84h

(English-origin maxim.) No testimony is credited in legal proceedings unless given under oath or affirmation; unsworn declarations are not evidence and cannot establish any fact before the court.

An infamous person is repelled or prevented from taking an oath.

Source: Co. Litt. 158; Bract. fol. 185; Weisman, 84i

(English-origin maxim.) A person whose character has been destroyed by conviction of an infamous crime is barred from taking an oath, because the law cannot trust the sworn word of one who has demonstrated contempt for truth.

All things are presumed to have been done rightly and in due form.

Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta.

Source: Co. Litt. 232b; Broom, Max. 847; Best, Ev. §300; Weisman, 89f

Until contrary proof is adduced, the law presumes that official acts were performed lawfully and that regular procedures were followed.

A presumption of law and from the law — a conclusive presumption.

Praesumptio juris et de jure.

Source: Co. Litt. 6b; Broom, Max.; Best, Ev.

Certain presumptions are so firmly established in law that no contrary evidence is permitted to rebut them; the law treats the presumed fact as conclusively established.

A strong presumption has great weight in law.

Praesumptio violenta valet in lege.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 56, case 3; Co. Litt. 6b; Weisman, 89c

Where the circumstances raise a violent presumption — one so strong as to amount to full proof — it operates with the force of direct evidence and shifts the burden to the opposing party. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.253.)

All things are presumed in favor of life, liberty, and innocence.

In favorem vitae, libertatis, et innocentiae omnia praesumuntur.

Source: Lofft, 125; Jackson, No. 379

When facts are doubtful, every presumption is made in favor of the accused and against forfeiture of life or liberty — the law will not presume guilt.

A presumption stands until the contrary is proved.

Praesumptio donec probetur in contrarium.

Source: Hob. 297; 3 Bl. Comm. 371; Weisman, 89e

Rebuttable presumptions have the force of proof until overcome by competent evidence to the contrary; the party challenging the presumption bears the burden.

The presumption always favors the one who denies.

Praesumptio semper est pro negante.

Source: 10 Clark & F. 534; Weisman, 89j

Because proof lies on the affirmative party, the law presumes in favor of the one who denies until the affirmative proposition is established.

All things are presumed against a despoiler.

Omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem.

Source: Broom, Max. 938; Best, Ev. §303

Where a party destroys or suppresses evidence, the law raises every presumption against him — he who silences the proof is presumed to fear its voice.

Nothing unjust is to be presumed in law.

Nihil iniquum est praesumendum in jure.

Source: 4 Co. 72; Co. Litt. 78; Weisman, 89h

The law will not presume that any party acted unjustly, dishonorably, or unlawfully; wrongdoing must be affirmatively proved.

What is clearly apparent needs no proof.

Quod constat clare non debet verificari.

Source: 10 Mod. 150; 9 Co. 54

When a fact is manifest to the court, requiring formal proof of it wastes the tribunal's time and insults its intelligence.

The extremes being proved, the intermediate things are presumed.

Probatis extremis, praesumuntur media.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 207; 1 Greenl. Ev. §20; Weisman, 39s

Where the beginning and end of a transaction are proved, the law presumes the intervening steps occurred in regular order.

From length of time, all things are presumed to have been done in due form.

Ex diuturnitate temporis, omnia praesumuntur solemniter esse acta.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 6; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 20

Where an act has stood unchallenged for a great length of time, the law presumes that all necessary formalities were observed in its execution.

When doubts arise, the most generous and benign presumptions are to be preferred.

Nobiliores et benigniores praesumptiones in dubiis sunt praeferendae.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

In cases of doubt, the law favors the presumption that is most favorable and least injurious, rather than the harsher interpretation. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.4.8.)

Presumptions arise from what generally happens.

Source: Post v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 425, 475; Weisman, 89a

(English-origin maxim.) Presumptions are drawn from the ordinary course of events — what usually happens in similar circumstances provides the basis for inferring what happened in the case at hand.

Odious and dishonest acts are not presumed in law.

