inheritance

Felony is implied in every treason.

Felonia implicatur in qualibet proditione.

Source: 3 Inst. 15; Jackson; Weisman, 26i

Treason necessarily includes felony as a lesser offense — the greater crime comprehends the lesser.

It is useless to prove that which, being proved, would not avail.

Frustra probatur quod probatum non relevat.

Source: Halk. Max. 50; Jackson; Weisman, 39u

Evidence that has no bearing on the issue should not be admitted — the court's time is not to be consumed by proof of immaterial facts.

A madman is like a man who is absent.

Furiosus absentis loco est.

Source: D. 50, 17, 124; Jackson

One who is insane is treated in law as though he were absent — he cannot act, consent, or bind himself, and the law provides for his protection as it would for one who is not present.

A general expression implies nothing certain.

Generale nihil certi implicat.

Source: 2 Co. 33; Jackson; Weisman, 43f

Broad and general language in a grant, statute, or contract conveys no specific right or obligation — certainty requires specificity.

That is perfect which is complete in all its parts; and nothing is perfect whilst anything remains to be done.

Id perfectum est quod ex omnibus suis partibus constat; et nihil perfectum est dum aliquid restat agendum.

Source: 9 Co. 9; Jackson

A legal proceeding, instrument, or obligation must be complete in every essential element — an incomplete act is imperfect and may be challenged until it is perfected.

The right of survivorship is preferred to encumbrances.

Jus accrescendi praefertur oneribus.

Source: Co. Litt. 185; Jackson; Weisman, 103n

The surviving joint tenant takes the property free of encumbrances created by the deceased tenant alone — the right of survivorship prevails.

Allegiance is, as it were, the essence of law; it is the chain of faith.

Ligeantia est quasi legis essentia; est vinculum fidei.

Source: Co. Litt. 129; Jackson

Allegiance is the reciprocal bond between the sovereign and the subject — the sovereign protects, the subject obeys, and this mutual obligation is the foundation of lawful government.

The right of coining money is comprehended amongst those rights of royalty which are never separated from the kingly sceptre.

Monetandi jus comprehenditur in regalibus quae nunquam a regio sceptro abdicantur.

Source: Dav. 18; Jackson

The power to coin money is a sovereign prerogative that cannot be delegated away — in the American system, this power is vested exclusively in Congress by Article I, Section 8.

No one can do through another what he cannot do himself.

Nemo potest facere per alium, quod per se non potest.

Source: Jenk. 237; Jackson

A principal cannot enlarge his own powers by acting through an agent — the agent’s authority can never exceed what the principal himself lawfully possesses.

A reason cannot be given for all the laws that have been established by our ancestors.

Non omnium quae a majoribus nostris constituta sunt ratio reddi potest.

Source: D. 1, 3, 20; Jackson; Weisman, 60o

Some laws rest on grounds that time has obscured — the inability to articulate their reason does not invalidate them, but neither does their antiquity alone justify their perpetuation.

When a noble woman marries a man not noble, she ceases to be noble, unless her nobility was born with her.

Quando mulier nobilis nupserit ignobili desinit esse nobilis nisi nobilitas nata fuit.

Source: 4 Co. 118; Jackson

Under the common law, a woman’s legal status was altered by marriage — this maxim has been superseded by constitutional amendments recognizing the inherent equality of all persons before the law. The Fourteenth Amendment did not create equality; it recognized and secured what already existed in natural law.

They who search for reason in all things subvert reason.

Qui rationem in omnibus quaerunt rationem subvertunt.

Source: 2 Co. Rep. 75a; Jackson

Not every legal rule can be reduced to a demonstrable reason — some principles rest on long experience and policy, and demanding a logical proof for every rule undermines the stability of the law.

Wills ought to have the broadest interpretation.

Testamenta latissimam interpretationem habere debent.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 81; Jackson; Weisman, 103d

Courts construe wills liberally to carry out the testator’s intent — unlike contracts, wills are read in the light most favorable to giving effect to the testator’s wishes.

