criminal

Crimes against nature are the most heinous.

Crimina contra naturam sunt gravissima.

Source: Coke, 3 Inst. 20; Weisman, 74k

Offenses that violate the natural order are treated with the greatest severity because they strike at the foundation of all law.

Custom can neither arise from nor be destroyed by a wrong.

Consuetudo neque injuria oriri neque tolli potest.

Source: Lofft 340; Jackson 157; Weisman, 27m

An unlawful practice, no matter how long continued, never ripens into a binding custom — illegality at the root destroys the claim.

Execution is the end and fruit of the law.

Executio est finis et fructus legis.

Source: Co. Litt. 289b

A law that is not executed is as if it did not exist — the entire purpose of law is fulfilled only when its commands are carried into effect. (Duplicate maxim — see also 11.1.13, 8.9.2.)

The original estate ceasing, that which is derived from it ceases.

Cessante statu primitivo, cessat derivativus.

Source: 8 Co. 34; Jackson

A derivative right cannot outlive its source — when the principal estate terminates, all lesser interests carved from it terminate as well.

Commerce, by the law of nations, ought to be common, and not converted to monopoly and the private gain of a few.

Commercium jure gentium commune esse debet, et non in monopolium et privatum paucorum quaestum convertendum.

Source: 3 Inst. 56; Jackson

Trade is a natural right of all men — government-granted monopolies that restrict commerce for the benefit of a privileged few violate the law of nations.

Election once made cannot be recalled.

Electio semel facta non patitur regressum.

Source: Co. Litt. 146a; Jackson

When a party is given a choice between two remedies or rights and elects one, he is bound by that election and cannot later pursue the other.

An event is that which follows from the cause; and is called an event because it results from causes.

Eventus est qui ex causa sequitur; et dicitur eventus quia ex causis evenit.

Source: 9 Co. 81; Jackson; Weisman, 38a

The law traces consequences to their causes — liability attaches to the cause, not to the mere occurrence of the event.

It is for the public good that no one should use his property badly.

Expedit reipublicae ne sua re quis male utatur.

Source: Inst. 1, 8, 2; Jackson

Under the monarchy, the Crown claimed authority to regulate property use for the public good without limit. In the American system, the People delegated limited authority to government — the public interest in property use is real, but it cannot override the owner's natural right of dominion without due process of law, and the burden falls on government to show genuine public harm, not mere regulatory preference.

Inheritance is of two kinds, corporeal and incorporeal: corporeal is that which can be touched and seen; incorporeal, that which can neither be touched nor seen.

Hereditas, alia corporalis, alia incorporalis: corporalis est, quae tangi potest et videri; incorporalis quae tangi non potest nec videri.

Source: Co. Litt. 9; Jackson; Weisman, 58m

The law recognizes both tangible and intangible property rights as inheritable — rights, rents, and easements pass by inheritance just as land and goods do.

That which is common is said to be ours.

Id quod commune est, nostrum esse dicitur.

Source: Jackson; Weisman, 70v

Common property belongs to all — each member of the public has an equal interest in public roads, navigable waters, and other common resources.

That which is more remote does not draw to itself that which is nearer, but on the contrary in every case.

Id quod est magis remotum non trahit ad se quod est magis junctum, sed e contrario in omni casu.

Source: Co. Litt. 164; Jackson; Weisman, 95kk

The nearer or more immediate interest prevails over the more remote — a closer connection or claim takes precedence over a distant one.

Impunity always invites to greater crimes.

Impunitas semper ad deteriora invitat.

Source: 5 Co. 69; Jackson

Failure to punish wrongdoing encourages escalation — when offenders go unpunished, they and others are emboldened to commit worse offenses.

In the whole a part is also contained.

In toto et pars continetur.

Source: D. 50, 17, 113; Jackson

He who has the whole necessarily has every part — a grant of the entirety includes all its constituent elements.

It is not safe to obey him who has no right.

Jus non habenti tute non paretur.

Source: Hob. 146; Jackson; Weisman, 99c

Obedience to an authority acting without lawful right may expose the obedient party to liability — one must first satisfy himself that the command comes from legitimate authority.

The law suffers no fractions and divisions of statutes.

Lex non patitur fractiones et divisiones statutorum.

Source: 1 Co. 87; Jackson

Statutes must be read as a whole, not cherry-picked in fragments — isolating one clause from its context to defeat the purpose of the act is impermissible.

The greater contains the less.

Majus continet minus.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 208; Jackson

A grant of a greater power necessarily includes all lesser powers within it — one who has authority to do the whole may do any part.

Mortmain (dead hand) because it is an immortal possession; “manus” stands for possession, and “mortua” for immortal.

Manus mortua, quia possessio est immortalis, manus pro possessione et mortua pro immortali.

Source: Co. Litt. 2; Jackson

Lands held in mortmain (by corporations or religious houses) are effectively removed from commerce because the holder never dies — statutes of mortmain exist to prevent perpetual accumulation by immortal entities.

The promises of women are prompter than those of men.

Maturiora sunt vota mulierum quam virorum.

Source: 6 Co. 71; Jackson; Weisman, 104n

This maxim historically justified earlier ages of legal capacity for women in certain contexts — it reflects the common law’s recognition that maturity of judgment may differ between individuals.

The smallest bodily punishment is greater than any pecuniary one.

Minima pena corporalis est major qualibet pecuniaria.

Source: 2 Inst. 220; Jackson; Weisman, 92y

Liberty of the person is more precious than property — the law treats even the slightest restraint on bodily freedom as more serious than any monetary penalty.

Death dissolves all things.

Mors omnia solvit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 160; Jackson; Weisman, 75v

Death extinguishes personal obligations and liabilities — actions that are purely personal (as opposed to those touching property) die with the party.

There are two sorts of nobility, the higher and the lower.

Nobilitas est duplex, superior et inferior.

Source: 2 Inst. 583; Jackson

The distinction between grades of nobility determined the order of precedence and the incidents of tenure — in American law, all titles of nobility are prohibited by the Constitution.

Names ought to be regarded not by the opinions of individuals, but by common use.

Non ex opinionibus singulorum sed ex communi usu nomina exaudiri debent.

Source: D. 38, 10, 7; Jackson

Legal terms are to be understood according to their ordinary and customary meaning, not according to any private or idiosyncratic definition a party may assign to them.

No one is considered entitled to recover that which he must give up to another.

Non videtur quisquam id capere, quod ei necesse est alii restituere.

Source: D. 50, 17, 51; Jackson; Weisman, 94l

The law does not permit a futile recovery — if a party must immediately surrender what he obtains, he has no real interest worth pursuing.

No one is to be esteemed a wrongdoer who merely avails himself of his legal rights.

Nullus videtur dolo facere qui suo jure utitur.

Source: D. 50, 17, 55; Jackson

The lawful exercise of a right is not actionable, even if it causes incidental harm to another — a man standing on his own right commits no wrong.

The estimation of a past offence is never increased by a later fact.

Nunquam crescit ex post facto praeteriti delicti aestimatio.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 8; Jackson

The gravity of an offense is fixed at the time it is committed — subsequent events cannot retroactively enlarge the penalty or change the character of the act.

The concealment of discovered treasure is fraudulent.

Occultatio thesauri inventi fraudulosa.

Source: 3 Inst. 133; Jackson

One who discovers treasure trove and conceals it commits a fraud upon the Crown or sovereign — the law requires disclosure of found treasure.

The offices of magistrates ought not to be sold.

Officia magistratus non debent esse venalia.

Source: Co. Litt. 234; Jackson

Public offices exist for the service of the People, not for the profit of the officeholder — the sale of public office is an act of corruption that vitiates the appointment.

Compacts which are not illegal, and do not originate in fraud, must in all respects be observed.

Pacta conventa quae neque contra leges neque dolo malo inita sunt omnimodo observanda sunt.

Source: C. 2, 8, 29; Jackson; Weisman, 24m

Lawful agreements freely made are binding and must be honored — only illegality or fraud in the formation of the contract furnishes ground for non-performance.

It is not enough that sentence be given unless it be carried to execution.

Parum est latam esse sententiam nisi mandetur executioni.

Source: Co. Litt. 289; Jackson

A judgment without enforcement is an empty declaration — the administration of justice is complete only when the sentence is actually executed.

He who has no power of alienation must retain.

Qui non habet potestatem alienandi habet necessitatem retinendi.

Source: Hob. 336; Jackson

When the law forbids a person from transferring property, he is compelled to hold it — the inability to alienate creates a corresponding obligation of custody.

We dispense with the forms of law rather than that crimes and wrongs should go unpunished.

Receditur a placitis juris potius quam injuriae et delicta maneant impunita.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 12; Jackson

Procedural technicalities must not become shields for injustice — when rigid adherence to form would allow a wrong to escape correction, the form yields.

Sacrilege transcends the cupidity and wickedness of all other thefts.

Sacrilegus omnium praedonum cupiditatem et scelera superat.

Source: 4 Co. 106; Jackson

Theft from a sacred place or of sacred things is treated as the most aggravated form of larceny — the violation of the sacred compounds the offense beyond ordinary theft.

Always in doubtful matters the more liberal construction should be preferred.

Semper in dubiis benigniora praeferenda.

Source: Jackson

When a legal provision is ambiguous, the interpretation most favorable to liberty, to the accused, or to the party whose rights are at stake is to be adopted.

Simony is an ecclesiastical word, derived from Simon Magus, who thought the gift of the Holy Spirit could be purchased with money.

Simonia est vox ecclesiastica, a Simone illo Mago deducta, qui donum Spiritus Sancti pecunia emi putavit.

Source: 3 Inst. 153; Jackson

The buying or selling of spiritual offices or sacraments is an offense against both divine and human law — this maxim defines the origin and nature of the crime of simony.

