equity

A dispensation is a wound that injures the common law.

Dispensatio est vulnus, quod vulnerat jus commune.

Source: Davies, Ir. K.B. 69; Weisman, 18f; Weisman, 82c

Every special exemption from the common law weakens the law itself — dispensations must be granted sparingly and never presumed.

Equity is a certain perfect reason which interprets and amends the written law, comprehended in no writing, but consisting in right reason alone.

Aequitas est perfecta quaedam ratio, quae jus scriptum interpretatur et emendat; nulla scriptura comprehensa, sed sola ratione consistens.

Source: Co. Litt. 24b; Jackson 35; Weisman, 36j

Equity operates through reason to correct what the written law, by its generality, gets wrong in a particular case — it is the conscience of the law.

Equity is, as it were, equality.

Aequitas est quasi aequalitas.

Source: Co. Litt. 24; Bouvier, Inst. 3725; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 64

The foundation of equity is equal treatment — it ensures that like cases are treated alike and that no party gains an unjust advantage through technicality.

Equity is the correction of the law where, by reason of its generality, it is deficient.

Aequitas est correctio legis generaliter latae, qua parte deficit.

Source: Plowden 375, 467; Jackson 34; Weisman, 36e

When a general rule produces an unjust result in a specific case, equity steps in to supply what the law omits — it does not destroy the rule but tempers its application.

Equity follows the law.

Aequitas sequitur legem.

Source: Talbot 52; Story, Eq. Jur. s. 64; Co. Litt. 24b; Broom, Max. 151; Weisman, 36r; Weisman, 95t

Equity does not override the law — it supplements it. A court of equity applies legal rules to equitable estates and respects the general policy of the law.

Equity does not make law, but assists law.

Aequitas non facit jus, sed juri auxiliatur.

Source: Lofft 379; Weisman, 36d

Equity is not a rival system of law — it is an auxiliary that fills gaps and prevents injustice where the strict letter of the law falls short.

Equity never counteracts the laws.

Aequitas nunquam contravenit leges.

Source: Black's, 2d. 45; Jackson 37; Weisman, 36o

No court of equity may overturn a clear legal rule — its power is to mitigate and supplement, never to contradict or repeal.

Nothing is more unjust than to extend equity too far.

Nihil iniquius quam aequitatem nimis extendere.

Source: Halkerton 103; Weisman, 36g

Equity that exceeds its proper bounds becomes itself a source of injustice — the remedy must remain proportionate to the wrong.

In all things, but especially in law, equity is to be regarded.

In omnibus quidem, maxime tamen in jure, aequitas spectanda sit.

Source: Dig. 50.17.90; Story, Bailm. s. 257; Weisman, 36m

Every legal proceeding must be measured against equity — a technically correct result that works manifest injustice is not the law's purpose.

Law regards equity.

Jus respicit aequitatem.

Source: Co. Litt. 24b; Broom, Max. 143; Weisman, 36i

The common law itself takes equity into account — rigid application that produces inequitable results is contrary to the spirit of the law.

Equity acts upon the person.

Aequitas agit in personam.

Source: Bouvier, Inst. n. 3733; Weisman, 36c; Weisman, 36n

Equity directs its decrees to the person of the defendant, commanding or forbidding specific acts — this is its distinctive power over courts of law, which act only on property and money.

Equity suffers not a wrong without a remedy.

Aequitas non patitur jus deesse remedium.

Source: Bouvier, Inst. n. 3726; Weisman, 36p

Where a legal wrong exists but no legal remedy reaches it, equity will supply the remedy — the maxim forbids any gap between recognized right and available relief.

The court of chancery is the workshop of justice.

Curia cancellaria est officina justitiae.

Source: Coke, 2 Inst. 552; Weisman, 36l

The equity court exists not to follow rigid forms but to forge practical justice — it adapts its tools to the case at hand.

That which is equitable and good is the law of laws.

Aequum et bonum est lex legum.

Source: Hobart 224; Jackson 39; Weisman, 68b

The ultimate test of any legal rule is whether it produces what is equitable and good — a rule that consistently fails this test has lost its claim to authority.

Extreme law is extreme injury.

Summum jus, summa injuria.

Source: Hobart 125; Cicero, De Officiis 1.10.33

The rigid application of a legal rule to its utmost extreme produces the greatest injustice — this maxim is the classical warrant for equity's intervention wherever strict law would work manifest wrong.

A court of equity ought to do justice completely and not by halves.

Source: Rice & Adams Corp. v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509, 515; Weisman, 36a

(English-origin maxim.) When equity takes jurisdiction of a cause, it must grant complete relief — a court cannot resolve part of the dispute and leave the rest, as half-justice is no justice at all.

The civil law is what a people establishes for itself.

Source: Inst. 1, 2, 1; Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 424, 426; Weisman, 36h

(English-origin maxim.) The civil law derives its authority from the consent of the people who adopt it — a statute imposed without the people's consent lacks the character of true law.

In the court of chancery ( equity) a man shall not be prejudiced by his mispleading, or defect of form, but according to the truth of the matter; for the decision should be made according to conscience and not according to the rigor of law.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 36f

(English-origin maxim.) Equity looks to substance, not form — a party's right to be heard on the merits cannot be defeated by a technical pleading defect, because the court of conscience is bound to reach the truth of the matter rather than punish imperfect procedure.

Laws derived from the pure source of equity and justice must be founded on the consent of those whose obedience they require.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 36s

(English-origin maxim.) No law is legitimate unless it rests on the consent of the governed — invoke this maxim to challenge any regulation, ordinance, or statute imposed upon the People without their genuine consent, as all just authority flows upward from the sovereign People, not downward from government.

All the powers, being derived from equity, are, even in a court of law, to be construed equitably.

Source: Wharton, III-14

(English-origin maxim.) Even in a court of law, powers derived from equity must be construed equitably — a party may invoke equitable principles to temper the rigid application of a legal power.

Courts of equity delight to do justice, and that not by halves.

Source: Wharton, III-58

(English-origin maxim.) Equity will not stop at half-measures — once a court of conscience undertakes a cause, it must fashion a remedy that fully resolves the matter rather than leaving parties in continuing dispute.

Equitable relief will not be granted to a suitor unless he comes into court with clean hands.

Source: Tripp v. Cook; Wharton, III-84

(English-origin maxim.) A party seeking equitable relief must come to court with clean hands — if the plaintiff has acted inequitably regarding the subject matter of the suit, the court will deny the requested relief.

Equity regards whatever is ordered to be done by one having authority, or what ought to be done, as actually done.

Source: Wharton, III-88

(English-origin maxim.) Equity treats an act that should have been performed as though it was performed — invoke this to enforce obligations that a party was duty-bound to complete but neglected.

