natural_law

Nature takes little heed.

Parum cavet natura.

Source: Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 127, 166; Weisman, 74g; Wharton, III-248

Nature operates by fixed principles indifferent to human convenience — courts invoke this maxim to explain why legal fictions cannot override natural facts such as birth, death, or biological parentage.

The antiquity of a custom is to be less regarded than its reasonableness.

Source: Co. Litt. 141a; Weisman, 27p

(English-origin maxim.) A custom's validity rests on its reasonableness, not merely its age — even an ancient custom may be struck down if it is unreasonable, and a newer custom sustained if it is sound.

Laws should bind their own maker.

Patere legem quam ipse tulisti.

Source: Fleta, lib. 1, c. 17, s. 11; Weisman, 72f

A legislature is bound by the laws it enacts — government officers cannot exempt themselves from statutes that bind the People, and any claim of sovereign immunity must yield to the principle that the lawmaker is the first subject of the law.

The principle ( or beginning) of anything is the most powerful part of a thing.

Source: 10 Coke, 49; Weisman, 95g

(English-origin maxim.) The origin or foundation of a right, grant, or obligation controls its entire subsequent operation — challenge the root and the whole structure falls.

That shall be preserved which is useful in the beginning.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 23; Bract. 73b; Weisman, 95o

(English-origin maxim.) A provision, grant, or right that served a lawful purpose at its inception should be maintained and enforced rather than discarded by later construction.

A thing that is within the letter of a statute, is not within the statute, unless it be within the intention of the law makers.

Source: Wharton, III-32

(English-origin maxim.) The literal text of a statute does not control if the act in question falls outside the legislature's actual purpose — courts must look to the intent behind the law, not merely its words.

The king is always presumed to attend to the business of the realm, for the public good of all.

Rex semper praesumitur attendere ardua regni pro bono publico omnium.

Source: 4 Co. 56; Jackson

Government officers are presumed to act in the public interest — but this presumption is rebuttable when their acts demonstrably serve private interests instead.

Anyone may renounce a right introduced for his own benefit.

Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se inducto.

Source: Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 77d

A man may waive a right that exists for his personal benefit, but only voluntarily and with knowledge — the waiver of a right cannot be compelled or presumed.

He who uses his legal rights harms no one.

Source: Carson v. Western R. Co., 8 Gray (Mass.) 424; Broom, Max. 379; Weisman, 77c; Weisman, 77i

(English-origin maxim.) A person who lawfully exercises his own rights cannot be held liable for any resulting harm to another — the exercise of a right is never a legal wrong, even if it causes inconvenience or loss to others.

Not the duration of time, but the solidity of reason, is to be considered.

Non diuturnitas temporis, sed soliditas rationis est consideranda.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 100, case 95; Weisman, 77g

What must be considered is not the duration of time but the solidity of reason — a right grounded in sound principle endures regardless of how long it has gone unexercised or been suppressed.

Mistaken notions about one's legal rights are not sufficient to bar prosecution for crime.

Source: Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 238; Weisman, 77m

(English-origin maxim.) A person's mistaken belief about his legal rights does not excuse criminal conduct — ignorance of the law is no defense, even when the defendant sincerely believed he was within his rights.

A continual usage is of great effect to establish a right.

Source: 4 Coke, 78; Wing. Max. p. 719, max. 192; Williams v. U.S., 341 US 97, 101; Weisman, 77n

(English-origin maxim.) Long and uninterrupted exercise of a right is powerful evidence of its existence — cite this to establish prescriptive rights, customary easements, or longstanding community practices as legally binding.

Any one may waive or renounce the benefit of a principle or rule of law that exists only for his protection.

Source: Black's, 304; Weisman, 77p

(English-origin maxim.) A party may voluntarily waive any legal protection that exists solely for his own benefit — but the waiver must be knowing and voluntary, and rights that protect the public generally cannot be waived by an individual.

He will not be considered as using force who exercises his rights and proceeds by forms of law.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 155, 1; Weisman, 77s

(English-origin maxim.) One who pursues his rights through proper legal channels is not considered to be using force — lawful process, even if coercive in effect, is not wrongful compulsion.

A fact does not necessarily constitute a right.