An outlaw is, as it were, put out of the protection of the law: he carries the head of a wolf.

Utlagatus est quasi extra legem positus: caput gerit lupinum.

Source: 7 Co. 14; Jackson; Weisman, 26cc

One declared outlaw forfeits the protection of the law — the severity of this maxim historically meant that any man might treat the outlaw as he would a wolf, though modern law has replaced outlawry with less drastic measures.

The disposition of the law is more equitable than that of man.

Source: 8 Coke, 152; Weisman, 71tt

(English-origin maxim.) The law, when allowed to operate according to its settled principles, produces more just results than the arbitrary discretion of any individual.

Where form is not observed, a nullity of the act is inferred.

Ubi forma non observatur, infertur adnullatio actus.

Source: Coke, 12 Co. 7; Weisman, 46c

An act performed without the required legal form has no legal effect — it cannot create rights, impose duties, or bind any party.

Where the law prescribes a form, the nonobservance of it is fatal to the proceeding.

Ubi lex aliquam formam praescribit, non observatio formae est fatalis.

Source: Best, Ev. Introd. s. 59; Weisman, 46d

A warrant without a signature, an indictment without a charge, a deed without a seal (where seal is required) — all are void for want of form.

We are able to do only that which we can do lawfully.

Id possumus quod de jure possumus.

Source: Bouvier, Max. 129; Weisman, 73c

Power without lawful authority is no power at all — an officer who exceeds his lawful commission acts as a private person, not as an agent of the law.

To investigate is the way to know what things are truly lawful.

Investigare est modus sciendi quae res sint vere licita.

Source: Litt. s. 443; Bouvier, Max. 150; Weisman, 73b

Lawfulness is not assumed — it is proved by inquiry. The party asserting lawful authority bears the burden of showing the lawful basis for the act.

Where the law ends, tyranny begins.

Ubi cessat lex, ibi incipit tyrannis.

Source: Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U.S. 694, 702

The boundary of law is the boundary of legitimate power — any exercise of authority beyond what the law authorizes is tyranny, regardless of who exercises it.

He vainly invokes the aid of the law who transgresses the law.

Frustra legis auxilium quaerit qui in legem committit.

Source: Fleta, lib. 4, c. 2, s. 3; Broom, Max. 279, 297; Weisman, 72n

A party who has acted unlawfully cannot turn to the law for relief arising from that very unlawfulness — the courts will not aid one whose own hands are unclean.

Where there is no law, there is no transgression.

Ubi non est lex, ibi non est transgressio.

Source: Coke, 4 Co. 16b; Romans 4:15; Weisman, 72h

No one can be punished for an act that was not prohibited by law at the time it was committed — this is the foundation of the prohibition against ex post facto legislation.

One who commands lawfully must be obeyed.

Legitime imperanti parere necesse est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 120; Weisman, 11s

Lawful authority commands obedience — but the emphasis falls on "lawfully." An unlawful command binds no one.

Although alienation be prohibited, yet by the consent of all those in whose favour it is prohibited it may take place; for it is in the power of every man to renounce a law made in his own favour.

Alienatio licet prohibeatur, consensu tamen omnium in quorum favorem prohibita est potest fieri.

Source: Co. Litt. 98; Jackson

A restriction on alienation may be waived by the unanimous consent of those the restriction was designed to protect — every person has the right to renounce a benefit conferred for his own advantage.

Power is not conferred but for the public good.

Potentia non est nisi ad bonum.

Source: Bouvier, Max.

All governmental power exists for the benefit of the governed — power exercised against the public good is power abused and is without lawful authority.

The law does not compel the impossible.

Lex non cogit ad impossibilia.

Source: Co. Litt. 231b; Broom, Max. 242; Hob. 96

No government may require of its citizens what is impossible to perform.

It is a wretched state of slavery which subsists where the law is vague or uncertain.

Misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut incertum.

Source: 4 Inst. 245, 246; Broom, Max. 150; Weisman, 47i

Vague laws that leave the citizen guessing whether he is free to act are instruments of servitude, not liberty. A law must be definite enough that a citizen of ordinary understanding can know what is required. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.3.9.)

Everyone is the manager and disposer of his own affairs.

Rerum suarum quilibet est moderator et arbiter.

Source: Co. Litt. 223a; Bouvier, Max.

Every man has the natural right to direct his own affairs, order his own household, and dispose of his own property — no authority may usurp this right without due process of law.

Not the duration of time, but the solidity of reason, is to be considered.

Non diuturnitas temporis, sed soliditas rationis est consideranda.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 100, case 95; Weisman, 77g

What must be considered is not the duration of time but the solidity of reason — a right grounded in sound principle endures regardless of how long it has gone unexercised or been suppressed.

Under the name of arms are included, not only shields and swords and helmets, but also clubs and stones.

Source: Co. Litt. 162; Weisman, 9b

(English-origin maxim.) The term "arms" is broadly defined to include any weapon, not merely firearms or bladed weapons — cite this to argue that the right to bear arms extends to all instruments of defense.

It is a liberty of free citizens to retain arms for their protection and according to their condition.

Source: People v. Horton, 264 N.Y.S. 84, 88; Weisman, 9c

(English-origin maxim.) Free citizens have a liberty to keep and bear arms suitable to their condition for their personal protection — this is a right of free status, not a government-granted privilege.

Arms used in the committing an offense include only that which is recognized as a dangerous weapon.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 9e

(English-origin maxim.) The term "arms" in the context of criminal offenses is limited to instruments recognized at common law as dangerous weapons — ordinary tools, household implements, or objects not inherently dangerous cannot be classified as "arms" merely because they were present during an offense, and any statute that expands this definition beyond its common law meaning encroaches upon the right of the People to keep and bear arms.

The people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state.

Source: Weisman, 9f

(English-origin maxim.) The people's right to bear arms exists for both personal defense and the defense of the state — this dual purpose cannot be legislatively reduced to only one or the other.

No one can improve his condition by his own misdeed.

Nemo potest conditionem suam meliorem facere delicto suo.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 134, 1; Broom, Max. 299; Weisman, 19f; Weisman, 76g

A wrongdoer cannot claim a legal benefit arising from his own wrong — no man shall profit from his own unlawful act.

One placed outside the law is civilly dead.

Extra legem positus est civiliter mortuus.

Source: Co. Litt. 130a; Wharton, Legal Maxims no. 172; Weisman, 36q

Outlawry — the deprivation of the protection of law — was the most severe civil penalty. It could not be imposed except by lawful judgment.

Impersonality neither concludes nor binds.

Impersonalitas non concludit nec ligat.

Source: Co. Litt. 352b; Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims no. 808; Weisman, 61g

A vague or impersonal charge or claim binds no one. The law requires that parties be specifically named and identified.

A municipality and a decuria function in the place of a person.

Personae vice fungitur municipium et decuria.

Source: Wharton, III-251

A municipality acts in the capacity of a legal person and may hold rights, incur obligations, and appear in court — but only through its duly authorized officers acting within their delegated power.

When the rights of the king and of the subject concur, those of the king are to be preferred.

Quando jus domini regis et subditi concurrunt jus regis praeferri debet.

Source: 9 Co. 129; Jackson

Where the sovereign and a subject hold competing claims to the same right or property, the sovereign's claim takes precedence — though in the American system this principle is constrained by the constitutional reservation of rights to the People.

A madman is punished by his madness alone.

Furiosus solo furore punitur.

Source: Co. Litt. 247b; Broom, Max. 15

The insane cannot be held criminally responsible — their affliction is itself their penalty.

Anger is a brief madness.

Ira furor brevis est.

Source: Beardsley v. Maynard, 4 Wend. (N.Y.) 336, 355; Horace, Epistles I.2.62

Acts done in the heat of passion are treated with some mitigation — but unlike true insanity, anger does not fully excuse the act.

He is insane who, reason being cast away, does everything with violence and rage.

Furiosus est qui, abjecta ratione, omnia cum impetu et furore facit.

Source: 4 Co. 128; Weisman, 55c

Insanity in law is defined not by diagnosis but by the abandonment of reason — the test is functional, not medical.

To him to whom nothing is enough, nothing is base.

Cui parum est nihil, nihil ei turpe est.

Source: 4 Inst. 53; Weisman, 55b

Unchecked appetite — whether for power, wealth, or control — recognizes no moral boundary. The law guards against this tendency by limiting authority to its grant.

Drunkenness both inflames and reveals every crime.

Omne crimen ebrietas et incendit et detegit.

Source: Co. Litt. 247; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 26k

Intoxication strips away restraint and exposes the true disposition — it is both an accelerant of wrongdoing and a window into character.

He who offends while drunk must be punished when sober.

Qui peccat ebrius, luat sobrius.

Source: Cary 133; Bouvier, Max.

Voluntary intoxication is no defense — a man who drinks and then commits wrong chose to impair his own judgment and must bear the full consequence.

Ignorance of the law does not excuse.

Ignorantia juris non excusat.

Source: 4 Bouv. Inst. no. 3828; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 111; 2 Co. 36; 4 Bl. Comm. 27; Broom, Max. 253

Every man is presumed to know the law. This presumption is necessary to the functioning of any legal system — without it, the most brazen violator would have the readiest defense.

Ignorance of the law excuses no one, for all are presumed to know the law.

Ignorantia legis neminem excusat; omnes enim praesumuntur legem scire.

Source: 1 Co. 177; Broom, Max. 253; Rankin v. Mortimere, 7 Watts (Pa.) 374

The presumption of legal knowledge is universal and cannot be rebutted by a claim of personal unfamiliarity with the law.

A mistake of law is no defense in criminal cases.

Error in jure in criminalibus non est defensio.