Wherever persons agree concerning any particular subject, that, in a court of equity, as against the party himself and any claiming under him voluntarily or with notice, raises a trust.

Source: Wharton, III-384

(English-origin maxim.) When parties agree on a matter, equity will enforce that agreement as a trust against the promisor and anyone claiming under him with notice — this is the foundation of constructive trusts arising from consensual dealings.

What is mine cannot be lost or transferred to another without my act or my default.

Quod meum est sine facto meo vel defectu meo amitti vel in alium transferri non potest.

Source: Prest. Abs. 147; Jackson; Weisman, 91z

Property cannot be taken from its owner without his voluntary act or his legal fault — involuntary transfers without consent or due process of law are void.

Whosoever is skilled in his profession is to be believed.

Cuilibet in sua arte perito est credendum.

Source: Co. Litt. 125; Jackson

Expert testimony is given credit in matters within the expert's field — but the same expert has no special authority outside his area of competence.

A deceiver deals in general terms.

Dolosus versatur in generalibus.

Source: 2 Co. 34; Jackson; Weisman, 29c

Vague and general language in a contract or representation is a hallmark of fraud — the honest party speaks with specificity, while the deceiver hides behind ambiguity. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.6.13, 7.2.14.)

In everything is born that which destroys the thing itself.

In omni re nascitur res quae ipsam rem exterminat.

Source: 2 Inst. 15; Jackson

Every right, power, or institution carries within it the seeds of its own limitation or destruction — overuse of authority tends to its eventual overthrow.

Nothing more preserves in tranquillity and concord those subjected to the Government than a due administration of the laws.

Nihil infra regnum subditos magis conservat in tranquillitate et concordia quam debita legum administratio.

Source: 2 Inst. 158; Jackson

Public peace depends on faithful law enforcement — when officials administer the law justly and consistently, order follows; when they do not, discord and resistance arise.

I ought not to be in a better position than my assignor, from whom the right passes to me.

Non debeo melioris conditionis esse, quam auctor meus, a quo jus in me transit.

Source: D. 50, 17, 175; Jackson

An assignee takes the right exactly as the assignor held it, with all its limitations and defects — no one can transfer a greater interest than he possesses.

Confirmation is not valid unless he who confirms is either in possession of the thing itself or of the right of which confirmation is to be made; and in like manner, unless he to whom confirmation is made is in possession.

Non valet confirmatio, nisi ille, qui confirmat, sit in possessione rei vel juris unde fieri debet confirmatio; et eodem modo, nisi ille cui confirmatio fit, sit in possessione.

Source: Co. Litt. 295; Jackson; Weisman, 20g

A confirmation conveys no interest unless both parties — the confirmer and the person confirmed — already hold some interest in the subject matter.

A novation is not presumed.

Novatio non praesumitur.

Source: Halk. 109; Jackson

An existing obligation is not presumed to have been replaced by a new one — the party asserting novation must prove that both parties intended to extinguish the original agreement.

Every privation presupposes former enjoyment.

Omnis privatio praesupponit habitum.

Source: Co. Litt. 339; Jackson

Before a right can be taken away, it must first have existed — a claim of deprivation requires proof that the claimant once possessed the thing of which he says he has been deprived.

It is undoubted law that agreements which are contrary to the laws and constitutions, or contrary to good morals, have no force.

Pacta quae contra leges constitutionesque vel contra bonos mores fiunt, nullam vim habere, indubitati juris est.

Source: C. 2, 3, 6; Jackson

A contract that violates the law, the constitution, or public morality is void ab initio — no court will enforce an agreement founded on illegality.

Every grant is to be most strongly taken against the grantor.

Quaelibet concessio fortissime contra donatorem interpretanda est.

Source: Co. Litt. 183; Jackson

Ambiguities in a grant are resolved against the party who drafted it — the grantor had the opportunity to express himself clearly and bears the consequence of any uncertainty.

He who succeeds to the right or property of another ought to be clothed with his right.

Qui in jus dominiumve alterius succedit jure ejus uti debet.

Source: D. 50, 17, 177; Jackson

A successor in interest takes the right exactly as the predecessor held it — he steps into the same legal position, with the same powers and the same limitations.

He who does not prevent what he can prevent, is regarded as doing the thing.

Qui non obstat quod obstare potest facere videtur.

Source: 2 Inst. 146; Jackson

One who has the power and duty to prevent a wrong and fails to act is treated as if he committed the wrong himself — passive acquiescence in preventable harm creates liability.

A strong presumption avails in law.

Praesumptio violenta valet in lege.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 56; Wharton; Weisman, 89b

A violent or compelling presumption has the force of proof — when the circumstances point overwhelmingly in one direction, the law treats the presumption as equivalent to direct evidence. (Duplicate maxim — see also 9.3.3.)

Simplicity is favorable to the laws, and too much subtlety in law is to be rejected.

Simplicitas est legibus amica; et nimia subtilitas in jure reprobatur.

Source: Coke, 4 Co. 8; Weisman, 44k; Weisman, 71cc

Legal proceedings should be simple and direct — complexity for its own sake obscures justice and serves only those who profit from confusion.

Where the law ends, tyranny begins.

Ubi cessat lex, ibi incipit tyrannis.

Source: Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U.S. 694, 702

The boundary of law is the boundary of legitimate power — any exercise of authority beyond what the law authorizes is tyranny, regardless of who exercises it.

The law delights in equity; it covets perfection; it is a rule of right.

Lex aequitate gaudet; appetit perfectum; est norma recti.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 36

The three attributes of law — equity, perfection, rightness — express its highest aspiration. Where a construction of law defeats any of these, the construction is wrong.

A beneficial law affords a remedy in a similar case.

Lex beneficialis rei consimili remedium praestat.

Source: 2 Inst. 689

When a law provides a remedy for one class of injury, equity extends that remedy to similar injuries — the law does not leave a man without recourse merely because his case is not identical to the one expressly provided for.

The law cannot fail in dispensing justice.

Lex deficere non potest in justitia exhibenda.

Source: Co. Litt. 197

If the law appears to fail a party seeking justice, the fault lies in the application, not in the law itself. A court must find a way to do justice within the law.

The law creates a fiction where equity subsists.

Lex fingit ubi subsistit aequitas.

Source: 11 Co. 90; Weisman, 45e

Legal fictions are permitted only to serve the ends of equity and justice — the law feigns what it must in order to produce a just result, but never to produce an unjust one.

The law never works an injury, nor does any man a wrong.

Lex nemini operatur iniquum, nemini facit injuriam.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 22

The law, correctly applied, is incapable of producing injustice — when an unjust result appears, it is the application that has erred, not the law itself.

The law speaks to all with one mouth.

Lex uno ore omnes alloquitur.

Source: 2 Inst. 184

The law applies equally to all — there is no separate law for the powerful and another for the weak. Uniform application is the essence of the rule of law.

