tort

Law arises from fact.

Ex facto jus oritur.

Source: Broom, Max. 102; Jackson 243; Weisman, 71q; Weisman, 30n

Legal rights and duties arise from concrete facts, not from abstract propositions — the court must first establish the facts before it can apply the law.

Legal actions do not admit a limitation.

Actus legitimi non recipiunt modum.

Source: Hob. 158; Jackson

Acts required by law must be performed absolutely and completely — they cannot be qualified by conditions or limitations that the law does not authorize.

Election once made cannot be recalled.

Electio semel facta non patitur regressum.

Source: Co. Litt. 146a; Jackson

When a party is given a choice between two remedies or rights and elects one, he is bound by that election and cannot later pursue the other.

Excess in law is reprehended. Excess in any matter is reprehended at common law.

Excessivum in jure reprobatur. Excessus in re qualibet jure reprobatur communi.

Source: Co. 44; Jackson; Weisman, 41a

The law disfavors excess in all things — whether in pleading, punishment, or the exercise of authority, going beyond what is necessary is condemned.

Want of finality in law is reprehensible.

Infinitum in jure reprobatur.

Source: 9 Co. 45; Jackson

The law abhors endless proceedings — every dispute must reach a final determination, and procedural devices that perpetuate litigation are disfavored.

In the whole a part is also contained.

In toto et pars continetur.

Source: D. 50, 17, 113; Jackson

He who has the whole necessarily has every part — a grant of the entirety includes all its constituent elements.

The multitude of those who err gives no excuse to error.

Multitudo errantium non parit errori patrocinium.

Source: 11 Co. 75; Jackson; Weisman, 37n

The popularity of a mistake does not make it right — no matter how many follow a wrong course, the error remains an error and the law does not bend to accommodate it.

Nobody need be wiser than the laws.

Neminem oportet esse sapientiorem legibus.

Source: Co. Litt. 97; Jackson

No individual is expected to exceed the wisdom of the law — a party who acts in conformity with the law has done all that can be required of him.

No iniquity is to be presumed in law.

Nullum iniquum est praesumendum in jure.

Source: 7 Co. 71; Jackson

The law presumes itself to be just — an interpretation that would make the law work an injustice is to be rejected in favor of one that produces an equitable result.

He who has no power of alienation must retain.

Qui non habet potestatem alienandi habet necessitatem retinendi.

Source: Hob. 336; Jackson

When the law forbids a person from transferring property, he is compelled to hold it — the inability to alienate creates a corresponding obligation of custody.

The value of a thing is estimated according to its worth in money; but the value of money is not estimated by reference to the thing.

Res per pecuniam aestimatur et non pecunia per res.

Source: 9 Co. 76; Jackson; Weisman, 35r

Money is the universal standard of value by which all other things are measured — damages are assessed in monetary terms because money provides the common denominator for compensation.

The disposition of the law is more equitable than that of man.

Source: 8 Coke, 152; Weisman, 71tt

(English-origin maxim.) The law, when allowed to operate according to its settled principles, produces more just results than the arbitrary discretion of any individual.

The body of a freeman does not admit of valuation.

Liberum corpus aestimationem non recipit.

Source: Dig. 9, 3, 7; Hob. 59; Bract. fol. 14; Weisman, 35n; Weisman, 47d

A free person's body and liberty cannot be reduced to a monetary value — the basis for the rule against involuntary servitude.

Anyone may renounce a right introduced for his own benefit.

Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se inducto.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 77d

A man may waive a right that exists for his personal benefit, but only voluntarily and with knowledge — the waiver of a right cannot be compelled or presumed.

He is not deemed to use force who exercises his own right, and proceeds by ordinary action.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 155, 1; Weisman, 86i

(English-origin maxim.) A person who exercises his lawful right through ordinary legal action is not considered to use force — the enforcement of a valid right by lawful means cannot constitute duress or compulsion.

When the rights of the king and of the subject concur, those of the king are to be preferred.

Quando jus domini regis et subditi concurrunt jus regis praeferri debet.

Source: 9 Co. 129; Jackson

Where the sovereign and a subject hold competing claims to the same right or property, the sovereign's claim takes precedence — though in the American system this principle is constrained by the constitutional reservation of rights to the People.

If you are moved to anger by insults, you publish them; if you despise them, they are forgotten.

Si injuriam movearis, profers eam; si contemnas, extinguis.

Source: 3 Inst. 198; Weisman, 55e

The wise course when provoked is to ignore the provocation — responding amplifies the harm; silence extinguishes it.

No one is bound to give information about things he is ignorant of, but everyone is bound to know that which he gives information about.

Nemo tenetur informare quod nescit, sed quisquis scire quod informat.

Source: Branch, Princ.; Black's Law Dict. (2d) 815; Weisman, 69q

One who volunteers information warrants its truth. Ignorance excuses silence — it does not excuse affirmative misrepresentation.

Want of skill is reckoned as fault.

Imperitia culpae adnumeratur.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 132; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 1004; 2 Kent, Comm. 588; Weisman, 44q

One who holds himself out as possessing a skill — a physician, attorney, or artisan — is liable for the consequences of his incompetence. His ignorance is his negligence.

The mistakes of the writer ought not to harm.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 324; Weisman, 37l

(English-origin maxim.) Errors introduced by the drafter or copyist of a legal instrument do not invalidate the instrument — the parties should not suffer for the writer's mistake when the true intent is clear.

He who can and ought to forbid a thing, and does not, commands it.

Qui potest et debet vetare, jubet.

Source: 2 Inst. 146; Bouvier, Max.

The officer or guardian who has the power and duty to prevent a wrong but stands idle is treated as having authorized it — silence in the face of duty is complicity.