Source: 4 Bl. Comm. 27; 4 Steph. Comm. 81; Broom, Max. 253

Criminal liability cannot be avoided by pleading that the accused did not know his act was unlawful. The law is equally binding on the learned and the unlearned.

It is ignorance when we do not know our own rights.

Ignorantia est cum jura nostra non cognoscimus.

Source: Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 130, 19 Am. Dec. 353; Weisman, 57e

The most dangerous form of ignorance is not ignorance of the law in general, but ignorance of one's own particular rights — for a man who does not know his rights cannot defend them.

Let him who wishes to be deceived, be deceived.

Qui vult decipi, decipiatur.

Source: 1 de G. M. & G. 687; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 29u

The law will not rescue a man from the consequences of deception he willingly embraced — voluntary blindness to fraud forfeits the right to complain of it.

A mistake in point of law is, in criminal cases, no sort of defense.

Source: 4 Bl. Comm. 27; 4 Steph. Comm. 81; Broom, Max. 253; 7 Car. P. 456; 2 Kent, Comm. 491, and note; Weisman, 57g

(English-origin maxim.) In criminal prosecutions, a defendant cannot escape liability by claiming he did not know his act was illegal — the law presumes knowledge of its own commands, and mistake of law is no defense to a criminal charge.

The act does not make one guilty unless the mind be guilty.

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

Source: 3 Inst. 107; 7 T.R. 514; Broom, Max. 306; Lofft 37

Criminal liability requires both a wrongful act and a wrongful intent. Neither alone suffices — the union of the two constitutes the crime.

An act done against my will is not my act.

Actus me invito factus non est meus actus.

Source: Bract. fol. 101b; Peloubet, Legal Maxims no. 62; Broom, Max. 270; Weisman, 2q

No man can be charged with the consequences of an act to which he did not consent. Compelled acts are not voluntary acts — and only voluntary acts give rise to legal liability.

The will and the purpose distinguish offenses.

Voluntas et propositum distinguunt maleficia.

Source: Bract. fol. 2b, 101b; Hob. 123

The same physical act may be innocent or criminal depending on the intent behind it. Intent is the dividing line between accident and offense.

My intention gives name to my act.

Intentio mea imponit nomen operi meo.

Source: Bract. fol. 2b, 101b; Hob. 123

The character of an act is determined by the purpose for which it was done — the same blow may be self-defense, accident, or murder depending on the intent behind it.

The act and the intent must both concur to constitute a crime.

Actus et intentio debent concurrere ut constituant crimen.

Source: 7 T.R. 514; Broom, Max. 306; Howard v. Sexton, 4 N.Y. 157, 159

A criminal prosecution must prove both the outward act (actus reus) and the inward intent (mens rea). Failure on either element defeats the charge.

Outward acts reveal the inner secrets.

Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta.

Source: Broom, Max. (3d ed.) 270; 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 115; 8 Co. 291

When direct proof of intent is unavailable, the law infers intent from conduct. A man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his deliberate acts.

Without knowledge, intent cannot exist.

Sine scientia intentio esse non potest.

Source: Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711; Weisman, 60m

Intent presupposes knowledge of the relevant facts. One who is genuinely ignorant of a material circumstance cannot have formed the specific intent the law requires.

The intention amounts to nothing unless some effect follows.

Intentio cadit ad nihil nisi sequatur aliquis effectus.

Source: 1 Rolle, 226; Bouvier, Law Dict. 143; Weisman, 60c

Mere intention, without any overt act in furtherance of it, creates no legal liability. The law punishes acts, not thoughts.

Every consent removes error.

Omnis consensus tollit errorem.

Source: 2 Inst. 123; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 37c

When a party, fully informed, freely consents to the terms of a transaction, his consent cures any prior defect of error — knowing ratification validates the act.

If the form is not observed, the annulment of the act follows.

Non observata forma, infertur adnullatio actus.

Source: 12 Co. 7; Broom, Max. 64

An officer who fails to follow the required procedure has not performed his duty — his act is void, not merely voidable.

No one is bound to criminate himself.

Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare.

Source: Wing. Max. 486; Wharton

The privilege against self-incrimination is a natural right — no tribunal, officer, or proceeding may compel a man to furnish evidence against himself.

He who can and ought to forbid a thing, and does not, commands it.

Qui potest et debet vetare, jubet.

Source: 2 Inst. 146; Bouvier, Max.

The officer or guardian who has the power and duty to prevent a wrong but stands idle is treated as having authorized it — silence in the face of duty is complicity.

Polygamy is the marriage of many husbands or wives at one time.

Polygamia est plurium simul virorum uxorumve connubium.

Source: 3 Inst. 88; Jackson

The law defines polygamy as the simultaneous union of multiple spouses — a practice forbidden at common law and punishable as an offense against the institution of marriage.

It is not lawful to have two wives at one time.

Duos uxores eodem tempore habere non potest.

Source: Inst. 1, 10, 6; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 79a

The law of nature and of nations forbids bigamy — no man may contract a second marriage while a first subsists.

Paternal power should consist in affection, not in atrocity.

Patria potestas in pietate debet, non in atrocitate consistere.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 11r

The authority of a parent over a child is grounded in love and nurture, not in violence or tyranny — the law restrains paternal power that degenerates into cruelty.

A theft is the fraudulent handling of another’s property with an intention of stealing, the proprietor, whose property it was, not willing it.

Furtum est contrectatio rei alienae fraudulenta, cum animo furandi, invito illo domino cujus res illa fuerat.

Source: 3 Inst. 107; Jackson

Theft requires three elements: fraudulent handling, intent to steal, and the absence of the owner’s consent — without all three, no theft is committed.

It is not theft where the commencement of the detention arises through the will of the owner of the thing detained.

Furtum non est ubi initium habet detentionis per dominum rei.

Source: 3 Inst. 107; Jackson

Where possession originated with the owner's consent, the subsequent retention does not constitute theft — the initial lawful delivery negates the element of unlawful taking.

He who commands a thing to be done is held to have done it himself.

Qui mandat ipse fecisse videtur.

Source: Story, *Bailments* § 147; Dig. 50, 17, 169; Weisman, 4j

The one who directs the act bears the same responsibility as the one who performs it — the command is the cause, and the cause answers.

In high treason there is no accessory, but principal alone.

In alta proditione nullus potest esse accessorius sed principalis solummodo.

Source: 3 Inst. 138; Jackson; Weisman, 26y

In cases of high treason, the law makes no distinction between principal and accessory — all participants are treated as principals, because the offense is so grave that every degree of participation bears equal guilt.

No one is called an accessory after the fact but he who knew the principal to have committed a felony and received and comforted him.

Nullus dicitur accessorius post feloniam, sed ille qui novit principalem feloniam fecisse et illum receptavit et comfortavit.

Source: 3 Inst. 138; Jackson; Weisman, 26g

Accessory-after-the-fact liability requires both knowledge of the felony and an affirmative act of harboring or aiding the felon — mere passive knowledge is not enough.

No one shall be called a principal felon except the party actually committing the felony, or the party present aiding and abetting in its commission.

Nullus dicitur felo principalis nisi actor, aut qui praesens est abettans aut auxilians ad feloniam faciendam.

Source: 3 Inst. 138; Jackson; Weisman, 26h

A principal in felony is either the person who commits the act or one who is physically present and actively assists — absence from the scene makes one an accessory, not a principal.

The loss falls on the owner.

Res perit suo domino.

Source: Bell Dict. 857; Jackson; Weisman, 91ff

The risk of accidental loss or destruction of property lies with the owner — unless another has assumed that risk by contract or wrongful act.

The law of God and the law of the land are one, and both preserve and favor the private rights to the land.

Lex Dei et lex terrae omnia una, et ambo conservant et praeferunt jura privata ad terram.

Source: Keilw. 191

The divine law and the common law unite in one purpose: the protection of every man's private right to his land and home.

Every man's house is his safest refuge.

Domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium.

Source: 5 Co. 91b; 3 Inst. 162; Dig. 2.4.18; Broom, Max. 432; Weisman, 54d; Weisman, 54f

The law regards the home as the ultimate sanctuary — no power may breach it without the most urgent lawful necessity.

Nothing is more sacred, more inviolate, than the house of every citizen.

Nihil est magis sacrum, magis inviolatum, quam domus uniuscujusque civis.

Source: C.L.M.; Dig. 50.17.103; 5 Co. 91, 92; Weisman, 54c

The sanctity of the home is among the highest protections the law affords — even the winds of heaven may blow through it, but the government may not enter without warrant.

A grant must be construed with certainty as to the thing granted.

Concessio per regem fieri debet de certitudine.

Source: Bract. fol. 15b; 9 Co. 46; Bacon, Max.

No grant is valid unless the subject of the grant can be identified with certainty — vagueness defeats a conveyance.

He is fraudulent who sells the same thing twice.

Fraudulentus est qui rem bis vendit.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 107; Weisman, 13i

Double-dealing in sales is fraud on its face — a man who sells what he has already sold defrauds the second buyer.

There shall be no commerce in illicit or prohibited goods.

Commercium illicitarum vel prohibitarum rerum non est habendum.

Source: 3 Kent, Comm. 262, note; Weisman, 13d

Commerce is favored, but not in things that are inherently wrong — the law will not enforce a bargain in unlawful goods.

The heir succeeds to the restitution, not to the penalty.

In restitutionem, non in poenam haeres succedit.

Source: 2 Inst. 198; Jackson; Weisman, 58y

An heir inherits the obligation to make restitution for wrongs committed by the ancestor, but does not inherit criminal penalties — punishment is personal and dies with the offender.

A penal action is not given against an heir, unless such heir is benefited by the wrong.

Source: Black's, 2d. 25; 2 Inst. 442; Weisman, 58t

(English-origin maxim.) An heir is not liable for the penal consequences of his ancestor's wrongs unless the heir has personally benefited from those wrongs — punishment does not pass by descent.