The law sometimes follows equity.

Lex aliquando sequitur aequitatem.

Source: 3 Wils. 119

Where strict law and equity diverge, the law bends toward the equitable result — rigidity in the law is tempered by the demands of justice.

It is a perpetual law that no human and positive law is perpetual.

Perpetua lex est nullam legem humanam ac positivam perpetuam esse.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; cf. 7 Co. 25; Weisman, 7c

Only the natural and divine laws endure forever — every statute, regulation, and ordinance of man is temporal and subject to repeal or amendment.

No one can improve his condition by his own misdeed.

Nemo potest conditionem suam meliorem facere delicto suo.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 134, 1; Broom, Max. 299; Weisman, 19f; Weisman, 76g

A wrongdoer cannot claim a legal benefit arising from his own wrong — no man shall profit from his own unlawful act.

He acts with guile who demands that which he will have to return.

Dolo facit qui petit quod restituere oportet.

Source: Broom, Max. 346; Dig. 50, 17, 173, 3; Weisman, 55f

One who brings a claim knowing he has no right to retain the remedy sought acts fraudulently and will be met with an equitable defense.

Equal knowledge on both sides makes the contracting parties equal.

Scientia utrinque par pares contrahentes facit.

Source: 3 Burr. 1910; Broom, Max. 774; Jackson, Lat. for Law. no. 959; Weisman, 24o

A contract formed where one party withholds material knowledge from the other is not a contract between equals — and may be voidable for that disparity.

Ignorance of fact excuses.

Ignorantia facti excusat.

Source: 2 Co. 3b; 2 Kent, Comm. 491; Code 1, 18, 10; Broom, Max. 253; Weisman, 57c; Weisman, 57d

Acts done and contracts made under a material mistake of fact are voidable. The distinction between ignorance of law (no excuse) and ignorance of fact (grounds for relief) is fundamental.

Ignorance of those things which one is bound to know does not excuse.

Ignorantia eorum quae quis scire tenetur non excusat.

Source: Hale, P.C. 42; Broom, Max. 267; 4 Bl. Comm. 27; Weisman, 57a

Where a duty to know exists — as with an officer of the court or a fiduciary — ignorance is treated as negligence, not as innocence.

The law aids the ignorant.

Lex succurrit ignoranti.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 15; Weisman, 44i; Weisman, 57h

Equity steps in where strict law would punish a party who acted in genuine ignorance of a material fact — particularly where the other party possessed superior knowledge.

It is a general rule that ignorance of law prejudices, but not ignorance of fact.

Regulae generalis est quod omnis ignorantia legis praejudicat, non facti.

Source: Code 1, 18, 10; 2 Kent, Comm. 491; 4 Bl. Comm. 27

This is the master rule from which the two branches — law and fact — flow. A mistake of law furnishes no ground to rescind agreements or reclaim money paid; a mistake of fact may.

He is not deceived who knows himself to be deceived.

Non decipitur qui scit se decipi.

Source: 5 Co. 60; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 29k

One who enters a transaction knowing the other party's deception cannot later claim injury from the fraud — knowledge of the trick negates the harm.

Let him who wishes to be deceived, be deceived.

Qui vult decipi, decipiatur.

Source: 1 de G. M. & G. 687; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 29u

The law will not rescue a man from the consequences of deception he willingly embraced — voluntary blindness to fraud forfeits the right to complain of it.

Error of law injures. A mistake of the law has an injurious effect; that is, the party committing it must suffer the consequences.

Source: Mackeld. Rom. Law, s. 178; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 139, note; 4 Bouv. Inst. n. 3828; Weisman, 37b

(English-origin maxim.) A party who acts under a mistaken understanding of the law bears the consequences of that mistake — ignorance of law is no excuse, and equity will not relieve against its effects.

It is safer to err on the gentler side or the side of mercy.

Source: 3 Inst. 220; Weisman, 37e

(English-origin maxim.) When the law is doubtful, courts should err on the side of mercy — invoke this in sentencing arguments or where a harsh construction and a lenient one are equally plausible.

An error made by a clerk should not injure or prejudice; a clerical error may be corrected.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 23, 324; Dig. 34, 5, 3; Weisman, 37g

(English-origin maxim.) A clerical or scrivener's error in a record, deed, or judgment may be corrected without prejudice to any party — the substance of the act controls, not the scribe's inadvertent mistake.

A man is presumed to be simple [minded] who makes a mistake in his own name.

Source: Code. 6, 24, 14; Van Alst v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 148, 161; Weisman, 37i

(English-origin maxim.) A man who misstates or misspells his own name raises a presumption of incapacity or fraud — cite this to challenge the authenticity of a document signed under a garbled version of the signer's name.

The mistakes of the writer ought not to harm.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 324; Weisman, 37l

(English-origin maxim.) Errors introduced by the drafter or copyist of a legal instrument do not invalidate the instrument — the parties should not suffer for the writer's mistake when the true intent is clear.

Ignorance of the fact excuses; ignorance of the law excuses not. Every man must be taken to be cognizant of the law; otherwise there is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance may not be carried.

Source: 1 Coke, 177; Broom, Max. 253; 4 Bouv. Inst. n. 3828; Weisman, 57f

(English-origin maxim.) Ignorance of fact may excuse a party from liability, but ignorance of law never does — every person is conclusively presumed to know the law, and no claim of unfamiliarity will serve as a defense.

A mistake in point of law is, in criminal cases, no sort of defense.

Source: 4 Bl. Comm. 27; 4 Steph. Comm. 81; Broom, Max. 253; 7 Car. P. 456; 2 Kent, Comm. 491, and note; Weisman, 57g

(English-origin maxim.) In criminal prosecutions, a defendant cannot escape liability by claiming he did not know his act was illegal — the law presumes knowledge of its own commands, and mistake of law is no defense to a criminal charge.

A hidden intention is bad and disfavored in law.

Intentio caeca mala est et in jure odibilis.

Source: 2 Bulstr. 179

The law disfavors secret reservations. One who conceals his true purpose while inducing another to act on a false representation acts fraudulently.

A guardian may make the estate of an heir in his custody better, not worse.

Custos statum haeredis in custodia existentis meliorem, non deteriorem, facere potest.

Source: 7 Co. 7; Weisman, 53a

The guardian holds a fiduciary position — he may improve the ward's estate by prudent management but may not diminish it by waste, sale, or self-dealing.

If a guardian commit fraud upon his ward, he shall be removed from the guardianship.

Si custos fraudem pupillo fecerit, a custodia removendus est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 39; Weisman, 53c

The guardian who betrays his trust forfeits his office. The remedy is immediate removal — the law does not leave a ward in the hands of a proven fraudster.

A guardian ought not to make money from the guardianship of his ward.