Source: Branch, Max. 15; Weisman, 77t

(English-origin maxim.) The mere existence of a state of affairs does not create a legal right — possession alone does not make ownership, and practice alone does not make law unless it meets the requirements of custom or prescription.

The right ascends collaterally.

Source: Bract. 20; Weisman, 77u

(English-origin maxim.) Rights of inheritance may pass not only downward to descendants but also upward and sideways through collateral lines — relevant in determining succession when direct heirs are absent.

The law favors common right.

Source: Wing. Max. p. 547, max. 144; Weisman, 82r; Weisman, 82f

(English-origin maxim.) When a statute or grant is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the common right of all the people rather than in favor of a private or exclusive privilege.

By natural right, anyone is entitled to summon another into court.

Source: Branch, Max. 120; Weisman, 82g

(English-origin maxim.) Every person has an inherent right to bring another before a court of justice — the right of access to the courts is a natural right, not a privilege granted by the state.

Natural rights are such as appertain to man, inherent in his nature or plainly assured by natural law, being distinguished from such as are created by law, and depend upon civilized society.

Source: Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 519, 527; 44 Am. Dec. 217; Weisman, 82h

(English-origin maxim.) Natural rights are inherent in man's nature and assured by natural law, while civil rights are created by positive law — cite this to argue that natural rights exist independently of and prior to any government grant.

It would be idle and trite to say that no right is absolute.

Source: Orient Ins. Co. v. Draggs, 172 U.S. 557, 566; Weisman, 86a

(English-origin maxim.) While every right has limits, the point of this maxim is that declaring rights non-absolute is itself a commonplace that proves nothing — the real question is always where the limit falls, not whether one exists.

Rights never die.

Jura non moritura.

Source: Bouv. 156; Weisman, 86d

Rights are immortal and cannot be extinguished by disuse, suppression, or the passage of time — a right that has lain dormant for generations may be revived and enforced at any time.

A thing is private which is not common.

Source: Le Breton v. Miles, 8 Paige, Ch. (N.Y.) 261, 270; Weisman, 86e

(English-origin maxim.) Private property or right is defined by exclusion from common use — cite this to establish that a thing claimed as private cannot simultaneously be treated as public or common.

Right is threefold,-of property, of possession, and of possibility.

Source: Black's, 681; Weisman, 86f

(English-origin maxim.) Right exists in three forms: the right of ownership (property), the right of actual holding (possession), and the right of future claim (possibility) — correctly identifying which type of right is at issue is essential to selecting the proper remedy.

A right not vested in a person living, but merely exists in the consideration and contemplation of law, is said to be in abeyance.

Source: Co. Litt. 342; Weisman, 86h

(English-origin maxim.) A right that is not yet vested in any living person but exists in contemplation of law is said to be in abeyance — it is not destroyed but merely suspended until a person qualifies to receive it.

He is not deemed to use force who exercises his own right, and proceeds by ordinary action.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 155, 1; Weisman, 86i

(English-origin maxim.) A person who exercises his lawful right through ordinary legal action is not considered to use force — the enforcement of a valid right by lawful means cannot constitute duress or compulsion.

No one is considered to act with guile, or to be a wrong-doer, who uses his own right.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 55; Broom, Max. 130; Amer. Ins. Co. v. Griswold, 14 Wend. (N.Y.) 399, 492; Weisman, 86k

(English-origin maxim.) No one is considered to act in bad faith or commit a wrong merely by exercising his own legal right — cite this to defeat claims of malice or tortious conduct where the defendant was simply using a right he lawfully possessed.

No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear or unquestionable authority of law.

Source: Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251; Weisman, 86m

(English-origin maxim.) The right of bodily autonomy is the most sacred right at common law — no one may be restrained, searched, or compelled to submit his body without clear and unquestionable authority of law.

A chase is by common law.

Source: 2 Bl. Comm. 414-416; Weisman, 86p

(English-origin maxim.) The right of chase (hunting) exists by common law and does not depend on statutory grant — cite this to argue that hunting rights on one's own land or common land are inherent, not licensed.

It is allowable to kill a thief if he cannot otherwise be taken.

Surem, si aliter capi non posset, occidere permittunt.

Source: Weisman, 77b

At common law, deadly force was permitted against a thief who could not be apprehended by lesser means — the right to protect property extended to lethal defense when no alternative existed.