He who does not repel a wrong when he can, occasions it.

Qui non propulsat injuriam quando potest, infert.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 105c

The duty to act against injustice is not optional for those in authority — passive acquiescence in wrong is itself a form of wrongdoing.

Let the master answer.

Respondeat superior.

Source: 4 Inst. 114; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874), p. 843; Wharton, *Legal Maxims* (1878), Max. LXXXV; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 939

The master is liable for injuries caused by his servant acting within the scope of employment — authority carries responsibility.

The master must answer for the acts of his servant.

Dominus respondeat de factis servi sui.

Source: Lofft, 229; 4 Inst. 114; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1337; Weisman, 96e

The master cannot direct the work and disclaim the consequences — the liability follows the authority.

The master is liable for injury done by his servant.

Source: Lofft, 229; Weisman, 96b

(English-origin maxim.) Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is liable for injuries caused by his servant acting within the scope of employment — cite this to hold an employer accountable for the torts of his employee.

He who acts through another acts himself.

Qui facit per alium facit per se.

Source: Co. Litt. 258; Broom, *Legal Maxims* (1874), pp. 817-818; Wharton, *Legal Maxims* (1878), Max. LXV; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 859

A principal is bound by the acts of his agent done within the scope of authority — he cannot delegate the act and disclaim the consequence.

He who commands a thing to be done is held to have done it himself.

Qui mandat ipse fecisse videtur.

Source: Story, *Bailments* § 147; Dig. 50, 17, 169; Weisman, 4j

The one who directs the act bears the same responsibility as the one who performs it — the command is the cause, and the cause answers.

By the law of nature it is not just that anyone be enriched at the loss or injury of another.

Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 206; 2 Kent, Comm. 336; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 461; Weisman, 59n

No man may profit from harm done to another — unjust enrichment offends the first principles of natural justice.

No one should intermeddle with a thing that in no way concerns him.

Nemo debet se immiscere rei ad se nihil pertinenti.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 18, case 32; Weisman, 61d

A stranger to a matter has no standing to interfere — the law forbids officious intermeddling in the affairs of others.

A personal action dies with the person.

Actio personalis moritur cum persona.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 16; Noy, Max. 6; Weisman, 86q

Claims arising from purely personal wrongs perish with the death of the party injured — they do not pass to heirs or representatives.

It is difficult that one man should sustain the place of two.

Source: 4 Coke, 118; Weisman, 61b

(English-origin maxim.) The law disfavors placing one person in two incompatible roles — cite this to challenge a dual appointment or conflict of interest where one man is asked to serve as both judge and party, or agent for opposing principals.

He who first offends causes the strife.

Source: Bouv. 152; Weisman, 61c

(English-origin maxim.) The first aggressor bears the blame for the conflict that follows — cite this to establish that the party who initiated the wrong cannot complain of the consequences that flowed from his own provocation.

Transactions between strangers may benefit, but cannot injure those who are not parties to them.

Source: 6 Coke, 1; Co. Litt. 132; Broom, Max. 954, 967; Weisman, 61j

(English-origin maxim.) Contracts and transactions between third parties may incidentally benefit a non-party but can never impose a burden or obligation on him — cite this to defeat a claim that a stranger to an agreement is bound by its terms.

He who condemns the precept condemns the party giving it.

Source: 12 Coke, 96; Weisman, 61k

(English-origin maxim.) To attack the authority of a command is to attack the one who issued it — cite this to argue that defiance of a lawful order is contempt of the authority behind it.

No man can forfeit another's right.

Source: Fleta, lib. 1, c. 28, s. 11; Weisman, 61m; Weisman, 86b

(English-origin maxim.) No person can, by his own act or default, forfeit or destroy a right belonging to another — cite this to protect a third party's vested right from being extinguished by someone else's misconduct.

A personal connection is equivalent to one's own interest; nearness of blood is as good a consideration as one's own interest.

Source: Bacon, Max. 72, reg; Weisman, 61n

(English-origin maxim.) A close blood relationship is treated as equivalent to a personal stake — cite this to establish standing or interest when a parent, child, or spouse seeks to act on behalf of a family member.

Personal things cannot be done by another.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 14; Weisman, 61o

(English-origin maxim.) Acts that are inherently personal — such as taking an oath, giving testimony, or exercising a personal trust — cannot be performed by a substitute and must be done by the person himself.

Personal things die with the person.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 1, c. 3, n. 16; Weisman, 61q

(English-origin maxim.) Rights and obligations that are purely personal — such as a personal license, a penal liability, or the duty to perform a personal service — expire with the death of the holder and do not pass to heirs or assigns.

Whose is the advantage, his also should be the disadvantage.

Source: Black's, 2d. 304; Weisman, 61r

(English-origin maxim.) He who enjoys the benefit must also bear the burden — cite this to prevent a party from claiming the advantages of a transaction while disclaiming its corresponding obligations.

Relation never defeats collateral acts.

Source: 18 Vin. Abr. 292; Weisman, 93b

(English-origin maxim.) The doctrine of relation back does not defeat collateral acts performed in good faith during the interval — cite this to protect third-party transactions that occurred before the relation back took effect.

Relation shall never make good a void grant or devise of the party.

Source: 18 Vin. Abr. 292; Weisman, 93c

(English-origin maxim.) A void grant or devise cannot be rescued by the doctrine of relation — if the original instrument was void ab initio, no subsequent event can breathe life into it.

Things incident cannot be severed.

Source: Finch, Law, b. 3, c. 1, n. 12; Weisman, 93e

(English-origin maxim.) Incidents that are inseparably attached to a principal right or estate cannot be severed from it — cite this to prevent a party from claiming the incident while disclaiming the principal, or vice versa.