The intention of a testator has a broad and benignant interpretation.

Voluntas testatoris habet interpretationem latam et benignam.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 260; Jackson

Courts favor the testator's intent and construe wills liberally to give effect to his wishes — ambiguities are resolved in favor of carrying out the expressed purpose rather than defeating it.

Where the law gives a right, it gives a remedy to recover.

Lou le ley done chose, la ceo done remedie a vener a ceo.

Source: 2 Rol. R. 17; Wharton

Every legal right carries with it a corresponding remedy — a right without a means of enforcement is no right at all.

Where the law compels a man to show cause, it is incumbent that the cause be just and lawful.

Ubi lex aliquem cogit ostendere causam necesse est quod causa sit justa et legitima.

Source: 2 Inst. 269; Jackson; Weisman, 14h

When a party is ordered to show cause, vague or pretextual reasons will not suffice — the cause shown must be substantive, lawful, and sufficient to justify the act in question.

Not to be born and to be born dead are the same thing.

Non nasci et natum mori pari sunt.

Source: Dig. 50, 17, 129; Bouvier, Max.

A stillborn child acquires no legal personality and transmits no rights — the law recognizes no status where life never began.

He who is in the womb is regarded as already born whenever his benefit is in question.

Qui in utero est pro jam nato habetur quoties de ejus commodo quaeritur.

Source: Dig. 1, 5, 7; Co. Litt. 36; Bouvier, Max.

The unborn child is treated as a living person for purposes of inheritance, guardianship, and any other matter where recognizing his existence serves his interest.

Towns and boroughs [municipal corporations] act as if persons.

Source: Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend. (N.Y.) 103, 144; Weisman, 76j

(English-origin maxim.) Municipal corporations are treated as artificial persons in law and may sue, be sued, hold property, and enter contracts — but only within the powers granted by their charter.

He who errs does not consent.

Non consentit qui errat.

Source: 1 Bouv. Inst. no. 581; Bouvier, Max.; Weisman, 39ff

Consent founded on mistake is no consent at all — a contract or waiver procured through the other party’s error is voidable at the election of the mistaken party.

A subsequent marriage makes the children legitimate so far as relates to the priesthood, not as to the succession, on account of the custom of the kingdom, which is contrary thereto.

Matrimonium subsequens legitimos facit quoad sacerdotium non quoad successionem propter consuetudinem regni quae se habet in contrarium.

Source: Co. Litt. 345; Jackson

At common law, a subsequent marriage of the parents legitimated children born before it for ecclesiastical purposes, but the custom of England did not extend that legitimation to rights of inheritance.

The lawful heir is he whom the marriage shows to be so.

Haeres legitimus est quem nuptiae demonstrant.

Source: Co. Litt. 7; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 326; Weisman, 58w

Inheritance follows lawful marriage — at common law, only those born within wedlock possess inheritable blood.

Heir is a name of law; son is a name of nature.

Haeres est nomen juris, filius est nomen naturae.

Source: Bacon, Max. Reg. 11; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 325; Weisman, 58ii

The status of heir is a legal construction tied to rules of succession; the status of son is a fact of nature — the two do not always coincide.

It is not just to make an elder-born a bastard after his death, who all his life has been accounted legitimate.

Justum non est aliquem antenatum mortuum facere bastardum qui pro tota vita sua pro legitimo habetur.

Source: 8 Co. 101; Jackson; Weisman, 58a

The law will not disturb the settled status of legitimacy after death — one who lived his whole life as legitimate cannot be posthumously bastardized.

It is not just to make an elder-born a bastard after his death, who during his lifetime was accounted legitimate.

Non est justum aliquem antenatum post mortem facere bastardum qui toto tempore vitae suae pro legitimo habebatur.

Source: Co. Litt. 244; Jackson

A restatement of 4.2.6 — the law strongly disfavors posthumous attacks on legitimacy, protecting the settled expectations of inheritance and status.

Children are of the blood of their parents, but the father and mother are not of the blood of their children.