The heir ought not to be bound in a penalty for the crime of the deceased.

Poena ex delicto defuncti, haeres teneri non debet.

Source: 2 Inst. 198; Jackson; Weisman, 58v

Criminal penalties are personal and die with the offender — the heir succeeds to the ancestor's property and obligations of restitution, but never to his punishments.

He who does anything by command of a judge will not be supposed to have acted from an improper motive, because it was necessary to obey.

Qui jussu judicis aliquod fecerit non videtur dolo malo fecisse quia parere necesse est.

Source: 10 Co. 76; Jackson

Obedience to a judicial command excuses the actor from imputation of wrongful intent — the necessity of compliance negates the presumption of malice.

Simony is the will or desire of buying or selling spiritualities, or things pertaining thereto.

Simonia est voluntas sive desiderium emendi vel vendendi spiritualia vel spiritualibus adhaerentia.

Source: Hob. 167; Jackson

The law forbids the buying and selling of sacred offices, sacraments, and spiritual benefits — such traffic is void as contrary to good morals and the law of the Church.

Those who act and those who consent to the act are visited with equal punishment.

Agentes et consentientes pari poena plectentur.

Source: 5 Co. 80; Jackson 43

An officer who consents to a trespass on the rights of the People is equally liable with the officer who executes it.

A contract founded on a base consideration, or against good morals, is null.

Contractus ex turpi causa, vel contra bonos mores, nullus est.

Source: Hob. 167; Broom, Max. 730, 732; Dig. 2, 14, 27, 4; Code 2, 3, 6; Weisman, 24p

An agreement rooted in illegality or immorality confers no rights and creates no duties — the law will not enforce what it forbids.

No contract can arise from an act radically wrong and illegal.

Ex maleficio non oritur contractus.

Source: 1 Term 734; 3 Term 422; Broom, Max. 734; Jackson 247; Weisman, 24z

An agreement rooted in illegality is void ab initio — no man gains rights by his own wrongdoing.

The mandate of an illegal thing is void.

Rei turpis nullum mandatum est.

Source: Dig. 17, 1, 6, 3; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 62f

No man can lawfully commission another to do what the law forbids — an unlawful mandate creates no obligation on either party.

He who has not the means to pay with his purse must suffer in his person.

Qui non habet in aere, luat in corpore.

Source: 2 Inst. 173; Jackson

At common law, a debtor who could not satisfy a judgment in money was subject to imprisonment for debt — a harsh rule largely abolished but reflecting the principle that obligations must be answered.

In criminal matters, the will is taken for the deed.

In criminalibus, voluntas reputabitur pro facto.

Source: Coke, 3 Inst. 106; Weisman, 26t; Weisman, 44r

Where criminal intent is clearly proved, the law may hold a man accountable even though the intended result was not fully accomplished.

In criminal matters, a general malice of intention is sufficient when joined with an act of equal degree.

In criminalibus sufficit generalis malitia intentionis cum facto paris gradus.

Source: Bacon, Max. p. 65, reg. 15; Broom, Max. 291; Weisman, 26s

The prosecution need not prove specific malice toward a particular person when general malicious intent accompanied the criminal act.

In offenses, the intention is regarded, not the outcome.

In maleficiis voluntas spectatur, non exitus.

Source: Dig. 48, 8, 14; Bacon, Max. reg. 7; Weisman, 26p

A man who attempts a crime with full intent is not excused merely because he failed in the execution.

In more atrocious crimes, the intent is punished even though the effect does not follow.

In atrocioribus delictis punitur affectus licet non sequatur effectus.

Source: 2 Rolle 82; Weisman, 26l

The more serious the intended crime, the more the law focuses on the criminal purpose rather than whether harm was actually accomplished.

Felony, by force of the term, signifies any capital crime committed with a malignant mind.

Felonia, ex vi termini, significat quodlibet capitale crimen felleo animo perpetratum.

Source: Co. Litt. 391; Weisman, 26e

The very definition of felony embeds the requirement of evil intent — without the felonious mind, there is no felony.

Drunkenness both inflames and reveals every crime.

Omne crimen ebrietas et incendit et detegit.

Source: Co. Litt. 241a; 4 Bl. Comm. 26; Broom, Max. 17

Intoxication is no defense to criminal conduct — it aggravates rather than excuses, and the law holds a man accountable for what he does when drunk.

Crime vitiates everything that springs from it.

Crimen omnia ex se nata vitiat.

Source: Henry v. Bank of Salina, 5 Hill (N.Y.) 523, 531; Weisman, 26o

No lawful right, title, or benefit can arise from a criminal act — the taint of the original wrong infects everything built upon it.

The crime of treason exceeds all other crimes as to its punishment.

Crimen laesae majestatis omnia alia crimina excedit quoad poenam.

Source: 3 Inst. 210; Weisman, 26c

Treason — the betrayal of sovereign trust — stands apart from all other offenses in severity, because it strikes at the foundation of the entire legal order.

The touching of property not one’s own, with an intention to steal, is theft.

Contrectatio rei alienae, animo furandi, est furtum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 132; Jackson; Weisman, 91c

The mere handling of another’s property with intent to steal constitutes theft, even if the property is not carried away — the crime is complete upon the wrongful touching.

He who is bound to obey is in no fault. As where the proper officer executes a criminal, or where an officer of justice, in the legal exercise of a particular duty, kills a person who resists.

Ejus nulla culpa est cui parere necesse sit.

Source: D. 50, 17, 169; Jackson

An officer acting under lawful compulsion bears no guilt for the consequences of obedience — the fault lies with the authority that commanded the act, not the instrument that carried it out.

It is a greater crime to kill one’s self than another.

Majus est delictum seipsum occidere quam alium.

Source: 3 Inst. 54; Jackson

Self-destruction is regarded as the greater offense because it deprives both God and the commonwealth of a life over which the individual has stewardship, not ownership.

He threatens the innocent who spares the guilty.

Minatur innocentibus, qui parcit nocentibus.

Source: 4 Co. 45; Jackson; Weisman, 92x

Failure to punish the guilty emboldens wrongdoers and leaves the innocent exposed to future harm — leniency toward criminals is cruelty toward their victims.

No crime is greater than disobedience.

Nullum crimen majus est inobedientia.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 77; Jackson

Disobedience to lawful authority strikes at the foundation of order itself — every other crime is a particular wrong, but disobedience is a rejection of the rule of law as such.

Let him who accuses be of clear fame, and not criminal.

Qui accusat integrae famae sit et non criminosus.

Source: 3 Inst. 26; Jackson

An accuser must himself be of unblemished reputation — a criminal bringing charges against another lacks the standing and credibility the law demands.

If a man kill one, meaning to kill another, he is held guilty of felony.

Si quis unum percusserit, cum alium percutere vellet, in felonia tenetur.

Source: 3 Inst. 51; Jackson; Weisman, 26n

Transferred intent applies in felony — a man who kills the wrong person through misdirected violence is as guilty as if he had struck his intended target.

An act does not make a person guilty, unless the intention be also guilty.

Actus non reum facit, nisi mens sit rea.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2211; Weisman, 60h; Weisman, 60n

Criminal liability requires the union of a wrongful act with a guilty mind; without criminal intent, there is no crime.

It is the crime which causes the shame, and not the scaffold.

C'est le crime qui fait la honte, et non pas l'echafaud.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

Disgrace attaches to the criminal act itself, not to the punishment that follows — the wrongdoer bears the shame regardless of whether he is caught.

Felony is included or implied in every treason.

Felonia implicatur in quolibet proditione.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 15

Every act of treason necessarily contains within it the lesser offense of felony, because betrayal of sovereign trust is the highest grade of criminal conduct.

Offenses against nature are the heaviest.

Peccata contra naturam sunt gravissima.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 20

Crimes that violate the natural order are treated as the most serious in law, because they offend not merely human enactment but the law of nature itself.

All crimes committed openly are considered lighter.

Omnia delicta in aperto leviora sunt.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 8 Co. 127; Weisman, 26aa

An offense committed in the open carries less moral weight than one carried out in secret, because concealment implies a deliberate effort to evade justice.

He who betrays his country is like the insane sailor who bores a hole in the ship which carries him.

Qui molitur insidias in patriam, id facit quod insanus nauta perforans navem in qua vehitur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 36

Treason is self-destructive folly — the traitor undermines the very order upon which his own safety depends.

Mayhem is the least of great crimes, and the greatest of small.

Mathemium est inter crimina majora minimum, et inter minora maximum.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 127

Mayhem occupies a middle position in the hierarchy of offenses, marking the boundary between capital crimes and lesser wrongs.

One who is accessory to a crime cannot be guilty of a higher degree of crime than his principal.

Source: 3 Inst. 139; Weisman, 26b

(English-origin maxim.) An accessory's guilt cannot exceed that of the principal — if the principal is guilty of manslaughter, the accessory cannot be convicted of murder.

The character of a past offense is never aggravated by a subsequent act or matter.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 138, 1; Bacon, Max. reg. 8; Broom, Max. 42; Weisman, 26d

(English-origin maxim.) A man's criminal liability is measured at the time of the offense and cannot be increased by anything he does afterward — later misconduct is charged separately.

Prevention is better than cure.

Source: Co. Litt. 304b; Weisman, 26f

(English-origin maxim.) The law favors preventive remedies — injunctions and restraining orders — over after-the-fact damages, because preventing harm is superior to compensating for it.

Facility of pardon is an incentive to crime.

Source: 4 Coke, 45; 3 Inst. 236; Weisman, 26m

(English-origin maxim.) Easy pardons encourage crime — when offenders expect clemency, the deterrent force of the law is destroyed and lawlessness increases.

Crimes are extinguished by death.