Things incident pass by the grant of the principal.

Source: Seymour v. C & N R.R. Co., 25 Barb. (N.Y.) 284, 310; Weisman, 93f

(English-origin maxim.) A grant of the principal carries with it all its incidents — cite this to argue that a conveyance of an estate automatically transfers the easements, privileges, and appurtenances that belong to it.

That is incident which inseparably belongs to, connected with, or inherent in another thing, called the principal.

Source: Black's, 611; Weisman, 93g

(English-origin maxim.) An incident is something inseparably connected to or inherent in the principal thing — cite this definition to establish that a claimed right or obligation is truly incidental and therefore passes automatically with the principal.

When suspicion between men is suggested, it is easily entertained.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 61f

(English-origin maxim.) Once suspicion is planted between parties, human nature readily embraces it — courts must therefore demand proof rather than innuendo, because mere suggestion of wrongdoing, without evidence, is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence or good faith that the law recognizes in every man.

The law favors mutual recompense.

Source: Wing. Max. 100; Weisman, 61h

(English-origin maxim.) The law prefers that obligations flow both ways — where one party has conferred a benefit, the other ought to render an equivalent return. This principle undergirds the common-law doctrine of consideration and prevents one-sided exactions by ensuring that every enforceable agreement rests on mutual exchange.

Nothing is so consonant to natural equity as to regard the intention of the owner in transferring his own property to another.

Nihil tam conveniens est naturali aequitati, quam voluntatem domini rem suam in alium transferre, ratam habere.

Source: 1 Co. 100; Jackson; Weisman, 91o

Natural equity demands that the owner's intent govern the transfer of his property — the law respects and gives effect to the will of the proprietor in all conveyances.

Water follows the land.

Aqua cedit solo.

Source: 2 Bl. Comm. 18; Co. Litt. 4; Weisman, 70k

A sale of land passes the water covering it — the owner of the bank owns the stream.

Prescription is a title derived from use and time, having the force of law.

Praescriptio est titulus ex usu et tempore.

Source: Co. Litt. 113

Rights of dominion may be acquired by long and uninterrupted use — time, combined with quiet possession, creates title.

Every entry on lands without the owner's leave, or authority of law, is a trespass.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 70c

(English-origin maxim.) The right to exclude others from one's land is among the most ancient rights secured by the common law — any unauthorized entry, whether by a private party or a government agent acting without lawful warrant or the owner's consent, constitutes a trespass actionable at law regardless of whether actual damage is shown.

It is not permitted to build upon one’s own land what may be injurious to another.

Aedificare in tuo proprio solo non licet quod alteri noceat.

Source: 3 Inst. 201; Jackson

Ownership of land does not confer the right to erect structures that cause harm to a neighbor — the right of property is bounded by the equal rights of others.

To a willing person, no injury is done.

Volenti non fit injuria.

Source: Broom, Max. 268, 269, 271, 395; Wing. Max. 482; Plowd. 501

He who freely and knowingly consents to an act cannot afterwards complain of it as an injury — but the consent must be truly free.

One cannot complain of having been deceived when he knew the fact and gave his consent.

Nemo videtur fraudare eos qui sciunt et consentiunt.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 145; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

Knowledge and consent together bar a claim of fraud — he who enters a transaction with full awareness of the facts cannot afterwards cry deception.

He who can will [exercise volition,] has a right to refuse to will, [to withhold consent.].

Source: Dig. 50, 7, 3; Weisman, 21d; Weisman, 21c

(English-origin maxim.) The right to consent necessarily includes the right to withhold consent — volition is meaningless unless refusal is equally available.

Consent-A concurrence of wills.

Source: Black's, 2d. 249; Weisman, 21e; Weisman, 95jj

(English-origin maxim.) True consent requires a meeting of two wills — the concurrence must be mutual, voluntary, and informed for any obligation to arise.

What I accept I do not reject.

Source: Broom, Max. 3d Lond. ed. 636; Weisman, 21g; Weisman, 21f

(English-origin maxim.) Acceptance and rejection are incompatible — a party who accepts a benefit or condition cannot simultaneously disclaim it, and acceptance binds.

Long sufferance is construed as consent.

Source: Fleta, lib. 4, c. 26, s. 4; Weisman, 21h

(English-origin maxim.) Prolonged toleration of another's act without objection is treated as consent — silence and inaction over time raise a presumption that the party acquiesced.

He who mistakes is not considered as consenting.

Source: Bract. fol. 44; Dig. 50, 17, 116, s. 2; Broom, Max. 262; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 581; 2 Kent, Comm. 477; Greerv. Caldwell, 14 Ga. 207; Weisman, 21m; Weisman, 21l

(English-origin maxim.) Consent procured through mistake is no consent — a party who agrees under a material misunderstanding of the facts has not truly consented, and the agreement may be avoided.

Silence shows consent.

Source: Wharton, III-317

(English-origin maxim.) Silence in the face of a claim or assertion, when the party had opportunity and duty to speak, is construed as consent — the law imputes agreement to those who stand mute when they should object.

He who consents cannot receive an injury.

Source: Broom, Max. 268, 269, 271, 395; Wing. Max. 482; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2279; Plowd. 501; Weisman, 21j

One who freely consents to an act cannot later claim injury from it — voluntary agreement extinguishes the right to complain. This maxim does not apply where consent was obtained by fraud or duress.

In the contract of loan, a stipulation not to be liable for fraud is not valid.

