Intent

The act does not make one guilty unless the mind be guilty.

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

Source: 3 Inst. 107; 7 T.R. 514; Broom, Max. 306; Lofft 37

Criminal liability requires both a wrongful act and a wrongful intent. Neither alone suffices — the union of the two constitutes the crime.

An act done against my will is not my act.

Actus me invito factus non est meus actus.

Source: Bract. fol. 101b; Peloubet, Legal Maxims no. 62; Broom, Max. 270; Weisman, 2q

No man can be charged with the consequences of an act to which he did not consent. Compelled acts are not voluntary acts — and only voluntary acts give rise to legal liability.

The will and the purpose distinguish offenses.

Voluntas et propositum distinguunt maleficia.

Source: Bract. fol. 2b, 101b; Hob. 123

The same physical act may be innocent or criminal depending on the intent behind it. Intent is the dividing line between accident and offense.

My intention gives name to my act.

Intentio mea imponit nomen operi meo.

Source: Bract. fol. 2b, 101b; Hob. 123

The character of an act is determined by the purpose for which it was done — the same blow may be self-defense, accident, or murder depending on the intent behind it.

In criminal matters, the will is taken for the deed.

In criminalibus, voluntas reputabitur pro facto.

Source: Coke, 3 Inst. 106; Weisman, 26t; Weisman, 44r

Where criminal intent is clearly proved, the law may hold a man accountable even though the intended result was not fully accomplished.

In offenses, the intention is regarded, not the outcome.

In maleficiis voluntas spectatur, non exitus.

Source: Dig. 48, 8, 14; Bacon, Max. reg. 7; Weisman, 26p

A man who attempts a crime with full intent is not excused merely because he failed in the execution.