Pueri sunt de sanguine parentum, sed pater et mater non sunt de sanguine puerorum.

Source: 3 Co. 40; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 58s

The bloodline runs downward for purposes of descent and inheritance — children inherit from parents, but the parent does not inherit from the child by the same rule.

The offspring of a legitimate bed knows not his mother more certainly than his father.

Partus ex legitimo thoro non certius noscit matrem quam genitorem suum.

Source: Fortes. c. 42; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

In lawful marriage, both parents stand on equal footing as to the child — the father's identity is as certain as the mother's, because the marriage itself establishes paternity.

A partnership is dissolved by the death of a partner.

Morte socii solvitur societas.

Source: Inst. 3, 26, 5; Dig. 17, 2; Weisman, 85h

Because partnership rests on personal trust and consent, the death of any partner extinguishes the relationship — the survivor carries on alone or not at all.

Co-heirs are deemed as one person on account of the unity of right which they possess.

Cohaeredes sunt quasi unum corpus, propter unitatem juris quod habent.

Source: Co. Litt. 163; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 116; Weisman, 58k

Co-heirs stand in a collective relation to the inherited estate — their unity of interest demands they act in concert, and the law treats them accordingly.

An heir under twenty-one years of age shall not be held to answer, except in the case of dower.

Haeres minor uno et viginti annis non respondebit, nisi in casu dotis.

Source: Moor, 348; Jackson, *Latin for Lawyers* (1915), Max. 327; Weisman, 58x

The law protects the minor heir from suit during his minority — but dower, being among the most favored causes, is the single exception.

Legitimacy is the lawful consequence of lawful marriage.

Legitimatio est legis consequentia matrimonii legitimi.

Source: Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. 472, 595 (1853); Weisman, 79m

The rights of inheritance and succession flow from the fact of legitimate birth — and legitimate birth flows from lawful marriage.

Chattels are considered in law among the minor things.

Catalla reputantur inter minima in lege.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 28; Jackson; Weisman, 91p

The law regards chattels (movable personal property) as lesser things compared to land — disputes over chattels receive less elaborate procedure than disputes over freehold estates.

Hanging fruits are considered part of the land.

Fructus pendentes pars fundi videntur.

Source: Dig. 6.1.44; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1578; Weisman, 70t

Ungathered crops growing upon the land belong to the landowner — once severed, they become personal property.

Not right, but seisin, makes the stock of descent. (But see now 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 106.).

Non jus, sed seisina, facit stipitem.

Source: Fleta, 6, c. 14; Jackson

At common law, the line of descent is traced from the person last seized (in actual possession), not from the person who held the mere right — actual seisin, not bare title, determines inheritance.

Inheritance is the succession to every right which the deceased had.

Haereditas est successio in universum jus quod defunctus habuerit.

Source: Co. Litt. 237; Dig. 50.17.62

The heir steps into the shoes of the dead — he takes all rights, all obligations, and all property that the ancestor lawfully held.

God alone makes the heir, not man.

Solus Deus haeredem facit, non homo.

Source: Co. Litt. 5, 7b; Broom, Max. 516; Weisman, 58o

The heir is determined by blood and by law, not by the contrivance of men — descent is a matter of divine and natural order, not human invention.

No one is heir to the living.

Nemo est haeres viventis.

Source: Co. Litt. 8a, 22b; 2 Bl. Comm. 70; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1694; Weisman, 58ll

A man has no heir while he lives — inheritance opens only at death, and no expectation of inheritance creates a present right.

The heir is part of his ancestor.

Haeres est pars antecessoris.

Source: Co. Litt. 22; Schoonmaker v. Sheely, 3 Hill (N.Y.) 165, 167

In law, the heir is treated as a continuation of the ancestor's legal identity — the ancestor lives on through the heir for purposes of right and obligation.

He who would have been heir to the father shall also be heir of the son.

Qui doit inheriter al pere doit inheriter al fils.