Source: Dig. 13, 7, 17, pr; Weisman, 24kk

(English-origin maxim.) A borrower cannot contractually exempt himself from liability for fraud in the loan — the law will not enforce a clause that shields a party from the consequences of his own deceit.

A delegated debtor is hateful in law.

Source: 3 Bulstr. 148; Weisman, 28e

(English-origin maxim.) The law disfavors the delegation of debts — substituting a new debtor in place of the original is viewed with suspicion and requires clear proof of the creditor's consent.

That which is due unconditionally is due now.

Source: Tray. Leg. Max. 519; Weisman, 28h

(English-origin maxim.) An unconditional debt is presently due and payable — the debtor cannot delay payment by claiming no time for performance was specified.

That which is paid by the order of another is the same as though it were paid by him who ordered it.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 180; Weisman, 28i

(English-origin maxim.) Payment made at the direction of a third party is treated as payment by the person who ordered it — the source of the funds is immaterial when the order is clear.

In alternatives, the debtor has the election.

Source: Black's, 599; Weisman, 28j

(English-origin maxim.) When a debt may be satisfied in alternative ways, the choice of method belongs to the debtor, not the creditor — the obligor selects which performance to render.

The principal should always be exhausted before coming upon the sureties.

Source: 2 Inst. 19; Weisman, 28l

(English-origin maxim.) The creditor must first exhaust his remedy against the principal debtor before pursuing the surety — the guarantor's liability is secondary, not primary.

Novation (the substitution of a new debt or obligation for an existing one) is not presumed in law.

Source: Halk. Lat. Max. 109; Weisman, 28m

(English-origin maxim.) The law does not presume that a new obligation has replaced an old one — novation must be clearly proved, and the intent to extinguish the prior debt must be unambiguous.

Naked reason and naked promise do not bind any debtor.

Source: Fleta, 1, 2, C. 60, S. 25; Weisman, 28q

(English-origin maxim.) Bare argument or a naked promise, unsupported by consideration or formality, creates no binding obligation on a debtor — the law requires something more than words.

A debt is a legal relation between two parties.

Source: Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 97; Weisman, 28v

(English-origin maxim.) A debt is not a thing but a legal relation between two determinate parties — the debtor-creditor bond is personal and exists only between those bound by the obligation.

What one has paid knowing it not to be due, with the intention of recovering it back, he cannot recover back.

Source: Dig. 2, 6, 50; Weisman, 28w; Weisman, 35x

(English-origin maxim.) One who pays money knowing it is not owed, intending to reclaim it, cannot recover — the voluntary payment with knowledge of the facts bars restitution.

A fire does not release a debtor from his debt.

Source: Code. 4, 2, 11; Weisman, 28x

(English-origin maxim.) The accidental destruction of evidence or property by fire does not extinguish the underlying debt — the obligation survives independent of the physical instruments that evidence it.

Let him who has nothing in his purse pay in his person, lest he who offends should go unpunished.

Source: C.L.M.; 2 Inst. 173; 4 Bl. Comm. 20; Weisman, 28g

(English-origin maxim.) Where a wrongdoer cannot make monetary restitution, the law requires satisfaction in his person — historically through imprisonment or corporal punishment — so that no offense goes without remedy. The principle secures the injured party's right to redress: inability to pay does not extinguish the obligation, and the law will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.

One who is accessory to a crime cannot be guilty of a higher degree of crime than his principal.

Source: 3 Inst. 139; Weisman, 26b

(English-origin maxim.) An accessory's guilt cannot exceed that of the principal — if the principal is guilty of manslaughter, the accessory cannot be convicted of murder.

The character of a past offense is never aggravated by a subsequent act or matter.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 138, 1; Bacon, Max. reg. 8; Broom, Max. 42; Weisman, 26d

(English-origin maxim.) A man's criminal liability is measured at the time of the offense and cannot be increased by anything he does afterward — later misconduct is charged separately.

Prevention is better than cure.

Source: Co. Litt. 304b; Weisman, 26f

(English-origin maxim.) The law favors preventive remedies — injunctions and restraining orders — over after-the-fact damages, because preventing harm is superior to compensating for it.

Facility of pardon is an incentive to crime.

Source: 4 Coke, 45; 3 Inst. 236; Weisman, 26m

(English-origin maxim.) Easy pardons encourage crime — when offenders expect clemency, the deterrent force of the law is destroyed and lawlessness increases.

Crimes are extinguished by death.

Source: Black's, 2d. 300; Weisman, 26r

(English-origin maxim.) Criminal prosecution abates upon the death of the accused — the state cannot try a dead man, and pending charges die with the defendant.

The will and the proposed end distinguished crimes.

Source: Bract. fol. 2b, 136b; 2 Inst. 57; Weisman, 26u

(English-origin maxim.) Criminal intent and the intended object distinguish one crime from another — the same physical act may constitute different offenses depending on the purpose behind it.

Capital crimes are punished by death.

Source: Walker v. State, 13 S.W. 860; Weisman, 26v

(English-origin maxim.) The defining characteristic of a capital crime is that it carries the death penalty — no lesser punishment qualifies an offense as capital.

It is not just and proper that he who speaks ill of a bad man should be condemned on that account; for it is fitting and expedient that the crimes of bad men should be known.

Source: Dig. 47, 10, 17; 1 Bl. Comm. 125; Weisman, 26dd

(English-origin maxim.) Truth is a defense to defamation — a man who speaks truthfully about the crimes of a wrongdoer cannot be condemned for doing so, because the public has a right to know.

The laws help persons who are deceived, not those deceiving.

Source: Tray. Lat. Max. 149; Weisman, 29a

(English-origin maxim.) Equity intervenes to protect the deceived party, not the deceiver — a man who practiced fraud upon another will find no shelter in the courts.