Tutor non debet lucrari ex tutela.

Source: Manning v. Manning's Ex'rs, 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 527, 535; Dig. 26, 7, 33; Weisman, 53b

The guardianship is a trust, not a profit center. Any benefit the guardian extracts from the ward's estate is a breach of duty and must be disgorged.

The law will provide for orphans, the insane, and the poor as though it were their guardian and curator.

Lex orbis, insanis, et pauperibus pro tutore atque curatore providebit.

Source: Morgan, Eng. Legal Maxims; cf. Jenk. Cent. 97; 3 Co. Inst. 6

Where no private guardian exists, the law itself steps into the role of protector for those who cannot protect themselves — orphans, the insane, and the destitute.

Whatever is acquired by the agent is acquired for the principal.

Quicquid acquiritur ab agente acquiritur principali.

Source: Story, *Agency* § 403

The agent's acquisitions within the scope of his authority vest immediately in the principal — the agent holds as the principal's hand, not as his own.

The same person cannot be both the doer and the one to whom the thing is done.

Idem agens et patiens esse non potest.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 40; Weisman, 4a

An agent cannot deal with himself on behalf of his principal — one cannot be both buyer and seller, grantor and grantee, in the same transaction.

Faith must be kept; the simplicity of the law of nations must prevail.

Fides servanda est; simplicitas juris gentium praevaleat.

Source: Story, *Agency* § 192; Dig. 2, 14, 1

Good faith is the foundation of all dealings — both between private parties and between nations. An agent is bound by the confidence reposed in him, and in the law of nations, simplicity and directness of dealing must prevail over technical evasion.

By the law of nature it is not just that anyone be enriched at the loss or injury of another.

Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 206; 2 Kent, Comm. 336; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 461; Weisman, 59n

No man may profit from harm done to another — unjust enrichment offends the first principles of natural justice.

He who receives the advantage ought also to bear the disadvantage.

Cujus est commodum ejus debet esse incommodum.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 10; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 962; Weisman, 12f

Benefit and burden are inseparable — the man who takes the profit must bear the risk.

No one ought to be enriched by another's loss.

Nemo debet alterius jactura locupletari.

Source: Dig. 6, 1, 48, 65; 2 Kent, Comm. 336; Jenk. Cent. 4; Weisman, 61a

The principle of unjust enrichment gives rise to restitution — what is gained at another's expense must be restored.

A burden ought not to be imposed upon one man by the act of another.

Gravamen non concedendum est alicui per factum alterius.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 74; 2 Kent, Comm. 646

No man may be saddled with obligations he did not assume — liability requires either personal action or personal consent.

No man ought to be burdened in consequence of another's act.

Nemo ex alterius facto praegravari debet.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 2k

Each man answers for his own acts — the consequences of one person's conduct cannot be shifted onto an innocent party who had no part in it.

Long possession produces the right of possession, and takes away an action from the true owner.

Longa possessio parit jus possidendi et tollit actionem vero domino.

Source: Co. Litt. 110; Jackson; Weisman, 91u

Continuous undisturbed possession over time creates a prescriptive right in the possessor and extinguishes the original owner’s right of action — the law rewards vigilance and punishes the sleeping claimant.

Buildings pass by a grant of the land.

Source: Fleta, lib. 3, c. 2, s. 12; Weisman, 70o

(English-origin maxim.) A conveyance of land includes all structures upon it — buildings are part of the realty and pass with the soil unless expressly excluded.

Clandestine gifts are always suspicious.

Dona clandestina sunt semper suspiciosa.

Source: 3 Co. 81; Noy, Max. 152; Jackson, Latin for Lawyers, 1915; Weisman, 48c

Secret transfers raise the presumption of fraud — the law expects transactions in property to be open and visible.

The manner gives law to the gift.

Modus legem dat donationi.

Source: Co. Litt. 19a; Weisman, 48f; Weisman, 48k

The terms and conditions attached to a gift by the donor govern its use — the recipient takes subject to the mode prescribed.

The will of the donor, manifestly expressed in his deed of gift, is to be observed.

Voluntas donatoris in carta doni sui manifeste expressa observetur.

Source: Co. Litt. 21; Weisman, 48h

The donor's intent, when clearly stated in the instrument of gift, binds all parties — no court may rewrite a deed of gift against the donor's expressed will.

No rule of law protects a buyer who willfully closes his ears to information, or refuses to make inquiry when circumstances of grave suspicion imperatively demand it.

Nulla juris regula protegit emptorem qui voluntarie aures claudit.

Source: Lytly v. Lansing, 147 U.S. 59, 72; Weisman, 13s

The buyer who refuses to investigate what a reasonable man would suspect forfeits the law's protection — willful blindness is no better than knowledge.

Be careful, purchaser.

Source: Wharton, III-38

(English-origin maxim.) The buyer must exercise caution and diligence before purchasing — the law places the burden of investigation on the purchaser.

The last will of a testator is to be thoroughly fulfilled according to his real intention.

Ultima voluntas testatoris est perimplenda secundum veram intentionem suam.

Source: Co. Litt. 322; Weisman, 103a

The executor's duty is to carry out the testator's wishes as the testator actually intended them — not as the executor might wish them to have been.

He who does not forbid what he can forbid is taken to assent.

Qui non prohibet quod prohibere potest, assentire videtur.

Source: 2 Inst. 308; 1 Bl. Comm. 430

An officer or trustee who stands by while a wrong is committed, having the power to prevent it, is deemed to have consented to it.

Advice, unless fraudulent, does not create an obligation.

Consilii non fraudulenti nulla est obligatio.

Source: Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

A man who gives honest counsel is not bound by it — liability arises only where the advice is fraudulently given to induce reliance and cause injury.

Every consent involves a submission; but a mere submission does not necessarily involve consent.

Source: Black's, 2d. 249; Weisman, 21a

(English-origin maxim.) Consent implies an act of the will; mere submission under compulsion does not — a man who yields to force has not consented, and no obligation arises from coerced compliance.

An agreement that there shall be no accountability for fraud has no effect.

Nihil actum efficitur de dolo non praestando.

Source: Dig. 2, 14, 27, 3; Broom, Max. 622, 188n

No man can contract away liability for his own fraud — such a stipulation is void as against public policy.

No man can come against his own act.

Nemo potest contra factum suum venire.

Source: 2 Inst. 66; Broom, Max. 219

A man who has conferred a right by grant cannot later impose conditions that destroy it — he is bound by what he has done.

No man should be in a better position by reason of his own wrong than he would have been without it.

Nemo debet melioris conditionis esse per delictum quam sine illo.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 134, 1; Broom, Max. 279

He who breaks a condition or commits a wrong gains no advantage from it — the law restores the injured party, not the wrongdoer.

The church can make its condition better, but not worse.