Source: 2 Bl. Comm. 239, 250; Broom, Max. 517; Weisman, 58z

Descent follows the blood, not the name — if a son dies intestate, the estate passes to the same line that would have inherited from his father. Cite this to establish the order of inheritance when an intermediate heir dies without issue, ensuring the property reverts to the ancestral bloodline rather than passing to strangers.

He who is in the womb is considered as born, whenever his benefit is concerned.

In utero existens pro jam nato habetur, quoties de ejus commodo quaeritur.

Source: Bouvier, Max. 151; Black's, 979; Dig. 1.5.7

A child conceived but not yet born is treated as already alive for purposes of inheritance — the law protects his right from the moment of conception.

The right of survivorship, for the benefit of commerce, holds no place among merchants.

Jus accrescendi inter mercatores pro beneficio commercii locum non habet.

Source: C.L.M.; Co. Litt. 182; Weisman, 58r

Among business partners, a deceased partner's share passes to his heirs, not to the surviving partner — commerce requires certainty of succession.

A greater inheritance comes to every one of us from right and the laws than from parents.

Major haereditas venit unicuique nostrum a jure et legibus quam a parentibus.

Source: 2 Inst. 56; Weisman, 58kk

The rights and liberties secured by law are a greater patrimony than any estate of land or goods — every man inherits the common law itself.

One blood being wanting, he cannot be heir.

Deficiente uno sanguine non potest esse haeres.

Source: 3 Co. 41; Jackson

Inheritance requires the blood connection — where the claimant lacks the requisite line of descent from the ancestor, he cannot inherit, regardless of other considerations.

A brother shall not succeed a uterine brother in the paternal inheritance.

Frater fratri uterino non succedet in haereditate paterna.

Source: Fort. de Laud, by Amos, 15; Jackson

A half-brother related only through the mother cannot inherit lands that descend through the paternal line — the blood of the father is required for paternal inheritance.

An heir is either by right of property or by right of representation.

Haeres est aut jure proprietatis, aut jure representationis.

Source: 3 Co. 40; Jackson; Weisman, 58dd

One inherits either in his own right (as the nearest blood heir) or by representation (standing in the place of a deceased ancestor who would have inherited) — these are the only two modes of succession.

The heir is the same person with his ancestor, a part of his ancestor.

Haeres est eadem persona cum antecessore, pars antecessoris.

Source: Co. Litt. 22; Jackson

In the legal fiction of descent, the heir is treated as a continuation of the ancestor's legal identity — what bound the ancestor binds the heir, and the ancestor's rights vest in the heir without interruption.

Heir is a collective name.

Haeres est nomen collectivum.

Source: 1 Vent. 215; Jackson

The word "heir" comprehends not only the immediate successor but the entire line of successors — it is a word of limitation denoting all who may inherit in succession.

The heir succeeds to the restitution, not to the penalty.

In restitutionem, non in poenam haeres succedit.

Source: 2 Inst. 198; Jackson; Weisman, 58y

An heir inherits the obligation to make restitution for wrongs committed by the ancestor, but does not inherit criminal penalties — punishment is personal and dies with the offender.

All sisters are as it were one heir to one inheritance.

Omnes sorores sunt quasi unus haeres de una haereditate.

Source: Co. Litt. 67; Jackson; Weisman, 58aa

When daughters inherit in the absence of sons, they take together as coparceners — they are treated collectively as a single heir, sharing the inheritance equally among them.

Inheritance is not to be understood as comprehending only the lands and tenements which a man has by descent; but also every fee simple or fee tail which he has by purchase is also called inheritance, because his heirs can inherit it from him.

Haereditas n'est pas tant solement entendue lou home ad terres ou tenements per discent d'enheritage, mes auxi chescun fee simple ou tail que home ad per son purchase puit estre dit enheritance, pur ceo que ses heirs luy purront enheriter.

Source: Co. Litt. 26; Wharton

The term "inheritance" extends beyond lands received by descent to include any estate of freehold acquired by purchase — if heirs can succeed to it, it is an inheritance regardless of how the ancestor obtained it.

A right descends, not the land.