It is safer to be deceived than to deceive.

Source: Lofft, 396; Weisman, 29b

(English-origin maxim.) A man is better off being the victim of deception than being the deceiver, because the deceiver bears the moral and legal guilt while the deceived retains the law's protection.

Fraud should be proved by clear tokens.

Source: 1 Story, Cont. s. 625; Code. 2, 21, 6; Weisman, 29d

(English-origin maxim.) Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, not mere suspicion — vague allegations of dishonesty are insufficient to set aside a transaction.

Gross negligence is equivalent to fraud.

Source: Black's, 2d. 698; Dig. 11, 6, 1; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 646; McCracken v. Hare, 2 Spears (S.C.) 256; Weisman, 29h; Weisman, 44e

(English-origin maxim.) A trustee or fiduciary whose neglect is so extreme as to amount to recklessness is treated the same as one who acted with fraudulent intent — gross negligence and fraud produce the same legal consequences.

Deceit and fraud shall not defend, excuse or benefit any man.

Source: Best, Evid. p. 469, s. 428; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 395; 3 Coke, 78; Fleta, lib. 1, C. 13, s. 15; Weisman, 29l

(English-origin maxim.) No party may use fraud as a shield — deceit cannot serve as a defense, an excuse, or a foundation for any legal benefit, regardless of the circumstances.

Deceit is an artifice, since it pretends one thing and does another.

Source: Black's, 387; Weisman, 29m

(English-origin maxim.) The essence of deceit is the gap between appearance and reality — fraud is proven by showing that the party represented one thing while intending or doing another.

A new road, not an old one, often deceives the traveler.

Source: 4 Inst. 34; Tray. Lat. Max. 162; 2 Coke, 34a; 3 Coke, 81a; Weisman, 29n

(English-origin maxim.) Counsel should warn clients that novel legal theories and untested procedures carry greater risk of error than well-established paths — the old and familiar road is the safer one.

He acts in fraud of the law who, though the letter of the law being inviolate, uses the law contrary to its intention.

Source: Dig. 1, 3, 29; Weisman, 29q

(English-origin maxim.) One who technically complies with the letter of a law while deliberately subverting its purpose commits fraud upon the law and will be treated as a violator.

Fraud is always positive or intentional and distinguished from negligence.

Source: Alexander v. Church, 53 Conn. 561; 4 Atl. 103; 53 Conn; Weisman, 29v

(English-origin maxim.) Fraud requires a deliberate act of deception — it is always affirmative and intentional, and must be distinguished from mere carelessness or negligence.

No one is considered as deceiving those who know and consent to his acts.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 145; Bouv. 141; Weisman, 29w

(English-origin maxim.) Volenti non fit injuria — a person who enters a transaction with full knowledge of the other party's conduct and consents to it cannot afterward claim to have been deceived.

Whatever in itself is not lawful, necessity makes lawful; and necessity induces a privilege as regards private rights.

Quicquid per se non est licitum, necessitate fit licitum; et necessitas inducit privilegium quoad jura privata.

Source: 2 Inst. 564

Under the monarchy, necessity was declared by the Crown and accepted without question. In the American system, necessity does not suspend due process of law — even genuine emergency must pass through judicial review, and no claim of necessity can permanently destroy a reserved right of the People without due process of law.

There may be damage without legal injury.

Damnum sine injuria esse potest.

Source: Lofft, 112; 3 Bl. Comm. 219; Broom, Max. 93

Not every loss gives rise to a legal claim — a man may suffer damage without any violation of his legal rights.

Injury is not presumed.

Injuria non praesumitur.

Source: Co. Litt. 232; Weisman, 59c

The law presumes that men act lawfully until the contrary is shown — no man is presumed to have wronged another without proof.

The act of God does injury to no one.

Actus Dei nemini facit injuriam.

Source: 2 Inst. 287; 1 Coke, 97b; Co. Litt. 206a; 5 Co. 87; Weisman, 59d

No man is held liable for losses caused by forces beyond human control — where God acts, man is excused.

No one causes damage except he who does what he has no right to do.

Nemo damnum facit nisi qui id fecit quod facere jus non habet.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 151

Lawful exercise of one's own rights cannot constitute an actionable injury to another, even if the other suffers loss thereby.

Bodily injuries cannot be assessed against future considerations.

Corporalis injuria non recipit aestimationem de futuro.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 22; Broom, Max. 278

A personal injury demands present satisfaction — it cannot be deferred, discounted, or traded against future contingencies.

The king cannot confer a favour on one subject to the injury and damage of others.

Non potest rex gratiam facere cum injuria et damno aliorum.

Source: 3 Inst. 286; Jackson

Sovereign favor extended to one person cannot lawfully come at the expense of another's rights — the crown's grace must not operate as a trespass upon the people.

Not every loss produces an injury.

Non omne damnum inducit injuriam.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Bl. Com. 219; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2211; Weisman, 59b

Loss alone does not give rise to a cause of action; there must be a violation of a legal right before the law provides a remedy.

He who suffers damage by his own fault has no right to complain.

Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur damnum sentire.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Dig. 50, 17, 203; Weisman, 59k

A man who brings loss upon himself through his own negligence or wrongdoing cannot seek redress from another for that self-inflicted harm.

There may be damage or injury inflicted without any act of injustice.

Source: Lofft, 112; Weisman, 59a

(English-origin maxim.) Not every loss gives rise to a legal claim — damage without a violation of a legal right (damnum absque injuria) is not actionable.

Extreme law (rigor of law) is the greatest injury; strict law is great punishment.