If a person neglect to insist on his right, he is deemed to have abandoned it.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 86c

(English-origin maxim.) Rights recognized by the common law must be actively asserted — a man who knows of a trespass upon his rights and remains silent is presumed to have waived them. This maxim underscores why timely notice and demand are essential to the preservation of every natural and constitutional right.

No man ought to be affected in his rights by the judgment or decree of any court, without an opportunity of being previously heard in his own defense.

Source: Wharton, III-208

(English-origin maxim.) Due process of law requires that no person's rights be taken or diminished by any judgment or decree without the opportunity to be heard in his own defense — a judgment entered without notice and hearing is void.

Anger is a short insanity.

Source: Beardsley v. Maynard, 4 Wend. (N.Y.) 336, 355; Weisman, 55d

(English-origin maxim.) Anger, like temporary insanity, may mitigate but does not excuse — courts consider provocation in reducing the grade of an offense, but the law never permits rage to serve as a complete defense.

To cover reproach with reproach is to lay mud upon mud.

Source: Bulst. 86; Weisman, 55g

(English-origin maxim.) Answering defamation with defamation only compounds the wrong — a party who retaliates with his own reproachful language forfeits the clean hands needed to seek equitable relief.

Human nature does not change with time or environment.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 55a

(English-origin maxim.) The foundational principles of law are rooted in unchanging human nature — invoke this maxim to rebut arguments that constitutional rights or common law principles are "outdated" and must yield to modern conditions. The Founders secured rights against the same tendencies toward tyranny that exist in every age.

By reasoning we come to true reason.

Source: Litt. s. 386; Weisman, 69b

(English-origin maxim.) Sound legal reasoning, carefully applied, leads to correct conclusions. Courts and advocates must reason from established principles rather than from assumptions or speculation.

Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things Divine and human; the science of the just and the unjust.

Source: Dig. 1, 1, 10, 2; Inst. 1, 1, 1; Bract. 3; People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 290, 295; Weisman, 69g

(English-origin maxim.) True jurisprudence encompasses both divine and human law and demands the ability to distinguish the just from the unjust — invoke this definition to remind a tribunal that law is a moral science, not mere procedure.

To know properly is to know a thing in its reason, and by its cause. We are truly said to know anything, where we know the true cause thereof.

Source: Co. Litt. 183b; Weisman, 69i

(English-origin maxim.) True understanding of a legal rule requires knowing its reason and cause — cite this to challenge a party who invokes a rule mechanically without understanding the principle that animates it.

Things universal are better known than things particular.

Source: 2 Rolle, 294; Weisman, 69k

(English-origin maxim.) General principles of law are more universally understood than the particular rules derived from them — begin any argument from the broad maxim before descending to the specific application.

No man is bound to have foreknowledge of a Divine or a future event.

Source: 10 Coke, 55a; Weisman, 69u

(English-origin maxim.) No person can be held liable for failing to foresee an act of God or an unforeseeable future event — invoke this to defeat a negligence claim premised on the expectation of superhuman foresight.

Right and obligation are considered by all ethical writers as correlative terms.

Source: Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 281; Weisman, 34i

(English-origin maxim.) Every right implies a corresponding obligation and vice versa — cite this to argue that a party who asserts a right must also acknowledge the duty that accompanies it, and one who bears a duty may enforce the correlative right.

A man may obey the law and yet be neither honest nor a good neighbor.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 34b

(English-origin maxim.) Mere legal compliance does not satisfy the demands of natural law or equity — a man may shelter behind the letter of the statute while violating every principle of good conscience. This maxim reinforces why equity looks beyond technical legality to the substance of a party's conduct and the dictates of natural justice.

Wife and son are names of nature.

Source: 4 Bacon's Works, 350; Weisman, 79k

(English-origin maxim.) The relationships of wife and son are created by nature, not by legal artifice — invoke this to argue that the natural family bond is prior to and independent of any civil regulation.

Neither disease, indigence, nor any evil of the same kind is more contrary to nature than appropriating or desiring to appropriate the property of another to our own use.