Jus descendit et non terra.

Source: Co. Litt. 345; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856); Weisman, 70d

What passes by descent is the legal right to the land, not the land itself — the heir inherits a title, not the physical soil.

He who is nearer excludes him who is near; he who is near, him who is remote; he who is remote, him who is more remote.

Propinquior excludit propinquum; propinquus remotum; et remotus remotiorem.

Source: Co. Litt. 10; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

The order of inheritance follows proximity of blood — the nearer in degree always excludes the more remote, tracing the line from the deceased outward.

Every will is completed by death.

Omne testamentum morte consummatum est.

Source: 3 Co. 29; Co. Litt. 232; 4 Inst. 279; Broom, Max. 555; Weisman, 103h

A will has no legal force until the testator dies — before death, it is merely an expression of intention, revocable at any moment.

In wills, the intention of the testator is more especially regarded.

In testamentis plenius testatoris intentionem scrutamur.

Source: 3 Bulst. 103; Broom, Max. 555; Jenk. Cent. 277; Co. Litt. 322; Weisman, 103e

The cardinal rule of will construction is to give effect to the testator's intent — technicalities of form yield to the substance of his wishes.

We interpret the charters and deeds of laymen benignly, on account of their simplicity.

Benigne interpretamur chartas propter simplicitatem laicorum.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 81; Dig. 50.17.12; Broom, Max. 437, 568

Instruments drafted by laymen — deeds, charters, wills, and other writings — are construed liberally, because those unskilled in legal language should not be defeated by technical deficiency when their intent is discernible. This rule applies with special force to wills, where the testator can no longer clarify his meaning.

Where two conflicting clauses are found in a will, the last shall stand.

Cum duo inter se pugnantia reperiuntur in testamento, ultimum ratum est.

Source: Co. Litt. 112b; Shep. Touch. 451; Broom, Max. 583; Wharton, Legal Maxims, Max. 25; Weisman, 103b; Weisman, 103q

The later clause prevails on the assumption that it represents the testator's final mind — the earlier, inconsistent provision is deemed revoked.

The will of a testator is ambulatory until the last moment of life — he may change it at any time.

Ambulatoria est voluntas defuncti usque ad vitae supremum exitum.

Source: Dig. 34.4.4; 4 Co. 61; 2 Bl. Comm. 502; Weisman, 103v

No will is final until the testator breathes his last — until that moment, he retains absolute power to alter, amend, or revoke it entirely.

The last will of a testator is to be thoroughly fulfilled according to his real intention.

Ultima voluntas testatoris est perimplenda secundum veram intentionem suam.

Source: Co. Litt. 322; Weisman, 103a

The executor's duty is to carry out the testator's wishes as the testator actually intended them — not as the executor might wish them to have been.

Things written in a will which cannot be understood are the same as if they had not been written at all.

Quae in testamento ita sunt scripta ut intelligi non possint, perinde sunt ac si scripta non essent.

Source: Dig. 50.17.73.3; Weisman, 103r

Unintelligible provisions are struck as surplusage — the law will not guess at what cannot be deciphered.

No one is presumed to trifle at the point of death.

Nemo praesumitur ludere in extremis.

Source: Cycl. Dict. 689; 6 Co. 76; Weisman, 103m

A dying man's declarations are presumed to be earnest and sincere — the law gives the greatest weight to words spoken in contemplation of death.

A madman can transact no business, because he does not understand what he does.

Furiosus nullum negotium gerere potest quia non intelligit quid agat.

Source: Dig. 50.17.40; Broom, Max. 314

Legal capacity requires a sound mind — no transaction by one who cannot comprehend the nature and effect of his act has any validity. This applies to contracts, conveyances, wills, and every other legal act without exception.

A testament is the legal declaration of a man's intentions which he wills to be performed after his death.

Testamentum est voluntatis nostrae justa sententia de eo quod quis post mortem suam fieri velit.

Source: 2 Bl. Comm. 499; Inst. 2.10.1; Weisman, 103o

The will is not a contract or a present conveyance — it is a declaration of future intent, taking effect only upon the testator's death.