Source: Hob. 125; Weisman, 59e

(English-origin maxim.) The rigid application of law without equity produces injustice — courts must temper strict legal rules with reason to avoid results that defeat the very purpose of the law.

A personal injury does not receive satisfaction from a future course of proceeding, [is not left for its satisfaction to a future course of proceeding.].

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 6; Broom, Max. 278; Weisman, 59h

(English-origin maxim.) A wrong to the person demands immediate redress — the injured party cannot be told to wait for some future proceeding, because personal injuries require present remedy.

An injury is done to him of whom a reproachful thing is said, or concerning whom an infamous song is made.

Source: 9 Coke, 60; Weisman, 59l

(English-origin maxim.) Defamation — whether by spoken word, written libel, or satirical song — constitutes a legal injury to the person whose reputation is attacked.

An injury is extinguished by the forgiveness or reconcilement of the party injured.

Source: Ersk. Inst. 4, 4, 108; Weisman, 59m

(English-origin maxim.) When the injured party forgives the wrongdoer or the parties reconcile, the cause of action for the injury is extinguished and cannot be revived.

Damage derived by consent is not a cause of action.

Source: Wing. Max. 482; Bract. fol. 20; Weisman, 59s

(English-origin maxim.) Volenti non fit injuria — one who voluntarily consents to a risk of harm cannot afterward sue for damages arising from that very risk.

No one should be injured by that which has taken place between other parties.

Source: Dig. 12, 2, 10; Weisman, 59u

(English-origin maxim.) A stranger to a transaction or proceeding cannot be prejudiced by it — no man should suffer injury from the acts of parties with whom he had no dealing.

From things to which one is accustomed, or in which there has been long acquiescence, no injury or wrong arises.

Source: Jenk. Cent. Intro. viii; Weisman, 59v

(English-origin maxim.) Long-standing custom or acquiescence bars a claim of injury — a party who endured a condition without complaint for an extended time cannot suddenly treat it as a wrong.

Extreme caution does no harm.

Source: 11 Coke, 6b; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 28, s.1; Weisman, 59x

(English-origin maxim.) Excessive caution in legal proceedings is never harmful — it is better to take every precaution than to overlook a safeguard and suffer irreversible loss.

Bodily injuries cannot be foreseen and guarded against by means of provisos.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 22; Weisman, 59y

(English-origin maxim.) Contract clauses and provisos cannot anticipate or guard against every possible bodily harm — personal injuries are by nature unpredictable and require remedies beyond mere contractual terms.

An injury offered to a judge, or person representing the king, is considered as offered to the king himself, especially if it be done in the exercise of his office.

Injuria illata judici, seu locum tenenti regis, videtur ipsi regi illata, maxime si fiat in exercente officium.

Source: 3 Inst. 1; Jackson

An affront to a judicial officer acting in his official capacity is treated as an affront to the sovereign authority he represents — contempt of the officer is contempt of the law itself.

Gross fault is equivalent to intentional wrong.

Culpa lata aequiparatur dolo.

Source: Dig. 50, 16, 226; Black's, 2d. 304

Negligence so extreme as to suggest reckless indifference to consequences is treated by the law as though it were a deliberate act.

He who is free from fault does not create fault.

Qui culpa caret non facit culpam.

Source: 5 Coke, 49

Where a man acts without fault, no culpability attaches to him — the law does not manufacture blame where none exists.

It is a fault for a man to meddle in a matter not pertaining to him.

Culpa est immiscere se rei ad se non pertinenti.

Source: D. 50, 17, 36; Jackson; Weisman, 44b

One who interjects himself into affairs that are none of his business bears responsibility for any harm that results — the law does not protect the busybody.

A fault finds its own authors.

Culpa tenet suos auctores.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

Blame attaches to the one who caused the fault — responsibility cannot be shifted to an innocent party but traces back to its true origin.

Ignorance, or want of skill, is considered a negligence.

Imperitia culpae annumeratur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Dig. 50, 17, 132; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 1004; Weisman, 57i

One who professes skill in a trade or profession and then performs incompetently is held negligent, because the undertaking itself creates the duty of competence.

Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.

Negligentia semper habet infortunium comitem.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Co. Litt. 246

Carelessness inevitably breeds adverse consequences; the law therefore treats neglect as a culpable failure, not as mere accident.

No guilt attaches to him who is compelled to obey.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 169, pr.; Bouv. 124; Weisman, 44c

(English-origin maxim.) A soldier obeying a lawful order, or a servant acting under his master's command, bears no fault for the consequences — compulsion negates personal culpability.

Obedience to existing laws is a sufficient extenuation of guilt before a civil tribunal.

Source: Broom, Max. 12, note; Weisman, 44d

(English-origin maxim.) Compliance with existing law is a sufficient mitigation of guilt before a civil tribunal — a man who acted within the bounds of the law as it stood is entitled to leniency, because obedience to the law of the land extenuates what might otherwise be blameworthy.

He adds fault to fault who sets up a defense of a wrong committed by him.

Source: 5 Coke, 49; Weisman, 44f

(English-origin maxim.) A wrongdoer who attempts to justify his wrong compounds his offense — defending a bad act adds a second fault to the first.

Where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it.

Source: Story, Ag. s. 195; Weisman, 44j

(English-origin maxim.) When both parties are equally at fault, the law will not intervene for either — the court leaves the loss where it finds it, granting no relief to either side.

Misconduct binds [should bind] its own authors. It is a never-failing axiom that everyone is accountable only for his own offense or wrong.

Source: Ersk. Inst. 4, 1, 14; Weisman, 44l

(English-origin maxim.) Each man answers only for his own misconduct — liability cannot be shifted to one who had no part in the wrong.

The law holds him excused who chose that his blood should be redeemed on any terms.