Source: Black's, 2d. 300; Weisman, 26r

(English-origin maxim.) Criminal prosecution abates upon the death of the accused — the state cannot try a dead man, and pending charges die with the defendant.

The will and the proposed end distinguished crimes.

Source: Bract. fol. 2b, 136b; 2 Inst. 57; Weisman, 26u

(English-origin maxim.) Criminal intent and the intended object distinguish one crime from another — the same physical act may constitute different offenses depending on the purpose behind it.

Capital crimes are punished by death.

Source: Walker v. State, 13 S.W. 860; Weisman, 26v

(English-origin maxim.) The defining characteristic of a capital crime is that it carries the death penalty — no lesser punishment qualifies an offense as capital.

It is not just and proper that he who speaks ill of a bad man should be condemned on that account; for it is fitting and expedient that the crimes of bad men should be known.

Source: Dig. 47, 10, 17; 1 Bl. Comm. 125; Weisman, 26dd

(English-origin maxim.) Truth is a defense to defamation — a man who speaks truthfully about the crimes of a wrongdoer cannot be condemned for doing so, because the public has a right to know.

It is fraud to conceal a fraud.

Fraus est celare fraudem.

Source: 1 Vern. 270; Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 389-390; Weisman, 29r

One who knows of a fraud and conceals it becomes a party to the fraud itself — silence in the face of known deceit is active participation.

Fraud is not purged by circuity.

Dolus circuitu non purgatur.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 4; Broom, Max. 228; Noy, Max. 9, 12; Weisman, 29p

A fraudulent act cannot be laundered into legitimacy by running it through intermediate steps, agencies, or transactions — the taint follows every link in the chain.

Fraud and deceit should be a defense or advantage to no one.

Dolus et fraus nemini patrocinari debent.

Source: 3 Coke, 78b; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 13, § 15; Best, Evid. p. 469

No man shall profit, find shelter, or gain legal advantage through his own deceit — the law strips every benefit built on fraudulent foundations.

He is not considered to have consented who has altered something under the direction of a threatening party.

Non videtur consensum retinuisse si quis ex praescripto minantis aliquid immutavit.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 145

Consent procured by threat or coercion is no consent at all — where duress overbears the will, the apparent agreement is void and the party compelled is not bound.

He who acts fraudulently acts in vain.

Qui per fraudem agit, frustra agit.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Roll. R. 17; Weisman, 29y

Every action grounded in fraud is void and of no legal effect — the law strips the deceiver of every advantage gained by his deceit.

The corruption of the best is the worst.

Corruptio optimi pessima.

Source: Black's, 2d. 277; Weisman, 25d

When those entrusted with the highest offices and duties become corrupt, the resulting injury to the public trust is the most severe.

Corruption is always the forerunner of despotism.

Corruptio est semper praecursor despotismi.

Source: Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U.S. 108, 111-12; Weisman, 25f

Where public officers engage in corrupt practices, tyranny inevitably follows — corruption in government is not an isolated vice but the gateway to the loss of all liberty.

Extortion is a crime when, under color of office, one takes what is not due, or more than is due, or before the time when it is due.

Extortio est crimen quando quis colore officii extorquet quod non est debitum, vel supra debitum, vel ante tempus quod est debitum.

Source: 10 Coke, 102; Weisman, 26q

A public officer who uses his position to exact anything beyond what is lawfully owed commits the specific crime of extortion — color of office magnifies, not excuses, the wrong.

Whatever in itself is not lawful, necessity makes lawful; and necessity induces a privilege as regards private rights.

Quicquid per se non est licitum, necessitate fit licitum; et necessitas inducit privilegium quoad jura privata.

Source: 2 Inst. 564

Under the monarchy, necessity was declared by the Crown and accepted without question. In the American system, necessity does not suspend due process of law — even genuine emergency must pass through judicial review, and no claim of necessity can permanently destroy a reserved right of the People without due process of law.

No one can change his purpose to the injury of another.

Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam.

Source: D. 50, 17, 75; Jackson; Weisman, 59i

A man may not reverse his course of action when doing so would injure another who has relied upon his original undertaking — change of mind does not excuse the harm it causes.

Surplusage hurts not.

Surplusagium non nocet.

Source: 9 H. 6, 26; Jackson

Unnecessary or redundant matter in a pleading or instrument does not vitiate what is otherwise sufficient — superfluous words are disregarded rather than treated as fatal defects.

A personal injury does not receive satisfaction from a future course of proceeding, [is not left for its satisfaction to a future course of proceeding.].

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 6; Broom, Max. 278; Weisman, 59h

(English-origin maxim.) A wrong to the person demands immediate redress — the injured party cannot be told to wait for some future proceeding, because personal injuries require present remedy.

He is free from fault who knows but cannot prevent.

Culpa caret qui scit sed prohibere non potest.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 50; Weisman, 44a

The law does not hold a man culpable for failing to prevent what was genuinely beyond his power — but the inability must be real, not merely inconvenient.

Gross fault is equivalent to intentional wrong.

Culpa lata aequiparatur dolo.

Source: Dig. 50, 16, 226; Black's, 2d. 304

Negligence so extreme as to suggest reckless indifference to consequences is treated by the law as though it were a deliberate act.

Let the punishment be proportioned to the fault.

Culpae poena par esto.

Source: Dig. 48, 19, 11; Broom, Max. 279; Weisman, 92dd

The measure of accountability must match the degree of blameworthiness — the law demands proportionality between fault and consequence.

A frivolous fear is not a lawful excuse.

Vanus timor non est excusatio.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 184; 2 Inst. 483; Weisman, 44g

The law does not accept speculative or imaginary fears as justification for wrongful action — the apprehended danger must be real and imminent.

To commit and not prohibit, when in your power, is the same thing; and he who does not, when he can prohibit, is in fault.

Idem est facere et non prohibere cum possis; et qui non prohibet cum prohibere possit in culpa est.

Source: 3 Inst. 158; Jackson; Weisman, 44n

He who has the power to prevent a wrong and fails to act is as culpable as the one who commits it — the duty to prevent evil is as binding as the duty not to commit it.

A fault finds its own authors.

Culpa tenet suos auctores.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

Blame attaches to the one who caused the fault — responsibility cannot be shifted to an innocent party but traces back to its true origin.

No guilt attaches to him who is compelled to obey.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 169, pr.; Bouv. 124; Weisman, 44c

(English-origin maxim.) A soldier obeying a lawful order, or a servant acting under his master's command, bears no fault for the consequences — compulsion negates personal culpability.

Obedience to existing laws is a sufficient extenuation of guilt before a civil tribunal.

Source: Broom, Max. 12, note; Weisman, 44d

(English-origin maxim.) Compliance with existing law is a sufficient mitigation of guilt before a civil tribunal — a man who acted within the bounds of the law as it stood is entitled to leniency, because obedience to the law of the land extenuates what might otherwise be blameworthy.

He adds fault to fault who sets up a defense of a wrong committed by him.

Source: 5 Coke, 49; Weisman, 44f

(English-origin maxim.) A wrongdoer who attempts to justify his wrong compounds his offense — defending a bad act adds a second fault to the first.

Where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it.

Source: Story, Ag. s. 195; Weisman, 44j

(English-origin maxim.) When both parties are equally at fault, the law will not intervene for either — the court leaves the loss where it finds it, granting no relief to either side.

Misconduct binds [should bind] its own authors. It is a never-failing axiom that everyone is accountable only for his own offense or wrong.

Source: Ersk. Inst. 4, 1, 14; Weisman, 44l

(English-origin maxim.) Each man answers only for his own misconduct — liability cannot be shifted to one who had no part in the wrong.

The law holds him excused who chose that his blood should be redeemed on any terms.

Source: Dig. 48, 21, 1; 1 Bl. Comm. 131; Weisman, 44m

(English-origin maxim.) Self-preservation is a right recognized by law — a man who acts under duress to save his own life is excused, even if he submitted to terms he would otherwise refuse.

Malice is bitter; it is the character of a wicked mind.

Malitia est acida; est mali animi affectus.

Source: 2 Bulstr. 49

Malice is not mere ill-feeling but a settled disposition to do wrong — the law treats it as a distinct and aggravating element of culpability.

Evil is not presumed.

Malum non praesumitur.

Source: 4 Coke, 72; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 78c

The law's starting presumption is innocence — no man is assumed to harbor evil intent until the evidence compels that conclusion.

It is not lawful to do evil that good may come of it.

Non licet ex malo bonum facere.

Source: 11 Coke, 74a; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 378; Weisman, 78n

No desired outcome, however beneficial, can justify the use of unlawful means to achieve it — the end never justifies the means.

Evil deeds are distinguished from evil purposes.

Mala in se distinguuntur a malis propositis.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 290; Weisman, 78m

The law recognizes the distinction between an act that is inherently wrong and a purpose that is wicked — both matter, but they are judged by different measures.

What otherwise was not lawful, necessity makes lawful; but when something is not in itself evil, yet may serve as an example for evil, it is not to be done.

Quod alias non fuit licitum, necessitas licitum facit; sed quando per se non sit malum, et tamen exemplum mali.

Source: 2 Inst. 564

Necessity may justify acts that would otherwise be unlawful; but even where an act is not inherently wrongful, the law prohibits it if permitting it would normalize wrongful conduct by setting a dangerous example.

Malice supplies age.

Malitia supplet aetatem.

Source: 1 Bl. Comm. 464; Weisman, 78j

Where a minor demonstrates a degree of malice beyond his years, the law may treat him as capable of criminal intent regardless of the presumption of incapacity attending his age.

Evil mind, evil intent.

Mala mens, malus animus.

Source: 4 Coke, 15

The law recognizes that a wicked purpose and a corrupt will are inseparable — where malice of mind is established, evil intent is presumed to follow, and the law acts accordingly.