Source: Co. Litt. 78; Jackson v. Miller, 6 Wend. (N.Y.) 228, 231, 21 Am. Dec. 316; Nichols v. Pinner, 18 N.Y. 295, 300; Weisman, 89g

(English-origin maxim.) The law will not presume that any person acted dishonorably or committed an odious act; wrongdoing must be affirmatively proved, not inferred from mere suspicion.

No impossible or dishonorable things are to be presumed; but only things true, honorable, and possible.

Source: Co. Litt. 78; Weisman, 89k

(English-origin maxim.) Courts will not presume the impossible or the dishonorable; all presumptions favor what is true, honorable, and within the realm of possibility.

A quality which ought to form a part is easily presumed.

Source: Black's, 2d. 973; Weisman, 89m

(English-origin maxim.) Where a quality naturally belongs to a thing or transaction, the law readily presumes its presence without requiring separate proof — what ordinarily accompanies a thing is presumed to be part of it.

Presumptions are conjectures from probable proof, assumed for purposes of evidence.

Praesumptiones sunt conjecturae ex signo verisimili ad probandum assumptae.

Source: Weisman, 89l

Presumptions are inferences drawn from probable signs, adopted as proof until rebutted — they serve the tribunal by supplying what direct evidence cannot always furnish.

Things manifest do not require proof.

Manifesta probatione non indigent.

Source: 7 Co. 40b; Co. Litt. 16

Plain and obvious facts need not be proved; to require formal evidence of what everyone can see would burden the proceeding without advancing truth.

That which appears to the court does not need the aid of witnesses.

Quod constat curiae opere testium non indiget.

Source: 2 Inst. 662; Weisman, 39i

Where a fact is within the court's own knowledge — from its records, its observation, or matters of which it takes judicial notice — witness testimony is unnecessary.

Judicial notice is a form of evidence.

Source: Mann v. Mann, 172 P.2d 369, 375, 76 Cal. App. 2d 32; Weisman, 39gg

(English-origin maxim.) Courts take judicial notice of facts so universally known or so readily verifiable from authoritative sources that they require no formal proof; such notice operates as evidence in the proceeding.

Of things which do not appear and things which do not exist, the rule is the same.

De non apparentibus, et non existentibus, eadem est ratio.

Source: 5 Co. 6; Jenk. Cent. 207; Jackson, No. 185

What is not brought before the court is treated as though it does not exist at all; a party who fails to produce evidence of a fact may not rely upon it.

Common opinion is of two kinds: the common opinion of the people, and the opinion which arises from law and custom.

Communis opinio est duplex, viz., opinio vulgaris, et opinio quae oritur ex jure et consuetudine.

Source: Co. Litt. 186a; Wing. Max. 203

The courts distinguish between popular rumor (which has no evidentiary value) and the settled understanding of law and practice (which may be received as authority).

The names of things ought to be understood according to common usage, not according to the opinions of individuals.

Nomina rerum debent intelligi secundum communem usum, non secundum opiniones privatorum.

Source: Dig. 33, 10, 7, 2; Weisman, 17b

Words in legal instruments are construed by their common and established meaning; a private or idiosyncratic definition cannot override the understanding shared by the community.

First principles prove; they are not proved.

Principia probant, non probantur.

Source: 3 Co. 40a, 50a

Fundamental axioms of law — like the rules of evidence themselves — are self-evident foundations; they are to be approved and applied, not themselves subjected to proof.

Plain truths need not be proved.

Perspicua vera non sunt probanda.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 16

What is obvious and undeniable requires no formal evidence — the law does not demand proof of what no reasonable person would dispute. (Duplicate maxim — see also 3.4.13.)

It matters not what is known to the judge, if it is not known to him judicially.

Non refert quid notum sit judici, si notum non sit in forma judicii.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Buls. 115

A judge's private knowledge cannot substitute for evidence properly before the court — what the judge knows as a man is irrelevant unless established through the formal record. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.165.)