Source: C.L.M.; Weisman, 91q

(English-origin maxim.) The natural law recognizes the right of property as so fundamental that its violation is worse than any natural misfortune — no condition of want or hardship justifies the taking of another's property, and government is no exception: the power of eminent domain, taxation, or regulatory seizure without the owner's consent and just compensation is a trespass upon a right that precedes all civil institutions.

That which is granted or reserved in a certain specified form must be taken as it is granted, and will not be permitted to be made the subject of any adjustment or compensation on the part of the grantee.

Source: Ex parte Miller, 2 Hill (NY) 423; Bacon, Max. 26, reg. 4; Weisman, 52i

(English-origin maxim.) A grant made in a specific form must be taken exactly as stated — the grantee may not adjust, compensate, or substitute terms that were fixed by the grantor.

In the price of buying and selling, it is naturally allowed to the contracting parties to overreach each other.

Source: 1 Story, Cont. 606; Weisman, 13g

(English-origin maxim.) In arm's-length bargaining over price, each party is naturally permitted to seek the best deal — the law does not police hard bargaining absent fraud or duress.

A debt is a legal relation between two parties.

Source: Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 97; Weisman, 28v

(English-origin maxim.) A debt is not a thing but a legal relation between two determinate parties — the debtor-creditor bond is personal and exists only between those bound by the obligation.

Although a thing may not be bad in itself, yet, if it is of bad example, it is not to be done.

Source: 2 Inst. 564; Weisman, 105p

(English-origin maxim.) Even lawful acts should be avoided when they set a dangerous precedent — the law considers not only the immediate effect but the example set for others.

In nearly all penal judgments, immaturity of age and imbecility of mind are favored.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 108; Broom, Max. 314; Weisman, 64kk

(English-origin maxim.) In criminal sentencing, youth and mental incapacity are treated as mitigating factors — the law extends greater leniency to those whose age or condition diminishes their culpability.

Precedents are principles of law which are also conclusions, or decision in a cause; and not a process of reasoning or illustration or analogy.

Source: Rodwell v. Rowland, (N.C.) 50 S.E. 319, 327; Weisman, 88k

(English-origin maxim.) A precedent is a decision, not an argument — it establishes a principle of law by its holding, not by any reasoning, analogy, or illustration that may accompany it.

It is in the nature of things that a negative is no proof.

Source: Black's, 2d. 890; Bouv. 147; Code. 4, 19, 23; Weisman, 39j

(English-origin maxim.) A negative proposition cannot be proved directly; therefore the party who asserts the affirmative bears the entire burden and must produce positive proof.

Interpretation must be reasonable.

Source: Jones v. Gibbons, 8 Exch. 923; Buck v. Burk, 18 N.Y. 339, 341; Wharton, III-B-33

(English-origin maxim.) Everything is to have a reasonable construction, and everything necessary to make a rule reasonable is implied.

The full meaning of a word should be ascertained at the outset, in order that the sense may not be lost by defect of expression, and that the law be not without reason.

Source: Co. Litt. 68; Weisman, 104x; Weisman, 104q

(English-origin maxim.) The full meaning of a word must be ascertained before applying it, so that ambiguity does not corrupt the sense of the instrument and leave the law without its intended reason.

Legal similarity is a similar reason which governs various cases when compared with each other; for what avails in one similar case will avail in the other. Of things dissimilar, the reason is dissimilar.

Source: Co. Litt. 191; Weisman, 97e

(English-origin maxim.) Legal similarity means that the same reason governs both cases; where cases share the same rationale, the same rule applies, but where the underlying reason differs, the cases must be treated differently.

Of things equal, the reason is the same, and the same is the law.

Source: Black's, 873; Weisman, 97l

(English-origin maxim.) Where things are truly equal in their essential character, the same reason and the same law govern both — parity of reason demands parity of treatment.

Every man is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own voluntary act.

Source: Greenl. Ev. s. 18; 9 East, 277; Weisman, 2p

(English-origin maxim.) Invoke this presumption to establish intent from conduct — a party who performs a voluntary act cannot later disclaim the foreseeable results by professing ignorance of their consequences.

A vague and uncertain cause is not a reasonable cause.

Source: 5 Coke, 57; Weisman, 14m

(English-origin maxim.) A cause of action resting on speculation or conjecture is legally insufficient — the court requires a definite, ascertainable cause before it will hear the case.