Good men hate sin through love of virtue; bad men, through fear of punishment.

Bonos mores peccata delinquentium odiunt per amorem virtutis; malos per timorem poenae.

Source: Black's, 2d. 847; Weisman, 92k

The law serves both the virtuous and the wicked — it reinforces the good man's conscience and restrains the bad man's appetite through the credible threat of consequences.

The malice of men is to be avoided.

Malum hominum est obviandum.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 4 Co. 15; Weisman, 78k

The law takes preventive measures against known evil — where malicious intent is apparent, it is to be guarded against before it ripens into harm.

The more common the evil, the worse.

Malum quo communius eo pejus.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Weisman, 78d

A wrong that spreads widely through society is more dangerous than an isolated offense, because it corrupts the general order and threatens the peace of all.

Malice is sour, it is the quality of a bad mind.

Source: 2 Bulst. 49; Weisman, 78b

(English-origin maxim.) Malice is the hallmark of a corrupt mind — where malice is proved, the law infers a disposition hostile to the rights of others and punishes accordingly.

Good laws arise from evil manners, i.e., are necessitated by the evil behavior of men.

Source: 2 Inst. 161; Weisman, 78f

(English-origin maxim.) Legislation arises from the need to restrain wrongdoing — it is the misconduct of men that compels the creation of new laws.

One wrong does not excuse another.

Injuria non excusat injuriam.

Source: Broom, Max. 395; 11 Exch. 822; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 105a

That another man wronged you first grants no license to wrong him in return — each wrong must be answered for independently.

No one can take advantage of his own wrong.

Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria.

Source: Co. Litt. 148b; Jenk. Cent. 161; Broom, Max. 279; Weisman, 105b

The law will never permit a wrongdoer to profit from his own wrongful act — no right, title, or benefit shall arise from a man's own unlawful conduct.

Force, fraud, and wrong are the greatest enemies of peace.

Vis, fraus, et injuria, maximi sunt hostes pacis.

Source: Co. Litt. 161

The three great destroyers of civil order are violence, deceit, and injustice — the law's first object is to suppress all three.

A wrong, in capital cases, is excused or palliated, which would not be so treated in civil cases.

Excusat aut extenuat delictum in capitalibus quod non operatur idem in civilibus.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 15; Jackson

Because life is at stake in capital matters, the law extends defenses and mitigating circumstances that would not avail in civil proceedings — the higher the penalty, the more liberal the construction in favor of the accused.

No one can improve his condition by a crime.

Nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Dig. 50, 17, 137

A criminal act can never serve as the foundation for bettering one's legal position — the law denies all benefit flowing from wrongful conduct.

Whatever is done in excess is prohibited by law.

Quicquid in excessu actum est, lege prohibetur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Co. Inst. 107; Weisman, 41b

The law sets bounds to every right and every power; action that exceeds those bounds is itself a wrong, regardless of whether the underlying authority was legitimate. (Duplicate maxim — see also 12.5.1.)

Wherever there is a wrong, there damage follows.

Source: 10 Coke, 116; Weisman, 105f

(English-origin maxim.) Every legal wrong carries with it a corresponding damage — where a right is violated, the law presumes that harm has resulted, even without proof of specific monetary loss.

Wrong is wiped out by reconciliation.

Source: Bouv. 124; Weisman, 105g

(English-origin maxim.) Reconciliation between the parties extinguishes the wrong and bars further suit — once the injured party and the wrongdoer are reconciled, the cause of action is dead.

The idea of rights naturally suggests the correlative one of wrongs; for every right is capable of being violated.

Source: Black's, 1235; Weisman, 105l

(English-origin maxim.) For every right the law recognizes, there exists a corresponding wrong that may violate it — rights and wrongs are correlatives, and the capacity of a right to be infringed is inherent in its nature.

A wrong is not presumed.

Source: Co. Litt. 232; 3 Inst. 23; Weisman, 105n

(English-origin maxim.) The law does not presume wrongdoing — in the absence of evidence, every man's conduct is presumed to be lawful and honest.

Although a thing may not be bad in itself, yet, if it is of bad example, it is not to be done.

Source: 2 Inst. 564; Weisman, 105p

(English-origin maxim.) Even lawful acts should be avoided when they set a dangerous precedent — the law considers not only the immediate effect but the example set for others.

The act of the law does no one wrong.

Source: 5 Coke, 116; 2 Bl. Comm. 123; Weisman, 105q

(English-origin maxim.) What the law itself commands or permits cannot constitute a legal wrong — an act done by operation of law injures no one in the eyes of the law.

Crimes are more effectively prevented by certainty than by severity of punishment.

Recidivum effectuosius praevenit certitudo quam severitas poenae.

Source: Cf. Beccaria, Dei Delitti e delle Pene (1764); Blackstone, 4 Bl. Comm. 11; Weisman, 92b

Swift and certain enforcement deters more powerfully than occasional extreme punishment — a law that is reliably enforced is respected more than one that punishes harshly but rarely.

No one should be punished twice for the same offense.

Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.

Source: 4 Coke, 43; 11 Coke, 59b; Jackson, No. 632; Weisman, 77a; Weisman, 92e

Double punishment for a single wrong is itself a wrong — once a man has answered for his crime by the sentence of a competent tribunal, that matter is concluded forever.

The instigator of a crime is worse than the perpetrator.

Auctor peccati praestat auctore facti.

Source: 5 Coke, 99; Weisman, 26z

The man who conceives and directs a crime from safety bears a heavier moral and legal burden than the one who carries it out — the mastermind outranks the tool.

No one is punished for the crime of another.

Nemo punitur pro alieno delicto.

Source: Wing. Max. 336; Weisman, 92hh

Criminal responsibility is individual — no man can be made to suffer punishment for wrongs committed by another without his knowledge, direction, or participation.

No one is punished unless for some wrong, act, or default.

Nemo punitur sine injuria, facto, seu defalta.

Source: 2 Inst. 287; Weisman, 92n

Punishment presupposes an offense actually committed — the law cannot punish status, condition, or mere association without a wrongful act or culpable omission.

Let the punishment reach the few, but the fear of it affect all.

Poena ad paucas, metus ad omnes perveniat.

Source: 4 Inst. 6; 4 Bl. Comm. 11; Weisman, 92p

The purpose of punishment is deterrence, not vengeance — it should be proportioned so that its certainty discourages all, even though only the guilty suffer it.

No one suffers punishment for his thoughts.

Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur.

Source: Dig. 48, 19, 18; Broom, Max. 279; Weisman, 92i

The law punishes acts, not ideas — a man's innermost thoughts, however wicked, are beyond the reach of earthly tribunals until they manifest in conduct.

The intention is punished though the intended result does not follow.

Intentio punitur licet non sequatur effectus.

Source: 9 Coke, 55; Weisman, 92s

Where criminal intent is fully formed and an overt act taken in furtherance of it, the failure to achieve the intended result does not shield the actor from punishment.

It concerns the state that crimes do not remain unpunished.

Interest reipublicae ne maleficia remaneant impunita.

Source: Jenk. Cent. pp. 30-31, case 59; Wing. Max. 501; Weisman, 92z

The public has an interest in the enforcement of criminal law that transcends the private interest of the victim — unpunished crime undermines the order upon which all rights depend.

He who sins when drunk shall be punished when sober.

Qui peccat ebrius, luat sobrius.

Source: Broom, Max. 17; Weisman, 92r

Voluntary intoxication is no defense — a man who deliberately impairs his own judgment assumes responsibility for every act committed in that impaired state.

Punishment ought not to precede the crime.

Poena non debet antecedere crimen.

Source: Halk. Max. 126; Weisman, 92cc

No person may be subjected to punitive measures in anticipation of wrongdoing — the law punishes what has been done, never what might be done.

As wickedness increases, so ought the punishment to increase.

Crescente malitia crescere debet et poena.

Source: 2 Inst. 479

The severity of punishment must match the severity of the offense — habitual or aggravated wrongdoing justifies proportionally greater penalties.

In penal causes the interpretation ought to be the more favourable.

In penalibus causis benignius interpretandum est.

Source: D. 50, 17, 155; Jackson

Penal statutes and criminal provisions must be construed strictly and in favor of the accused — ambiguity in the law may not be resolved to the defendant's disadvantage.

No Court which has not a record can impose a fine, or commit any person to prison; because those powers belong only to Courts of record.

Nulla curia quae recordum non habet potest imponere finem, neque aliquem mandare carceri; quia ista spectant tantummodo ad curias de recordo.

Source: 8 Co. 60; Jackson; Weisman, 65h

The power to fine and imprison is reserved exclusively to courts of record — inferior tribunals lacking a formal record have no authority to deprive a man of his property or liberty.

Those consenting and those perpetrating are embraced in the same punishment.

Consentientes et agentes pari poena plectentur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 5 Co. 80

One who consents to a crime is equally liable with the one who carries it out — the law draws no distinction between the approver and the doer.

Impunity offers a continual bait to a delinquent.

Impunitas continuum affectum tribuit delinquenti.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 4 Co. 45

Failure to punish emboldens the wrongdoer to repeat and escalate his offenses — unpunished crime breeds more crime.

A person may not be punished differently than according to what the sentence enjoins.

Non alio modo puniatur aliquis, quam secundum quod se habet condemnatio.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 217; Weisman, 92ii

The punishment must conform strictly to the judgment — no officer may impose penalties beyond or different from those ordered by the court.

A madman is punished by his madness alone.

Furiosus solo furore punitur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 247

The insane cannot be held criminally responsible, for their affliction is itself their punishment and the law will not add to it.

The heir is not bound in a penalty inflicted for the crime of the ancestor.