Ecclesia meliorari non deteriorari potest.

Source: 2 Eden, 313; Jackson; Weisman, 80a

Those who hold ecclesiastical property in trust may improve it but cannot alienate or diminish it — the same principle applies to any trustee who holds for the benefit of others.

He who receives the benefit should also bear the burden.

Qui sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus.

Source: 1 Co. 99; Broom, Max. 706-713; 1 Kames, Eq. 289; 1 Story, Const. 78

Benefit and burden are inseparable — a government that claims the benefit of authority must also bear the burden of its fiduciary duties.

What I approve I do not reject.

Quod approbo non reprobo.

Source: Broom, Max. 712; Weisman, 12i

A man cannot take the benefit of an instrument or transaction while simultaneously repudiating its burdens — he must accept the whole or reject the whole.

He who uses his own right injures no one.

Qui jure suo utitur nemini facit injuriam.

Source: Broom, Max. 379; Jackson

A man exercising a right that belongs to him by nature or by law does no legal injury to another — cite this to defend against claims that the lawful exercise of a recognized right (property, speech, arms, travel) constitutes harm to a third party.

It is fraud to conceal a fraud.

Fraus est celare fraudem.

Source: 1 Vern. 270; Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 389-390; Weisman, 29r

One who knows of a fraud and conceals it becomes a party to the fraud itself — silence in the face of known deceit is active participation.

Fraud is odious and is not to be presumed.

Fraus est odiosa et non praesumenda.

Source: Cro. Car. 550; Jackson, No. 296; Weisman, 29s

The law does not presume fraud but requires it to be proved by clear evidence — yet once proved, every presumption turns against the wrongdoer.

Fraud is not purged by circuity.

Dolus circuitu non purgatur.

Source: Bacon, Max. reg. 4; Broom, Max. 228; Noy, Max. 9, 12; Weisman, 29p

A fraudulent act cannot be laundered into legitimacy by running it through intermediate steps, agencies, or transactions — the taint follows every link in the chain.

No right of action arises from fraud.

Ex dolo malo non oritur actio.

Source: Cowp. 341; Broom, Max. 729; Phelps v. Decker, 10 Mass. 276

A party who has himself engaged in fraud cannot invoke the courts to enforce an advantage gained by that fraud — the law will not assist the fraudulent.

Fraud and justice never dwell together.

Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant.

Source: Wing. Max. 680; Weisman, 29t

Where fraud is found, right cannot coexist — justice demands that every trace of fraud be rooted out before any claim built upon it can stand.

Fraud and deceit should be a defense or advantage to no one.

Dolus et fraus nemini patrocinari debent.

Source: 3 Coke, 78b; Fleta, lib. 1, c. 13, § 15; Best, Evid. p. 469

No man shall profit, find shelter, or gain legal advantage through his own deceit — the law strips every benefit built on fraudulent foundations.

Let him who wishes to be deceived, be deceived.

Qui vult decipi, decipiatur.

Source: Broom, Max. 782 n.; Shep. Touch. 56

One who voluntarily enters a transaction with full knowledge of its deceptive character cannot afterward claim the protection of the court.

Once a fraud, always presumed a fraud.

Semel fraudator, semper praesumitur fraudator.

Source: 13 Vin. Abr. 539; Weisman, 29i

A proven pattern of fraud raises a continuing presumption — the law does not extend fresh credit to a demonstrated deceiver.

A man cannot validly contract that he shall be irresponsible for his own fraud.

Nulla pactione effici potest ut dolus praestetur.

Source: D. 2, 14, 27; Jackson

No contract clause can exempt a party from liability for his own fraud — an agreement to be held harmless for future deceit is void as against public policy.

The fraud of a predecessor does not prejudice the successor.

Dolus auctoris non nocet successori.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Weisman, 29e

A successor in title or office is not tainted by the fraud of his predecessor — each person answers for his own deceit, and no innocent party inherits another's guilt.

Fraud lies hidden in general expressions.

Fraus latet in generalibus.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

Vague and sweeping language is the natural refuge of the deceiver; the law demands specificity precisely because generality conceals the fraud.

Fraud deserves fraud.

Fraus meretur fraudem.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Plow. 100

He who practices deceit cannot complain when deceit is returned upon him — the law gives no sympathy to the deceiver who is himself deceived.

A deceiver deals in generalities.

Dolosus versatur in generalibus.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Co. 34

The fraudulent actor avoids specifics because particular statements can be tested and disproved, while vague assertions resist scrutiny. (Duplicate maxim — see also 10.6.13, 1.5.54.)

He who acts fraudulently acts in vain.

Qui per fraudem agit, frustra agit.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Roll. R. 17; Weisman, 29y

Every action grounded in fraud is void and of no legal effect — the law strips the deceiver of every advantage gained by his deceit.

What is otherwise good and just, if sought by force or fraud, becomes bad and unjust.

Quod alias bonum et justum est, si per vim vel fraudem petatur, malum et injustum efficitur.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Co. 78; Weisman, 29j

Even a rightful claim is corrupted when pursued through unlawful means — the manner of seeking justice must itself be just.

The laws help persons who are deceived, not those deceiving.

Source: Tray. Lat. Max. 149; Weisman, 29a

(English-origin maxim.) Equity intervenes to protect the deceived party, not the deceiver — a man who practiced fraud upon another will find no shelter in the courts.

It is safer to be deceived than to deceive.

Source: Lofft, 396; Weisman, 29b

(English-origin maxim.) A man is better off being the victim of deception than being the deceiver, because the deceiver bears the moral and legal guilt while the deceived retains the law's protection.

Fraud should be proved by clear tokens.

Source: 1 Story, Cont. s. 625; Code. 2, 21, 6; Weisman, 29d

(English-origin maxim.) Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, not mere suspicion — vague allegations of dishonesty are insufficient to set aside a transaction.

Gross negligence is equivalent to fraud.

Source: Black's, 2d. 698; Dig. 11, 6, 1; 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 646; McCracken v. Hare, 2 Spears (S.C.) 256; Weisman, 29h; Weisman, 44e

(English-origin maxim.) A trustee or fiduciary whose neglect is so extreme as to amount to recklessness is treated the same as one who acted with fraudulent intent — gross negligence and fraud produce the same legal consequences.

Deceit and fraud shall not defend, excuse or benefit any man.

Source: Best, Evid. p. 469, s. 428; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. s. 395; 3 Coke, 78; Fleta, lib. 1, C. 13, s. 15; Weisman, 29l

(English-origin maxim.) No party may use fraud as a shield — deceit cannot serve as a defense, an excuse, or a foundation for any legal benefit, regardless of the circumstances.

Deceit is an artifice, since it pretends one thing and does another.