What is necessary is lawful.

Quod est necessarium est licitum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. p. 76, case 45; Weisman, 83b

Necessity justifies what would otherwise be unlawful — when no alternative exists, the law permits acts done out of genuine necessity that it would not otherwise sanction.

That consideration is strongest which determines in favor of religion.

Source: Co. Litt. 341a; 5 Coke, 14b; Dig. 11, 7, 43; Weisman, 49g

(English-origin maxim.) When competing legal considerations are weighed, the one that favors religion carries the greatest weight — the law preferentially protects the sacred over the secular.

No one was ever a great man without some Divine inspiration. Cicero.

Source: Bouv. 141; Weisman, 49h

(English-origin maxim.) This maxim recognizes divine inspiration as the wellspring of extraordinary human achievement — the law acknowledges a higher order that shapes the capacities of men.

A bishop need not obey any mandate save the king’s.

Episcopus alterius mandato quam regis non tenetur obtemperare.

Source: Co. Litt. 134; Jackson

A bishop’s temporal allegiance runs to the sovereign alone; no inferior officer or magistrate may command the bishop’s obedience in matters of governance.

No other than the king can command the bishop to make an inquisition.

Nullus alius quam rex possit episcopo demandare inquisitionem faciendam.

Source: Co. Litt. 134; Jackson

The power to direct a bishop to conduct an inquiry belongs exclusively to the sovereign; no lesser authority may co-opt the ecclesiastical office for investigative purposes.

Let every one employ himself in what he knows.

Source: 11 Coke, 10; Weisman, 35b; Weisman, 69o

(English-origin maxim.) A person should confine himself to his own trade or profession — one who ventures beyond his competence assumes the risk of error and may not claim the protections afforded to a skilled practitioner.

An insane person who knows not what he does cannot make a bargain, nor transact any business.

Furiosus stipulare non potest, nec aliquid negotium agere, qui non intelligit quid agit.

Source: 4 Coke, 126; Weisman, 35c

A person who lacks the mental capacity to understand the nature of a transaction cannot be bound by it — contracts and bargains require a meeting of minds, and an insane person has no mind to give.

The term 'merchandise' belongs to movable things only.

Source: Dig. 50, 16, 66; Weisman, 35h

(English-origin maxim.) The term 'merchandise' applies only to movable goods — real property and fixtures are not merchandise, and laws governing the sale of goods do not automatically apply to them.

Merchandise is whatever can be sold.

Source: Baldwin v. Williams, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 365; Weisman, 35i

(English-origin maxim.) The legal definition of merchandise is broad: anything capable of being bought and sold in commerce qualifies, regardless of its physical form or character.

The words "current money" designate current at the time of payment.

Source: Dav. 20; Black's, 2d. 1200; Weisman, 35m

(English-origin maxim.) A contract calling for payment in 'current money' requires tender in whatever currency is legal tender at the time of payment, not at the time the contract was made.

For concerning anything which occurs without deceit or wrong on the part of the vendor, the vendor is secure.

Source: Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 198; 4 Pick; Weisman, 35p

(English-origin maxim.) A seller who acts without deceit or wrongdoing is not liable for defects unknown to him — the risk of latent defects falls on the buyer absent fraud or express warranty.

He at whose risk a thing is done, should receive the profits arising from it.

Source: Black's, 2d. 1182; Weisman, 35q

(English-origin maxim.) Risk and reward travel together — the party who bears the risk of loss in a venture is entitled to receive the profits arising from it.

Services which are incapable of division are to be performed in whole by each individual.

Source: 6 Coke, 1; Weisman, 35t

(English-origin maxim.) Where a service or obligation is by its nature indivisible, each person bound by it must perform the whole — partial performance by one does not discharge the rest.

It is natural that he who bears the charge of a thing should receive the profits.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 10; Weisman, 35u

(English-origin maxim.) He who bears the expense and burden of maintaining a thing is naturally entitled to its fruits — the law connects the duty of care to the right of profit.

No one is prohibited from following several kinds of businesses or several arts.

Source: 11 Coke, 54a; Weisman, 35v

(English-origin maxim.) Every person has the right to pursue multiple trades, professions, or occupations — the law does not confine a man to a single calling.