Common opinion is good authority in law.

Source: Co. Litt. 186a; Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 528, 577, 49 Am. Dec. 189; Weisman, 17c

(English-origin maxim.) The settled opinion of learned and experienced persons on a point of law or practice carries authoritative weight and may be cited as a legitimate source of legal reasoning.

Common knowledge includes matters of learning, experience, history, and facts of which judicial notice may be taken, and may be referred to in argument of counsel.

Source: Shelley v. Chilton's Adm'r, 32 S.W.2d 974, 977; 236 Ky. 221; Weisman, 17e

(English-origin maxim.) Matters of history, learning, and common experience fall within judicial notice and may be referenced by counsel in argument without the need for formal evidentiary proof.

The law dispenses what common use has approved.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 17g; Weisman, 71ff

(English-origin maxim.) The common law draws its authority from the customs and usages long recognized by the People — where a practice has been universally and peaceably adopted, the law confirms and enforces it as an expression of the People's sovereign will.

Truth is the mother of justice.

Veritas est justitiae mater.

Source: Halk. Max. 185; Weisman, 101m

Justice cannot exist apart from truth; every legal proceeding is, at its foundation, a search for truth, and any process that obscures truth undermines justice.

Truth fears nothing but concealment.

Veritas nihil veretur nisi abscondi.

Source: 9 Co. 20b; Weisman, 101g

Truth is its own defense; the only thing that can defeat it is suppression. He who hides evidence betrays the truth and obstructs justice.

The suppression of the truth is the expression of a falsehood.

Suppressio veri, expressio falsi.

Source: Addington v. Allen, 11 Wend. (N.Y.) 374, 417; Wharton, Max.; Weisman, 101e

He who deliberately conceals a material fact is as culpable as one who affirmatively states what is untrue; silence, when there is a duty to speak, is a species of fraud.

He who does not freely speak the truth is a betrayer of the truth.

Qui non libere veritatem pronuntiat, proditor est veritatis.

Source: 4 Inst. Epil.; Bouv. 152; Weisman, 101b

The duty to speak truth is affirmative; a witness or officer who withholds what he knows to be true is as much a traitor to justice as one who speaks falsehood.

The law never operates without reason; truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from God.

Lex nunquam sine ratione; veritas a quocunque dicitur a Deo est.

Source: 4 Inst. 153

Truth is not diminished by the rank or station of the one who speaks it; the humblest witness may establish a fact that overturns the most powerful claim.

Truth of the name removes the error of description.

Veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 614; Co. Litt.; Weisman, 101j

Where the identity of a person or thing is established with certainty, an error in the description does not defeat the instrument — truth of substance prevails over error of form.

Truth is lost by too much disputation.

Veritas nimium altercando amittitur.

Source: Hob. 344

Excessive argument and procedural wrangling obscure the truth rather than illuminating it; simplicity and directness serve justice better than prolixity.

The law suffers nothing contrary to truth.

Lex non patitur aliquid contra veritatem.

Source: 2 Inst. 252; Weisman, 101c

No fiction, no presumption, and no procedural rule may be carried so far as to contradict established truth; where truth is known, it must prevail.

Truth not sufficiently defended is overcome; and he who does not disapprove, approves.

Veritas, quae non sufficienter defenditur, opprimitur; et qui non improbat, approbat.

Source: 3 Inst. 27; Weisman, 101l

Silence in the face of falsehood operates as consent; he who knows the truth and fails to defend it bears responsibility for the falsehood that prevails.

Painted error appears in many things more probable than naked truth; and again and again conquers truth by reasoning.

Error fucatus nuda veritate in multis est probabilior; et saepenumero rationibus vincit veritatem error.

Source: 2 Co. 78; Jackson

A well-dressed falsehood often appears more plausible than plain truth — advocates and tribunals must guard against sophisticated arguments that obscure simple facts.

False spelling or false grammar does not vitiate a grant.

Falsa orthographia, sive falsa grammatica, non vitiat concessionem.