Source: Black's, 387; Weisman, 29m

(English-origin maxim.) The essence of deceit is the gap between appearance and reality — fraud is proven by showing that the party represented one thing while intending or doing another.

A new road, not an old one, often deceives the traveler.

Source: 4 Inst. 34; Tray. Lat. Max. 162; 2 Coke, 34a; 3 Coke, 81a; Weisman, 29n

(English-origin maxim.) Counsel should warn clients that novel legal theories and untested procedures carry greater risk of error than well-established paths — the old and familiar road is the safer one.

He acts in fraud of the law who, though the letter of the law being inviolate, uses the law contrary to its intention.

Source: Dig. 1, 3, 29; Weisman, 29q

(English-origin maxim.) One who technically complies with the letter of a law while deliberately subverting its purpose commits fraud upon the law and will be treated as a violator.

Fraud is always positive or intentional and distinguished from negligence.

Source: Alexander v. Church, 53 Conn. 561; 4 Atl. 103; 53 Conn; Weisman, 29v

(English-origin maxim.) Fraud requires a deliberate act of deception — it is always affirmative and intentional, and must be distinguished from mere carelessness or negligence.

No one is considered as deceiving those who know and consent to his acts.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 145; Bouv. 141; Weisman, 29w

(English-origin maxim.) Volenti non fit injuria — a person who enters a transaction with full knowledge of the other party's conduct and consents to it cannot afterward claim to have been deceived.

An evil custom is to be abolished.

Malus usus abolendus est.

Source: Co. Litt. 141; Weisman, 78h

No custom or practice, however long-standing, can survive once shown to be contrary to right — duration does not convert wrong into right.

Something is conceded, which otherwise would not be conceded, lest an injury should remain unpunished.

Aliquid conceditur ne injuria remaneat impunita, quod alias non concederetur.

Source: Co. Litt. 197; Jackson

The law will stretch its ordinary rules to ensure that no wrong goes without remedy — procedural or technical barriers yield when their enforcement would leave an injury entirely unredressed.

Not every loss produces an injury.

Non omne damnum inducit injuriam.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 3 Bl. Com. 219; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 2211; Weisman, 59b

Loss alone does not give rise to a cause of action; there must be a violation of a legal right before the law provides a remedy.

When both parties are equally at fault, the position of the possessor (or defendant) is the stronger.

In pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis (vel defendentis).

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 154; 4 T.R. 270; Broom, Max. 325

Where both parties are equally guilty, the court will not intervene to shift the advantage — it leaves the loss where it finds it.

When both parties are in fault the plaintiff must always fail, and the cause of the person in possession be preferred.

Cum par delictum est duorum, semper oneratur petitor.

Source: D. 50, 17, 154; Jackson; Weisman, 44p; Weisman, 99w

Where both parties are equally culpable, the court will not disturb the existing state of affairs — the plaintiff who comes with unclean hands loses to the defendant in possession.

That which is without remedy avails of itself if there be no fault in the party seeking to enforce it.

Quod remedio destituitur ipsa re valet si culpa absit.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 9; Jackson; Weisman, 94b

Where no formal remedy exists, the right itself still has force provided the claimant is free from fault — the absence of a prescribed procedure does not extinguish the underlying right.

One wrong does not excuse another.

Injuria non excusat injuriam.

Source: Broom, Max. 395; 11 Exch. 822; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 105a

That another man wronged you first grants no license to wrong him in return — each wrong must be answered for independently.

No one can take advantage of his own wrong.

Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria.

Source: Co. Litt. 148b; Jenk. Cent. 161; Broom, Max. 279; Weisman, 105b

The law will never permit a wrongdoer to profit from his own wrongful act — no right, title, or benefit shall arise from a man's own unlawful conduct.

A right cannot arise from a wrong.

Jus ex injuria non oritur.

Source: Broom, Max. 738 n.; 4 Bing. 639; Weisman, 77h

No lawful claim can be founded on an unlawful act — a right purportedly created by wrongdoing is no right at all.

It is better to turn back than to proceed wrongly.

Melius est recurrere quam male currere.

Source: 4 Inst. 176; Weisman, 95aa; Weisman, 105m

When a course of action is discovered to be unlawful, the duty is to stop and reverse — not to press on and hope the wrong corrects itself.

No one can take advantage of his own wrong.

Nul prendra advantage de son tort demesne.

Source: 2 Inst. 713; Wharton

A man may not profit from or found a claim upon his own wrongful act — the law denies every benefit flowing from self-created injury.

No one can improve his condition by a crime.

Nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Dig. 50, 17, 137

A criminal act can never serve as the foundation for bettering one's legal position — the law denies all benefit flowing from wrongful conduct.

Where the crime is, there the punishment should be also.

Ubi culpa est, ibi poena subesse debet.

Source: 6 Coke, 47; Weisman, 92t

Punishment must follow the offender and attach to him personally — it cannot be imposed on an innocent party, and it must be inflicted where the guilt actually lies.

In similar cases, the remedy should be similar.

In consimili casu consimile debet esse remedium.

Source: Hardr. 65; Statute of Westminster II (13 Edw. I, c. 24); Weisman, 94p

Like wrongs demand like remedies — the law applies consistent treatment to comparable injuries, ensuring that justice is not arbitrary.

Remedies ought to be reciprocal.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary

(English-origin maxim.) Where the law grants a remedy to one party, the opposing party must have a corresponding remedy available — justice requires mutuality of recourse.

A good judge decides according to what is just and right, and prefers equity to strict law.

Bonus judex secundum aequum et bonum judicat, et aequitatem stricto juri praefert.

Source: Co. Litt. 24; Jenk. Cent. 45, case 85; Broom, Max. 77; Weisman, 63c

A judge who mechanically applies the letter while ignoring the substance of justice has failed his office.

It is the duty of a good judge to extend justice.

Boni judicis est ampliare justitiam.

Source: Chan. Prac. 329; 1 Burr. 304; Broom, Max. 79; Weisman, 63k; Weisman, 66b; Weisman, 68p

Where justice requires it, a judge should apply his remedial authority liberally — not to usurp jurisdiction, but to ensure that no wrong goes unremedied for want of procedure.

A judge ought always to regard equity.

Judex aequitatem semper spectare debet.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 45; Jackson; Weisman, 63s

A judge must look beyond the bare letter of the law to the equitable substance of the case — rigid literalism that produces injustice is a failure of the judicial office.

Let no one depart from the Court of Chancery without a remedy.

Nullus recedat e curia cancellaria sine remedio.

Source: 4 H. 7, 4; Jackson

The equity court exists to provide relief where the common law cannot — no suitor who presents a just cause should leave Chancery without a remedy for his grievance.

The verdict of a jury is a bar in equity.

Veredictum juratorum obstat in aequitate.