Source: Dig. 48, 21, 1; 1 Bl. Comm. 131; Weisman, 44m

(English-origin maxim.) Self-preservation is a right recognized by law — a man who acts under duress to save his own life is excused, even if he submitted to terms he would otherwise refuse.

Wherever there is a wrong, there damage follows.

Source: 10 Coke, 116; Weisman, 105f

(English-origin maxim.) Every legal wrong carries with it a corresponding damage — where a right is violated, the law presumes that harm has resulted, even without proof of specific monetary loss.

Wrong is wiped out by reconciliation.

Source: Bouv. 124; Weisman, 105g

(English-origin maxim.) Reconciliation between the parties extinguishes the wrong and bars further suit — once the injured party and the wrongdoer are reconciled, the cause of action is dead.

The idea of rights naturally suggests the correlative one of wrongs; for every right is capable of being violated.

Source: Black's, 1235; Weisman, 105l

(English-origin maxim.) For every right the law recognizes, there exists a corresponding wrong that may violate it — rights and wrongs are correlatives, and the capacity of a right to be infringed is inherent in its nature.

A wrong is not presumed.

Source: Co. Litt. 232; 3 Inst. 23; Weisman, 105n

(English-origin maxim.) The law does not presume wrongdoing — in the absence of evidence, every man's conduct is presumed to be lawful and honest.

Although a thing may not be bad in itself, yet, if it is of bad example, it is not to be done.

Source: 2 Inst. 564; Weisman, 105p

(English-origin maxim.) Even lawful acts should be avoided when they set a dangerous precedent — the law considers not only the immediate effect but the example set for others.

The act of the law does no one wrong.

Source: 5 Coke, 116; 2 Bl. Comm. 123; Weisman, 105q

(English-origin maxim.) What the law itself commands or permits cannot constitute a legal wrong — an act done by operation of law injures no one in the eyes of the law.

Remedy signifies the judicial means for enforcing a right or redressing a wrong.

Source: Walters v. City of Ottawa, 88 N.E. 651, 654, 240 Ill. 259; 240 Ill; Weisman, 94f

(English-origin maxim.) A remedy is the judicial means by which a right is enforced or a wrong is redressed — without a remedy, a right exists only on paper.

Recovery, i.e., restitution, is had by sentence of a judge of a thing wrongfully extorted or detained.

Source: Co. Litt. 154a; Weisman, 94g

(English-origin maxim.) Restitution is the judicial restoration of property wrongfully taken or withheld — the court compels the return of what was unlawfully seized or detained.

It is better to restrain or meet a thing in time, than to seek a remedy after a wrong has been inflicted.

Source: 2 Inst. 299; Weisman, 94j; Weisman, 105o

(English-origin maxim.) Prevention is superior to cure — it is better to restrain a threatened wrong by injunction than to seek damages after the injury has been inflicted.

The law wills that, in every case where a man is wronged and endamaged, he shall always have a remedy.

Source: Co. Litt. 197b; Branch, Princ.; Broom, Max. 192; Bouv. Inst. 2411; Weisman, 94u

(English-origin maxim.) The law guarantees a remedy for every wrong — no man may be injured without recourse, and for every violation of a right the law provides a means of redress.

It is just that every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or character.

Source: Weisman, 94h

(English-origin maxim.) Every person is entitled to a remedy at law for injuries to his person, property, or reputation — the right to redress is itself a fundamental right.

It is not just and right that he who exposes the faults of a guilty person should be condemned on that account; for it is proper and expedient that the offense of the guilty should be known.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 68c

(English-origin maxim.) The People's right to expose malfeasance by public officers or private wrongdoers is essential to self-governance — one who brings the guilty to light serves justice and cannot be punished for doing so. This principle undergirds the right of remonstrance, petition, and the freedom of speech secured by the First Amendment.

He who has once relinquished or renounced his action cannot bring it again.

Source: 8 Coke, 59a; Weisman, 75j

(English-origin maxim.) Once a party voluntarily abandons or relinquishes a cause of action, it cannot be revived — the right to sue, once surrendered, is extinguished forever.

In civil matters agency ( or service) excuses, but not so in criminal matters.

Source: Lofft. 228; Tray. Leg. Max. 243; Weisman, 75t

(English-origin maxim.) In civil matters, acting as an agent or servant excuses personal liability, but in criminal cases the agent remains personally responsible for his own criminal acts regardless of who directed them.

Negatives cannot be proved.

Negativa probari non possunt.

Source: 4 Inst. 279; Code. 4, 19, 23

It is in the nature of things that a party cannot prove what did not happen; therefore the law places the burden of proof on the affirmative.

Advice, unless fraudulent, does not create an obligation.

Consilii, non fraudulenti, nulla est obligatio.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

One who gives honest counsel in good faith incurs no liability for the consequences of that advice — only when advice is given with intent to deceive does it become actionable.

That interpretation is to be received [or adopted] which is free from fault [or wrong.] The law will not intend a wrong.

Source: Bacon, Max. 17, in reg. 3; Bouv. 124; Weisman, 22aa

(English-origin maxim.) Among competing interpretations, the one free from wrong or absurdity must be adopted; the law will not intend an unjust result when a just reading is available.

The cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused.

Causa causae est causa causati.

Source: 12 Mod. 639; Bouv. 119; Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 177; Weisman, 14f

Liability traces backward through the chain of causation — he who sets the first cause in motion is answerable for the final effect.

In law, the immediate and not the remote cause is looked at.

In jure, non remota causa, sed proxima, spectatur.