Poena ex delicto defuncti haeres teneri non debet.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Inst. 198

Criminal punishment is personal and dies with the offender — no descendant may be compelled to answer for the wrongs of a forebear.

Punishments should rather be softened than aggravated.

Poenae potius molliendae quam exasperandae sunt.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. Inst. 220

When doubt exists as to the proper measure of punishment, the law favors leniency over severity.

No wise man punishes that things done may be revoked, but that future wrongs may be prevented.

Nemo prudens punit ut praeterita revocentur, sed ut futura praeveniantur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Buls. 173; Weisman, 92gg

The purpose of punishment is prevention, not revenge — the law looks forward to deterrence rather than backward to retribution.

Positive rules of law will be receded from, rather than crimes and wrongs should remain unpunished.

Receditur a placitis juris, potius quam injuriae et delicta maneant impunita.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Bacon's Max. Reg. 12

Technical legal rules yield when their strict application would allow wrongdoing to escape all consequence, because the public safety is the supreme law.

The smallest bodily punishment is greater than any pecuniary one.

Minima poena corporalis est major qualibet pecuniaria.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Inst. 220

Even the lightest physical punishment outweighs the heaviest fine, because liberty of the person is more precious than property.

In whatever thing one offends, in that he is rightfully to be punished.

In quo quis delinquit, in eo de jure est puniendus.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 233; Weisman, 92ee

The punishment should correspond in kind to the nature of the offense — the law matches consequence to transgression.

The estimation of a crime committed never increases from a subsequent fact.

Aestimatio praeteriti delicti ex postremo facto nunquam crescit.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Bac. Max. Reg. 8

A past offense cannot be retroactively aggravated by later events — the gravity of a crime is fixed at the time of its commission.

A prison is established not for the sake of punishment, but of detention and guarding.

Source: Co. Litt. 260a; Lofft, 119; Weisman, 92c

(English-origin maxim.) The purpose of imprisonment before trial is detention, not punishment — a jail is a place of custody to ensure the accused appears for trial, not a penal institution.

Those sinning secretly are punished more severely than those sinning openly.

Source: 8 Coke, 127; Weisman, 92d

(English-origin maxim.) Concealment aggravates the offense — a crime committed in secret is punished more severely than one committed openly, because secrecy implies deliberate evasion of justice.

Punishment adheres to the offense.

Source: Peoria Gas & Elec. Co. v. Peoria, 200 U.S. 48, 56; Weisman, 92f

(English-origin maxim.) Punishment belongs to the specific offense committed — it cannot be transferred to another person or attached to a different act.

Death is called the "last punishment," the "extremity of punishment".

Source: 3 Inst. 212; Weisman, 92h

(English-origin maxim.) Death is the ultimate and final penalty the law can impose — no punishment beyond death exists, making it the last extremity of penal power.

The most extreme punishment we consider to be is death.

Source: Dig. 48, 19, 21; Weisman, 92h

(English-origin maxim.) Because death is the ultimate penalty, it establishes the outer boundary of the state's punitive power — no punishment may exceed it, and its imposition demands the most rigorous procedural safeguards recognized under the common law.

The law punishes falsehood.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 15; Weisman, 92j

(English-origin maxim.) Perjury and false testimony are among the wrongs the law most actively punishes, because the integrity of judicial proceedings depends entirely on the truthfulness of witnesses.

One confessing willingly should be dealt with more leniently.

Source: 4 Inst. 66; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 92l

(English-origin maxim.) A voluntary confession merits more lenient treatment — the law rewards cooperation with justice and treats the willing confessor more favorably than the defiant offender.

A fine does not impose a loss of reputation or character.

Source: Code. 1, 54; Weisman, 92m

(English-origin maxim.) A monetary fine, unlike imprisonment or corporal punishment, does not affect a man's character or reputation — it is a penalty upon the purse, not upon the person.

He who spares the guilty punishes the innocent.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 133; Weisman, 92q

(English-origin maxim.) Failure to punish the guilty is itself an injury to the innocent — when wrongdoers go unpunished, their future victims bear the cost of the law's leniency.

The deprivation of any rights may be punished.

Source: Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277, 320; Weisman, 92aa

(English-origin maxim.) The deprivation of any right — whether by civil disability, exclusion from a profession, or denial of a previously held privilege — is a punishable wrong. Cite this to establish that government actions stripping rights are subject to due process of law, and that the wrongful taking of a right gives rise to a cause of action.

Infamy arises from crime, not from its punishment.

Infamia ex delicto, non ex poena.

Source: Weisman, 92g

The disgrace of a criminal conviction attaches to the crime itself, not to the penalty imposed — a man is infamous because he committed the offense, not because the court punished him for it.

Where the crime is, there the punishment should be also.

Ubi culpa est, ibi poena subesse debet.

Source: 6 Coke, 47; Weisman, 92t

Punishment must follow the offender and attach to him personally — it cannot be imposed on an innocent party, and it must be inflicted where the guilt actually lies.

Let not jailers torture or augment the punishment of those intrusted to their keeping; but let the sentence of the law be duly yet mercifully executed.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 92u

(English-origin maxim.) A jailer's authority extends only to the lawful execution of the sentence imposed by the court — any cruelty, deprivation, or punishment beyond the judgment is an unauthorized trespass upon the prisoner's natural rights. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments recognizes this ancient common-law limitation on custodial power.

Trial should always be held where the jurors can have better knowledge.

Ibi semper debet fieri triatio ubi juratores meliorem possunt habere notitiam.

Source: Co. Litt. 112

Venue should be fixed where the jury can be best informed of the facts — the right to trial by a jury of the vicinage ensures that those who decide the case have local knowledge of the circumstances.

No one is obliged to restore that which has been exacted by way of penalty.

Quod a quoquo poenae nomine exactum est id eidem restituere nemo cogitur.

Source: D. 50, 17, 46; Jackson

A penalty lawfully imposed and collected need not be refunded to the offender — what was taken as punishment is taken permanently.

The judge is condemned when a guilty person escapes punishment.

Judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur.

Source: Dig. 1, 1, 13; Pub. Syr. Sent.; Weisman, 63g

The public holds the judge accountable for the faithful discharge of his duty — failure to administer justice implicates the judge himself.

A judge must take care that nothing be imposed either more harshly or more leniently than the cause demands; for the reputation of neither severity nor clemency should be pursued.

Respiciendum est judicanti, ne quid aut durius aut remissius constituatur quam causa deposcit; nec enim aut severitatis aut clementiae gloria affectanda est.

Source: 3 Inst. 220

The judge who sentences to make an example, or who pardons to win popularity, has abandoned justice for vanity — the punishment must fit the offense, no more and no less.

It is not consonant to justice that any accessory should be convicted in the king’s court before some one has been attainted of the fact.

Juri non est consonum quod aliquis accessorius in curia regis convincatur antequam aliquis de facto fuerit attinctus.

Source: 2 Inst. 183; Jackson

An accessory cannot be convicted before the principal — unless the underlying crime is first established against the primary offender, there is no foundation for charging one who merely assisted.

Justice is double; punishing with severity, preventing with lenity.

Justitia est duplex; viz. severe puniens et vere praeveniens.

Source: 3 Inst. Epil.; Jackson; Weisman, 68j

The two arms of justice are punishment after the fact and prevention before it — the law is most effective when it deters wrongs before they occur through gentle warning, reserving harsh measures for those who offend nonetheless.

It is always safer to err in acquitting than in punishing: on the side of mercy, than of strict justice.

Tutius semper est errare acquietando quam in puniendo, ex parte misericordiae quam ex parte justitiae.

Source: H. H. P.C. 290; Jackson; Weisman, 64o

When the court is uncertain, it is better to let a guilty man go free than to punish an innocent one — mercy in doubt is the safer course for the preservation of justice.

It is not just and right that he who exposes the faults of a guilty person should be condemned on that account; for it is proper and expedient that the offense of the guilty should be known.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 68c

(English-origin maxim.) The People's right to expose malfeasance by public officers or private wrongdoers is essential to self-governance — one who brings the guilty to light serves justice and cannot be punished for doing so. This principle undergirds the right of remonstrance, petition, and the freedom of speech secured by the First Amendment.

Where a man offends, there shall he be punished.

Ubi quis delinquit, ibi punietur.

Source: 3 Inst. 24; Bract. fol. 154b

Jurisdiction in criminal matters belongs to the place where the offense was committed — transporting a cause to a distant forum deprives the accused of his right to be tried by jurors of the vicinage.

No one is bound to accuse himself.

Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare.

Source: Wing. Max. 486; 1 Bl. Comm. 443; Weisman, 49c; Weisman, 75r; Weisman, 77l

The privilege against self-incrimination is not a modern statutory creation but an ancient common law maxim — no man may be compelled to furnish evidence against himself.

A prison ought to be used for the keeping of men, not for their punishment.

Carcer ad homines custodiendos, non ad puniendos, dari debet.

Source: Co. Litt. 260

Imprisonment before conviction is custody, not punishment — the gaol holds the accused for trial, not to inflict suffering. Any pretrial condition that punishes before judgment perverts the purpose of confinement.

Every plaint and every action for injuries is limited within certain times.

Omnis querela et omnis actio injuriarum limitata est infra certa tempora.

Source: Co. Litt. 114; Jackson; Weisman, 75l

All legal actions are subject to limitation periods — the law requires claims to be brought within a reasonable time to prevent stale demands and preserve certainty.

In every action where two distresses concur, that is, in rem and in personam, that is to be chosen which is most dreaded, and which binds most firmly.

Source: Bract. fol. 372; Fleta, l. 6, c. 14, s. 28; Weisman, 75q

(English-origin maxim.) When both an action in rem and an action in personam are available, counsel should choose the more powerful remedy — the one that binds more firmly and is most likely to compel compliance.