Source: Branch, Max. 155; Weisman, 67f; Weisman, 67h

Once a jury has determined the facts, a court of equity may not retry them — the verdict settles the matter.

The administration of an oath is an indispensable requisite to the formation of a legal jury.

Source: Lumsden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 485, 486; Weisman, 67e

(English-origin maxim.) Without the administration of an oath, no lawful jury is constituted — the oath is the foundation of the jury's authority and the guarantee of its fidelity.

There can be no valid trial jury of less than 12 men, and a consent even by the defendant to a trial by a less number is absolutely void.

Source: Hunt v. State, 61 Miss. 577, 580, 581; Weisman, 67g

(English-origin maxim.) The common law right to trial by jury means a jury of twelve — a trial by fewer than twelve is void, and no party's consent can validate what the law prohibits.

Justice is the steady and unceasing disposition to render to every man his due.

Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi.

Source: Inst. 1, 1, pr.; Dig. 1, 1, 10; Weisman, 68g

Justice is not occasional or discretionary — it is a permanent obligation owed equally to every person, without respect of station.

Justice knows neither father nor mother; justice looks to truth alone.

Justitia non novit patrem nec matrem; solam veritatem spectat justitia.

Source: 1 Bulstr. 199; Weisman, 68m

Partiality, favoritism, and respect of persons are the death of justice — the court must be blind to everything except the merits of the cause.

The law does not fail in dispensing justice.

Lex non deficit in justitia exhibenda.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 31, case 61; Co. Litt. 197; Weisman, 68n

For every wrong the law provides a remedy — where no remedy appears, the deficiency is in the practitioner's knowledge, not in the law itself.

Justice that prevents a wrong is better than justice that punishes it.

Praevalet justitia praeventioni.

Source: 3 Inst. Epil.; Weisman, 68h

Courts and officers should act to prevent injuries where possible, rather than waiting to assess damages after the harm is done.

Equity is as it were equality.

Aequitas est quasi aequalitas.

Source: Co. Litt. 24; Jackson; Weisman, 36k

The essence of equity is equal treatment — it intervenes where the strict letter of the law would produce unequal or unconscionable results.

No one acquires a right of action from his own wrongdoing.

Nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur actionem.

Source: Broom, Max. 297; Wing. Max. 131

The law will not reward misconduct — a party who engineers the very situation he complains of has no standing to seek relief.

In nearly all penal judgments, immaturity of age and imbecility of mind are favored.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 108; Broom, Max. 314; Weisman, 64kk

(English-origin maxim.) In criminal sentencing, youth and mental incapacity are treated as mitigating factors — the law extends greater leniency to those whose age or condition diminishes their culpability.

Truth is the mother of justice.

Veritas est justitiae mater.

Source: Halk. Max. 185; Weisman, 101m

Justice cannot exist apart from truth; every legal proceeding is, at its foundation, a search for truth, and any process that obscures truth undermines justice.

The suppression of the truth is the expression of a falsehood.

Suppressio veri, expressio falsi.

Source: Addington v. Allen, 11 Wend. (N.Y.) 374, 417; Wharton, Max.; Weisman, 101e

He who deliberately conceals a material fact is as culpable as one who affirmatively states what is untrue; silence, when there is a duty to speak, is a species of fraud.

Good faith requires that what is agreed upon shall be done.

Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat.

Source: Dig. 19, 2, 21; Dig. 19, 1, 50; Dig. 50, 8, 2, 13; Weisman, 5g; Weisman, 50c

The law demands performance of agreements honestly made; good faith is not merely an aspiration but a binding obligation.

Good faith does not permit the same thing to be demanded twice.

Bona fides non patitur ut bis idem exigatur.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 57; 9 Co. 53; Broom, Max.; Weisman, 50a; Weisman, 50e

A party who has received satisfaction cannot in good faith demand it again; double recovery is repugnant to equity and conscience.

A possessor in good faith is liable only for that which has actually come to him.

Bona fide possessor, in id tantum quod ad se pervenerit, tenetur.

Source: 2 Inst. 285; Dig.; Weisman, 50f

He who holds property believing his title to be lawful is accountable only for the benefit he actually received, not for speculative or consequential gains.

A good-faith possessor makes the fruits he has gathered and consumed his own.

Bona fide possessor facit fructus perceptos et consumptos suos.

Source: Tray. Max. 57; Dig.; Weisman, 50b

Where a person holds property in genuine good faith, the profits and fruits he has consumed before notice of a superior title are his by right; the law protects innocent use.

Good faith must be observed.

Bona fides servanda est.

Source: Coolidge v. Brigham, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 547, 551; Dig.; Weisman, 50d

The principle of good faith pervades every department of law — contracts, property, procedure, and public office alike — and its violation is a ground for relief in all of them.

Fraud corrupts everything it touches.

Fraus omnia corrumpit.

Source: 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §395; Broom, Max.

Where fraud is established, it vitiates the entire transaction — no part of an instrument or proceeding tainted by fraud may stand, for the corruption extends to the whole.

In an ambiguous expression of law, that meaning is to be preferred which is consonant with equity, especially when the spirit of the law can be gathered from it.

In ambigua voce legis, ea potius accipienda est significatio quae vitio caret, praesertim cum etiam voluntas legis ex hoc colligi possit.

Source: Dig. 1, 3, 19; Broom, Max. 576; Weisman, 6f

Where the law speaks with a double tongue, the meaning which accords with justice and reason is preferred over that which leads to inequity.

A deceiver deals in generalities.

Dolosus versatur in generalibus.

Source: 2 Co. 34; Bouvier

Fraud hides behind vague, general language; the more general the expression, the greater the suspicion that it conceals the true bargain — specificity is the mark of honest dealing. (Duplicate maxim — see also 1.5.54, 7.2.14.)

A fiction of law injures no one.

Fictio legis neminem laedit.

Source: 3 Co. 36; 3 Bl. Comm. 43; Broom, Max. 127; Weisman, 45c

A fiction is adopted only for equitable ends; the moment it produces harm or injustice, it ceases to be legitimate and must be abandoned.

In fiction of law, equity always exists.

In fictione juris semper aequitas existit.

Source: 11 Co. 51a; Broom, Max. 127, 130; Wharton, Max. no. 261

Every legal fiction must be consistent with equity; a fiction that produces inequity is no longer a fiction but a falsehood and must fall.

A fiction of law is wrongful if it works loss or injury to anyone.

Fictio legis inique operatur alicui damnum vel injuriam.

Source: 2 Co. 35; Broom, Max. 122; Weisman, 45g

This is the negative corollary of the rule that fiction injures no one: where a fiction does in fact produce damage, it stands condemned by its own excess and will not be sustained.

In the fiction of law there is always equity; a legal fiction is always consistent with equity.

