Home › Topics › Construction of Statutes Topic Construction of Statutes 7 maxims cross-cutting the 12 books 10.1.1 Liberal constructions of written instruments are to be made, on account of the simplicity of the common people, so that the thing may have effect rather than perish; and words should serve the intention, not the intention the words. Benignae faciendae sunt interpretationes propter simplicitatem laicorum, ut res magis valeat quam pereat; et verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire. Source: Coke, Co. Litt. 36a; Broom, Max. 540; Wharton, Max. no. 13; Weisman, 22x Instruments are to be read to give them effect, not to defeat them by technicality; intention governs over bare literalism. 10.1.2 The best interpretation is drawn from what goes before and what follows. Ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretatio. Source: 2 Inst. 317; Broom, Max. 577; Wharton, Max. no. 33; 1 Rolle 375; Weisman, 22nn No clause or word may be interpreted in isolation; context — preceding and following language — is the primary guide to meaning. 10.1.3 The whole is preferred to any single part. Totum praefertur unicuique parti. Source: 2 Kent, Comm. 555; 2 Inst. 317; Wing. Max. 238 Every part of an instrument must be read together and harmonized; no single clause may be wrested from its place to defeat the whole. 10.1.4 Usage is the best interpreter of things. Optimus interpres rerum usus. Source: 2 Inst. 282; Broom, Max. 917, 930; Weisman, 22ee When the meaning of a term or provision is doubtful, how it has been understood and applied in practice is the strongest evidence of its true sense. 10.1.5 Interpretation is always to be made so that what is absurd and inconvenient may be avoided. Talis interpretatio semper fienda est, ut evitetur absurdum et inconveniens. Source: 1 Co. 52; 4 Inst. 328; Broom, Max. 576; Weisman, 22n; Weisman, 24gg An interpretation that produces an absurd, unjust, or impracticable result is presumed wrong and must yield to a reading that makes the instrument workable and reasonable. 10.6.1 A general residuary clause does not comprehend things which are not of the same kind as those specifically enumerated. Clausula generalis de residuo non ea complectitur quae non ejusdem sint generis cum iis quae speciatim dicta fuerint. Source: Lofft 419; Broom, Max.; Wharton, Max. This is the *ejusdem generis* rule: when specific items are listed followed by a general term, the general term is limited to things of the same kind as those specifically named. 10.6.2 Where the law does not distinguish, neither ought we to distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Source: 7 Co. 5b; Weisman, 98g When the legislature has spoken in general terms without qualification, the court has no warrant to introduce distinctions or limitations the law itself does not make.