A matter, the validity of which is at issue in legal proceedings, cannot be set up as a bar [impediment] thereto.

Source: Bac. Max. reg. 2; Weisman, 75u

(English-origin maxim.) A proceeding whose validity is the very question at issue cannot be pleaded as a bar to the suit challenging it — to allow otherwise would make every void act self-validating.

Everyone is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Source: C.L.M.; Lofft, 121; Weisman, 65y

(English-origin maxim.) The presumption of innocence is a foundational right recognized at common law and secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments — the sovereign People cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property by the state unless guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt through due process of law.

No man ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause.

Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.

Source: 5 Co. 61; Broom, Max. 327; Dig. 50, 17, 57

The prohibition against double jeopardy and duplicative litigation is fundamental — once a matter has been properly determined, it may not be relitigated between the same parties.

A traitor is punished that one and not all may perish.

Reus laesae majestatis punitur, ut pereat unus ne pereant omnes.

Source: 4 Co. 124; Jackson

The severe punishment of treason serves the public good — the destruction of one who betrays the commonwealth preserves the safety of all its members.

Matters adjudged between other parties create no prejudice to those who were not parties.

Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt.

Source: Dig. 44, 2, 1; Dig. 42, 1, 63

A judgment binds only the parties to the proceeding — strangers to the suit are not affected by it, because they had no opportunity to be heard.

In doubt, always prefer the safer course.

In dubio, semper id quod tutius est praeferendum.

Source: Branch, Princ.; 2 Hale, P.C. 290; Broom, Max. 326

When the court is uncertain, it is always safer to err on the side of mercy and acquittal than on the side of punishment — doubt favors the accused.

He who flees judgment confesses his guilt.

Fatetur facinus qui judicium fugit.

Source: 3 Inst. 14; Jackson; Weisman, 64m

Flight from justice is treated as an admission of guilt — a man who evades the court's process demonstrates consciousness of his own wrongdoing.

False in one thing, false in all things.

Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Broom, Max.; Jackson, Lat. for Lawyers, No. 266; Weisman, 26bb; Weisman, 37f

Where a witness is shown to have testified falsely on a material point — one on which he could not be presumed to be mistaken — the tribunal may reject the whole of his testimony.

We have the best witness in an accused who confesses the charge.

Habemus optimum testem confitentem reum.

Source: Fost. Cr. L. 243; Jackson

A voluntary confession by the accused is the strongest evidence of guilt — no testimony from any other witness can surpass the defendant's own admission.

The divine punishment for perjury is destruction; the human punishment is disgrace.

Perjurii poena divina exitium, humana dedecus.

Source: 3 Inst. 163; Co. Litt. 158

Perjury strikes at the foundation of the legal system; the law regards it with the utmost severity because the oath is the pillar upon which all judicial proceedings rest.

A foolish oath, though false, does not amount to perjury.

Stultum juramentum, licet falsum, tamen non committit perjurium.

Source: 2 Inst. 167; Weisman, 84g

Where an oath is so vague, absurd, or impossible that it cannot affect the matter at issue, its falsity does not constitute the crime of perjury — the substance, not the form, determines the offense.

In law, none is credited unless he is sworn. All facts must, when established by witnesses, be under oath or affirmation.

Source: Cro. Car. 64; Bouv. 130; Weisman, 84h

(English-origin maxim.) No testimony is credited in legal proceedings unless given under oath or affirmation; unsworn declarations are not evidence and cannot establish any fact before the court.

All things are presumed in favor of life, liberty, and innocence.

In favorem vitae, libertatis, et innocentiae omnia praesumuntur.

Source: Lofft, 125; Jackson, No. 379

When facts are doubtful, every presumption is made in favor of the accused and against forfeiture of life or liberty — the law will not presume guilt.

To write is to act.

Scribere est agere.

Source: 2 Rolle 89; 4 Bl. Comm. 80; Broom, Max. 312, 967; Weisman, 2s

A writing carries the force of an act — a treasonous letter is as much an overt act as a treasonous deed.

The cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused.

Causa causae est causa causati.

Source: 12 Mod. 639; Bouv. 119; Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 177; Weisman, 14f

Liability traces backward through the chain of causation — he who sets the first cause in motion is answerable for the final effect.

In law, the immediate and not the remote cause is looked at.

In jure, non remota causa, sed proxima, spectatur.

Source: 12 East 648; 3 Kent, Comm. 302; Bacon, Max. reg. 1; Weisman, 14c

The law fixes responsibility on the proximate cause — the nearest link in the chain — not on speculative or distant origins.

In doubtful cases, the more favorable construction is to be preferred.

In dubiis, benigniora praeferenda sunt.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Dig. 50, 17, 56; 2 Kent, Comm. 557; Weisman, 22v; Weisman, 22mm; Weisman, 32a

Where an instrument or statute admits of two readings, the one more favorable to liberty, to the accused, or to the grantee is preferred.

In doubt, the gentler or safer course is to be followed.

In dubio, pars mitior est sequenda.

Source: Bouv. 130; Dig. 50, 17, 56; Weisman, 22y; Weisman, 32f

Uncertainty counsels restraint — where either severity or leniency might be justified, the law leans toward the milder result.

When there is doubt, the accused is to be acquitted.

Cum in dubio est, reus est absolvendus.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 125; cf. 1 Hale P.C. 310

The foundational rule of criminal law — doubt belongs to the accused, and the state bears the full weight of proof.

Necessity has no law.

Necessitas non habet legem.

Source: Plowd. 18a; Broom, Max. 17; Hob. 144

Where genuine necessity compels, the strict letter of the law yields — but the necessity must be real and present, not speculative or manufactured.

Necessity makes that lawful which otherwise is not lawful.

Necessitas facit licitum quod alias non est licitum.

Source: 10 Co. 61; 2 Inst. 326; Fleta, lib. 5, c. 23, s. 14; Weisman, 83c

An act that would ordinarily be unlawful may be justified by true necessity — but the actor bears the burden of proving the necessity was genuine and the response proportionate.

Necessity overrules the law.

Necessitas vincit legem.

Source: Hob. 144; Cooley, Const. Lim. (4th ed.) 747; Plowd. 18a; Weisman, 83h

Necessity is the supreme exception — but it is the narrowest one, and the party invoking it must demonstrate that no lawful alternative existed.

That which necessity compels, it justifies.

Quod necessitas cogit, defendit.

Source: Hale, P.C. 54; Weisman, 83f

The defense of necessity is complete when the compulsion is shown — what a man is forced to do by irresistible necessity, the law will not punish.

Necessity is the law of the time and of the place.

Necessitas est lex temporis et loci.

Source: Hob. 159; 1 Hale P.C. 54

Necessity is always measured against the particular moment and circumstances — what is necessary today may not be tomorrow, and what is necessary here may not be elsewhere.

In cases of extreme necessity, all things are in common.

In casu extremae necessitatis, omnia sunt communia.

Source: Hale, P.C. 54; Weisman, 83g

At the extremity of need — shipwreck, famine, imminent peril — private property gives way to the common right of survival, and the taker is excused by the emergency.

Where blood is spilled, the case is unpardonable.

Nec veniam, effuso sanguine, casus habet.

Source: 3 Inst. 57; Jackson

The plea of accident is unavailable where homicide results; the shedding of blood strips the act of any claim to pardon on grounds of mere misfortune.

What an attempt is, is not defined in law.

Conatus quid sit, non definitur in jure.

Source: 2 Bulstr. 277; 6 Co. 42

The law treats attempt as a flexible concept — it arises from the facts of each case rather than from a rigid statutory definition.

An attempt does not harm unless a consequence follows.

Conatus nemini nocet nisi sequatur effectus.

Source: 11 Co. 98; Cycl. Dict. 700

A bare attempt without result is generally not actionable at common law — the law measures harm by what was accomplished, not merely by what was intended.

The attempt becomes of consequence, if the effect follows.

Conatus consequitur effectum, si effectus sequatur.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 55; Bouv. 145

An attempt that reaches its object is no longer merely an attempt — it merges into the completed act and bears the full consequence.

An attempt is an intent to do a particular criminal thing with an act toward it falling short of the thing intended.

Conatus est intentio facere rem particularem criminalem cum actu tendente sed deficiente.

Source: State v. Davis, 229 A.2d 842, 844, 108 N.H. 158

Two elements define an attempt: the specific intent to commit the act, and an overt step toward its commission that falls short of completion.

An overt act, failure, interception, or prevention in the execution of a crime are factors inherent in the concept of an attempt.

Actus manifestus, defectus, interceptio, vel praeventio in executione criminis sunt factores conatus.

Source: People v. Urbana, 163 N.E.2d 511, 514, 18 Ill. 2d 81

The law recognizes attempt wherever a crime was begun in earnest but did not reach fruition — whether by the actor's own failure, external interception, or voluntary abandonment.

An accuser is not to be heard after a reasonable time unless he can account satisfactorily for the delay.

Accusator post rationabile tempus non est audiendus, nisi se bene de omissione excusaverit.

Source: Moor. 817; Jackson; Weisman, 99x

Stale accusations are disfavored; he who delays bringing a charge must explain the delay or forfeit the right to prosecute.

Concerning the death of a man, no delay is long.

De morte hominis nulla est cunctatio longa.

Source: Co. Litt. 184; Jackson; Weisman, 99s

In cases involving homicide, no lapse of time bars the prosecution; the gravity of the offense overrides the ordinary prejudice against stale claims.

Enemies are those whom we declare war upon, or who declare it against us; all others are traitors or pirates.

Hostes sunt qui nobis vel quibus nos bellum decernimus; ceteri proditores vel piratae sunt.

Source: 7 Co. 24; Weisman, 102f

The law distinguishes between a lawful enemy — entitled to the protections of the law of war — and an outlaw who operates without sovereign authority.