Source: 12 East 648; 3 Kent, Comm. 302; Bacon, Max. reg. 1; Weisman, 14c

The law fixes responsibility on the proximate cause — the nearest link in the chain — not on speculative or distant origins.

The effect follows the cause.

Effectus sequitur causam.

Source: Wing. Max. 226; Weisman, 14d

Where a lawful cause produces a result, the result partakes of the character of the cause; where the cause is unlawful, so is the effect.

He who overthrows the cause overthrows its future effects.

Source: 10 Coke, 51; Weisman, 14e

(English-origin maxim.) Defeating the root cause extinguishes every consequence that flows from it — strike down the foundation and the structure built upon it falls.

It shall have effect as far as it can have effect.

Source: Cowp. 600; 4 Kent, Comm. 493; Shep. Touch. 87; Weisman, 14g

(English-origin maxim.) An instrument or act that cannot operate as intended will nonetheless be given whatever legal effect it can lawfully support — the law saves what can be saved.

Remove the cause and the effect will cease.

Source: 2 Bl. Comm. 203; Weisman, 14i

(English-origin maxim.) Eliminating the cause of a legal obligation or wrong terminates its ongoing effects — this maxim supports actions to enjoin continuing harm at its source.

When that which I do does not have effect as I do it, let it have as much effect as it can; i.e., in some other way.

Source: Troup v. Blodget, 16Johns. (N.Y.) 172, 178; Vandervolgen v. Yates, 3 Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 242, 261; 4 Kent, Comm. 493; Weisman, 14k

(English-origin maxim.) Where an instrument fails in its primary purpose, the law will give it effect in any alternative capacity it can lawfully support rather than declare it a total nullity.

He who fails in a syllable fails in his whole cause.

Source: Bract. fol. 211; Weisman, 14l

(English-origin maxim.) Precision in pleading is essential — a defect in a single material particular may be fatal to the entire cause, reflecting the ancient rigor of the common law forms of action.

A vague and uncertain cause is not a reasonable cause.

Source: 5 Coke, 57; Weisman, 14m

(English-origin maxim.) A cause of action resting on speculation or conjecture is legally insufficient — the court requires a definite, ascertainable cause before it will hear the case.

The word 'cause' in its ordinary and usual definition may be deemed to mean that which occasions or effects a result.

Source: Kemp v. John Charlton & Sons, 169 F.2d 203, 206; Weisman, 14p

(English-origin maxim.) The legal definition of 'cause' aligns with common understanding: it is that which directly occasions or brings about the result in question, not a remote or speculative antecedent.

A necessary cause; a cause without which the effect in question could not have happened.

Causa sine qua non.

Source: Hayes v. R.R. Co., 111 U.S. 228; Weisman, 14n

The "but for" test of causation — if the injury would not have occurred without the defendant's act, that act is a necessary cause and liability may attach.

A fortuitous event is not to be expected, and no one is bound to foresee it.

Casus fortuitus non est sperandus, et nemo tenetur divinare.

Source: 4 Co. 66; Hardr. 82 arg.; Broom, Max. 260; Weisman, 1b

The law does not charge a man with anticipating the unforeseeable — liability attaches only to events within the range of reasonable expectation.

Negligence, carelessness, or misconduct are not to be regarded as accidents.

Neglegentia, incuria, aut malefacta pro accidentibus non habenda sunt.

Source: Citizens Nat. Bank v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio Dec. 685, 687; Weisman, 1d

An event caused by human fault is not an accident — the label of "accident" cannot shield a party whose own negligence produced the harm.

No one is held to answer for the effects of a superior force or of a fortuitous event, unless his own fault has contributed.

Nemo tenetur ad impossibile; nec casus fortuitos praestat.

Source: Fleta, lib. 2, c. 72, s. 16; 4 Co. 66; Weisman, 1c

Acts of God, storms, insurrection, and irresistible forces excuse performance — but only where the party's own conduct did not invite or amplify the disaster.

Laws can neither prevent accidents nor equally protect all against them.

Leges neque accidentia praecavere neque aequaliter contra ea omnes protegere possunt.

Source: Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 465; Weisman, 1e

The law is not an insurer against all misfortune — it governs human conduct, not the operations of chance.

An unusual event is not presumed.

Casus insolitus non praesumitur.

Source: 4 Co. 66; cf. Dig. 22, 3, 1

Legal presumptions are built on ordinary experience — extraordinary events are not anticipated, and liability for them must be proved, not assumed.

For concerning anything which occurs without deceit or wrong on the part of the vendor, the vendor is secure.

Source: Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 198; 4 Pick; Weisman, 35p

(English-origin maxim.) A seller who acts without deceit or wrongdoing is not liable for defects unknown to him — the risk of latent defects falls on the buyer absent fraud or express warranty.

No man is bound for the advice he gives.

Nemo tenetur ex consilio suo respondere.

Source: Story, Bailm. s. 155; Dig. 50, 17, 47; Weisman, 3b

Advice freely given does not create liability in the advisor — the person who receives counsel bears the risk of acting on it.

A simple recommendation does not bind the party offering it.

Simplex commendatio non obligat.

Source: Dig. 4, 3, 37; 2 Kent, Comm. 485; Broom, Max. (3d Lond. ed.) 700; Weisman, 3d

A mere endorsement or suggestion — as distinguished from a warranty or guarantee — imposes no obligation on the recommender.

Every one is free to ascertain for himself whether advice is advantageous to his interests.

Unicuique licet explorare an consilium sibi commodum sit.

Source: Upton v. Vail, 6 Johns. (N.Y.) 181, 184; 5 Am. Dec. 210; Weisman, 3e

The recipient of advice is not a passive vessel — the law presumes every man capable of evaluating counsel and choosing whether to follow it.