Source: 9 Co. 48; Jackson; Weisman, 30i

A grant, deed, or other instrument is not defeated by mere errors of spelling or grammar when the meaning and intent are clear — substance prevails over form. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.2.14.)

Judgments are as it were the dicta of the law, and are received as truth.

Judicia sunt tanquam juris dicta, et pro veritate accipiuntur.

Source: 2 Inst. 587; Jackson; Weisman, 64e

A final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is presumed to state the law correctly and is treated as conclusive truth until reversed on appeal or vacated for jurisdictional defect.

Monuments which we call records are the vestiges of truth and antiquity.

Monumenta quae nos recorda vocamus sunt veritatis et vetustatis vestigia.

Source: Co. Litt. 118; Jackson

Official records carry the weight of established truth and historical fact — they are the permanent evidence of what was done and decided, and are presumed accurate until rebutted.

Impossibilities or dishonesty are not to be presumed; but honesty, and truth, and possibility.

Nulla impossibilia aut inhonesta sunt praesumenda; vera autem et honesta et possibilia.

Source: Co. Litt. 78; Jackson

The law always presumes in favor of what is honest, true, and possible — dishonesty and impossibility must be proved, never assumed.

Truth, by whomsoever pronounced, is from God.

Veritas, a quocunque dicitur, a Deo est.

Source: 4 Inst. 153; Jackson; Weisman, 101f

This is a restatement of 9.5.5 from a different source — truth has divine origin and carries the same authority regardless of the rank or station of the one who speaks it.

To lie is to go against the mind.

Mentiri est contra mentem ire.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 8 Buls. 260

A lie is a deliberate contradiction of what the speaker knows to be true — it is an offense against the faculty of reason itself, not merely against the hearer. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.137.)

We can do nothing against truth.

Nihil possumus contra veritatem.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Doct. & Stu. Dial. 2, c. 6

Truth is indestructible — no artifice, no legal fiction, and no exercise of power can alter or overcome what is objectively true. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.256.)

Truth is lost by excessive altercation.

Source: Hob. 344; Weisman, 101k

(English-origin maxim.) Excessive dispute and prolonged argument obscure rather than reveal the truth; courts and advocates should seek clarity and directness rather than exhaustive contention.

A man may not insist at different times on the truth of each of two conflicting allegations, according to the promptings of his private interest.

Source: Wharton, III-16

(English-origin maxim.) A party who asserts one version of facts in one proceeding and a contradictory version in another is estopped — the law forbids blowing hot and cold to serve shifting private interests.

A latent ambiguity may be supplied by proof; for what arises in ambiguity from an extrinsic fact is removed by proof of the fact.

Ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur; nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 23; 2 Kent, Comm. 557; Broom, Max. 608

Where an instrument appears clear on its face but becomes ambiguous when applied to the facts, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to resolve the doubt.

A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence.

Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur.

Source: Lofft 249; Bacon, Max. reg. 25; Broom, Max. 619; Weisman, 6b; Weisman, 6c

Where the ambiguity is apparent on the face of the instrument itself, the defect must be cured by the instrument's own language or not at all; outside evidence is inadmissible.

An ambiguity in a writing which will warrant the introduction of parol evidence is duplicity, indistinctness, or an uncertainty of meaning or expression, and mere omission or mistake is not an ambiguity.

Source: Beidler v. Davis, 50 N.E.2d 613, 616, 72 Ohio App. 27; 72 Ohio App; Weisman, 6k

(English-origin maxim.) Only genuine ambiguity — duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty of expression — warrants the introduction of parol evidence; a simple omission or scrivener's error is not ambiguity and does not open the door to extrinsic proof.

It is the same thing not to exist and not to appear.

Idem non esse et non apparere.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 207; Co. Litt. 6b

A right, condition, or fact that is not made to appear in the record or instrument is treated as if it did not exist; what cannot be shown cannot be relied upon.

Not what is said, but what is done, is to be regarded.