Source: 11 Coke, 51a; Broom, Max. 127, 130; Weisman, 45d

(English-origin maxim.) Every legal fiction must be grounded in equity — the fiction exists to serve fairness, and the moment it produces inequitable results, it ceases to be a legitimate instrument of law.

Acts required to be done by law do not admit of qualification.

Source: Hob. 153; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 2b

(English-origin maxim.) When the law mandates a specific act — such as recording a deed or filing within a deadline — no party may attach conditions or qualifications to the performance; it must be done precisely as the law commands.

Certain legal consequences are attached to the voluntary act of a person.

Source: Duncan v. Landis, 106 Fed. 839; Weisman, 2e

(English-origin maxim.) A person who voluntarily performs an act is bound by the legal consequences that flow from it, regardless of whether he foresaw or intended those consequences.

Things which are done simultaneously with an act are supposed to be inherent in it; to be a constituent part of it.

Source: Co. Litt. 236b; Weisman, 2f

(English-origin maxim.) Contemporaneous acts and declarations made at the time of a transaction are admissible as part of the res gestae — they are woven into the act itself and inseparable from it.

Environment illuminates the meaning of acts, as context does that of words.

Source: Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 33; Weisman, 2g

(English-origin maxim.) The circumstances surrounding an act — its time, place, and setting — are essential to determining its legal character, just as context gives meaning to language.

Where there is no principal, there can be no accessory.

Ubi non est principalis non potest esse accessorius.

Source: 4 Coke, 43; Weisman, 2i

Without a principal act or offense, no accessory liability can exist — the accessory charge is entirely dependent on the commission of the primary act.

Your motive gives a name to your act.

Source: Bract. 2b, 101b; Weisman, 2j

(English-origin maxim.) The intent behind an act determines its legal classification — the same physical deed may be lawful or unlawful depending on the motive that animates it.

A repugnant act cannot be brought into being, i.e., cannot be made effectual.

Source: Plowd. 355; Weisman, 2l; Weisman, 62b

(English-origin maxim.) An act that contradicts itself or is internally inconsistent is void — the law will not give effect to what is self-defeating.

When many join in one act, the law will construe it as the act of him who could best accomplish it.

Source: Noy, Max. 38; Weisman, 2m

(English-origin maxim.) Where several persons participate in a single transaction, the law attributes the act to the party with the authority or capacity to perform it, such as the grantor in a deed or the officer with jurisdiction.

One may not do an act to himself.

Source: Bouv. 146; Weisman, 2n

(English-origin maxim.) A man cannot be both grantor and grantee, obligor and obligee, in the same transaction — the law requires distinct parties for a valid legal act.

Take away the will, and every action will be indifferent.

Source: Bract. 2; Weisman, 2o

(English-origin maxim.) Without voluntary intent, no act carries moral or legal significance — this principle is the foundation of the defense of compulsion and the requirement of mens rea.

Every man is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own voluntary act.

Source: Greenl. Ev. s. 18; 9 East, 277; Weisman, 2p

(English-origin maxim.) Invoke this presumption to establish intent from conduct — a party who performs a voluntary act cannot later disclaim the foreseeable results by professing ignorance of their consequences.

External acts indicate undisclosed thoughts.

Source: 8 Coke, 146b; Weisman, 2t

(English-origin maxim.) Where a party's subjective intent is unknown, the court infers it from outward conduct — overt acts are the law's window into hidden purpose.

All actions in the world are limited within certain periods.

Source: Bract. 52; Weisman, 2u

(English-origin maxim.) No cause of action endures forever — statutes of limitation reflect this principle by fixing a definite period within which every claim must be brought or be forever barred.

A party's own act should prejudice himself, not his adversary.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 155; Weisman, 2v

(English-origin maxim.) Where one party's conduct creates a legal disadvantage, the burden falls on the actor himself — no man should profit from shifting the consequences of his own deed to another.

When there is doubt about an act, it receives interpretation from the (known) feelings of the actor.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 68, 1; Weisman, 2w

(English-origin maxim.) When a deed or transaction is ambiguous, the known disposition and prior declarations of the actor supply the key to construction.

There is no surer way to find out what parties meant, than to see what they have done.

Source: Brooklyn Ins. Co. v. Dutcher, 5 Otto (95 U.S.) 269, 273; Weisman, 2z

(English-origin maxim.) The practical construction placed on an agreement by the parties' own conduct is the best evidence of their mutual intent — actions speak louder than recitals.

A party who is silent when he ought to speak shall not be permitted to speak afterwards to the prejudice of those who have been induced to act upon such omission to speak.

Source: Wharton, III-26

(English-origin maxim.) A party who remains silent when duty requires him to speak is estopped from later asserting a position that contradicts the reliance others placed on his silence.

No person, by his own transgression, can create a cause of action in his own favor, against another.

Source: Briggs v. Easterly; Wharton, III-215

(English-origin maxim.) A wrongdoer cannot manufacture a cause of action from his own transgression — the law will not allow a party to benefit from his own wrong.

Prescription and execution do not pertain to the validity of the contract, but to the time and manner of bringing the action.

Praescriptio et executio non pertinent ad valorem contractus, sed ad tempus et modum actionis instituendae.

Source: Wharton, III-255

The statute of limitations and the mode of enforcement affect only procedure, not the underlying validity of the contract — a barred action does not mean the obligation never existed.

He is repelled by the exception of actions to be assigned.

Repellitur exceptione cedendarum actionum.

Source: Wharton, III-297

A party who has failed to assign or transfer an action when required may be barred by the exception — the defense lies against him who has neglected to cede what ought to have been ceded.

Old age alone and of itself does not vitiate a gift, a will, or a transaction.

Sola ac per se senectus donationem, testamentum, aut transactionem non vitiat.

Source: Wharton, III-321

Advanced age, standing alone, is no ground to set aside a deed, will, or contract — incapacity must be proved by evidence of mental infirmity, not merely by the passage of years.

Unusual clauses always excite suspicion.

Clausulae inconsuetae semper inducunt suspicionem.

Source: 3 Co. 81; Broom, Max. (3d Lond. ed.) 264; Weisman, 16d

An uncommon or unexpected provision in an instrument invites close scrutiny — it may signal fraud, overreach, or an attempt to conceal the true bargain.

Every worthier thing draws to it the less worthy, though the latter be more ancient.

Omne magis dignum trahit ad se minus dignum, sit antiquius.

Source: Co. Litt. 355; Bouvier

Where two rights or interests conflict, the more dignified or important prevails and absorbs the lesser — rank and worth, not mere priority in time, determine which governs.

Nothing is more just than that which is necessary.

Nihil tam justum est quam quod necessarium est.

Source: Dav. Ir. K.B. 12; Branch, Princ.; Weisman, 83e

Justice and necessity converge — when the law recognizes a true need, meeting that need is itself an act of justice.