It concerns the state that men's last wills be held valid.

Interest reipublicae ne hominum testamenta rata habeantur.

Source: Co. Litt. 236b; Black's, 1010; Weisman, 103p

Public policy favors the validity of wills — the law strains to uphold, not defeat, a testamentary disposition, because the right of disposal is fundamental to property itself.

Give your things while they are yours; after death they are not yours.

Da tua dum tua sunt; post mortem tunc tua non sunt.

Source: 3 Bulst. 18; Weisman, 103f

A man who would dispose of his property does well to act in life — after death, the will speaks, but the testator no longer commands.

A legacy is confirmed by the death of the testator, in the same manner as a gift from a living person is confirmed by delivery alone.

Legatum morte testatoris tantum confirmatur, sicut donatio inter vivos traditione sola.

Source: Dyer 143; Bouvier, *Law Dictionary* (1856)

Death is to a legacy what delivery is to a gift inter vivos — until the testator dies, the legacy is merely a promise; at death, it becomes a vested right.

Although the grant of a future interest is inoperative, yet it may become a declaration precedent, which will take effect on the intervention of some new act.

Licet dispositio de interesse futuro sit inutilis, tamen fieri potest declaratio praecedens quae sortiatur effectum, interveniente novo actu.

Source: Bac. Max. Reg. 14; Jackson

A grant of a future interest, though void as a present conveyance, may operate as a declaration of intent that takes effect when a subsequent act completes it.

The heir ought not to be bound in a penalty for the crime of the deceased.

Poena ex delicto defuncti, haeres teneri non debet.

Source: 2 Inst. 198; Jackson; Weisman, 58v

Criminal penalties are personal and die with the offender — the heir succeeds to the ancestor's property and obligations of restitution, but never to his punishments.

The intention makes the wording of a will effective.

Voluntas facit quod in testamento scriptum valeat.

Source: D. 30, 1, 12; Jackson

The testator's intent gives life to the words of his will — even imperfect expressions are upheld when the intent behind them can be clearly discerned.

The heir is not bound in a penalty inflicted for the crime of the ancestor.

Poena ex delicto defuncti haeres teneri non debet.

Source: Bouvier's Law Dictionary; 2 Inst. 198

Criminal punishment is personal and dies with the offender — no descendant may be compelled to answer for the wrongs of a forebear.

In contracts, the interpretation is to be liberal; in wills, more liberal; in restitutions, most liberal.

In contractibus, benigna; in testamentis, benignior; in restitutionibus, benignissima interpretatio facienda est.

Source: Co. Litt. 112a; Wharton, Max. no. 255; Weisman, 22g

The degree of liberality in construction increases with the character of the instrument — contracts are read fairly, wills with greater indulgence to the testator's intent, and acts of restoration with the greatest favor toward making the right whole.

The coupling of words shows that they are to be taken in the same sense.

Copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu.

Source: Bac. iv. 26; Jackson; Weisman, 104a

Words joined together in a clause are presumed to share a common sense; coupling signals that the terms are of the same class and import.

In words, not the words but the thing and the meaning are to be inquired after.

In verbis non verba sed res et ratio quaerenda est.

Source: Jenk. Cent. 182; Jackson; Weisman, 104cc

The substance and reason behind the words, not the words themselves, are the proper object of legal inquiry.

A false description does not vitiate when the thing is sufficiently identified.

Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat.

Source: 6 Term 676; 1 Greenl. Ev. §301; Broom, Max. 562, 629; Weisman, 31a; Weisman, 31d

Mere misdescription in a deed, will, or instrument does not invalidate it if the subject matter intended can be identified with certainty from the whole instrument.

In doubtful cases, there is no presumption in favor of the will.

In dubiis, non praesumitur pro testamento.

Source: Cro. Car. 51; Weisman, 32b

A testamentary instrument clouded by ambiguity is not presumed to speak — the burden falls on the proponent to demonstrate intent.