Non quod dictum est, sed quod factum est, inspicitur.

Source: Co. Litt. 36; 6 Bing. 310; Osborn v. Cook, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 536; Weisman, 2d

In the delivery of instruments, the substance of what was performed controls — not the oral declarations accompanying it.

To write is to act.

Scribere est agere.

Source: 2 Rolle 89; 4 Bl. Comm. 80; Broom, Max. 312, 967; Weisman, 2s

A writing carries the force of an act — a treasonous letter is as much an overt act as a treasonous deed.

Acts indicate the intention.

Actus indicant intentionem.

Source: 8 Co. 291; Broom, Max. 270; Troy v. Yelle, 176 P.2d 459, 463; Weisman, 2r

Where written intent is ambiguous, the course of conduct of the parties is the surest guide to meaning.

Deeds are more powerful than words.

Facta sunt potentiora verbis.

Source: Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 476; Co. Litt. 36; Weisman, 30a

Where a deed and a parol declaration conflict, the deed prevails — written instruments carry greater weight than oral statements. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.1.18.)

Writings remain; words fly away.

Scripta manent, verba volant.

Source: Attributed to Caius Titus, Roman Senate; Broom, Max. 312 (principle)

The enduring nature of a written instrument is why the law favors documented evidence over oral testimony — what is written persists; what is spoken vanishes.

An allegation contrary to a deed is not admissible.

Allegatio contra factum non est admittenda.

Source: Jackson; Weisman, 24dd

A party may not contradict by oral allegation what he has solemnly committed to a written instrument; the deed speaks and cannot be gainsaid.

A deed or bond found with the debtor is presumed to be paid.

Chirographum apud debitorem repertum praesumitur solutum.

Source: Bouvier

The physical possession of an obligation by the debtor raises a presumption that it has been satisfied — if the debt were still owed, the creditor would retain the instrument. (Duplicate maxim — see also 6.5.1.)

In the delivery of writings, not what is said, but what is done, is to be considered.

In traditionibus scriptorum non quod dictum est, sed quod gestum est, inspicitur.

Source: 9 Co. 137; Bouvier; Weisman, 30d

The validity and effect of a written instrument depend on the actual delivery and acts performed, not on the oral declarations accompanying the transfer.

An argument drawn from things commonly happening is frequent in law.

Argumentum a communiter accidentibus in jure frequens est.

Source: Broom, Max. 44; Co. Litt. 191; Weisman, 8j

The law reasons from ordinary experience — what usually happens is the baseline for legal presumption.

There must be sufficient positive facts proved to take a matter out of the realm of conjecture and presumption to that of certainty.

Source: Reynolds v. Blaisdell, 49A. 42, 43, 23 R.I. 16; Weisman, 15k

(English-origin maxim.) To prevail on a claim, the proponent must present sufficient affirmative evidence to elevate the matter from mere possibility to reasonable certainty — speculation is not proof.

In cases of doubt, the more generous and more favorable presumptions are to be preferred.

Nobiliores et benigniores praesumptiones in dubiis sunt praeferendae.

Source: Reg. Jur. Civ.; Jackson

Where the facts permit more than one inference, the law prefers the presumption that is more generous and more favorable to the party, rather than the harsher one. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.3.12.)

An unusual event is not presumed.

Casus insolitus non praesumitur.

Source: 4 Co. 66; cf. Dig. 22, 3, 1

Legal presumptions are built on ordinary experience — extraordinary events are not anticipated, and liability for them must be proved, not assumed.

Opinion is of two kinds: common opinion, which springs up among grave and discreet men and has the appearance of truth; and opinion which springs up among light and foolish men, without the semblance of truth.

Opinio est duplex, scilicet communis quae inter graves et discretos homines oritur et veritatem habet, et opinio quae inter leves et vulgares homines oritur sine veritatis specie.

Source: 4 Co. 107; Weisman, 3c

Not all opinion carries equal weight — the law distinguishes between the considered judgment of the learned and the idle talk of the uninformed.